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## Abstract

Sebastiano Molinelli

### *Dissoi Logoi: A New Commented Edition*

What in 1897 Ernst Weber first called ‘Dissoi Logoi’ is an untitled work written by an anonymous author in a peculiar kind of Doric dialect and which was handed down at the end of a few manuscripts of Sextus Empiricus. Since Thomas Robinson’s authoritative edition in 1979, most scholars have regarded *Dissoi Logoi* as a collection of lecture notes by a sophist lived between the 5<sup>th</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> century BCE. In this thesis, articulated in five chapters, I will analyse and, where necessary, rethink the standard view about the most salient historical, philological and philosophical matters concerning *Dissoi Logoi*.

After briefing the reader on the theoretical and methodological framework of my research (*Preface*), I will devote the first chapter (*Introduction*) to the transmission, language, literary influences, date, place, and nature of the work.

In the second chapter (*Critical Text and Translation*), I will offer my critical Greek text of *Dissoi Logoi* and a parallel English translation of it.

In the third chapter (*Commentary*), I will closely analyse the most relevant lemmas, from a linguistic, rhetorical and philosophical viewpoint.

In the fourth chapter (*The Author’s Message*), firstly, I will investigate the work as a whole, thus tackling the highly debated problem of its unity; then, I will draw an overall outline of the author’s sophistic thought; finally, I will assess the possible theoretical connections between this work and the later Pyrrhonian tradition.

At the end of this journey, I will summarize the various conclusions which I have reached throughout the thesis and which delineate a new portrait of *Dissoi Logoi*, alternative to that of the standard view (*Conclusion*).

*Dissoi Logoi:*  
**A New Commented Edition**

Sebastiano Molinelli

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Classics and Ancient History

Durham University

2017

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## **Statement of copyright**

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## **Dedication**

I dedicate this thesis to the memory of my grandparents Veris and Giacomina, who passed away during these four years.

## Abbreviations

### Works of reference

*BNP* = *Brill's New Pauly*, Antiquity volumes edited by: Hubert Cancik and Helmuth Schneider. Consulted online on 1 August 2017.

*DELG* = Chantraine, P. (1968), *Dictionnaire Étymologique de la Langue Grecque*, Paris: Éditions Klincksieck.

*LSJ* = Liddel, H. G., Scott, R. and Jones, H. S. (1996), *A Greek-English Lexicon: With a Revised Supplement*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

*OED* = Simpson, J. and Weiner, E. (eds.) (1989), *The Oxford English Dictionary*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

*TLG* = *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*® Digital Library. Ed. Maria C. Pantelia. University of California, Irvine. Consulted online on 1 August 2017.

**Greek authors** are abbreviated as in *LSJ* and **Latin ones** as in Glare, P. G. W. (1996), *Oxford Latin Dictionary* [1968-1982], Reprinted with Corrections, Cary: Oxford University Press.

### Critical Apparatus

Bl. = Blass

codd. = codices

Di. = Diels

DK = Diels/Kranz

Fa. = Fabricius

Mu. = Mullach

No. = North

Or. = Von Orelli

Ro. = Robinson

Roh. = Rohde

Scha. = Schanz

Schu. = Schulze

St. = Stephanus

Va. = Valckenaer

Wi. = Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff

## Preface

Thomas M. Robinson's full-length edition of *Dissoi Logoi* (with critical text, English translation and commentary), first published in 1979, marked a watershed in the history of the scholarship on this work.<sup>1</sup> The interpretation of *Dissoi Logoi* as a sophistic text had already been hinted by Lodewijk C. Valckenaer in 1802, was firstly defended with adequate detail by Theodor Bergk in 1883, and consensus grew around it in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, among scholars such as Heinrich Gomperz, Max Pohlenz, Walter Kranz, Adolfo Levi, and Mario Untersteiner, just to name few.<sup>2</sup> However, only with Robinson the sophistic attribution proved at once likely and preferable to the other alternatives which had been suggested over the centuries and which he first scrupulously analysed and refuted. Before quickly passing in review over these former attributions, we must recall how this text was handed down to us at the end of Sextus Empiricus' manuscripts, and how in 1570 it was initially printed within an appendix to Henricus Stephanus' edition of Diogenes Laertius' *De vitis philosophorum* devoted to Pythagorean fragments.<sup>3</sup> From then, it was attributed, in the chronological order of the scholars, to the Stoic Sextus of Chaeronea (Johann A. Fabricius), to the writer who forged the fragments of Archytas (Otto F. Gruppe), to the Socratic Simmias of Thebes (Friedrich Blass), to Simon the shoemaker, friend of Socrates (Gustav Teichmüller), to Miltas of Thebes, former rhetor and then Platonic philosopher (Theodor Bergk), and to a semi-Eleatic thinker of the Socratic circle (Alfred E. Taylor).<sup>4</sup>

As always, the value of a study is measured not just in how much it breaks with the past, but also in the duration of its acceptance within the scholarly community. From this perspective too, Robinson's edition proves outstanding, because although a lot of ink has been spilled on *Dissoi Logoi* since its publication, its answers to some

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<sup>1</sup> Robinson (1979).

<sup>2</sup> Gomperz (1912), Pohlenz (1913), Kranz (1937), Levi (1940), Untersteiner (1954), Untersteiner (1967).

<sup>3</sup> Stephanus (1570).

<sup>4</sup> Fabricius (1724), Gruppe (1840), Blass (1881), Teichmüller (1884), Bergk (1883), Taylor (1911).

fundamental questions concerning the work's composition — namely 'by whom?', 'when?', 'where?', 'with what goal?', 'under whose influence?' — are still held as correct by the vast majority of scholars, and they still represent the standard view on these matters. The sole exception is Thomas M. Conley's supposition, in 1985, that the work is actually a forgery from a Byzantine school, and to which Robinson replied in 2003.<sup>5</sup> One may also want to recall that in 1998 Myles Burnyeat gave the idea for exploring the possibility of a reception of *Dissoi Logoi* by Pyrrhoneans;<sup>6</sup> a suggestion which, too, albeit new, did not contrast with Robinson's views in any way, the two being compatible.

When four years ago I started this project, my main goals were two. Firstly, having read Carl J. Classen's two articles of 2001 and 2004 — where he reviewed all the known *Dissoi Logoi* manuscripts and editions and where he offered a few new revisionary philological conjectures — and having personally inspected codices Laurentiani 85.19 and 85.24, I saw room for improvement in Robinson's Greek text, and hence for establishing a new one.<sup>7</sup> The same inputs from Classen's studies had already motivated Alexander Becker and Peter Scholz to produce their own edition of the text in 2004.<sup>8</sup> Their work, too, was accompanied by a translation, in German, and a commentary, which treated only the chapters as wholes, though, without entering the arguments of the single paragraphs. As one may imagine from what has been said above, Becker and Scholz subscribed to the standard view on *Dissoi Logoi*, and so did I initially, being persuaded by Robinson's reconstruction. In fact, as a second goal of this thesis, I originally planned my commentary to cast light on the kind of teaching that the author delivered to his students through his text, under the hypothesis of a didactic goal, which Robinson started to defend later on.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Conley (1985), Robinson (2003).

<sup>6</sup> Burnyeat (1998).

<sup>7</sup> Classen (2001), Classen (2004).

<sup>8</sup> Becker/Scholz (2004).

<sup>9</sup> Robinson (2003).



However, in execution, I realised that my two objectives did not correspond to each other very well. For producing a commented edition of an ancient text is a wide-scale operation — historical, philological and philosophical at the same time — and one which entails personal assessment of every salient aspect of the work. To my surprise, the sophistic nature of *Dissoi Logoi* excepted, from its dating to its dialect, from its connection with Sextus Empiricus' works to its didactic aim, which underpinned my very plan of digging out the author's teaching, my re-examination did not leave any one of the points which made up the standard view unchanged, and new conclusions have followed from it. The result is a thesis consisting in five parts which I lay out in the same logical order in which I proceeded during my research, namely moving from the material data of the textual transmission — because more certain — to the increasingly theoretical questions of language, literary influences, date and place of composition, nature, and message of the work — because less decidable and more subject to interpretation.

As a preliminary methodological indication, I must highlight that the Greek text which I here propose repeats Robinson's in most cases, except when I opt for a different manuscript variant or scholarly conjecture, or, rarely, for my own conjecture. I will signal these cases in the critical apparatus at the bottom of the Greek page, where I will compare the reading I select with Robinson's one. Each of these choices will be also justified within the third chapter (*Commentary*), where I will recall all the other available readings too. Likewise, in this section I will also account for the points where my translation diverges significantly from Robinson's, while other lemmas will be devoted to passages, or words, which are salient from a philosophical or rhetorical viewpoint.

## 1. Introduction

### § 1. Textual transmission

The text which nowadays goes under the name of ‘Dissoi Logoi’ has actually been handed down without any indication as to its title, author, or date of composition. The manuscripts which transmit it just generically introduce it, in their superscription, as a writing (σύγγραμμα) in Doric dialect (δωρικὴ διάλεκτος), or, as in the case of codices Parisiensis 1964, Parisiensis 1967, and Vaticanus Ottobonianus 21, in Ionic (ἰωνικὴ διάλεκτος), this difference giving a first hint of the heterogeneous and peculiar language of the text. To that, the copyists immediately add their uncertainty as to whether or not the work belongs to Sextus Empiricus, as the material immediately before does (ζητεῖται δὲ εἰ καὶ τὸ παρὸν σύγγραμμα Σέξτειόν ἐστιν).

*Dissoi Logoi*, in fact, survives at the end of 22 manuscripts of Sextus Empiricus, dated between the 14<sup>th</sup> and the 16<sup>th</sup> centuries. We also know that it survived at the end of a lost 15<sup>th</sup> century codex of Sextus, the so-called Vaticanus Perditus,<sup>10</sup> and, finally, it features, exceptionally, all by itself in the 16<sup>th</sup> century codex Leidensis Vossianus misc. 1 no. 4.<sup>11</sup> A relevant step towards the ‘better and fuller knowledge of the MSS’<sup>12</sup> which Classen hoped for in 1982 when reviewing Robinson’s edition of this work, was achieved between 1995 and 2002, when Luciano Floridi investigated the ‘transmission and recovery’ of Sextus Empiricus in Renaissance.<sup>13</sup> Based on the latter contributions, I have mapped out the following synopsis, which for each of the 24 codices indicates the

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<sup>10</sup> Floridi (2002), 29.

<sup>11</sup> ‘This seems to have escaped Robinson’ (Classen (1982), 84). It will not be my custom to linger on scholars’ slips, yet here I must make another, and last, exception, as it is indicative of the scarce attention which has been so far paid for the yet obviously tight connection between the transmission of Sextus Empiricus and that of *Dissoi Logoi*. One can still read that *Dissoi Logoi* ‘has reached us *in extenso* by direct transmission via medieval manuscripts’ (Laks/Most (2016), 165), which clearly indicates the confusion of those Sextus codices transmitting *Dissoi Logoi*, the earliest one of which is dated 14<sup>th</sup>/16<sup>th</sup> century, with all the Sextus codices, some few of which are indeed medieval.

<sup>12</sup> Classen (1982), 84.

<sup>13</sup> Floridi (1995), Floridi (2002).

abbreviation I will adopt in this dissertation (identical to Robinson's, except in the case of Vaticanus Perditus, which he ignores), its full name, its revised date, and the specific work of Sextus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* ('P') and/or *Against the Mathematicians* ('M'), which comes before *Dissoi Logoi* in that codex:


B	Berolinensis Philippicus 1518	1542	P M
C	Cizensis 70	1556	M
E	Escorialensis T-1-16	16 <sup>th</sup> c.	M
F1	Laurentianus 85.19	14 <sup>th</sup> /16 <sup>th</sup> c.	P M
F2	Laurentianus 85.24	15 <sup>th</sup> c.	P M
H	Vesontinus 409	16 <sup>th</sup> c.	P M
L	Leidensis Vossianus misc. 1 no. 4	16 <sup>th</sup> c.	
M	Mertonensis 304	16 <sup>th</sup> c.	M
P1	Parisiensis 1964	15 <sup>th</sup> c.	P M
P2	Parisiensis 1967	16 <sup>th</sup> c.	P M
P3	Parisiensis 1963	1534	P M
P4	Parisiensis 2081	16 <sup>th</sup> c.	M
P5	Parisiensis Supplementum 133	16 <sup>th</sup> c.	P M
P6	Parisiensis 1965	16 <sup>th</sup> c.	M
Q	Vaticanus Ottobonianus gr. 21	1541	P M
R	Regimontanus S. 35	15 <sup>th</sup> c.	M
S	Savillianus Graecus 1	1589	M
T	Taurinensis Athenaei gr. 81	15 <sup>th</sup> /16 <sup>th</sup> c.	P M
Y1	Vaticanus 1338	16 <sup>th</sup> c.	P M
Y2	Vaticanus 217	16 <sup>th</sup> c.	P M
YP	Vaticanus Perditus	15 <sup>th</sup> c.?	M
V1	Marcianus 4.26	1494-1495	P M
V2	Marcianus 262	15 <sup>th</sup> c., ante 1468	M
Z	Monacensis 79	16 <sup>th</sup> c.	P M

The new dating of some of the manuscripts does not pose problems to Robinson's *stemma codicum*, which is still the latest available and the one on which I have relied in my research, along with his evaluation of the codices' quality.<sup>14</sup> At the same time, a minor modification in the branches of Y1, P4, P6, V2, and C, has been suggested by Classen.<sup>15</sup> Hence, I have deemed it not idle to update Robinson's stemma to this change.

<sup>14</sup> The most valuable codices are P1, P2, P3, R, F1, F2, P6, V2, P4, B (Robinson (1979), 22).

<sup>15</sup> Classen (1982), 84.

Unlike Robinson, in this new version of the stemma, I shall also leave aside Q, Y2, P5, and T, because they are apographs respectively of P1, Y1, R, and Z.<sup>16</sup> The abbreviation ‘St’ stands for Stephanus’ first printed edition of the work, whose presence both in this and in Robinson’s stemma is due to its relevance in the work transmission, as it will result later. Hence, the graph goes as follows:



Comparing this stemma with the list above, one can easily notice how YP does not have a place, just as it did not in Robinson’s stemma either. Nonetheless, Paul Canart, inferring from the little philological information available about this codex, suggested that V1, F2, and R may be copies of YP, which has found Floridi’s agreement as far as V1 and R are concerned.<sup>17</sup> Yet, I observe that if we assume, with Floridi, that YP may also be the manuscript registered ‘in a Greek Inventory compiled between 1517 and 1518 under Leone X (Vat Gr 1483 f. 68v)’,<sup>18</sup> where it is referred to as Σέξτου Ἐμπειρικοῦ πρὸς μαθηματικούς – περὶ κριτερίου τῶν κατὰ Σέξτον σκεπτικῶν δέκα ὑπομνήματα,

<sup>16</sup> Robinson (1979), 22.

<sup>17</sup> Canart (1977-79), Floridi (1995), 78, n. 59, Floridi (2002), 34.

<sup>18</sup> Floridi (1995), 78, n. 59.

λόγος περὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ, then none of the other 23 manuscripts known to us can be connected to it. For 20 of them transmit a portion of text which, scattered minor omissions excepted, is equivalent to what nowadays we recognize as the nine chapters of the work, whereas P1, P2, and Q have the first three chapters only.<sup>19</sup> Neither of these cases fits the phrase λόγος περὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ, which one would rather associate just with chapter 1. And this sounds even more suspicious as we observe that in that same Greek description, Sextus' *Against the Mathematicians* is described as the 'ten treatises on the criterion of the sceptics according to Sextus' (περὶ κριτερίου τῶν κατὰ Σέξτον σκεπτικῶν δέκα ὑπομνήματα) with great accuracy and completeness.<sup>20</sup>

Ultimately, we do not have good enough information to place YP anywhere in the stemma. Yet, whatever the reason for its handing down just *Against the Mathematicians* and the first chapter of *Dissoi Logoi*, this fact betrays a closeness between that Sextan work and the start of ours, which goes beyond this mere manuscript juxtaposition. For a glance at the codices list above reveals that except in L, which does not bear any Sextus Empiricus, *Dissoi Logoi* is always preceded by *Against the Mathematicians*, but not always by *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, as YP itself testifies. Furthermore, as far as contents are concerned, a special similarity stands out between the second part of *Against the Mathematicians*, namely books VII-XI, and *Dissoi Logoi* 1-6, both dealing with logic, physics, and ethics. Some scholars have variously shown how that is particularly true of M. XI, i.e. *Against the Ethicists*, on one side, and *Dissoi Logoi* 1-3, on the other.<sup>21</sup> These three chapters are also the only ones which the two valuable codices P1 and P2 bear. I suggest this may be due to their copyists deliberately excluding the rest of the work,

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<sup>19</sup> Mutschmann (1909), 245-250, De Meyier (1955), 222-223, Floridi (2002), 91-93.

<sup>20</sup> Both in and outside Sextus, one finds references to this work in similar terms, such as σκεπτικὰ ὑπομνήματα (S.E. M. I.29, II.106, VI.52), or τὰ δέκα τῶν Σκεπτικῶν (D.L. IX.116) (cf. Floridi (2002), 10, Janáček (1964)), or Σέξτου Ἐμπειρικοῦ ὑπομνήματα, which is the title of *Against the Mathematicians* in the manuscripts of *Dissoi Logoi*. One may perceive a discrepancy with the 11 books now known as *Against the Mathematicians*, but *Against the Geometers* (M. III) and *Against the Arithmeticians* (M. IV) originally made up one sole book (Floridi (2002), 10, Janáček (1964), 120).

<sup>21</sup> Robinson (1979), 208, Conley (1985), 63, Bett (2002), 239.

precisely because it is not equally reminiscent of *Against the Mathematicians*. Contrariwise, Thomas M. Conley supposed that they were the only ones originally attached to Sextus Empiricus, whereas the rest of the text was added later.<sup>22</sup> This hypothesis, along with his more general one that *Dissoi Logoi* appeared just at a later stage in the tradition of Sextus Empiricus,<sup>23</sup> still ignores what emerges in Mutschmann's still authoritative studies of the manuscripts, namely that the opposite is the case: originally, the archetype of Sextus contained also the whole *Dissoi Logoi*, which then progressively faded away.<sup>24</sup> From this perspective, the fact that the codices preserving all the nine chapters do not feature the end of chapter 9 would be a sign that when those manuscripts came out, this process of erosion had already started.<sup>25</sup>

Support for this explanation comes from the fact that out of the 31 Greek codices containing exclusively Sextus Empiricus, a good 21 are dated from the 16<sup>th</sup> century onwards. Meanwhile, Sextus' works were printed for the first time, and never in conjunction with *Dissoi Logoi*.<sup>26</sup> We can hence safely locate in the 16<sup>th</sup> century the end of a symbiosis between our text and the Sextan corpus, which started, if we refer to the composition of the archetype, at an imprecise moment between the second half of the 2<sup>nd</sup> century CE — namely Sextus Empiricus' approximate historical time — and the 9<sup>th</sup>-10<sup>th</sup> centuries, the time to which his oldest, and fragmentary, manuscript in our possession dates.<sup>27</sup> But this is just one side of the coin, because as our work was departing from Sextus' corpus, it also started being copied and edited in other forms, which proves that scholars of that time attributed some value to it.

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<sup>22</sup> Conley (1985), 62.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 60.

<sup>24</sup> Mutschmann (1909), 277-278, Mutschmann/Mau (1958), VI, VIII.

<sup>25</sup> Mutschmann (1909), 277.

<sup>26</sup> Floridi (2002), 38-39.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 92, where we read that this manuscript is actually made of three fragments preserved in three distinct codices, namely Parisiensis, Supplementum 1156, Vaticanus Graecus 738, and Vindobonensis Theologicus Graecus 179.

This is especially true of Henricus Stephanus and Melchior Goldast. The former, in 1562, printed a translation of the *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* alone, and in 1570 placed *Dissoi Logoi* in an appendix devoted to Pythagoreans at the end of his edition of Diogenes Laertius' *Philosophers' Lives*.<sup>28</sup> We are ignorant of his codicological source, but Robinson's suggestion that this is the same subarchetype (ι) as the contemporaneous codex L — which was redacted by Goldast — can be strengthened by the fact that L is the only surviving codex which carries *Dissoi Logoi* but not Sextus Empiricus, just as Stephanus does, and that in the margins of its folia 3-6 one finds annotations by the same Stephanus.<sup>29</sup>

Besides being the first to appear, and being given the same consideration as a valuable codex by editors of the following two centuries, Stephanus' edition is also worth recalling for its new division of the chapters. In the manuscripts, in fact, there are four, the first three of which corresponding to the current *Dissoi Logoi* 1-3, and the fourth comprising all of the other six chapters (4-9) under the only heading *περὶ ἀληθείας καὶ ψεύδους*. Stephanus reduced this long, final section to just the current chapters 4 and 5, distinguishing a new, fifth one which covers the rest of the text and which he entitled *περὶ τῆς σοφίας καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς, αἱ διδακτόν*. He, thus, replaced the above codices' superscription with the prefatory line *Ἀνωνύμου τινὸς Διαλέξεις Δωρικῇ διαλέκτῳ, περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ, περὶ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου, περὶ τοῦ ψεύδους καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, περὶ τῆς σοφίας καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς, εἰ διδακτόν*. Particularly interesting here is the definition of the previously generic *σύγγραμμα* as *Διαλέξεις*, which Stephanus did not translate, but which we can assume means 'discourses', in the wake of the following Latin translations 'dissertationes' by North, and 'disputationes' by Fabricius.<sup>30</sup> Incidentally, 'Dialexeis' is the title by which this work is still referenced in *LSJ* and *TLG*.

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<sup>28</sup> Stephanus (1570).

<sup>29</sup> De Meyier (1955), 223.

<sup>30</sup> North (1671), 47, Fabricius (1724), 617.

*Dissoi Logoi*'s first Latin translation appeared after only one century, in 1671, when Thomas Gale included it in his *Opuscula*, again within the Pythagorean section.<sup>31</sup> At this stage, Gale appointed the editorship of text, translation, and commentary to John North, whereas in the second edition, printed in 1688, the latter's work underwent a revision by Marcus Meibom.<sup>32</sup> A noteworthy change which occurred between the two editions is in the Latin title, conceived of as a summarizing translation of Stephanus' Greek one. For it turned from 'Incerti cujusdam dissertationes quinque Dorico sermone conscriptae'<sup>33</sup> into 'Incerti cujusdam Dissertationes Morales, Dorico sermone conscriptae',<sup>34</sup> where the supplement of 'morales' reveals that the initial and ethical part of *Dissoi Logoi* was still felt as the most representative, even when the work no longer adjoined Sextus' *Against the Ethicists*.

Two centuries passed, and in 1884 Gustav Teichmüller edited the first modern-language translation of the work, which was in German.<sup>35</sup> He also identified the author as the scarcely known figure of Simon the shoemaker, and regarded *Dissoi Logoi* as part of the lost 33 Socratic dialogues attributed to Simon and whose titles are listed at D.L. II.122.<sup>36</sup> This led Teichmüller to subdivide the text further, into eight chapters: he broke Stephanus' chapter 4 into the current fourth and fifth ones,<sup>37</sup> and he was the first to separate the current sixth and seventh, but not the eighth and the ninth. This division had its rationale in Diogenes Laertius' list, as Teichmüller recognized each chapter in one of Simon's dialogues.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> North (1671).

<sup>32</sup> Meibom (1688).

<sup>33</sup> North (1671), 47.

<sup>34</sup> Meibom (1688), 704.

<sup>35</sup> Teichmüller (1884), 205-224.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 105-129.

<sup>37</sup> A move which in the past had been simply proposed by North (North (1671), 67).

<sup>38</sup> Chapter 1 would correspond to περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, chapter 2 to περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ, chapter 3 to περὶ δικαίου, chapter 4 to περὶ κρίσεως, chapter 5 to περὶ τοῦ ὄντος, chapter 6 to περὶ ἀρετῆς, ὅτι οὐ διδακτόν, chapter 7 to περὶ δημαγωγίας, and chapter 8 to περὶ ἐπιστήμης (Teichmüller (1884), 113).



With Ernst Weber's subsequent edition of 1897, for the first time 'Dissoi Logoi' replaced Stephanus' 'Dialexeis' as the work title.<sup>39</sup> Following Martin Schanz, Weber explained the work's association with Sextus in the manuscripts by its sceptic character.<sup>40</sup> In particular, he stressed how the very phrase δισσοὶ λόγοι, which opens the work and characterizes the beginnings of the first four chapters, has some bearing on the sceptic tradition.<sup>41</sup> For he recalled that Diogenes Laertius had attributed a work Περί διττῶν λόγων to the sceptic Zeuxis (D.L. IX.106), and that the Δικτυακά of the sceptic and empirical physician Dionysius Aegeus consisted in a form of δισσοὶ λόγοι applied to medicine (Phot. *Bibl.* 185, 211).<sup>42</sup>

The adoption of this new title, however, did not immediately satisfy everyone, as shown by Walther Kranz who highlighted its unfitness to represent the second part of the text, where the phrase does not even feature.<sup>43</sup> In that time, a good compromise was reached by Hermann Diels, who from the second edition of his *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* in 1907, published both the titles, with the old 'Dialexeis' following, between brackets, the new ΔΙΣΣΟΙ ΛΟΓΟΙ.<sup>44</sup> Within this collection the work's position changes again, as it is included in the old sophistic section. For the first time, it also displays nine chapters, obtained by singling out the final part of Teichmüller's eighth, devoted to mnemonics.

## § 2. Language of the work

A component of *Dissoi Logoi* which at once strikes the reader and interests the scholar is its language, a kind of Doric dialect mingled with a few Ionic and Attic forms. Various suggestions have been tentatively made about its nature, and, by accompanying them with the names of their first proposers only, I recall them as follows: (a) a peripheral

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<sup>39</sup> Weber (1897), 33.

<sup>40</sup> Schanz (1884), 372.

<sup>41</sup> Weber (1897), 34.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 34, n. 1.

<sup>43</sup> Kranz (1937), 225. See also Nestle who continues to prefer 'Dialexeis' (Nestle (1966), 437).

<sup>44</sup> Diels (1907), 635.

Doric, such as that of Southern Italy or Sicily (North),<sup>45</sup> or Megara (Taylor);<sup>46</sup> (b) a non-genuine standard Doric: either the product of a non-native Doric speaker (Teichmüller),<sup>47</sup> or the artificial language of a later forger (Conley).<sup>48</sup> At the same time, almost all commentators agree that nothing definitive about the *Dissoi Logoi* dialect can be said, nor can anything about the work be concluded on this basis. Although this is surely true, it is worth noting that the only two scholars who have conducted close inspections of this language ended up with clearer results than those of the others. Due to their more thorough inquiries, discussion of their two studies will be the starting point of this section, to lay the foundation for my final assessment of the matter.

The earlier contribution was Weber's extended article of 1898, 'über den Dialect der sogenannten Dialexeis',<sup>49</sup> where he goes beyond Theodor Bergk's judgement of *Dissoi Logoi* as one 'der ältesten Denkmäler der dorischen Prosa',<sup>50</sup> enhancing its value to the extent 'der ältesten Denkmäler des dorischen Dialekts'.<sup>51</sup> This opinion reflects the principle which he abided by one year earlier when reconstructing the text in his critical edition of the work: to Doricize all the non-Doric manuscript readings, as Johan L. Heiberg had already done with the contaminations of Archimedes' similar Doric.<sup>52</sup> However, the rationale behind this course of action, which inevitably led to an admittedly 'energische Durchführung des Dorischen',<sup>53</sup> does not seem particularly robust, as Robinson remarked,<sup>54</sup> and no subsequent editor acted in the same way. For Weber regarded the sophistic nature of the text, which he deduced from its contents, as

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<sup>45</sup> North (1671), 47.

<sup>46</sup> Taylor (1911), 128.

<sup>47</sup> Teichmüller (1884), 129-134.

<sup>48</sup> Conley (1985), 65.

<sup>49</sup> Weber (1898).

<sup>50</sup> Bergk (1883), 125-126.

<sup>51</sup> Weber (1898), 64.

<sup>52</sup> Heiberg (1884). On the similarity between the two philologists' methods, see Weber (1897), 33-34, Thesleff (1961), 83-84, Robinson (1979), 14. On the linguistic similarity between the two works see Magnien (1920), 136, Thumb/Kieckers (1932), 102, where their non-Doric forms are also explained as the result of Hellenistic influences.

<sup>53</sup> Weber (1898), 70.

<sup>54</sup> Robinson (1979), 14.

an unequivocal sign that the author wrote in a time, such as the sophistic age of the 5<sup>th</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> centuries BCE, when Doric was not yet contaminated. The frequency of certain Dorisms, which he meticulously recorded and discussed, would hence be proof that Doric is the exclusive dialect in which this work was originally composed, as opposed to the non-Doric forms, which he explained were due to later scribal emendations which were made especially during the production of the archetype.<sup>55</sup>

In 1922, then, Carsten Høeg returned to this topic, but with a different result.<sup>56</sup> He nonetheless made use of Weber's study when drawing a list of the distinctive features of this idiom, the most significant of which are these:<sup>57</sup>

1. In most, but not all cases, Doric  $\bar{\alpha}$  replaces Attic-Ionic  $\eta$  (e.g.,  $\nu\acute{\iota}\kappa\alpha$ , § 1.6, but  $\sigma\omega\phi\rho\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\eta\varsigma$ , § 5.7);

2. In the first two chapters, the plural dative of the active present participle mostly, but not always ends in  $-\text{οντι}$ <sup>58</sup> rather than in  $-\text{ουσι}$  ( $\mu\text{ισ}\theta\alpha\rho\nu\acute{\epsilon}\text{οντι}$ , but  $\alpha\pi\text{ο}\theta\alpha\nu\acute{\omicron}\text{ουσι}$ , § 1.3);

3.  $\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}$  undergoes apocope, which is common in Doric,<sup>59</sup> only when it is part of recurring expressions ( $\kappa\alpha\tau\tau\omega\lambda\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omicron$ , § 1.7), and in some occurrences of compound verbs ( $\kappa\alpha\tau\theta\acute{\epsilon}\mu\epsilon\nu$ , but  $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\theta\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ , § 9.4);

4. In most, but not all cases, Doric  $\omega$  is preferred over Attic-Ionic  $\text{ου}$  ( $\tau\acute{\omega}\ \alpha\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{\omega}$ , § 1.1, but  $\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \text{Ιλίου}$ , § 1.9);

5. Forms in  $-\text{εο}$  ( $\mu\text{ισ}\theta\alpha\rho\nu\acute{\epsilon}\text{οντι}$ , § 1.3) are attested throughout the text, but in the first two chapters they alternate with contracted ones, both  $-\text{ιν}$   $\epsilon\upsilon$  ( $\delta\iota\alpha\iota\rho\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha\iota$ , § 1.11), as in Ionic, and in  $-\text{ου}$  ( $\alpha\sigma\theta\epsilon\nu\acute{\omicron}\nu\text{ντι}$ , § 1.2), as in Attic; in chapters 3-9 they alternate only with forms contracted in  $-\text{ου}$  ( $\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\alpha\sigma\omicron\upsilon\mu\alpha\iota$ , § 3.1).

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<sup>55</sup> Weber (1898), 69-70.

<sup>56</sup> Høeg (1922).

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., 107-110.

<sup>58</sup> An extremely rare trait even in Doric dialects, attested only in inscriptions from Messenia and Crete, and one 'which gives an idiomatic touch to the language' (Thesleff (1961), 94).

<sup>59</sup> Buck (1973), 81.

Based on these points, Høeg discarded the possibility that this dialect could be an artificial product of a non-native Doric speaker, as it strays too much from the rules of standard Doric to which such a person would have been likely to stick.<sup>60</sup> Furthermore, he thought that the specific conditions under which (2), (3), and (5) occur denote a precise intention on the writer's part, which 'ne peut être dû au hasard':<sup>61</sup> namely, it would not tally with such casual phenomena as corruptions appearing, and then being emended over a text. Rather, he suggested that we search the Greek linguistic map for a place in which the specific Doric of this work is most likely to have been spoken; and by so doing he pointed to Cos.<sup>62</sup>

Høeg was surely too point-blank in his conclusions, as he did not have 'la preuve que ce n'est pas un dorien artificiel que nous avons sous les yeux', or that 'la tradition est bonne', as he claimed.<sup>63</sup> The textual evidence he brought forward is not sufficient to conclude that *Dissoi Logoi*'s language is such-and-such a dialect; at best, it could guide us towards the *most likely* candidate. At the same time, there may be some truth in his regarding the departures from standard Doric in (1)-(5) as out of place in an artificial language. As far as forgeries are concerned, these features do not have a parallel in other Doric forged texts like Archytas' letters, Timaios Locros' Περί φύσιος κόσμῳ καὶ ψυχᾶς, or in Aristippus' 16<sup>th</sup> epistle (Hercher, *Epistolog. Graec.* 16). Only to a lesser extent do they appear in other pseudo-Pythagorean texts such as Okkelos' Περί τῆς τοῦ παντός φύσεως, Philolaos' Περί ψυχῆς, and Aristaios' Περί ἀρμονίας, as well as in three other Aristippus epistles (Hercher, *Epistolog. Graec.* 9, 11, 13).<sup>64</sup> Moreover, unlike all these parallels, *Dissoi Logoi* does not provide clear indication as to its own purported

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<sup>60</sup> Høeg (1922), 107.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., 108.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., 111.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., 107.

<sup>64</sup> *Contra* Orelli, who pushed the similarity with Aristippus' letters further without even making distinctions among them, to argue for the artificiality of *Dissoi Logoi* (Von Orelli (1821), 633).

author or provenance;<sup>65</sup> hence, if we are to presuppose a forger, then it would have been in his interest to at least connote his writing with an easily identifiable language to make it more credible.<sup>66</sup>

Another case of artificiality could be that of a non-Doric author who wrote in this dialect just to reach a Doric audience. This corresponds with Thesleff's<sup>67</sup> (and then Robinson's)<sup>68</sup> hypothesis that *Dissoi Logoi* was firstly composed in Ionic and then translated into Doric. Teichmüller too, had made a similar proposal, supposing that in writing our work, the Attic speaker, Simon, chose Doric to be read by the tyrant Dionysius of Syracuse. The result was a linguistically uneven writing, with a contemporary presence of Attic and Doric forms, in a way reminiscent of the 25 dialogues, some in Attic some in Doric, which Aristippus too is said to have sent to Dionysius, according to D.L. II.83.<sup>69</sup> Once again, in all these interpretations non-Doric forms count as involuntary imperfections due to the author's insufficient familiarity with the language. However, not only would that not square with the elements Høeg pointed out as denoting intentionality, but also with the following, noted not by him, but by Weber:<sup>70</sup>

6. Sometimes a Doric trait and a non-Doric equivalent of it are at a very short distance from one another (μανία σωφοσύνης, § 5.7).

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<sup>65</sup> Cf., by contrast, the apocryphal '*Definitions*, attributed to Plato, or the *De decentia*, attributed to Hippocrates', both in Attic κοινή (Adrados (2005), 179).

<sup>66</sup> Such a point was already made by Robinson against Conley's suggestion of *Dissoi Logoi* as a Byzantine school exercise, staged in Greece around 400 BCE. Robinson observed that 'for it to have any plausibility as a hypothesis, we have to imagine our author, whoever he is, doing a very strange thing. That is, he composes a piece that tries, on the face of it, to be in Doric, but succeeds in large part in being in Ionic and Attic, while on occasion evincing dialectal forms that suggest quite specific locations, like the island of Kos [...] But why do any such strange thing, rather than simply write a piece in passable Attic if the text was meant to stem from Athens, or in passable Ionic if from some island location, or in passable Doric if from some Doric-language location?' (Robinson (2003), 240-241).

<sup>67</sup> Thesleff (1961), 93.

<sup>68</sup> Robinson (1979), 51.

<sup>69</sup> Teichmüller (1884), 129-132.

<sup>70</sup> Weber (1898), 70.

How could the author write in correct Doric only one of these words? By the same line of thought, one can also sympathize with Høeg's disbelief in the copyists' responsibility of these contaminations. They too would be unlikely to have corrected the text in a dialect which is not Doric, contrary to what they recognize in most codices' superscription, and, moreover, with such an easily detectable inconsistency. Finally, since the dialect is so deeply mixed-up throughout the work, one also finds it difficult to agree also with the hypothesis of a plurality of authors in action at different times, as no portion of the text can be distinguished from the rest on the basis of a specific dialectal or stylistic thumb mark, as one would expect in a similar scenario.<sup>71</sup>

Moving now to the specific of the non-Doric variations, one notices that:

7. Peculiarly Ionic forms outnumber those more generally Attic-Ionic, and, just to mention some of them, one can recall σοφίη (§ 5.7), ἀμαθίης (§ 5.7), κάρτα (§§ 6.7, 7.5), εἶπαι (§ 2.20), οἶδας (§ 9.4), διαίρεῦμαι (§ 1.11), ποτιτιθεῖ (§ 5.13).<sup>72</sup>

These words, assessed as genuine by Thesleff and Robinson on palaeographic grounds, constitute another blow for Teichmüller's attribution of the text to the Athenian Simon, and their considerable number makes the hypothesis of a mistake on the copyists' part even more unlikely. Furthermore, they lead us back to what was touched on above about two of the best manuscripts, P1 and P2, introducing *Dissoi Logoi* as a text in Ionic dialect (ἰωνικῇ διάλεκτος).<sup>73</sup> As Weber pointed out, that looks like a mere corruption in the transmission of the original δωρικῇ.<sup>74</sup> Yet, what may have tricked the otherwise valuable copyist of their common source, the subarchetype δ, into this mistake could be precisely the large number of Ionicisms which the archetype α itself contained.

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<sup>71</sup> Robinson suggested it in later times, in connection with the possibility that the work is a manual of sophistic arguments (see *infra*, 46-48).

<sup>72</sup> Thesleff (1961), 93, Robinson (1979), 51, 86, n. 46, 89, n 63.

<sup>73</sup> See *supra*, 7.

<sup>74</sup> Weber (1898), 69.

In sum, albeit without his same certainty, one is keen to share Høeg's disbelief both of the artificiality of the dialect of *Dissoi Logoi*, and of the possibility that this language, originally consisting in a pure Doric, then got contaminated by non-Doric influences during the handwritten transmission. Hence, the alternative hypothesis of an idiom actually used at some point and time in Greece gains plausibility, although Høeg's preference for Cos' Doric over other dialects does not seem very convincing. Granted, Coan would have the advantage of satisfying (5),<sup>75</sup> as well as these points:

8. The replacement of the active infinitive ending -ειν (contract verbs in -εω included) with -εν, which is attested in many Doric dialects, occurs most of the time but not always (ἐσθίεν, § 1.16, ἱεροσυλέν, § 3.7, but διδάσκειν, § 1.17, ἐπιορκεῖν, § 3.7).<sup>76</sup>

9. The singular dative of -ευσ nouns ends in η (χαλκῇ, § 1.5).<sup>77</sup>

10. The singular genitive of -ις nouns ends in -ιος, as common in Doric (φύσιος, § 8.1).<sup>78</sup>

On the other hand, as Høeg himself noticed, Coan too diverges from our dialect, as it does not have -ω in place of -ου, nor does the plural accusative of -ος nouns end in -ως, but, rather, remains, -ος (cf. (4)). Hence, albeit to a lesser degree than that of the other suggested dialects, Coan too fails to meet the requirements of this language, and Høeg was left to acknowledge that, properly speaking, 'le dialecte des *Dialexeis* n'est identique à aucun des dialects que nous connaissons'.<sup>79</sup>

However, there is a family of later dialects, which neither he nor any other scholar has adequately considered so far, and that is Doric κοινή. Quoting Buck, that 'is substantially Doric, retaining a majority of the general West Greek characteristics, but

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<sup>75</sup> Høeg (1922), 111.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., 111, Buck (1973), 122.

<sup>77</sup> Høeg (1922), 112, Buck (1973), 92.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., 91.

<sup>79</sup> Høeg (1922), 111.

with a tendency to eliminate local peculiarities and with a strong admixture of form from the Attic κοινή'.<sup>80</sup> To our knowledge, Doric κοινή can be subdivided in the Achaean, Aegean and North-Western variants,<sup>81</sup> but 'conspicuously local characteristics are on the whole absent'.<sup>82</sup> Hence, we cannot list the distinctive traits of a city's own κοινή in the same way that we do with its traditional dialect. *Dissoi Logoi's* dialect has a few points of contact with Doric κοινή in general, and with the Achaean and Aegean sub-groups more than with the North-Western one, in particular. These two levels of kinship can be seen back in (10),<sup>83</sup> and in these other points:

11. The plural nominative of -ις nouns ends in the Doric -ιες (πόλιες, § 2.9), but the plural dative in the Attic -εσι (ἀποδείξεσι, § 6.1).<sup>84</sup>

12. In most, but not all cases, the 1<sup>st</sup> plural active ending is the East Greek -μεν, and not the West Greek -μες (μανθάνομεν, but ἴσαμες, § 6.12).<sup>85</sup>

13. Both the Attic πρῶτος (§ 3.1) and πρὸς (§ 6.7), and the Doric πρᾶτος (§ 5.2) and ποτί (§ 2.28) appear.<sup>86</sup>

14. Doric future is generally more frequent in the active, and it is hybridized both with the Ionic/Aegean -εῦ (πειρασεῦμαι, § 2.2) and the Attic -ου (παρεξοῦμαι, § 2.19).<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> Buck (1973), 176. Attic κοινή is, in its turn, a form of Attic contaminated by Ionic, which progressively imposed itself as the first 'medium of communication' (ibid., 175) and 'standard language' (ibid., 176) in the history of Greece. It came as the result of a process of universal diffusion of Attic whose start can be traced back to the creation of the Athenian Maritime League (477 BCE), and whose 'principal landmark' (ibid., 176) was the Macedonian period, as that kingdom was the first to spread it. It finally led to Modern Greek. (see also Adrados (2005), 176).

<sup>81</sup> Bubenik (1989), 193-197.

<sup>82</sup> Thesleff (1961), 82.

<sup>83</sup> Buck (1973), 177.

<sup>84</sup> Høeg (1922), 109, Buck (1973), 91, 177.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., 177.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> Høeg (1922), 109, Buck (1973), 177, Bubenik (1989), 194.



15. Two hyperdorisms pop up, namely διάδαλος (§ 1.11) and ἀσυχία (§ 2.4).<sup>88</sup>

At the same time, Høeg emphasised the endings -οντι in (2) and -η in (9) as too markedly Doric for this dialect to be just a κοινή.<sup>89</sup> We hence get back to a ‘swings and roundabouts’ situation about the likelihood of some suggested dialect, but this time with something more in our hands. And I am not referring just to the questionably consolatory fact that now the reasons against are fewer and maybe due just to the fact that our knowledge of this dialect family is imperfect and not as developed as that which we have of the traditional dialects;<sup>90</sup> the substantial point is that Doric κοινή can finally account for the Ionic and Attic contaminations, the inconsistencies, and the peculiarities of the work’s Doric, as was apparent in (1)-(15). It is also the dialect family to which Archimedes’ language is thought to belong;<sup>91</sup> therefore, under the assumption that the same is true of *Dissoi Logoi*’s dialect too, we can also better account for the aforementioned similarity between the two authors’ languages.<sup>92</sup>

In conclusion, although no certainty can be reached about *Dissoi Logoi*’s dialect, its features seem to suggest that it is not artificial, but rather a form of Doric κοινή, probably Achaean or Aegean. If this is so, then some chronological observations become necessary. For Doric κοινή is known ‘to have been employed all over the Doric world from the late 4<sup>th</sup> century right down to the 2<sup>nd</sup> and sometimes even the 1<sup>st</sup> century B.C., with occasional archaistic instances later’.<sup>93</sup> That opens two possible scenarios about the

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<sup>88</sup> See also Høeg (1922), 109, Buck (1973), 179, and Adrados (2005), 183, where hypercorrections such as these are explained by the speaker being no longer perfectly familiar with the original laws of the dialect.

<sup>89</sup> Høeg (1922), 110. He also mentioned forms contracted in -εϋ, mentioned in (5), and those in -η (<εα) such as ἀλαθη in § 4.3, but both cases are actually attested in Doric κοινή (Buck (1973), 179, Bubenik (1989), 194).

<sup>90</sup> The most we know of it is the above subdivision in three kinds of Doric κοινάι, which has much room for improvement, if one just thinks that, for example, in the same Aegean Doric κοινή, the singular genitive of -ις nouns is attested to end in -ιος ‘in the central part of the South Aegean Sea (Thera, Anaphe, Astypalaea), whereas the eastern parts (Rhode, Calymna, Cos) already show some advancing Hellenistic forms (πόλεως)’ (ibid.).

<sup>91</sup> Thumb/Kieckers (1932), 200, Adrados (2005), 124-125, Mimbrera (2012), 248.

<sup>92</sup> See *supra*, 15.

<sup>93</sup> Thesleff (1961), 82. It ‘ended up being displaced by the Ionic-Attic koine after a period of diglossia’ Adrados (2005), 176. An exceptionally early case is that of Syracusan κοινή, which ‘dominated in Sicily

origin of the text as we have it. In the first one, what has been handed down to us is the later rewrite of a work composed decades, or maybe centuries, earlier: the writer turned the work from its original and traditional dialect (whatever it was) into the Doric κοινή used in his time. This hypothesis would hence be compatible with a date of composition as early as 403-395 BCE, which is the one usually maintained. Alternatively, we must suppose that the text was created in Doric κοινή, and therefore at least fifty years after that time period, which obviously causes troubles to the usual dating.

But to tackle the work's dating more thoroughly than through any reasoning about language, other aspects of *Dissoi Logoi* need to be explored first, which I shall do in the next few paragraphs. As a marginal note, it is worth taking a look at how the author employs the language described thus far. His plain and short-sentenced prose is unchanged during the work, and is typified by the two stock-phrases καὶ τᾶλλα καττῶντό (§§ 3.16, 5.5, 5.14, 7.2, 7.6) and ὥσπερ καὶ τῶνυμα οὕτω καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα (§§ 1.11, 2.1, 3.13, 4.6).<sup>94</sup> The unity of *Dissoi Logoi*, which can be questioned in some respects, is hence enhanced by an individual style which the author never abandons, even when he seems to be reworking materials from other sources.<sup>95</sup> Exemplary are the long ethnological excursus and the connected thought experiment following it in §§ 2.9-18, where he appears to borrow ideas, but not language, from Herodotus.<sup>96</sup> From this point of view, Robinson's interpretation of the κάρτα of § 6.7 as a homage paid to Protagoras in a chapter strongly reminiscent of Plato's *Protagoras* discussion on the teachability of excellence, not only relies shakily on the authenticity of Protagoras' speech as reported by Pseudo-Plutarch in *Consol. ad Apoll.* 33.118e, but clashes with the same word appearing in § 7.5 too.<sup>97</sup>

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[...] from the start of the fourth century BC until it was gradually displaced by the Ionic-Attic koine and subsequently by Latin' (ibid., 176).

<sup>94</sup> See also αἵπερ τῶντόν ἐστι.... in both §§ 1.12,14,16 and §§ 2.21,22,24.

<sup>95</sup> On the stylistic consistency throughout the work see also Schanz (1884), 374.

<sup>96</sup> Cf. ταῖς χερσί and τοῖς ποσί (§ 2.17) with Herodotus' Ionian τῇσι χερσί, and τοῖσι ποσί (Hdt. 2.63.3); αἰ (§ 2.18) with εἰ (Hdt. 3.38.1, 7.152.2); νομίζοντι and κα (§ 2.18) with νομίζουσι and ἄν (Hdt. 3.38.1).

<sup>97</sup> Robinson (1979), 213.

The author's command of the use of non-Doric forms emerges also from the way he deals with names of famous figures, both historical and fictional, which he puts in the dialects of their geographical, or literary origin, as can be seen in Ὀρέστας (§3.9, in Mycenaean), Κλεοβουλίνης (§ 3.11, Rhodian), Αἰσχύλου (§ 3.12, Attic), and Ἀχιλλῆα (§ 9.6, Epic).<sup>98</sup> That is not enough to infer some literary quality in *Dissoi Logoi's* dialect, as Høeg and Thesleff were ready to do.<sup>99</sup> Nonetheless, it proves an informed and thought-out use of language, which goes hand in hand with the knowledge of Greek literature occasionally displayed.

### § 3. Defining *Dissoi Logoi*

#### § 3.1 The Standard View

Over the centuries, a plethora of suggestions have been made in response to the question of when this text was conceived, by whom, with what intent, and under the influence of which other authors. Yet, since the first publication of his edition in 1979, most scholars have agreed on Robinson's assessment, which I shall call the 'standard view' (abbr. 'SV') from now on. It goes as follows:

SV: *Dissoi Logoi* was 'written some time around 403-395',<sup>100</sup> and represents the collection of 'fairly full but unpolished "lecture-notes" (not really planned for publication)'<sup>101</sup> of a sophist 'of a Ionian provenance'<sup>102</sup> before a Doric speaking audience, possibly from Megara, Sicily, or Southern Italy. His thought appears 'largely influenced by Protagoras and in some smaller measure by Hippias, Gorgias, perhaps Socrates himself, and a number of ethnographers'.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> See also Høeg (1922), 108. Thesleff (1961), 80, 81, 83.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., 110.

<sup>100</sup> Robinson (1979), 41.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid., 54.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid., 51.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid., 51.

However, there is room to reconsider the validity of this description, by means of a new examination of the text, and through the aid of some scholarly contributions appeared both before and after Robinson's work. In order to respect the methodological principle which I stated in the *Preface* and have been observing so far,<sup>104</sup> I shall first examine an issue likely to cross the mind of a reader of ancient Greek literature, when first presented with *Dissoi Logoi*, namely its points of contact with other known works in the same field (§ 3.2). I will then proceed to the chronological and geographical coordinates which one can gather precisely from the literary influences, as well as from the contents of the text (§ 3.3). Having clarified from whose works the author is more likely to have taken inspiration, and when and where the work composition might have been, I will thus be in a better position to finally draw plausible conclusions about the nature of both *Dissoi Logoi* and its anonymous author (§ 3.4).

### § 3.2 Literary influences

The past participle 'influenced' in SV calls for some clarification, as it captures the connection between *Dissoi Logoi* and the works of major classical Greek thinkers in a too generic way, and in some respects, also too weakly. To be sure, some passages of *Dissoi Logoi* merely call to mind other texts; but some suggest direct influence, one way or the other. Similarities of the first kind include the authors SV mentions, and, actually, some more. Here I shall give a brief overview of them, from the most to the least relevant, whereas for their full analysis, I refer the reader to the commentary.

I hence start from the three main sophists of the 5<sup>th</sup> century BCE. Protagoras stands out as the first to say that two opposing speeches can be delivered about every subject matter (DK80 A1),<sup>105</sup> and he is known to have written some lost antilogies (Ἀντιλογίαι, *ibid.*), a literary form to which chapters 1-6 belong. The relativism expressed by his *homo*

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<sup>104</sup> Namely to move from the known, or, at least, from what is easier to find out, to the unknown, or what is more difficult, so as to avoid question-begging (see *supra*, 6).

<sup>105</sup> καὶ πρῶτος ἔφη δύο λόγους εἶναι περὶ παντὸς πράγματος ἀντικειμένων ἀλλήλοις.

*mensura* doctrine (DK80 B1) perfectly tallies with the speeches in defence of the identity theses in chapters 1-5, whereas at *Tht.* 171a-b Plato has Protagoras deploy a self-contradiction argument which is reminiscent of part of a larger one in § 4.6.<sup>106</sup> Chapter 6 similarly recalls the genre of excellence which in Plato's *Protagoras* the sophist promises to teach to the young Hippocrates, and which can be broken down into a series of skills, then listed throughout chapter 8, among which correctness of speech (ὀρθῶς διαλέγεσθαι, § 8.1) has as a specially Protagorean flavour (cf. ὀρθοέπεια: DK80 A24, Pl. *Phdr.* 267c), as Gomperz noticed.<sup>107</sup>

Finding myself in agreement with the order in which SV lists the most influential sophists, I then cite Hippias who echoes in the last two chapters of this work. Dupréel rightly observes how chapter 8 gathers all the most popular disciplines in the late 5<sup>th</sup> century (physics, politics, eloquence, law, dialectics) in the true spirit of Hippias' *polymathia* (DK86 A8).<sup>108</sup> Hippias was also known to resort to mnemonics — which is the subject of chapter 9 — to store such vast knowledge in his mind, and he would publicly perform before Doric speaking audiences such as Olimpia, Sparta, and Sicily, he himself coming from the Dorian city of Elis (DK86 A2, Pl. *Hp.Ma.* 281a-286c). Finally, at *Hp.Ma.* 285d (=DK86 A11), Plato recalls his unrivalled expertise in discussing 'the value of letters and syllables and rhythms and harmonies',<sup>109</sup> which mirrors our author's morphological examples of §§ 5.11-12.<sup>110</sup>

Gorgias, as third, can be spotted in the author's personal and varied use of the notion of καιρός in §§ 2.19, 3.1, 4.2, and 5.9 (cf. DK82 A1a, B13), and in the thesis of ἀπάτη δικαία defended in §§ 3.9-12 (cf. DK82 B23) and which is characteristic of Simonides too (Plu. *Aud. poet.* 15c). Traces of the latter may also be in §§ 1.12-13 (Pl. *R.* I

<sup>106</sup> See also Solana Dueso (1996), 156, 177.

<sup>107</sup> Gomperz (1912), 162-167.

<sup>108</sup> Dupréel (1948), 195.

<sup>109</sup> Translation from Fowler (1926), 353.

<sup>110</sup> See also Gomperz (1912), 71, n. 148.

331b-332d), in the unattributed verses of § 2.19 (Fr. PMG 36, Fr. 53 Diehl), and again in the mnemonics of chapter 9 (*Marm.Par.* 55, *et alibi*).

The ideas of some other authors make rarer appearances in the work. Socrates' thesis on the impossibility of teaching excellence (Pl. *Prt.* 319a-b, *et alibi*) is put forward in the first speech of chapter 6, and his arguing against the appointment of public officers by lot because not meritocratic (X. *Mem.* I.2.9, Arist. *Rh.* II 20.4) appears in chapter 7 too. Three other sophists, Prodicus (DK84 A20, *et alibi*), Antiphon (DK87 B15, *et alibi*), and Alcidamas (Alcid. *Soph.* 3,8,23,31) might come to mind in chapter 8, and so does Hippocrates (Hp. *Nat. hom.* 1).<sup>111</sup> The indiscernibility of all things, defended in § 5.3, is a position attributed to Pyrrho too (D.L. IX.61), along with that of ontological indeterminateness at § 5.5 (Aristocles in Eus. *PE* 14.18.4), firstly ascribed to Heraclitus (Arist. *Metaph.* Γ 1005b24-25).

As for the similarities of the second kind, they are more numerous and we can further divide them into a first class made of passages *likely* to inspire, or to be inspired by, pages of ancient Greek authorities, and a second one comprised of others *very likely* to do so; the watershed between the two groups is again the degree of similarity in words and ideas between what is said in *Dissoi Logoi* and in those classics. Following are these classes, each item of which is accompanied by its relevant passage from major works:

#### First class

§§ 1.2-3 and Pl. *Prt.* 334b-c

§ 2.2 and Pl. *Smp.* 184c-e

§ 2.5 and S.E. *P.* I.152, III.209

§§ 2.9-17 and S.E. *P.* III.199-234

§ 2.27 and Pl. *Alc. I* 111c

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<sup>111</sup> See also Becker/Scholz (2004), 30-31.

§ 2.28 and Pl. *Grg.* 501e-502a, *R.* X 607c, S.E. *M.* I.280-281, 297  
καὶ πρῶτον...οὐ (§ 3.2) and Pl. *R.* II 382c, [Pl.] *Just.* 374c  
αὐτίκα...ἐνήμην; (§ 3.2) and [Pl.] *Just.* 374d  
§ 3.4 and Pl. *R.* I 331c-d, II 382c  
§ 4.2 and Pl. *Sph.* 263b, S.E. *M.* VIII.323-324  
§ 4.5 and Pl. *Phd.* 100d, *Ly.* 217b-e  
ὥσπερ...ἐστίν (§ 4.5) and Pl. *Smp.* 207d-e  
§ 4.9 and Pl. *Sph.* 259a  
Chapter 5 and Pl. *Cra.* 386c-e  
§ 5.4 and Pl. *Tht.* 154c  
§ 5.8 and Pl. *Alc.* 2 138d-139c  
Chapter 6 and S.E. *P.* III.252, *M.* XI.216-257  
§ 6.3 and Pl. *Prt.* 319b-d, *Men.* 89d-e, 90b-e, 96a-d, [Pl.] *Virt.* 376b-c, 378c  
§ 6.4 and Pl. *Prt.* 319e-320b, *Men.* 93a-94e, *La.* 179a-d, *Alc. I* 118c-119a, [Pl.] *Virt.* 377a-378c  
§ 6.6 and Pl. *La.* 185e  
§ 6.7 and Pl. *Euthd.* 278d, 283a, *Prt.* 312b, 325d-326c, *Men.* 91a-e, *Alc. I* 118c-d  
§ 6.11 and Pl. *Prt.* 320a, 327b-c  
§ 6.12 and Pl. *Prt.* 327e-328a  
§ 7.2 and Isoc. *Areopagiticus* 22, Arist. *Rh.* II 20.4.1393b 4-9  
τῷ...τέχνας (§ 8.1) and Pl. *Euthd.* 274e, *Phdr.* 261d-e  
κατὰ...ἤμην (§ 8.1) and Pl. *Grg.* 449b-c  
δικάσασθαι...δαμαγορεῖν (§ 8.1) and Pl. *Grg.* 452e  
περὶ...διδάσκειν (§ 8.1) and Pl. *Sph.* 232c  
§ 8.2 and Pl. *Prt.* 337d  
§ 8.3 and Pl. *Grg.* 457a  
περὶ πάντων...ἐπιστασεῖται (§ 8.4) and Pl. *Euthd.* 271c  
§ 8.9 and Pl. *Grg.* 454b

§ 8.10 and Pl. *Grg.* 484d

§ 9.1 and S.E. *M.* I.52

### Second class

§ 2.13 and Hdt. 5.6

τοί...θεοῖς (§ 2.13) and Hdt. 4.64-66

Μασσαγέται...τέθαφθαι (§ 2.14) and Hdt. 1.216

Λυδοῖς...ἤμεν (§ 2.16) and Hdt. 1.93

Αἰγύπτιοι...καλόν (§ 2.17) and Hdt. 2.35-36

§ 2.18 and Hdt. 3.38, 7.152

καὶ πρῶτον... οὐ (§ 3.2) and X. *Mem.* IV.2.16

αὐτίκα...ἐνήμεν; (§ 3.2) and X. *Mem.* IV.2.17

§ 3.4 and X. *Mem.* IV.2.17

ἀνδραποδίξασθαι...ἀποδόσθαι; (§ 3.5) and X. *Mem.* IV.2.15

Chapter 5 and S.E. *M.* XI.197-209

καὶ πρῶτον...πάντα (§ 5.2) and Pl. *Cra.* 392c

§§ 5.3-5 and Pl. *R.* V 479b-d

§§ 5.11-14 and Pl. *Cra.* 431e-432b

§ 5.14 and S.E. *P.* II.215, III.109, *M.* IV.25, X.323

§ 6.5 and Isoc. *Against the Sophists* 14

τό...ποιεῖν (§ 6.8) and Pl. *Prt.* 328c

§ 6.12 and Hdt. 2.2

§ 7.2 and X. *Mem.* I.2.9

§ 7.5 and Isoc. *Areopagiticus* 23

Based on the second class, it is reasonable to conclude that the works which are most likely to have influenced *Dissoi Logoi*, or to have been influenced by it, are, in chronological order, Herodotus' *Histories*, Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, Plato's *Cratylus*,



*Republic*, and *Protagoras*, Isocrates' *Against the Sophists* and *Aeropagiticus*, and Sextus Empiricus' *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* and *Against the Mathematicians*. At the same time, a special case can be made for Plato's *Gorgias*, which features in the first class, but whose points of contact with our text, although less strong, are as many as six.

While it is understood that the resemblance between our work and many others could be simply coincidental, and that both our author and those aforementioned could have conceived their respective texts independently from one another, the high number of parallels listed above makes this less plausible than considering a dependence between them. The question then arises about who drew upon whom. First and foremost, the fact that over the centuries preceding its manuscript appearance, *Dissoi Logoi* has left practically no mark of itself<sup>112</sup> seems to clash with its possible characterization as a source of inspiration for many other, much more renowned works. Not by chance, the latter hypothesis has never been taken into serious consideration by scholars, except for Trieber's far-fetched attempt to present § 3.4 as the source of X. *Mem.* IV.2.2-18, and Robinson's sporadic and unargued supposition that § 4.5 may have inspired Plato's παρρησία.<sup>113</sup> SV's reading of this influence as reversed is hence more plausible, although maybe too flat, as we will see later.

Another option could be that both *Dissoi Logoi* and those texts drew upon a third, common source, as some scholars, in fact, have suggested concerning three of the parallels listed above. However, besides these alleged common sources being works of which we know little, and whose very existence is sometimes object of contention, this interpretation has the unlikely corollary that an author who seems to be used to lifting passages from well diffused texts would look at more remote sources in those three cases. This objection gains substance if one inspects these parallels more closely.

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<sup>112</sup> The only potential case could be the elliptical reference to it in Diogenes Laertius' account of Zeuxis (see *supra*, 14, *infra* 289).

<sup>113</sup> Trieber (1892), 218, Robinson (1979), 193.

First comes the similarity between the ethnographic descriptions in §§ 2.9-17 and some of those we read in Herodotus. That the latter may have been the source of our work is something Robinson and some of his predecessors have found difficult to accept, arguing that ‘on a number of occasions’ our author ‘offers details not found in Herodotus; and a fair number of the more general points he makes are not to be found in Herodotus at all’.<sup>114</sup> Yet, Robinson dismissed as ‘pure speculation’ Gomperz and Kranz’s hypotheses about Protagoras and his followers being the real source, in the belief these had collected ethnographical material ‘for the purpose of demonstrating the relativity of moral concepts’;<sup>115</sup> a valid criticism, as we indeed do not possess any substantial piece of evidence for that. Contrariwise, he welcomed the possibility that ‘the author is drawing upon earlier sources, some or all of which were also tapped by Herodotus (e.g. Hecataeus and Hellanicus)’.<sup>116</sup> However, this idea relies on an old-fashioned view about Herodotus’ sources, and it is no wonder that Robinson’s authority for that was Aly.<sup>117</sup> For later studies, with Detlev Fehling’s monograph first in the line, got rid of the idea that Herodotus was heavily dependent on the geographic and historical lore of earlier logographers such as Hecataeus, Acusilaus, and Pherecydes, as well as on contemporaries like Xanthus and Hellanicus; the very existence of such extensive literature from which Herodotus could lift is contested.<sup>118</sup> If that was not enough to abandon the common source track for this case, one must notice how Herodotus continues to echo in chapter 2 even once the ethnographic section is over, that is in the mental experiment of § 2.18, whose literary parallels are Hdt. 3.38 and 7.152.

The second case where a common source has been adduced concerns the likeness between §§ 3.2-5 and X. *Mem.* IV.2.15-17. Here Robinson, on the one hand,

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<sup>114</sup> Robinson (1979), 165.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., 166. See also Gomperz (1912), 163-164, Kranz (1937), 228.

<sup>116</sup> Robinson (1979), 165-166.

<sup>117</sup> Aly (1929).

<sup>118</sup> Fehling (1971), 2-3.

acknowledged that ‘the structure of the two passages is remarkably similar, and verbal affinities (often the very same examples) abound’.<sup>119</sup> On the other hand, he fell into what Classen considered the ‘main fault’ of his edition, namely the fact that ‘Robinson discusses and determines the date of the treatise in the introduction and, on that basis, considers and judges a number of passages in the commentary which should be viewed without prejudice as regards the date, as they might contribute to determining it’.<sup>120</sup> He, in fact, did not even take into account the possibility that Xenophon’s *Memorabilia*, completed not earlier than 371 BCE, was the original of our text, and so he explained the above similarity by putting forth the three following possibilities. The first posits that our author is the source of Xenophon; the second speculates that the two authors personally heard Socrates’ arguments about justice; the third conjectures that both authors drew on an earlier thinker.<sup>121</sup> At a closer look, though, all hypotheses pose problems. The first one entails that Xenophon put arguments into Socrates’ mouth which he had read in *Dissoi Logoi*, and that would seem at the very least bizarre for a Socratic like him. The second hypothesis assumes that our author lived in a time which allowed him to encounter Socrates, which itself needs to be proven. The third option necessitates specification either of the possible identity of this ‘earlier thinker’ or of what his arguments could have been like, if it does not want to sound just like a strained attempt to oppose the direct dependence between two texts which, as seen, Robinson himself viewed as strongly similar. Things do not improve even if we supplement it with other scholars’ proposals. Nestle’s attempt to base his claim about an unspecified sophistic source for both Xenophon and our author on X. *Mem.* IV.2.1, where it is simply said that Euthydemus collected works of famous poets and sophists, was fanciful, to say the least.<sup>122</sup> Dupréel’s identification of such a source with Hippias had no better grounds, as it was based on elements unrelated to the texts at issue, namely Hippias’

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<sup>119</sup> Robinson (1979), 179.

<sup>120</sup> Classen (1982), 86-87.

<sup>121</sup> Robinson (1979), 180.

<sup>122</sup> Nestle (1908), 580.

said presence in *Dissoi Logoi* 8 and 9, and Socrates and Hippias' conversation on justice at X. *Mem.* IV.4.<sup>123</sup>

Third, and last, is the case of chapter 6 and its striking similarity with Plato's *Protagoras*, both in content and in the form of six pairs of passages, falling within either of the classes of the second-kind influences. Trieber<sup>124</sup> and Taylor<sup>125</sup> extended the similarity also to Plato's *Meno*, pointing out how the arguments in favour of and against the teachability of excellence of all the three works could be traced back to 'the common-places of fifth-century rhetoric'.<sup>126</sup> Granted, these claims are less weak than the common source hypotheses seen so far. For there indeed might be room to include *Meno*, and also, I would add, the pseudo-Platonic *De Virtute* in this relationship, judging by their very similar arguments. Furthermore, for the first time, we have a hint as to which the common source could have been, because the teachability of excellence may well have been the subject of Protagoras' Μέγας Λόγος too (DK80 B3), as Heinrich Gomperz suggested.<sup>127</sup> However, the special kinship of chapter 6 with Plato's *Protagoras* can be inferred not only from its higher number of parallels, but particularly from the reference to Polyclitus teaching his art to his child at § 6.8, which has a parallel in Pl. *Prt.* 328c only. Finally, since we have no certainty about the actual contents of Μέγας Λόγος, the hypothesis of our author reading Plato, or vice versa, is at least slightly ahead of that about a common Protagorean source for the two. As an upshot of the analysis of these three cases, the hypothesis of a common source proves less likely than the more intuitive one of one author directly drawing on the other.

In conclusion, SV seems right in maintaining that the many points of contact of *Dissoi Logoi* with ancient Greek authorities should be explained in most cases by our author's drawing upon the latter. Yet, its list of these influences should be reconsidered

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<sup>123</sup> Dupréel (1948), 208, 310.

<sup>124</sup> Trieber (1892), 235.

<sup>125</sup> Taylor (1911), 117-119.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, 119. Similarly, Guthrie (1971), 319.

<sup>127</sup> H. Gomperz (1912), 175.

and enlarged so as to also include a series of parallels in which the closeness of the texts is so strong as to suggest our author's direct reading of those classics. As seen before, among the latter eleven stand out as the most likely sources of *Dissoi Logoi* and out of them now I would like to highlight nine in particular, as their date is later than the one SV attributes to our work. These are Plato's *Protagoras*, *Gorgias* (both before 387 BCE), *Cratylus* (387-380), and *Republic* (390-360), Isocrates' *Against the Sophists* (ca 390) and *Areopagiticus* (355), and, finally, Sextus Empiricus' *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* and *Against the Mathematicians* (around 200 CE).

By advancing the possibility that our author was a reader of Plato's dialogues, this interpretation somehow takes up the route started by Kathleen Freeman, who first commented that 'it is hard to believe that the work was not written after the publication of *Protagoras*, *Meno*, *Phaedo*, *Phaedrus* and *Theaetetus*'.<sup>128</sup> Yet, the main difference between our hypotheses lies not so much in the selection of the dialogues to refer to, but, rather, in our views about the use which our author makes of what he reads elsewhere. For in recognizing these and other debts (Heraclitus' and Protagoras' too), Freeman then concluded that 'the author shows no originality [...] repeating arguments and examples used by others', which makes the final product 'superficial'.<sup>129</sup> On the same wavelength, few years later, Maria Timpanaro Cardini and Josef L. Fischer denied the intellectual value of *Dissoi Logoi*, considering it as a mere compilation of ideas of Protagoras and Hippias.<sup>130</sup> On the contrary, what I will endeavour to show in the commentary is that the author's use of the classics is original, and subordinate to his own philosophical and rhetorical necessities. To anticipate some examples of that, theses which Plato and Xenophon put in Socrates' mouth are absorbed in a weave of sophistic and anti-Socratic lines of thought in *Dissoi Logoi*, like the argument against the appointment of public

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<sup>128</sup> Freeman (1946), 417, n. a1.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., 417.

<sup>130</sup> Timpanaro Cardini (1954), 213, n.1, Fischer (1969), 33,36.

offices by lot in § 7.2, or those of philosophical temper in §§ 8.9-11, within a chapter devoted to sophistic polymathy.

A different and more radical way to oppose the intellectual originality of the work in light of the many sources spotted has been the one (already introduced earlier) in which some have denied the historical authenticity of *Dissoi Logoi*, arguing that the work was a forgery put up with heterogeneous material from some relevant authors by someone lived a long time after what he describes. This interpretation would enable the inclusion of the latest of the classics I mentioned above, namely Sextus Empiricus, within our author's sources. It is no wonder that Conley, the most recent and incisive upholder of the forgery view, stresses the already discussed similarity between the first chapters of *Dissoi Logoi* and *Against Ethicists* to this end.<sup>131</sup> Yet, clearly debates on 'good and bad, seemly and disgraceful'<sup>132</sup> did not start with Sextus, having a long-lasting history in ancient Greek philosophy, which starts, among the others, with some 5<sup>th</sup>-4<sup>th</sup> century BCE works I quoted among the second-kind influences. From this point of view, § 5.14, the paragraph very close to some passages from Sextus, is as much so with the earlier Plato's *Cratylus*. Furthermore, as already touched on, one should refrain from thinking, as done by SV, that only *Dissoi Logoi* can draw upon other texts, and never the other way around. That applies especially to our work, as a similar limitation would clash with what emerges about its most likely date at various levels, and which we will see in the following paragraph. An alternative explanation of the points of contacts between *Dissoi logoi* and Sextus, which hence is still called for, will be given in the final section of the dissertation.

### § 3.3 Date and place

SV dates *Dissoi Logoi* 'some time around 403-395' and places it in one city among 'Megara, Sicily, or Southern Italy'. Similarly to what has been done with the influences,

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<sup>131</sup> Conley (1985), 62-63. On the similarity between the two texts, see also *supra*, 10.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*, 63.

let us now test the value of these coordinates, both in their adhesion to the text and history, and as for their logical consistency.

The first scholar who contributed to these opinions was North, who spotted in § 1.8 the proof that the work was written shortly after Sparta's victory in the naval battle at the mouth of the Aegospotami river (ἀ...συμμάχως) in 404 BCE.<sup>133</sup> This is due to his conjecture τὰ νεωστί ('what is just occurred') to correct the codices' τὰ νεότατι which since Gisbertus Koen editors have been rightly revising as τὰ νεώτατα ('the most recent events') instead.<sup>134</sup> North also saw Sicily and Southern Italy as the most likely locations of our author, considering him to be a Pythagorean, and his reference to Hellas in λέγονται ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων (§ 1.1) as oddly detached, if made by a person coming from that same place.<sup>135</sup>

Centuries passed, and in 1913 Pohlenz not only identified τὰ νεώτατα with the final act of the Peloponnesian War, and hence made it the *terminus post quem* of the work, but he also suggested that this association compels us to take 394 BCE as *terminus ante quem*.<sup>136</sup> For in that year the Corinthian War started, and it hence should have had a place in the author's list of historical conflicts, if only it had already occurred.<sup>137</sup>

Finally, the hypothesis of Megara as the author's city, was firstly suggested in 1961 by Edwin S. Ramage, but without any specific supporting reason except for Megara being a Doric-speaking city.<sup>138</sup> Unlike him, one year later, Martha Kneale grounded this same judgement on *Dissoi Logoi's* marked interest in notions such as truth, falsehood and contradiction which are distinctive of the Megarian school, and which characterize the first part of our work too, especially chapter 4.<sup>139</sup>

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<sup>133</sup> North (1671), 47, n.1.

<sup>134</sup> Koen in Schaefer (1811), 234, n. 26.

<sup>135</sup> North (1671), 47, n.1.

<sup>136</sup> Pohlenz (1913), 72.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid., 72.

<sup>138</sup> Ramage (1961), 423-424.

<sup>139</sup> Kneale/Kneale (1962), 16.

These are the grounds on which SV argues about date and place of the work, the latter of which are the shakier. Starting from Sicily and Southern-Italy as possible geographical provenances, Pythagoreanism was certainly present in these cities, but not in *Dissoi Logoi* which only gratuitous interpretations of § 4.4, and § 7.5 can connect with it.<sup>140</sup> It is no wonder that neither North nor Stephanus before him ever offered a reason for their insertion of *Dissoi Logoi* among Pythagorean fragments, which hence seems to be there simply due to its Doric dialect. But even granting the rather impressionistic idea that every philosophical writing in Doric has to do with Pythagoreanism, one must recall that the Doric of this work is a peculiar one, and different from the varieties attested in Sicily and Southern-Italy. Judging by its Ionic contaminations, it actually seems eastwardly rather than westwardly oriented.<sup>141</sup> Even less persuasive is North's argument based on the reference to Hellas, which would seem to lead to the absurdity that every time somebody names their own country in a discourse, they also need to specify that they belong to it. As for Megara, Kneale was right in presenting it as a place which would have satisfied our author's dialectical interests, but wrong in singling it out as the only possible one, from this point of view. So much so that one cannot rule out the possibility that, whatever the reason of the peculiar Doric dialect of the work, the author actually got his philosophical and literary education in Athens.<sup>142</sup>

In the search for a more suitable place where this work was composed, an obligatory stop is at Cyprus, an island recalled in a controversial passage of § 5.5, which says that 'what is here, is not in Libya, and what is in Libya is not in Cyprus'. Bergk was the first to defend the coincidence of 'here' with 'Cyprus', and, then, around it he built a broader interpretation of the work as the writing of a 4<sup>th</sup> century sophist from that island.<sup>143</sup> He, in fact, focussed on the barbarian menace to contrast which Hellas had to

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<sup>140</sup> See *infra*, 154, 221.

<sup>141</sup> See *supra*, 22-23 for my conclusion for Achaean or Aegean Doric κοινή.

<sup>142</sup> This idea has been defended a few times, the most recent of which can be found in Becker/Scholz (2004), 13-40.

<sup>143</sup> Bergk (1883), 126-133.



take the extraordinary measure of sacrificing the temples of Delphi and Olympia, as recalled in § 3.8. This episode he recognized in the last phase of the Corinthian war, immediately before the peace of Antalcidas (387 BCE), when Evagoras, the king of Salamis on Cyprus, was engaged in promoting Greek culture in the island and securing it from the Persian aims, with the help of Athens. In his *Olympic Oration* of 388, Lysias exhorts the Hellenic cities to a national unity against the Persians, and Bergk believed that this oration arrived to Cyprus, that there it got translated and soon read by our author who was writing *Dissoi Logoi*, and who must have thus been inspired by Lysias' words when composing § 3.8. According to Bergk, that a sophist could operate in a remote place like Cyprus should not come as a surprise; rather it was also proven by the fact that Polycrates (436/5 – after 380 BCE) came to this island from Athens, to spend his retirement. And that was thanks to the material development and cultural flourishing which Cyprus has experienced since Evagoras took power in 411, as magnified in Isocrates' *Evagoras*. Finally, Bergk quoted the mental experiment of § 6.12 about a Hellenic child learning Persian simply by being raised there, and a Persian child doing the same the other way around, as a sign that the place from which the author wrote was close to Persia, and hence more likely to be Cyprus than other suggested places such as Southern Italy.<sup>144</sup>

I begin from the end, as the last argument speaks for itself in oddly constraining our ability to figure out mental scenarios in some requirement of spatial proximity. As for § 5.5, then, Taylor wisely observed that the conflation of 'here' with 'Cyprus' would make the whole statement redundant, as the second part, 'what is in Libya is not in Cyprus', is the simple converse of the first one, 'what is in Cyprus is not in Libya'.<sup>145</sup> This rejoinder, yet, implies a commitment to exactness and conciseness about which we

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<sup>144</sup> 'Dies setzt enge Verbindung und Nachbarschaft voraus; in Kypern lag dieses Beispiel sehr nahe, für Unteritalien wäre es sehr ungeschickt gewählt' (ibid., 132).

<sup>145</sup> Taylor (1911), 94, n. 1.

cannot know whether it was among our author's priorities. Hence, I would not go so far as to say that the writer 'would hardly express himself thus', as Taylor did.<sup>146</sup>

At any rate, the most difficult points to Bergk's solution are the following three. First is the fact that the historical circumstances in which he argued that *Dissoi Logoi* had been composed do not feature any episode reminiscent of the Hellenes' use of their own temples for military reasons, as described in § 3.8, and from which Bergk seemed to draw only what he needed, namely the outline of a moment critical for Hellas' safety, and in which the cities' cooperation was vital.

Secondly, notwithstanding the cultural development of 4<sup>th</sup> century Cyprus, to our knowledge, philosophy seems to have been marginally involved in it. For if we except Zeno of Citium (c. 334-262/1 BCE), the founder of the Stoic school in Athens, where he also spent most of his life, the list of Cypriote ancient philosophers consists just in few 'second- or third-rate authors',<sup>147</sup> such as Aristotle's friend Eudemus (?- ca. 353 BCE), who was perhaps previously a member of the Academy too, Persaeus of Citium (307/6–243 BCE), Stoic and pupil of Zeno at Athens, and the cynic Demonax (70-170 CE), mainly known from the *Life of Demonax*, written by his student Lucianus. None of the philosophies embodied by these figures had diffusion on the island, nor a real bearing on *Dissoi Logoi*. Even if we agreed on Eudemus having been an Academic, drawing a link between him and the passages where *Dissoi Logoi* gets in touch with Platonic dialogues would be far-fetched, both because these are just some of the work's likely sources, and because a vast part of *Dissoi Logoi* leans towards anti-Platonic positions. In a similar way, nothing suggests that the stay of the old Polycrates promoted the development of the sophistic profession on the island, nor is it presumable that he himself composed *Dissoi Logoi* on that occasion, as the little we know of this sophist's production is at odds with our work. He, in fact, 'was famous in antiquity for his

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<sup>146</sup> Ibid., 94, n. 1.

<sup>147</sup> Hill (1949), 212.

speeches on paradoxical and absurd themes',<sup>148</sup> and at *Is.* 20 Dionysius of Halicarnassus condemns his style for its 'overblown verbosity and a tasteless use of too many extravagant figures and poeticisms'.<sup>149</sup> Furthermore, the likely hypothesis of a dependence of our text on Isocrates, would be seriously affected if this author were Polycrates. For, firstly, there was no love lost between him and Isocrates, as we can argue from Isocrates' denunciation, in his *Busiris*, of the shortcomings of Polycrates' *Encomium of Busiris* and *Accusation of Socrates*. Secondly, only the deployment of Isocrates' *Against the Sophists* would have been chronologically possible for Polycrates who in 355 BCE, when *Aeropagiticus* was composed, was not alive anymore.

Thirdly and lastly, nothing guarantees that the place in which chapter 5 is set is the same as that of the other chapters. The chapters may well correspond to speeches which our sophist held in various places<sup>150</sup> — maybe never where the author lived — or may even not be set in any specific place. The same applies to chapter 7, which sketches a moderate democracy, devoid of the lot system as method of appointment for public officers, but nothing specific emerges as to its identity and relationship to the author.

Earlier on, we anticipated the exigency of going beyond the dialect to make a good guess about the work's date of composition. However, at the end of this analysis on what the author lets us know about *Dissoi Logoi*'s place, the results invite us to backtrack. For, *bona pace* the scholars' hypotheses which have just been discussed, the contents of the work do not point to any Hellenic city in particular, whereas the Aegean /Achaean Doric κοινή in which the work seems to have been written is the only element potentially speaking of a geographical unity of *Dissoi Logoi*. Granted, as earlier observed, it may well also be the product of a later translation of a work originally composed somewhere else. Yet, this hypothesis will lose likelihood at the end of the following inquiry on the work's date.

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<sup>148</sup> Livingstone (2001), 28.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>150</sup> See also Kranz (1937), 225.

The latter can be started by recalling that the identification of τὰ νεώτατα in § 1.8 with the Aegospotami battle, and, hence, of 404 BCE as *terminus post quem*, was attacked by Santo Mazzarino.<sup>151</sup> He, interestingly, noticed how on that occasion the balance of military power was the opposite of the one described in our text.<sup>152</sup> Quoting Thucydides, he pointed out how on that occasion we see ‘the destruction of the Athenian empire and the capture of the Long Walls and the Peiraeus by the Spartans and their allies’ (Th. 5.26.1).<sup>153</sup> In order to see Sparta defeating the Athenians and their allies (Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ καὶ οἱ συμμάχοι), Mazzarino suggested, rather, a look back at the battle of Tanagra in 457, which he deemed the real *terminus post quem*.<sup>154</sup> However, although more consistent with the text, this alternative identification too is far from conclusive, as the impact of the Tanagra battle on Greek history cannot be compared with that of the Aegospotami one, which marked the end of a war which Thucydides himself defined as ‘major [...] and more momentous than any previous conflict’ (Th. 1.1.1).<sup>155</sup> The Aegospotami battle is hence less likely to be forgotten than the Tanagra one in our author’s list of crucial military conflicts in the Hellenic world.

SV has thus found a sound *terminus post quem* in 404 BCE. Nonetheless, it is worth moving on from chapter 1, to see whether we can encounter other elements relevant in this respect. As first comes the already quoted passage of § 3.8, dealing with the exploitation of temples which are common property of Hellas, to repel an imminent Persian menace. Unfortunately, despite the aforementioned effort of Bergk, and others too, it is impossible to identify this episode with any known event of Greek history, as I will explain in the commentary. In §§ 3.11-12, then, we learn that the author was acquainted with Cleobuline and Aeschylus, which too is of little help, as it draws us back from 404. But once we get to § 7.5, we find a line of reasoning which, as mentioned

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<sup>151</sup> Mazzarino (1962), Mazzarino (1966).

<sup>152</sup> Mazzarino (1966), 289-290.

<sup>153</sup> Translation from Hammond (2009), 270.

<sup>154</sup> Mazzarino (1966), 151.

<sup>155</sup> Translation from Hammond (2009), 3.

in the earlier paragraph and shown in the commentary, has a close and exclusive parallel with Isoc. *Areopagiticus* 23. I therefore believe that we should take 355 BCE, the date of composition usually assigned to this oration, as a more precise *terminus post quem* than 404 for our work.

As for the *terminus ante quem*, that the Corinthian war would have been mentioned if only it had already started when the author was writing is not surer than the above possibility of the Tanagra battle as *terminus post quem*. On the other hand, as Bergk pointed out, what is certain is the lack of any reference to the Macedonian power, especially in the list of the most important battles of §§ 1.8-10, which thus makes 338 BCE, the date of the battle of Chaeronea, a later, maybe loose, but no doubt safer *terminus ante quem*.<sup>156</sup>

For the sake of completeness, the search for a *terminus ante quem* must yet call also at the two short arguments of § 6.8, which drew the attention of some. Firstly, Becker and Scholz argued that the author's reference to Anaxagoreans in this paragraph could have been possible only before 380 BCE.<sup>157</sup> This statement is puzzling, as it is both unargued and clearly contrary to the three occurrences of οἱ Ἀναξαγορεῖοι attested after that date, according to the *TLG*. Pl. *Cra.* 409b6 is one, and maybe the earliest, as that dialogue is approximately dated between 388 and 368 BCE; the other two belong to the Byzantine Georgius Cedrenus (*Compendium historiarum* 1.144.13) and Georgius Syncellus (*Ecloga chronographica* 174.25). The author's next example of the famous sculptor Polyclitus teaching his child his own art was used by Mazzarino in support of his early dating, seen above.<sup>158</sup> Firstly, he pointed out how from Pl. *Prt.* 328c Polyclitus appears to have taught his children, from which Mazzarino argued that *Dissoi Logoi* must have been composed at a time when Polyclitus had already trained only one of them. Secondly, considering the time when Polyclitus and his master Ageladas are

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<sup>156</sup> Bergk (1883), 126.

<sup>157</sup> Becker/Scholz (2004), 16.

<sup>158</sup> Mazzarino (1966), 288.

known to have worked,<sup>159</sup> SV's suggested date of composition would appear too late for the former to have not yet taught sculpture also to his second child. According to Mazzarino, to get things square one needs to adopt the dramatic time of the *Protagoras*, which he questionably saw in 423 BCE,<sup>160</sup> as a *terminus ante quem* to date *Dissoi Logoi*. In reply to this, Untersteiner warned against being too trusting of Plato's chronology. For it cannot be excluded that Plato anachronistically transferred the number of Polyclitus' children when the *Protagoras* was composed (between 395 and 394 BCE) to the dramatic time.<sup>161</sup> On the same wavelength was Robinson, who excused the chronological inaccuracies on the part of both Plato and our author, saying that what interested them was, rather, the widespread τόπος of Polyclitus teaching his children his own art.<sup>162</sup> One must not also pass over the yet unexplored possibilities that the taught children were more than one by 433, as the *Protagoras* says, but that *Dissoi Logoi* refers only to one of them either because only one was still alive at that time, or because only one actually followed his father's steps in sculpture.<sup>163</sup> Finally, Robinson did not favour any of these hypotheses in particular, believing that they all demonstrated excessive faith in the historical accuracy of both Plato's and our author's accounts. For this reason, in none of them does he see a true danger for SV's dating.<sup>164</sup> For my part, I share Robinson's scepticism about the historical reliability of what has been written about Polyclitus and his children in both works, which cannot hence help us with the *terminus ante quem* in any sense. However, I also observe that one reason why our author's words were historically incorrect could be the length of time separating them from those episodes and diminishing their memory. From this point of view, the *terminus post quem* I argued for above may be preferable to Robinson's one, because it is later.

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<sup>159</sup> Ageladas' oldest statue is dated 520 BCE, Polyclitus' one 460 (ibid., 288-289).

<sup>160</sup> *Contra* the usual 433 (Taylor (1992), 64).

<sup>161</sup> Untersteiner (1967), 470-471.

<sup>162</sup> Robinson (1979), 38-39.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid., 39.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid., 39-41.

With that being said about *Dissoi Logoi*'s date of composition, the conclusion is that the assertions made by SV in this regard must be rethought precisely as above it happened concerning the place of composition. Rather than 403-395 BCE, the work seems to be dated between 355 and 338 BCE, an interval which becomes particularly interesting when put in connection with the peculiar dialect of the work, because, as touched on above, *koineization* of Doric is thought to start precisely in 'the late 4<sup>th</sup> century'.<sup>165</sup> Hence, the peculiar language of this work does not only give us clues about Achean or Aegean Doric-speaking areas as the most likely provenance of the text, as seen above, but it also turns out to be the language in which *Dissoi Logoi* is most likely to have been originally written, rather than just that of a later translation of the text.

### § 3.4 Nature of the work

SV attributes *Dissoi Logoi* to a sophist of classical age, and with what I believe to be good reason. I will go into the ideas and structure of the work in the sections to follow, but that easily appears just by looking at the writer's swiftly moving from ethics to eristic, from education to politics, from ontology to mnemonics, and especially at that manifesto of similar competences which is chapter 8, where the arts of speaking and philosophy are sophistically intertwined.

In the relatively short length of each chapter, in its spare prose, and in the seeming absence of a unitary line crossing all of them, SV sees the proof that the text is nothing more than a collection of lecture-notes which helped the author to prepare himself for his declamations, but which may even be wrong to call work, as it was not meant for publication. In particular, Robinson observed that 'the constant use of κατὰ τὸ suggests strongly that we are looking at shorthand versions of arguments that could be expanded on the appropriate occasion'.<sup>166</sup>

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<sup>165</sup> See *supra*, 22.

<sup>166</sup> Robinson (1979), 90, n. 69.

It is at this point that my views on what the work is start to diverge from SV. Firstly, despite their own essentiality and brevity, the nine speeches of *Dissoi Logoi* are yet fully developed, the only few interruptions which affect them being due to *lacunae* in the manuscripts. The structural completeness of the author's treatment sounds also like a reason of pride for him in § 6.13, where he closes the chapter by stressing the tripartite structure of 'a beginning, a conclusion and a middle' he has given to his speech. Secondly, as I will show at the end of this thesis, although the chapters are independent in content the one from the other, their topics are not unrelated, both because all of them pertain to the sphere of sophistic education, and because subgroups of them describe more specific lines of thought. Finally, καττωὺτό actually features as part of the bigger stock-phrase καὶ τᾶλλα καττωὺτό, which I have already mentioned, and which always appears at the end of an argument as a way to universalize the conclusion the author has just inferred from a select few particular cases. If we buy into Robinson's logic, then the only expansion which those arguments can undergo, and which the stock-phrase could adumbrate, will consist precisely in the addition of further examples instantiating the same general rationale. But why should the sophist have risked forgetting such additional unsaid examples, by hiding them under τᾶλλα καττωὺτό, especially if one agrees with Robinson that *Dissoi Logoi* is a collection of lecture notes, which, as such, are designed to improve the retention of a speech?

As for the fact that a work of similar contents and form cannot be ready for publication, I again have some reservations. In the first place, a fair assessment of both its style and thought should consider the expectations and the intellectual level of its readership. Alas, the latter is unknown, but considering the Dorian origin of the text, it stands to reason that so were their readers, or at least a part of them. If so, then, as Rossetti observed, the work's inadequacy to the standards of the Athenian rhetoric and philosophy argues in favour of its suitability to a Dorian cultural environment, less



intellectually demanding as emblematically depicted by Plato in *Hp.Ma.* 285c-d.<sup>167</sup> At the same time, and this constitutes a second reason for the work's publication, underneath its superficial naivety, *Dissoi Logoi* also reveals a series of major ancient sources which the more learned among its readers would have found it rewarding to recognize, and in as big a number as has ever been found among surviving sophistic texts.<sup>168</sup> Finally, the habit of assessing the author as talentless, which Diels started, has always been accompanied by blindness of some valuable aspects of his thought and rhetoric, to which I will try to do justice in the next sections of the dissertation.<sup>169</sup> Just to name some of them, I recall the actual dynamics of contrast between identity and difference theses in chapters 1-5, the four rhetorical strategies the author adopted in those same chapters, and the identical list of topics covered by the second speeches of chapters 1-4.

As last, it is worth tackling an alternative hypothesis about the nature of the work, which emphasizes its didactic character by regarding it as one of those 'little manuals or catechisms of sophistic arguments' which were 'in fairly common circulation' according to some reading of Arist. *SE* 183b36-184a2.<sup>170</sup> Recently, Robinson himself defended this interpretation, presenting it just as possible as the above hypothesis of the work as a sophist's lecture-notes.<sup>171</sup> Yet, it is problematic in more than one respect. In the first place, one must clarify what Aristotle means in that passage, which reads thus:

For the training given by the paid teachers of contentious argument resembled the system of Gorgias. For some of them gave their pupils to learn by heart speeches

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<sup>167</sup> See also Rossetti (1980), 28-29.

<sup>168</sup> Alcidamas testifies that one of sophists' habits was precisely 'to marshal the collected writings of past sophists and bring together ideas from many sources into the same work' (Alcid. *Soph.* 4, translation in Muir (2001), 3-5).

<sup>169</sup> Diels (1907), 635.

<sup>170</sup> Robinson (2003), 241.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid., 241, contra Robinson (1979), 89, n. 68, where he expressed his reservation about it. In Dorion (2009), 127, one finds the latest support for this hypothesis which firstly appeared in Diels (1907), 635, where *Dissoi Logoi* are considered 'Niederschrift von Schulvorträgen'.

which were either rhetorical or consisted of questions and answers, in which both sides thought that the rival arguments were for the most part included.<sup>172</sup>

As one can see, the speeches under debate do not perfectly coincide with the genres of speech in our work — surely not with the most distinctive one, namely the antilogy of chapters 1-6. We may find a correspondence between chapters 7-9 and what Aristotle calls ‘rhetorical speeches’ (λόγοι ῥητορικοί). Yet, as far as ‘questions and answers’ are concerned, this rhetorical device is employed in just few paragraphs throughout our work, whereas none of its nine chapters is a speech consisting in only this device, as according to Aristotle’s testimony (λόγοι ἐρωτητικοί). Even more crucially, this passage talks just of eristic teachers having their pupils learn some ready-made speeches by heart, with no mention whatsoever of any sophistic manual. Granted, the role of a physical medium on which to store words to assist their memorization is something which I myself leverage to translate § 9.3. Nonetheless, describing the above passage as the one where Aristotle ‘tells us of “Manuals of Eristic” put together by fee-taking sophists’, as Robinson did, has no grounding on the text.<sup>173</sup> And that is all the more notable, because Robinson pushed this strained interpretation even further, to the point of justifying the heterogeneous quality of *Dissoi Logoi*’s dialect with it: precisely because the work may have been a sophistic manual such as those Aristotle refers to – he argued – and hence been ‘used over the years in a “hands on” way’, we can imagine it as open to modifications of its contents and language ‘in a way that standard books would not have been’.<sup>174</sup>

Furthermore, there is no doubt that, albeit short and mutilated, chapter 9 guides the reader through mnemonics in a way so detailed to prove that at its initial Greek stage, of which it is the only testimony, mnemonics was not as far from the later Roman development as usually maintained. On the other hand, in the rest of the text the

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<sup>172</sup> Translation in Forster/Furley (1955), 155.

<sup>173</sup> Robinson (1979), 56.

<sup>174</sup> Robinson (2003), 244-245.

exposition sounds more epideictic than didactic, nothing suggesting that the work was composed to be studied in a school rather than to be read by a more general audience. On the other hand, the former hypothesis cannot be discarded either, especially considering the fact that even Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen* and *Defence of Palamedes*, whose style is incomparably higher than our work's, may have been composed just as examples of 'models to be learnt by heart' by an apprentice rhetor.<sup>175</sup>

To sum up, *Dissoi Logoi* appears to be a complete work, rather than a collection of notes, written by a sophist between 355 and 338 BCE, in a time when Alcidamas was still the most relevant figure in the profession and the rhetorical treatise preserved in *POxy* 410 had already been composed. I touch here on the latter because *Dissoi Logoi* has been deemed contemporaneous to it, and sometimes the two have been likened to one another on the basis of an allegedly similar rhetorical interest, and of their Doric dialect.<sup>176</sup> However, a quick look immediately reveals the higher degree of purity of the Doric of the *POxy* 410 treatise compared to our work's κοινή; and that, in turn, may reflect the difference between a text composed at the beginning, and one in the second half of the 4<sup>th</sup> century BCE, as I argue. Also, although literary quotations are frequent in both, the didactic intent of the *POxy* 410 treatise is not as evident in *Dissoi Logoi*. As I will better show later, in fact, the goal of the nine speeches of our work seems not so much to form a sophistic manual, but rather to give an essay of the author's vast culture and preparation which ranges from rhetoric to literature, from history to philosophy, in a way not belonging to the *POxy* 410 treatise.

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<sup>175</sup> Guthrie (1971), 270.

<sup>176</sup> On the similarity between the two see Grenfell/Hunt (1903), 26, Christ/Schmid/Stählin (1940), 204.



## 2. Critical Text and Translation

### 1. Περί τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ

(1) δισσοὶ λόγοι λέγονται ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων περὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ. τοὶ μὲν γὰρ λέγοντι ὡς ἄλλο μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κακόν· τοὶ δὲ ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθὸν εἶη, τοῖς δὲ  
5 κακόν, καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τοτὲ μὲν ἀγαθόν, τοτὲ δὲ κακόν. (2) ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τοῖσδε ποτιτίθεμαι. σκέψομαι δὲ ἐκ τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ βίῳ, ᾧ ἐπιμελὲς βρώσιός τε καὶ πόσιος καὶ ἀφροδισίων. ταῦτα γὰρ ἀσθενοῦντι μὲν κακόν, ὑγιαίνουντι δὲ καὶ δεομένῳ ἀγαθόν. (3) καὶ ἡ κρασία τοίνυν τούτων τοῖς μὲν ἀκρατέσι κακόν, τοῖς δὲ πωλεῦντι ταῦτα καὶ  
10 μισθαρνεόντι ἀγαθόν. νόσος τοίνυν τοῖς μὲν ἀσθενεῦντι κακόν, τοῖς δὲ ἰατροῖς ἀγαθόν. ὁ τοίνυν θάνατος τοῖς μὲν ἀποθανοῦσι κακόν, τοῖς δὲ ἔνταφιοπώλαις καὶ τυμβοποιοῖς ἀγαθόν. (4) γεωργία τε καλῶς ἐξενείκασα τῶς καρπῶς τοῖς μὲν γεωργοῖς ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ ἐμπόροις κακόν. τὰς τοίνυν ὀλκάδας συντρίβεσθαι καὶ παραθραύεσθαι τῷ μὲν  
15 ναυκλήρῳ κακόν, τοῖς δὲ ναυπαγοῖς ἀγαθόν. (5) ἔτι δὲ τὸν σίδαρον κατέσθεσθαι καὶ ἀμβλύνεσθαι καὶ συντρίβεσθαι τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις κακόν, τῷ δὲ χαλκῇ ἀγαθόν. καὶ μὲν τὸν κέραμον παραθραύεσθαι τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις κακόν, τοῖς δὲ κεραμεῦσιν ἀγαθόν. τὰ δὲ ὑποδήματα κατατρίβεσθαι καὶ διαρρήγνυσθαι τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις κακόν, τῷ δὲ σκυτῇ  
20 ἀγαθόν. (6) ἐν τοίνυν τοῖς ἀγῶσι τοῖς γυμνικοῖς καὶ τοῖς μωσικοῖς καὶ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, αὐτίκα ἐν τῷ γυμνικῷ τῷ σταδιοδρόμῳ, ἂν νίκα τῷ μὲν νικῶντι ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ ἡσασμένοις κακόν. (7) καττωὺτὸ δὲ καὶ τοὶ παλαισταὶ καὶ πύκται καὶ τοὶ ἄλλοι πάντες μωσικοί· αὐτίκα ἂν κιθαρωδία τῷ μὲν νικῶντι ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ ἡσασμένοις κακόν.

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1 Περί τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ St.] Περί ἀγαθῷ καὶ κακῷ Ro.

## **1. On what is good and what is bad**

(1) Contrasting speeches are made in Hellas by those who philosophize about what is good and what is bad. For some say that that which is good is one thing, that which is bad is another; others say that they are the same, and that for some people it is good, for others bad, and for the same man sometimes good, sometimes bad. (2) I too agree with the latter. I will reflect, then, starting from human life, whose business is food, drinking and sexual pleasures. These things, in fact, are bad for those who are sick, but good for one who is in health and needs them. (3) And incontinence in these things is something bad for the incontinent, but good for those who trade in them and earn wages by them. Illness, further, is bad for patients, but good for physicians. Death is something bad for those dying, but good for undertakers and grave-diggers. (4) When farming produces a successful harvest, it is a good thing for farmers, but bad for merchants. And the fact that the trading vessels shatter and smash is bad for the ship-owners, but good for the ship-builders. (5) Besides, that iron corrodes, loses edge and wears out is a bad thing for the others, but good for the blacksmith. And that the pottery gets broken is a bad thing for others, good for the potters. And the fact that footwear gets worn out and broken through is a bad thing for others, good for the cobbler. (6) In gymnastic contests, in musical ones and in those of war, for example the race at the stadium, victory is a good thing for the winner, but for the losers bad. (7) And the same applies to fighters, boxers and all musicians; for example, singing to the kithara is a good thing for the winner, but for the losers bad.

(8) ἔν τε τῷ πολέμῳ (καὶ τὰ νεώτατα πρῶτον ἐρῶ) ἅ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων  
νίκα ἂν ἐνίκων Ἀθηναίως καὶ τῶς συμμάχως Λακεδαιμονίοις μὲν  
ἀγαθόν, Ἀθηναίοις δὲ καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις κακόν· ἅ τε νίκα ἂν τοὶ  
Ἕλλανες τὸν Πέρσαν ἐνίκασαν τοῖς μὲν Ἑλλασιν ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ  
5 βαρβάροις κακόν. (9) ἅ τοίνυν τοῦ Ἰλίου αἵρεσις τοῖς μὲν Ἀχαιοῖς ἀγαθόν,  
τοῖς δὲ Τρῳσὶ κακόν. καδδὲ ταῦτόν καὶ τὰ τῶν Θηβαίων καὶ τὰ τῶν  
Ἀργείων πάθη. (10) καὶ ἅ τῶν Κενταύρων καὶ Λαπιθᾶν μάχη τοῖς μὲν  
Λαπίθαις ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ Κενταύροις κακόν. καὶ μὲν καὶ ἅ τῶν θεῶν  
καὶ Γιγάντων λεγόμενα μάχα καὶ νίκα τοῖς μὲν θεοῖς ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ  
10 Γίγασιν κακόν. (11) ἄλλος δὲ λόγος λέγεται ὡς ἄλλο μὲν τὰγαθὸν εἶη,  
ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κακόν, διαφέρον ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν νυμα οὔτῳ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα. ἐγὼ  
δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτον διαιρεῦμαι τὸν τρόπον. δοκῶ γὰρ οὐδὲ διάδαλον  
ἤμεν ποῖον ἀγαθὸν καὶ ποῖον κακόν, αἱ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ἐκάτερον  
εἶη· καὶ γὰρ θαυμαστόν κ' εἶη. (12) οἶμαι δὲ οὐδέ κ' αὐτὸν ἔχεν  
15 ἀποκρίνασθαι, αἱ τις [αὐτόν] ἔροιτο τὸν ταῦτα λέγοντα· “εἶπον δὴ μοι,  
ἤδη τύ τι τοὶ γονέες ἀγαθὸν ἐποίησαν;” φαίη κα· “καὶ πολλὰ καὶ  
μεγάλα.” “τὸ ἄρα κακὰ καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ τούτοις ὀφείλεις, αἵπερ  
τωυτόν ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῷ κακῷ. (13) τί δέ, τῶς συγγενέας ἤδη τι ἀγαθὸν  
ἐποίησας; τῶς ἄρα συγγενέας κακὸν ἐποίεις. τί δέ, τῶς ἐχθρῶς ἤδη  
20 κακῶς ἐποίησας; καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μέγιστα ἄρα ἀγαθὰ ἐποίησας. (14) ἄγε  
δὴ μοι καὶ τόδε ἀπόκριναι· ἄλλο τι ἢ τῶς πτωχῶς οἰκτεῖρεις, ὅτι πολλὰ  
καὶ κακὰ ἔχοντι, <καὶ> πάλιν εὐδαιμονίζεις, ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ  
πράσσοντι, αἵπερ τωυτό κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν;”

16 τύ τι τοὶ γονέες ἀγαθὸν ἐποίησαν; Schu.] τι τῶς γονέας ἀγαθὸν ἐποίησας; Ro.

21 πολλὰ καὶ κακὰ ἔχοντι, <καὶ> πάλιν DK] πολλὰ καὶ κακὰ ἔχοντι, πάλιν Ro.

(8) In war (and I will talk about the most recent events first) the victory of the Lacedaemonians over the Athenians and their allies was good for the Lacedaemonians, but bad for the Athenians and their allies. And that in which the Hellenes prevailed over Persia was a good thing for the Hellenes, bad for the barbarians. (9) The taking of Ilium was for the Achaeans a good thing, but for the Trojans bad. And in the same way went the events of the Thebans and the Argives. (10) And the battle of the Centaurs and the Lapiths was a good thing for the Lapiths, bad for the Centaurs. Further, the battle between the Gods and the Giants, of which we are told, was a good thing for the Gods, bad for the Giants. (11) But another speech says that what is good is one thing, what is bad another one, differing as much in name as in fact. I myself make a distinction in this way. For I believe that one could not recognize what sort is good and what sort bad, if the one were the same as the other and not different; and in fact that would be surprising. (12) I also think that not even he who says these things would be able to answer if thus asked: "Tell me, then, have your parents ever done good to you?" He could reply: "Many and important ones". "Therefore, you owe them many and important evils, if it is true that what is good is the same as what is bad. (13) And have you ever done good to your relatives? This way, you have done evil to them, then. Well, have you ever harmed your enemies? This way, then, you have brought them benefits many and important. (14) Come on, answer me this too: is it not the case that you pity beggars because they have many evils, and contrariwise, deem them lucky, since they attain many goods, if indeed the same thing is bad and good?"



(15) τὸν δὲ βασιλῆ τὸν μέγαν οὐδὲν κωλύει ὁμοίως διακεῖσθαι τοῖς πτωχοῖς. τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἀγαθὰ αὐτῷ πολλὰ κακὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἐστίν, αἱ γὰρ τούτων ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν. καὶ τάδε μὲν περὶ τῷ παντὸς εἰρήσθω. (16) εἴμι δὲ καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τῷ

5 ἐσθίεν καὶ πίνεν καὶ ἀφροδισιάζεν. τούτῳ γὰρ τοῖς ἀσθενεῦντι ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἀγαθόν ἐστίν, αἵπερ τούτων ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν. καὶ τοῖς νοσέοντι κακόν ἐστὶ τὸ νοσεῖν καὶ ἀγαθόν, αἵπερ τούτων ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν τῷ κακῷ. (17) καδδὲ τόδε καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν λόγῳ εἴρηται. καὶ οὐ λέγω τί ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο πειρῶμαι διδάσκειν,  
10 ὥς οὐ τούτων εἷη κακόν καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἄλλο ἐκάτερον.

(15) And there is nothing to prevent the Great King from finding himself in the same situation as beggars. For his many, important goods are many, important evils, if the same thing really is good and bad. And let this apply in every subject. (16) But I shall come to them individually as well, starting from eating, drinking and having sex. For it is good alike for people who are ill to follow these practices, if indeed the same thing is good and bad. And ailing is bad and good for the sick, if indeed what is good is the same as what is bad. (17) All the other cases mentioned in the previous speech are in accordance with this one. And I do not mean to say what the good thing is, but this I endeavour to show, that the same thing is not good and bad, but the one thing is different from the other.

## 2. Περί τῶ καλῶ καὶ τῶ αἰσχροῦ

(1) λέγονται δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶ καλῶ καὶ αἰσχροῦ διῃσοὶ λόγοι. τοὶ μὲν γὰρ φαντι ἄλλο μὲν ἦμεν τὸ καλόν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ αἰσχρόν, διαφέρον ὥσπερ καὶ τῶνυμα οὕτω καὶ τὸ σῶμα· τοὶ δὲ τῶντὸ καλόν καὶ αἰσχρόν. (2) καὶ γὰρ πειρασεῦμαι τόνδε τὸν τρόπον ἐξαγεύμενος. αὐτίκα γὰρ παιδὶ ὠραίῳ ἐραστᾷ μὲν χρηστῷ χαρίζεσθαι καλόν, μὴ ἐραστᾷ δὲ καλῷ αἰσχρόν. (3) καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας λοῦσθαι ἔνδοι καλόν, ἐν παλαίστρᾳ δὲ αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἐν παλαίστρᾳ καὶ ἐν γυμνασίῳ καλόν. (4) καὶ συνίμεν τῷ ἀνδρὶ ἐν ἀσυχίᾳ μὲν καλόν, ὅπου τοίχοις κρυφθήσεται, ἔξω δὲ αἰσχρόν, ὅπου τις ὄψεται. (5) καὶ τῷ μὲν αὐτᾷ συνίμεν ἀνδρὶ καλόν, ἀλλοτρίῳ δὲ αἰσχιστον. καὶ τῷ γε ἀνδρὶ τᾷ μὲν ἑαυτῷ γυναικὶ συνίμεν καλόν, ἀλλοτρίᾳ δὲ αἰσχρόν. (6) καὶ κοσμεῖσθαι καὶ ψιμυθίῳ χρίεσθαι καὶ χρυσία περιάπτεσθαι τῷ μὲν ἀνδρὶ αἰσχρόν, τᾷ δὲ γυναικὶ καλόν. (7) καὶ τῶς μὲν φίλως εὖ ποιῆν καλόν, τῶς δὲ ἐχθρῶς αἰσχρόν. καὶ τῶς μὲν πολεμίως φεύγεν αἰσχρόν, τῶς δὲ ἐν σταδίῳ ἀγωνιστὰς καλόν. (8) καὶ τῶς μὲν φίλως καὶ τῶς πολίτας φονεύεν αἰσχρόν, τῶς δὲ πολεμίως καλόν. καὶ τάδε μὲν περὶ πάντων. (9) εἶμι δ' ἐφ' ἃ ταὶ πόλιές τε αἰσχροὶ ἀγῆνται καὶ τὰ ἔθνεα. αὐτίκα Λακεδαιμονίοις τὰς κόρας γυμνάζεσθαι καὶ ἀχειριδῶτως καὶ ἀχίτωνας παρέρπεν καλόν, Ἰῶσι δὲ αἰσχρόν.

## 2. On what is seemly what is shameful

(1) Contrasting speeches are made also about what is seemly and what is shameful. In fact, some say that what is seemly is one thing, what is shameful is another, differing as much in name as in body; other people say that the same thing is seemly and shameful. (2) I too shall attempt to expound the matter in this way. To begin with, it is seemly for a youngster in the prime of life to grant his favours to a worthy lover, but shameful to the one who is not seemly. (3) And that women wash is seemly at home, shameful in the palaistra, but for men it is seemly in the palaistra and in the gymnasium. (4) And for the man having sex in a sheltered place, where he will be hidden by the walls, is seemly, whereas outdoors, where someone will observe him, is shameful. (5) <For the woman> having sexual intercourse with her own husband is seemly, with another woman's one is very shameful. And for the man too having sexual intercourse with his own wife is seemly, with another man's one shameful. (6) Adorning oneself, painting oneself with white lead, and covering oneself with gold leaves for the man is shameful, but is seemly for the woman. (7) Doing good to friends is seemly, to those hostile to us shameful. And fleeing from the enemies is shameful, but the competitors in the running race seemly. (8) Killing friends and fellow citizens is shameful, but enemies seemly. And that applies in everything. (9) I next move on to those behaviours which cities and peoples deem shameful. For example, to Lacedaemonians that girls practise gymnastic exercises and show themselves without sleeves and chiton is seemly, to Ionians shameful.

(10) καὶ <τοῖς μὲν> τὼς παιῖδας μὴ μανθάνειν μωσικὰ καὶ γράμματα  
καλόν, Ἵωσι δ' αἰσχροὺς μὴ ἐπίστασθαι ταῦτα πάντα. (11) Θεσσαλοῖσι δὲ  
καλόν τὼς ἵππως ἐκ τῆς ἀγέλας λαβόντι αὐτῷ δαμάσαι καὶ τὼς ὄρεας,  
βῶν τε λαβόντι αὐτῷ σφάξαι καὶ ἐκδεῖραι καὶ κατακόψαι, ἐν Σικελίᾳ δὲ  
5 αἰσχροὺς καὶ δώλων ἔργα. (12) Μακεδόσι δὲ καλόν δοκεῖ ἡμεῖν τὰς κόρας,  
πρὶν ἀνδρὶ γάμασθαι, ἔρασθαι καὶ ἀνδρὶ συγγίγνεσθαι, ἐπεὶ δὲ κα  
γάμηται, αἰσχροὺς Ἑλλασιν δ' ἄμφω αἰσχροὺς. (13) τοῖς δὲ Θραξὶ κόσμος  
τὰς κόρας στίζεσθαι, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις τιμωρία τὰ στίγματα τοῖς ἀδικέοντι.  
τοῖ δὲ Σκύθαι καλόν νομίζοντι ὅς ἄνδρα κα κατακανῶν ἐκδεῖραι τὴν  
10 κεφαλὰν τὸ μὲν κόμιον πρὸ τοῦ ἵππου φορῇ, τὸ δ' ὀστέον χρυσώσας καὶ  
ἀργυρώσας πίνην ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ σπένδην τοῖς θεοῖς· ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἑλλασιν  
οὐδέ κ' ἐς τὴν αὐτὴν οἰκίαν συνεισελθεῖν βούλοιντο τις τοιαῦτα  
ποιήσαντι. (14) Μασσαγέται δὲ τὼς γονέας κατακόψαντες κατέσθοντι,  
καὶ τάφος κάλλιστος δοκεῖ ἡμεῖν ἐν τοῖς τέκνοις τέθαφθαι, ἐν δὲ τῇ  
15 Ἑλλάδι αἱ τις ταῦτα ποιήσαι ἐξελαθεὶς ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος κακῶς κα ἀποθάνει  
ὥς αἰσχροὺς καὶ δεινὰ ποιέων. (15) τοῖ δὲ Πέρσαι κοσμεῖσθαι τε ὥσπερ τὰς  
γυναῖκας καὶ τὼς ἄνδρας καλόν νομίζοντι, καὶ τῇ θυγατρὶ καὶ τῇ μητρὶ  
καὶ τῇ ἀδελφῇ συνίμεν, τοῖ δὲ Ἕλληνας καὶ αἰσχροὺς καὶ παράνομα. (16)  
Λυδοῖς τοίνυν τὰς κόρας πορνευθείσας καὶ ἀργύριον ἐνεργάσασθαι καὶ  
20 οὕτω γάμασθαι καλόν δοκεῖ ἡμεῖν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἑλλασιν οὐδεὶς κα θέλοι  
γάμει.

(10) And to the former that youngsters do not learn the music and the letters is seemly, whereas to Ionians it is shameful not to know all these things. (11) To Thessalians it is seemly that he who has captured horses from the herd breaks them in by himself, and so it is with mules, and that he who has captured an ox slays it, flays it and chops it by himself; on the contrary, in Sicily, it is shameful and those are actions of slaves. (12) To Macedonians it appears seemly that girls, before finding a husband, love and have sexual intercourse with a man, but once <a girl> has been taken in marriage, shameful; to Hellenes both the actions appear shameful. (13) To Thracians that women get tattooed is orderly, whereas to the other peoples tattoos are a punishment for those who do wrong. Scythians deem it seemly that he who has killed a man, after having flayed his head, carries his scalp about on the forehead of his horse, and having gilded and silvered the skull, that he drinks from it and makes libations to the gods. Among Hellenes one would not wish even to come together at the same house with him who has performed such actions. (14) Massagetae devour their parents once having chopped them and to them being buried inside their children seems a marvellous burial, whereas in Hellas if one did these things, he would die in misery, banished from there, as perpetrator of shameful and terrible actions. (15) Persians consider it seemly that, as well as women, men too adorn themselves, and have sex with their daughter, mother and sister, whereas Hellenes consider these behaviours shameful and illegal. (16) To Lydians, then, it appears to be seemly that girls by means of prostitution not only make money, but also find a husband this way, whereas among Hellenes none would like to take them as their wives.

- (17) Αἰγύπτιοί τε οὐ ταῦτὰ νομίζοντι καλὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις· τῇδε μὲν γὰρ  
 γυναῖκας ὑφαίνειν καὶ <ἔρια> ἐργάζεσθαι καλόν, ἀλλὰ τῇδε τῶς  
 ἄνδρας, τὰς δὲ γυναῖκας πράσσειν ἄπερ τῇδε τοὶ ἄνδρες. τὸν παλὸν  
 δεύειν ταῖς χερσί, τὸν δὲ σῖτον τοῖς ποσί, τήνοις καλόν, ἀλλ' ἀμὴν τὸ  
 5 ἐναντίον. (18) οἶμαι δ', αἵ τις τὰ αἰσχροῖ ἐς ἓν κελεύοι συνενεῖκαι πάντας  
 ἀνθρώπως ἅ ἕκαστοι νομίζοντι, καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ἀθρώων τούτων τὰ καλὰ  
 λαβὲν ἅ ἕκαστοι ἄγηνται, οὐδὲν κα λειφθῆμεν, ἀλλὰ πάντας πάντα  
 διαλαβέν. οὐ γὰρ πάντες ταῦτὰ νομίζοντι. (19) παρεξοῦμαι δὲ καὶ  
 ποιήμα τι
- 10 καὶ γὰρ τὸν ἄλλον ὧδε θνητοῖσιν νόμον  
 ὄψῃ διαθρῶν· οὐδὲν ἦν πάντῃ καλόν  
 οὐδ' αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἐποίησεν λαβῶν  
 ὁ καιρὸς αἰσχροῖ καὶ διαλλάξας καλά.
- 15 (20) ὥς δὲ τὸ σύνολον εἶπαι, πάντα καιρῶ μὲν καλά ἐντι, ἐν ἀκαιρίᾳ δ'  
 αἰσχροῖ. τί ὦν διεπραξάμην; ἔφην ἀποδείξειν ταῦτὰ αἰσχροῖ καὶ καλὰ  
 ἐόντα, καὶ ἀπέδειξα ἐν τούτοις πᾶσι. (21) λέγεται δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶ αἰσchrῶ  
 καὶ καλῶ ὥς ἄλλο ἐκάτερον εἶη. ἐπεὶ αἵ τις ἐρωτάσαι τῶς λέγοντας ὥς  
 τὸ αὐτὸ πράγμα αἰσχρόν καὶ καλόν ἐστιν, αἵ ποκά τι αὐτοῖς καλόν  
 ἔργασται, αἰσχρόν ὁμολογησοῦντι, αἵπερ τούτων καὶ τὸ αἰσχρόν καὶ τὸ  
 20 καλόν. (22) καὶ αἵ τινά γα καλὸν οἶδαντι ἄνδρα, τοῦτον καὶ αἰσχρόν τὸν  
 αὐτόν. καὶ αἵ τινά γα λευκόν, καὶ μέλανα τοῦτον τὸν αὐτόν.

(17) Egyptians do not regard the same things as seemly as the other peoples: for here it is seemly that women weave and work the wool, but there that men do it, and that women run the businesses which here men do. Kneading the clay with hands and the bread with feet to them is a seemly thing, but to us the reverse is. (18) I believe, then, that if someone bid all men make a heap of the things which they each deem to be the shameful, and conversely, to take those that each considers as the seemly ones from these collected, nothing would be left behind, but everyone would take everything. For not all have the same opinions. (19) And I will offer up also a certain poem:

And, in fact, this you will see, by observing  
the other law of men: nothing is completely seemly  
or shameful, but having got hold of the same things,  
the right moment makes them shameful and seemly, exchanging them.

(20) Generally speaking, all things are seemly at the right moment, shameful at the wrong one. What did I then accomplish? I said that I would show that the same things are shameful and seemly, and I did it through all these arguments. (21) But it is said also about what is shameful and what is seemly that they differ from one other. For, if someone asked those who say that the same thing is shameful and seemly whether anything seemly has ever been done to them, they would acknowledge that as shameful, if it is true that what is shameful and what is seemly are the same. (22) And if they know some man as seemly, they know that this same one is shameful too. And if they know that someone is white, they know that this same man is black too.



καὶ αἱ καλὸν γ' ἐστὶ τῶς θεῶς σέβεσθαι, καὶ αἰσχρὸν ἄρα τῶς θεῶς  
σέβεσθαι, αἵπερ τούτων αἰσχρὸν καὶ καλὸν ἐστὶ. (23) καὶ τάδε μὲν περὶ  
ἀπάντων εἰρήσθω μοι· τρέψομαι δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον αὐτῶν ὃν λέγοντι. (24)  
αἱ γὰρ τὰν γυναῖκα καλὸν ἐστὶ κοσμεῖσθαι, τὰν γυναῖκα αἰσχρὸν  
5 κοσμεῖσθαι, αἵπερ τούτων αἰσχρὸν καὶ καλόν· καὶ τᾶλλα κατὰ τούτον.  
(25) ἐν Λακεδαίμονί ἐστὶ καλὸν τὰς παῖδας γυμνάζεσθαι, ἐν  
Λακεδαίμονί ἐστὶν αἰσχρὸν τὰς παῖδας γυμνάζεσθαι, καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως.  
(26) λέγοντι δὲ ὥς αἱ τινες τὰ αἰσχροῖα ἐκ τῶν ἐθνέων πάντοθεν  
συνενεῖκαιεν, ἔπειτα συγκαλέσαντες κελεύοιεν ἅ τις καλὰ νομίζοι  
10 λαμβάνεν πάντα καὶ ἐν καλῷ ἀπενειχθῆμεν. ἐγὼ θαυμάζω αἱ τὰ αἰσχροῖα  
συνενεχθέντα καλὰ ἐσεῖται, καὶ οὐχ οἷάπερ ἦνθεν. (27) αἱ γοῦν ἵππως ἢ  
βῶς ἢ δις ἢ ἀνθρώπως ἄγαγον, οὐκ ἄλλο τί καὶ ἀπάγον· ἐπεὶ οὐδ' αἱ  
χρυσὸν ἤνεικαν, χαλχόν <κα> ἀπῆνεικαν, οὐδ' αἱ ἀργύριον ἤνεικαν,  
μόλιβδόν καὶ ἀπέφερον. (28) ἀντὶ δ' ἄρα τῶν αἰσχροῶν καλὰ ἀπάγοντι;  
15 φέρε δὴ, αἱ ἄρα τις αἰσχρὸν ἄγαγε, τοῦτον αὖ <κα> καλὸν ἀπάγαγε;  
ποιητὰς δὲ μάρτυρας ἐπάγονται, οἳ ποτὶ ἄδοναν οὐ ποτ' ἀλάθειαν  
ποιεῦντι.

And if it is seemly to worship the gods, it is also shameful to worship the gods, if indeed the same thing is shameful and seemly. (23) And let this reasoning of mine apply in every case; but I will turn to the speech of theirs which they make. (24) If, in fact, it is seemly that the woman adorns herself, it will be shameful that the woman adorns herself, if indeed the same thing is shameful and seemly; and all the other cases go this same way. (25) In Lacedaemon it is seemly that children exercise, in Lacedaemon it is shameful that children exercise, and so it is for all the other cases. (26) They also say that if some men gathered the shameful things from the peoples of everywhere, and then, following a convocation, they bid each one take the things which he considers seemly, all would be taken away as seemly. I marvel that the shameful things gathered will be seemly and surely not such as they came. (27) No doubt, if they had brought horses, or oxen, or sheep, or men, they would not have taken away something different; for neither if they had brought gold, would they have taken away bronze, nor if they had brought silver, would they have taken away lead. (28) Therefore, do they take away seemly things in place of the shameful ones? Come on, if then one had brought something shameful, would he have carried this off as seemly? After all, they call on poets as witnesses, who compose not in the name of truth, but in view of pleasure.

### 3. Περί τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ

(1) διισοὶ δὲ λόγοι λέγονται καὶ περὶ τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ, καὶ τοὶ μὲν ἄλλο ἤμεν τὸ δίκαιον, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἀδικον, τοὶ δὲ τωὐτὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἀδικον· καὶ ἐγὼ τούτῳ πειρασοῦμαι τιμωρὲν. (2) καὶ πρῶτον μὲν  
5 ψεύδεσθαι ὡς δίκαιόν ἐστι λεξῶ καὶ ἐξαπατᾶν. τῶς μὲν πολεμίως ταῦτα ποιεῖν αἰσχροὺν καὶ πονηρὸν ἂν ἐξείποιεν· τῶς δὲ φιλτάτως οὐ· αὐτίκα τῶς γονέας· αἱ γὰρ δέοι τὸν πατέρα ἢ τὴν μητέρα φάρμακον πιεῖν καὶ φαγέειν, καὶ μὴ θέλοι, οὐ δίκαιόν ἐστι καὶ ἐν τῷ ῥοφήματι καὶ ἐν τῷ ποτῷ δόμεν καὶ μὴ φάμεν ἐνῆμεν; (3) οὐκῶν ἤδη ψεύδεσθαι καὶ ἐξαπατᾶν τῶς  
10 γονέας καὶ κλέπτειν μὲν τὰ τῶν φίλων καὶ βιῆσθαι τῶς φιλτάτως δίκαιον. (4) αὐτίκα αἱ τις λυπηθεὶς τι τῶν οἰκητῶν καὶ ἀχθεσθεὶς μέλλοι αὐτὸν διαφθεῖρεν ἢ ξίφει ἢ σχοινίῳ ἢ ἄλλῳ τινί, δίκαιόν ἐστι ταῦτα κλέψαι, αἱ δύναται, αἱ δὲ ὑστερίξαι καὶ ἔχοντα καταλάβοι, ἀφελέσθαι βία. (5) ἀνδραποδίσσασθαι δὲ πῶς οὐ δίκαιον τῶς πολεμίως, αἱ τις δύναται ἐλὼν  
15 πόλιν ὅλαν ἀποδόσθαι; τοιχωρυχὲν δὲ τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν κοινὰ οἰκήματα δίκαιον φαίνεται. αἱ γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ ἐπὶ θανάτῳ, κατεστασιασμένος ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, δεδεμένος εἴη, ἄρα οὐ δίκαιον διορύξαντα κλέψαι καὶ σῶσαι τὸν πατέρα; (6) ἐπιорκεῖν δέ· αἱ τις ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων λαφθεὶς ὑποδέξαιτο ὁμνύων ἢ μὲν ἀφεθεὶς τὴν πόλιν προδώσεν, ἄρα οὗτος  
20 δικάϊα κα ποιῆσαι εὐορκήσας; (7) ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐ δοκῶ, ἀλλὰ μάλλον τὴν πόλιν καὶ τῶς φίλως καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ σῶσαι ἂν τὰ πατρώϊα ἐπιορκήσας. ἤδη ἄρα δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἐπιορκεῖν. καὶ τὸ ἱεροσυλὲν ·

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1 Περί τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ St.] Περί δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου Ro. 13 βία. O] βία; Ro. (sed punctum in translatione)

### 3. On what is just and what is unjust

(1) Contrasting speeches are made also about what is just and what is unjust, and some people <say> that what is just is one thing, what is unjust is another; other people say that the same thing is just and unjust. I too shall try to defend the latter thesis. (2) And to begin with, I shall say that it is just to lie and deceive. People may assert that <it is> ugly and base to do these things to one's enemies, but not to the people dearest to one, for instance parents. For if it were necessary for one's father or mother to drink or eat a medication, and they were not willing to do it, would it not be just to give it to them in the gruel or in the drink, without saying that it is inside? (3) Therefore, <it is> already just to lie to parents and to deceive them, and besides to steal the belongings of one's friends and to use force against one's most beloved people. (4) For example, if someone who is grieved and vexed by some private issue were about to kill themselves with a sword, or a rope, or something else, it would be just to take these away, if possible; and if one happened to arrive late and found him with those, it would be just to remove them with force. (5) How could it not <be> just to enslave one's enemies, if one were able to sell a whole city into slavery, having seized <it>? It also seems just to break through the walls of the buildings which are common possession of the citizens. For if one's father, overpowered by his enemies, had been sentenced to death, would it not <be> just, perhaps, to secretly carry him away and save his life, having dug through <the walls>? (6) And to break an oath: if a man, captured by his enemies, indicated under solemn oath that, once set free, he would betray his city, would he act justly by keeping it? (7) For I personally do not think so, but rather that he should save his city, his friends and the temples of his fathers, by breaking it. It immediately follows that <it is> just to break one's oath too. And also to rob a temple:

(8) τὰ μὲν ἴδια τῶν πόλεων ἔῳ, τὰ δὲ κοινὰ τᾶς Ἑλλάδος, τὰ ἐκ Δελφῶν καὶ τὰ ἐξ Ὀλυμπίας, μέλλοντος τῷ βαρβάρῳ τὴν Ἑλλάδα λαβὲν καὶ τᾶς σωτηρίας ἐν χρήμασιν εἰσάρας, οὐ δίκαιον λαβεῖν καὶ χρῆσθαι ἐς τὸν πόλεμον; (9) φονεύειν δὲ τὼς φιλτάτως δίκαιον, ἐπεὶ καὶ Ὀρέστας καὶ

5 Ἀλκμαίων \*\*\* καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἔχρησε δίκαια αὐτῷ ποιῆσαι. (10) ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς τέχνας τρέψομαι καὶ τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν. ἐν γὰρ τραγωδοποιίᾳ καὶ ζωγραφίᾳ ὅστις πλεῖστα ἐξαπατῇ ὅμοια τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς ποιέων, οὗτος ἄριστος. (11) θέλω δὲ καὶ ποιημάτων παλαιότερων μαρτύριον ἐπαγαγέσθαι. Κλεοβουλίνης ·

10 ἄνδρ' εἶδον κλέπτοντα καὶ ἐξαπατῶντα βιαίως,  
καὶ τὸ βίᾳ ῥέξαι τοῦτο δικαιοτάτον.

(12) ἦν πάλαι ταῦτα· Αἰσχύλου δὲ ταῦτα·

ἀπάτης δικαίας οὐκ ἀποστατεῖ θεός ·  
ψευδῶν δὲ καιρὸν ἔσθ' ὅπου τιμῇ θεός.

15 (13) λέγεται δὲ καὶ τῷδε ἀντίος λόγος ὡς ἄλλο τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικόν ἐστιν, διαφέρον ὥσπερ καὶ τῶνυμα οὕτω καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα. ἐπεὶ αἱ τις ἐρωτάσαι τὼς λέγοντας ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστιν ἄδικον καὶ δίκαιον, αἱ ἤδη τι δίκαιον περὶ τὼς γονέας ἔπραξαν, ὁμολογησοῦντι. καὶ ἄδικον ἄρα. τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἄδικον καὶ δίκαιον ὁμολογέοντι ἡμεν.

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5 lacunam inter Ἀλκμαίων et καί suspicio] Ἀλκμαίων· καὶ Ro.

(8) I leave out those which are exclusive property of cities, but when the barbarian was about to take over Hellas, and its safety lay in money, <was it> not just to seize the temples which are common property of Hellas, those of Delphi and Olympia, and use them for the purpose of war? (9) And <it is> just to kill the people dearest to one, since Orestes and Alcmaeon <did it (?)> and the god proclaimed that they had acted justly. (10) Now I shall turn to arts and to poets' activity. In fact, in the composition of tragedies and in the art of painting he who deceives the most by making works similar to real objects <is> the best. (11) And I want to call on the testimony of older poems. These words of Cleobuline,

'a man I saw stealing and deceiving violently,  
and doing that perforce <was> very just',

(12) were ancient. These are from Aeschylus:

'From a just deception, the god does not stand aloof';

'There are cases when the god holds in honour the right moment for lies.'

(13) But also a speech opposite to this one is made, to the effect that what is just is one thing, what is unjust is another, differing as much in name as in fact. For if one asked those who say that the same thing is unjust and just whether they have ever performed a just action towards their parents, they will answer in the affirmative. Then, that <will be> unjust too. For they admit that the same thing is unjust and just.

(14) φέρε ἄλλο δέ· αἷ τινα γινώσκεις δίκαιον ἄνδρα, καὶ ἄδικον ἄρα τὸν αὐτὸν (καὶ μέγαν τοίνυν καὶ μικρὸν κατὰ τωυτόν). καὶ τοι πολλὰ ἀδικήσας ἀποθανέτω <καὶ πολλὰ καὶ δίκαια δια>πραξάμενος. (15) καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλῃς. εἴμι δὲ ἐφ' ἃ λέγοντες ἀξιοῦντι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἄδικον ἀποδεικνύεν. (16) τὸ γὰρ κλέπτεν τὰ τῶν πολεμίων δίκαιον, καὶ ἄδικον ἀποδεικνύει τοῦτ' αὐτό, αἷ κ' ἀληθῆς ὁ τήνων λόγος, καὶ τᾶλλα καττωυτό. (17) τέχνας δὲ ἐπάγονται ἐν αἷς οὐκ ἔστι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον. καὶ τοὶ ποιηταὶ οὗτοι ποτ' ἀλάθειαν ἀλλὰ ποτὶ τὰς ἀδονὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὰ ποιήματα ποιέοντι.

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1 γινώσκεις Di.] γινώσκει Ro.    2 καὶ τοι πολλὰ O] καίτοι πολλὰ Ro.    3 ἀποθανέτω <καὶ πολλὰ καὶ δίκαια δια>πραξάμενος Di.] ἀποθανέτω <ἄτε θανάτω ἄξια δια?>πραξάμενος Ro.    6 ἀποδεικνύει Wi.] ἀποδεικνύεν Ro.

(14) But take another case: if you know someone as a just man, then you will know the same person as unjust (and, further, as big and small, on the same principle). And, mark you, if he has performed many unjust actions let him be put to death also for having carried out many and just actions!

(15) Now, enough about these cases. I come to the things saying which they claim that they show that the same thing <is> just and unjust. (16) For if ever their speech <is> true, it shows that robbing one's enemies <is> just and that this same action <is> unjust, and the same applies to the rest. (17) They bring in arts, in which what is just and what is unjust have no place. And indeed poets compose poems not for the sake of truth, but in view of men's pleasure.



#### 4. Περί ἀλαθείας καὶ ψεύδους

(1) λέγονται δὲ καὶ περὶ τῷ ψεύδεος καὶ τᾶς ἀλαθείας δισσοὶ λόγοι, ὧν ὁ μὲν φασι ἄλλον μὲν τὸν ψεύσταν ἤμεν λόγον, ἄλλον δὲ τὸν ἀλαθῆ· τοὶ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν αὖ. (2) καὶ γὰρ τὸνδε λέγω· πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς

5 ὀνόμασι λέγονται· ἔπειτα δέ, ὅταν λόγος ῥηθῇ, ἂν μὲν ὡς λέγεται ὁ λόγος οὕτω γένηται, ἀλαθὴς ὁ λόγος, ἂν δὲ μὴ γένηται, ψευδὴς ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. (3) αὐτίκα κατηγορεῖ ἱεροσυλίαν τῷ· αἱ γὰρ ἐγένετο τῷ ῥον, ἀλαθὴς ὁ λόγος· αἱ δὲ μὴ ἐγένετο, ψεύστας. καὶ τῷ ἀπολογουμένῳ ὥς γε ὁ λόγος. καὶ τὰ γε δικαστήρια τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ψεύσταν καὶ

10 ἀλαθῆ κρίνουν. (4) ἐπεὶ τοι καὶ ἐξῆς καθηήμενοι αἱ λέγοιμεν “μύστας εἰμί,” τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν πάντες ἐροῦμεν, ἀλαθὴς δὲ μόνος ἐγώ, ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰμί. (5) δᾶλον ὦν ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅταν μὲν αὐτῷ παρῇ τὸ ψεῦδος, ψεύστας ἐστίν, ὅταν δὲ τὸ ἀλαθές, ἀλαθὴς ὥσπερ καὶ ἄνθρωπος τὸ αὐτό, καὶ παῖς καὶ νεανίσκος καὶ ἀνὴρ καὶ γέρων, ἐστίν. (6) λέγεται δὲ καὶ ὡς ἄλλος εἶη

15 ὁ ψεύστας λόγος, ἄλλος δὲ ὁ ἀλαθής, διαφέρων <ὥσπερ καὶ> τῷ νυμᾷ <οὕτω καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα>. αἱ γὰρ τις ἐρωτάσαι τῶς λέγοντας ὡς ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος εἶη ψεύστας καὶ ἀλαθής ὃν αὐτοὶ λέγοντι, πότερος ἐστίν· αἱ μὲν “ψεύστας”, δᾶλον ὅτι δύο εἶη· αἱ δ’ “ἀλαθής” ἀποκρίναιτο, καὶ ψεύστας ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος. καὶ ἀλαθές τί ποκα εἶπεν ἢ ἐξεμαρτύρησε, καὶ ψευδῆ ἄρα

20 τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. καὶ αἱ τίνα ἄνδρα ἀλαθῆ οἶδε, καὶ ψεύσταν τὸν αὐτόν. (7) ἐκ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ λέγοντι ταῦτα, ὅτι γενομένῳ μὲν τῷ πράγματι ἀλαθῆ τὸν λόγον, ἀγενήτω δὲ ψεύσταν. οὐκ ὦν διαφέρει <ἐρέσθαι> (8) αὐθις τῶς δικαστὰς ὅ τι κρίνουν· οὐ γὰρ πάρεντι τοῖς πράγμασιν.

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1 ψεύδους O] ψευδέος Ro. 2 ψεύδεος O] ψευδέος Ro. τᾶς ἀλαθείας P3] τῷ ἀλαθέος Ro. 5 ἂν codd.] αἱ Ro. λέγεται O] <ἂν?> λέγεται Ro. 6 γένηται O bis] <γε>γένηται Ro. ἂν codd.] αἱ Ro. 13 ὥσπερ...ἐστίν intra parentheses posuit Ro. 15 <ὥσπερ καὶ> τῷ νυμᾷ <οὕτω καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα> Bl.] τῷ νυμᾷ <ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα> Ro. 19 καὶ Di.] καὶ <αἱ> Ro. 23 κρίνουν Scha.] κρίνοιντο Ro.

#### 4. On truth and falsehood

(1) Also about falsehood and truth contrasting speeches are made, of which one asserts that false speech is one thing, and true speech another; other people, instead, say that they are the same thing. (2) I too say the latter: firstly, because false and true speeches are said with the same words; secondly, when a speech is uttered, if what happened is as it is said, the speech is true; if not, the same speech is false. (3) For example, accuse someone of temple-robbery: if the action has occurred, the speech is true, if it has not, false. And so it is for the speech of him who defends himself. The Courts too judge the same speech false and true. (4) And indeed, if we, when we sit next to one another, should say 'I am an initiate', we shall all say the same thing, but I shall be the only truthful one, as I also am <an initiate>. (5) It is, then, clear that the same speech, when falsehood is present to it, is false, but when truth is, is true, just as a man is only one thing as a child, a youngster, an adult, and when old. (6) However, it is also said that the false speech is one thing, the true another, differing as much in name as in fact. For if someone asked those who claim that the same speech is false and true which is the one they are saying, and the person answered 'the false one', then it is clear that the speeches would be two; if, instead, he answered 'the true one', then this same speech would be false too. And if he ever said or testified something true, then these same words would be false too. And if he knows some man as truthful, he will know the same person as lying too. (7) And according to their speech, they maintain the following idea: that if the fact has happened, the speech is true, if it has not, false. Therefore, it is important to ask (8) jurors in their turn what they judge; for they are not present at the events.

(9) ὁμολογέοντι δὲ καὶ αὐτοί, ὥ μὲν τὸ ψευδὸς ἀναμέμικται, ψεύσαν  
ἡμεν, ὥ δὲ τὸ ἀλαθέες, ἀλαθῇ. τοῦτο δὲ ὅλον διαφέρει [...]

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2 post διαφέρει. lacunam susp. No.] lacunam susp. sed not indic. Ro.

(9) However, even they themselves acknowledge that the speech with which falsehood is mixed is false, whereas the one with which truth is mixed is true. But that is wholly different from [...]

5. (1) ταὐτὰ τοὶ μαινόμενοι καὶ τοὶ σωφρονοῦντες καὶ τοὶ σοφοὶ καὶ τοὶ ἀμαθεῖς καὶ λέγοντι καὶ πράσσοντι. (2) καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ὀνομάζοντι ταὐτά, γὰρ καὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἵππον καὶ πῦρ καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα. καὶ ποιέοντι ταὐτά, κάθηνται καὶ ἔσθοντι καὶ πίνοντι καὶ κατάκεινται, καὶ  
5 τᾶλλα καττῶντό. (3) καὶ μὲν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ μέζον καὶ μῆρόν ἐστι καὶ πλέον καὶ ἔλασσον καὶ βαρύτερον καὶ κουφότερον. οὕτω γάρ ἐντι ταὐτά πάντα. (4) τὸ τάλαντόν ἐστι βαρύτερον τῆς μνᾶς καὶ κουφότερον τῶν δύο ταλάντων· τῶντὸν ἄρα καὶ κουφότερον καὶ βαρύτερον. (5) καὶ ζῶει ὁ αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐ ζῶει, καὶ ταὐτὰ ἐστι  
10 καὶ οὐκ ἐστι· τὰ γὰρ τῇδ' ἐόντα ἐν τῇ Λιβύᾳ οὐκ ἐστίν, οὐδέ γε τὰ ἐν Λιβύᾳ ἐν Κύπρῳ. καὶ τᾶλλα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον. οὐκῶν καὶ ἐντι τὰ πράγματα καὶ οὐκ ἐντί. (6) τοὶ τῇνα λέγοντες, τὼς μαινομένως <καὶ τὼς σωφρονοῦντας> καὶ τὼς σοφῶς καὶ τὼς ἀμαθεῖς τῶντὰ διαπράσσεσθαι καὶ λέγειν, καὶ τᾶλλα <τὰ> ἐπόμενα τῷ λόγῳ, οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγοντι. (7) αἱ  
15 γὰρ τις αὐτῶς ἐρωτάσαι αἱ διαφέρει μανία σωφροσύνης καὶ σοφίῃ ἀμαθίῃς, φαντί· “ναί”. (8) εὖ γὰρ καὶ ἐξ ὧν πράσσοντι ἐκάτεροι δᾶλοί ἐντι ὡς ὁμολογησοῦντι. οὐκῶν, καὶ ταὐτὰ πράσσοντι, καὶ τοὶ σοφοὶ μαίνονται καὶ τοὶ μαινόμενοι σοφοὶ καὶ πάντα συνταράσσονται. (9) καὶ ἐπακτέος ὁ λόγος πότερον ἐν δέοντι τοὶ σωφρονοῦντες λέγοντι ἢ τοὶ μαινόμενοι. ἀλλὰ γὰρ φαντι ὡς ταὐτὰ μὲν λέγοντι, ὅταν τις αὐτῶς ἐρωτῇ· ἀλλὰ τοὶ μὲν σοφοὶ ἐν τῷ δέοντι, τοὶ δὲ μαινόμενοι ἄ οὐ δεῖ. (10) καὶ τοῦτο λέγοντες δοκοῦντι μικρὸν ποτιθῆναι τὸ ἄ δεῖ καὶ μὴ δεῖ, ὥστε μηκέτι τὸ αὐτὸ ἤμεν.

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1 “ταὐτὰ... (oratio recta §§ 5.1-5) Ro.      7 τάλαντόν codd.] τάλαντόν Ro.      12 μαινομένως <καὶ τὼς σωφρονοῦντας> καὶ Scha.] codd. Ro.      17 καὶ codd.] καὶ <αἱ> Ro.

5. (1) The insane and the sane, the wise and the ignorant say and do the same things. (2) In the first place, they give the same names to things: 'earth', 'man', 'horse', 'fire', and all the rest. And they perform the same actions: they sit, eat, drink, lie down, and the same applies to the rest. (3) And besides, the same thing is also both bigger and smaller, more and less, heavier and lighter. Hence, in this way all things are the same. (4) The talent is heavier than the mina and lighter than two talents: the same thing, then, is lighter and heavier. (5) The same man both lives and does not live, and the same things are and are not; in fact, what is here, is not in Libya, nor is what is in Libya in Cyprus. And the same rationale applies to every other example. Surely then, things are and are not. (6) Those who maintain that, namely that the insane <and the sane>, the wise and the ignorant carry out and say the same things, and every other consequence of this speech, do not speak correctly. (7) In fact, should one ask them whether insanity differs from sanity, and wisdom from ignorance, they say 'yes'. (8) For it is pretty clear that they will grant it, also from what each group does. Therefore, it is not true that they do the same things, nor that the wise behave insanely, nor that the insane are wise, nor that everything is thrown into confusion. (9) So, one must bring up the question whether it is the sane or the insane who speak at the proper time. But surely, whenever one asks them, they answer that <the two groups> say the same things, but the wise at the proper time, the insane when there is no need. (10) And by saying that, they seem to have made the small addition of 'when there is need', and 'when there is no need', in such a way that <what the two groups say> is not the same anymore.

(11) ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ πράγματος τοσούτῳ ποτιτεθέντος ἀλλοιοῦσθαι δοκῶ τὰ  
 πράγματα, ἀλλ' ἀρμονίας διαλλαγείσας· ὥσπερ “Γλαῦκος” καὶ  
 “γλαυκός” καὶ “Ξάνθος” καὶ “ξανθός” καὶ “Ξοῦθος” καὶ “ξουθός”. (12)  
 ταῦτα μὲν τὴν ἀρμονίαν ἀλλάξαντα διήνεικαν, τὰ δὲ μακρῶς καὶ  
 5 βραχυτέρως ῥηθέντα, “Τύρος” καὶ “τυρός”, “σάκος” καὶ “σακός”, ἄτερα  
 δὲ γράμματα διαλλάξαντα, “καρτὸς” καὶ “κρατός”, “ὄνος” καὶ “νόος”.  
 (13) ἐπεὶ ὧν οὐκ ἀφαιρεθέντος οὐδενὸς τοσοῦτον διαφέρει, τί δὴ, αἷ τις ἢ  
 ποτιτιθεῖ τι ἢ ἀφαιρεῖ; καὶ τοῦτο δείξω οἷόν ἐστιν. (14) αἷ τις ἀπὸ τῶν  
 δέκα ἐν ἀφέλοι, οὐκέτι δέκα οὐδὲ ἐν ἄν εἴη, καὶ τᾶλλα καττωῦτό. (15) τὸ  
 10 δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἤμεν καὶ μὴ ἤμεν, ἐρωτῶ “τί ἢ τὰ πάντα  
 ἔστιν;” οὐκῶν αἷ τις μὴ φαίη ἤμεν, ψεύδεται τὰ πάντα εἰπὼν ταῦτα.  
 πάντα ὧν πη ἔστι.

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6 “καρτὸς” καὶ “κρατός” scripsi] “κάρτος” καὶ “κρατός” Ro. 11 τὰ πάντα codd.] “τὰ  
 πάντα” Ro. εἰπὼν ταῦτα. πάντα scripsi] εἰπὼν. ταῦτα πάντα Ro.

(11) Personally, I think that things become different not <only> through addition of so big an element, but by change of intonation: for example, 'Glaucus' and 'glaucous', 'Xanthus' and 'yellow', 'Xuthus' and 'golden'. (12) These things differed by changing their intonation; others by being pronounced with a long vowel and with a shorter one, <such as> 'Tyre' and 'cheese', 'goat-hair cloth' and 'fold'; others again by exchanging the place of their letters, like 'shorn smooth' and 'of the head', 'ass' and 'mind'. (13) Therefore, since it makes such a big difference despite nothing has been taken away, what if someone adds or takes away something? And that I shall show as it is. (14) If someone should take one from ten, there would not be either ten or one anymore, and the same applies to the rest. (15) As for the fact that the same man is and is not, I ask: "Is it true in some respect or in all respects?" Surely, should one say that the same man is not, he speaks falsely if he means that in all respects. For every thing, in some way, is.



6. (1) λέγεται δέ τις λόγος οὐτ' ἀλαθῆς οὔτε καινὸς ὅτι ἄρα σοφία καὶ ἀρετὰ οὔτε διδακτὸν εἶη οὔτε μαθητόν. τοῖ δὲ ταῦτα λέγοντες ταῖσδε ἀποδείξεσι χρῶνται· (2) ὥς οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶη, αἷ τι ἄλλω παραδοίης, τοῦτο αὐτὸν ἔτι ἔχειν. μία μὲν δὴ αὐτά. (3) ἄλλα δὲ ὥς, αἷ διδακτὸν ἦν, 5 διδάσκαλοι καὶ ἀποδεδεγμένοι ἦν, ὥς τὰς μωσικᾶς. (4) τρίτα δὲ ὥς τοῖ ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι γενόμενοι σοφοὶ ἄνδρες τὰ αὐτῶν τέκνα ἂν ἐδίδαξαν καὶ τὼς φίλως. (5) τετάρτα δὲ ὅτι ἤδη τινὲς παρὰ σοφιστὰς ἐλθόντες οὐδὲν ὠφέληθεν. (6) πέμπτα δὲ ὅτι πολλοὶ οὐ συγγενόμενοι σοφισταῖς ἄξιοι λόγῳ γεγέννηται. (7) ἐγὼ δὲ κάρτα εὐήθη νομίζω τόνδε τὸν λόγον· 10 γινώσκω γὰρ τὼς διδασκάλως γράμματα διδάσκοντας ἅ καὶ αὐτῶν <ἕκαστος> ἐπιστάμενος τυγχάνει, καὶ κιθαριστὰς κιθαρίζεν. πρὸς δὲ τὰν δευτέραν ἀπόδειξιν, ὥς ἄρα οὐκ ἐντὶ διδάσκαλοι ἀποδεδεγμένοι, τί μὲν τοῖ σοφισταὶ διδάσκοντι ἀλλ' ἢ σοφίαν καὶ ἀρετάν; (8) ἢ τί δὲ Ἀναξαγόρειοι καὶ Πυθαγόρειοι ἦεν; τὸ δὲ τρίτον, ἐδίδαξε Πολύκλειτος 15 τὸν υἱὸν ἀνδριάντας ποιεῖν. (9) καὶ ἂν μὲν τις μὴ διδάξη, οὐ σαμῆον· αἷ δ' εἷς τις ἐδίδαξε, τεκμάριον ὅτι δυνατόν ἐστι διδάξαι. (10) τέταρτον δὲ αἷ μὴ τοῖ παρὰ σοφῶν σοφιστῶν σοφοὶ γίνονται. καὶ γὰρ γράμματα πολλοὶ οὐκ ἔμαθον μαθόντες. (11) ἔστι δὲ τις καὶ φύσις. αἷ δὲ τις μὴ μαθὼν παρὰ σοφιστᾶν ἱκανὸς ἐγένετο, εὐφυῆς καὶ γενόμενος, ῥαδίως συνάρπαξε τὰ 20 πολλά, ὀλίγα μαθὼν παρ' ὧν περ καὶ τὰ ὀνύματα μανθάνομεν· καὶ τούτων τι ἦτοι πλέον ἦτοι ἔλασσον, ὁ μὲν παρὰ πατρός ὁ δὲ παρὰ ματρός.

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2 σοφία codd.] σοφίη Ro.    14 καὶ αὐτῶν <ἕκαστος> Or.] καὶ αὐτὸς Ro.    17 σοφίαν codd.] σοφίην Ro.    18 ἢ codd.] [ἢ] Ro.    21 δ' εἷς τις Wi.] δ' ἔστι Ro.    ἐδίδαξε Wi.] διδάξαι Ro.    22 τοί codd.] τοι Ro.    18 φύσις. codd.] φύσις, Ro.    αἷ δὲ codd.] ἃ δὴ Ro.    19 συνάρπαξε Scha.] συναρπάξαι Ro.

6. (1) Some thesis neither true nor new is stated: that is to say that wisdom and excellence are not something teachable or learnable. Those who say this make use of the following proofs: (2) that it would not be possible for you, if you handed over something to someone else, to still possess this same thing. And that is one proof. (3) Another one is that, if they could be taught, there would be proven teachers of them, as in music. (4) A third is that those men in Greece who became wise would have taught their own children and friends. (5) A fourth proof is that already some who frequented the sophists did not derive any benefit. (6) A fifth, that many not associated with the sophists have become important. (7) I myself deem this thesis extremely silly: for I know that the teachers teach the letters that each of them too happens to know, and kithara-players how to play kithara. Against the second proof, namely that there are no proven teachers, well, what do the sophists teach, if not wisdom and excellence? (8) Or what were the Anaxagoreans and the Pythagoreans? As to the third, Polyclitus did teach his son to make statues. (9) And should someone not teach, that would not be a sign of anything; but if some single man taught, there is proof that it is possible to teach. (10) A fourth proof <occurs> if those coming from wise sophists do not become wise. And, in fact, many did not learn the letters, even though they took lessons. (11) But there is also a kind of natural disposition. In fact, if someone became competent without learning from the sophists, if he is also naturally gifted, he easily grasped a lot having learnt few things from those very persons from whom we also learn words; and someone learns a part of these, be it the most or the least, from the father, someone else from the mother.

(12) αἱ δέ τω μὴ πιστόν ἐστι τὰ ὀνύματα μανθάνεν ἀμέ, ἀλλ' ἐπισταμένως ἅμα γίνεσθαι, γνῶτω ἐκ τῶνδε· αἷ τις εὐθύς γενόμενον παιδίον ἐς Πέρσας ἀποπέμψαι καὶ τηνεῖ τράφοι, κωφὸν Ἑλλάδος φωνᾶς, περσίζοι κα· καὶ αἷ τις τηνόθεν τῇδε κομίζοι, ἑλλανίζοι κα.

5 οὕτω μανθάνομεν τὰ ὀνύματα, καὶ τῶς διδασκάλως οὐκ ἴσαμες. (13)  
οὕτω λέλεκταί μοι ὁ λόγος, καὶ ἔχεις ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος καὶ μέσον· καὶ οὐ λέγω ὥς διδακτόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀποχρῶντί μοι τῆναι ταὶ ἀποδείξεις.

(12) And if someone does not believe that we learn words, but believes that we are born together with knowledge, let him understand from what follows: if a man sent a little child, right after he was born, to Persia and he had it brought up there, deaf to the Hellenic language, the child would speak Persian. And if a man brought one here from there, it would speak Greek. That is how we learn words and we do not know our teachers. (13) My argument has been so formulated and you have a beginning, a conclusion and a middle. And I am not saying that <wisdom and excellence> are something teachable, but that those proofs are not sufficient for me.

7. (1) λέγοντι δέ τινες τῶν δαμαγορούντων, ὡς χρή τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ κλάρω  
γίνεσθαι, οὐ βέλτιστα ταῦτα νομίζοντες. (2) εἰ γάρ τις αὐτὸν ἐρωτῇ τὸν  
ταῦτα λέγοντα, “τί δὴ σὺ τοῖς οἰκέταις οὐκ ἀπὸ κλήρω τὰ ἔργα  
προστάσεις, ὅπως ὁ μὲν ζευγηλάτας, αἱ κ’ ὀψοποιὸς λάχῃ, ὀψοποιᾶ, ὁ  
5 δὲ ὀψοποιὸς ζευγηλατῇ, καὶ τᾶλλα κατὰ τοῦτο; (3) καὶ πῶς οὐ καὶ τῶς  
χαλκῆας καὶ τῶς σκυτῆας συναγαγόντες καὶ τέκτονας καὶ χρυσοχόας  
διεκλαρώσαμεν καὶ ἡναγκάσαμεν, ἂν χ’ ἕκαστος λάχῃ τέχνην  
ἐργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἂν ἐπίσταται;” (4) τούτων δὲ καὶ ἐν ἀγῶσι τὰς  
μωσικᾶς διακλαρῶσαι τῶς ἀγωνιστὰς καὶ ὅτι χ’ ἕκαστος λάχῃ,  
10 ἀγωνίζεσθαι· αὐλητὰς κιθαρίζει τυχὸν καὶ κιθαρωδὸς αὐλήσει. καὶ ἐν  
τῷ πολέμῳ τοξότας καὶ ὀπλίτας ἵππασεῖται, ὁ δ’ ἵππεὺς τοξεύσει, ὥστε  
πάντες ἃ οὐκ ἐπίστανται οὐδὲ δύνανται πραξοῦντι. (5) λέγοντι δὲ καὶ  
ἀγαθὸν ἡμεν καὶ δαμοτικὸν κάρτα· ἐγὼ ἥκιστα νομίζω δαμοτικόν. ἐντὶ  
γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι μισόδαμοι ἄνθρωποι, ὧν αἱ καὶ τύχη ὁ κύαμος,  
15 ἀπολοῦντι τὸν δᾶμον. (6) ἀλλὰ χρή τὸν δᾶμον αὐτὸν ὀρῶντα αἰρεῖσθαι  
πάντας τῶς εὖνως αὐτῷ, καὶ τῶς ἐπιταδείως στραταγέν, ἀτέρως δὲ  
νομοφυλακὲν καὶ τᾶλλα <καττωυτό>.

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2 εἰ codd.] αἱ Ro.    4 ὀψοποιᾶ St.] ὀψοποιῇ Ro.    5 κατὰ τοῦτο codd.] κατὰ τωυτό  
Ro.    10 κιθαρίζει Di.] κιθαριεῖται Ro.    11 πολέμῳ codd.] πολεμῷ Ro.    14 κύαμος,  
codd.] κύαμος Ro.    17 καττωυτό add. Scha.] sine supplemento Ro.

7. (1) Some of those who address the assembly say that it is necessary that the magistrates be selected by lot, without having the best opinion about the matter. (2) In fact, suppose someone would ask the one who says this: “why, then, do you not assign the tasks to your slaves by lot, in such a manner that the teamster, if he is drawn as a head cook, cook a dish, whereas the head cook drives a yoke of oxen, and in this way for all the other tasks? (3) And how is it the case that we do not gather the blacksmiths, the shoemakers, the carpenters and the goldsmiths, draw their names and compel them to exercise whatever skill each one is assigned by lot and not that which he knows?” (4) And it would be the same to assign by lot the competitors in the musical contests and that they contend in whatever skill each of them drew: by chance, an aulete will play the kithara and a citharode the aulos. And in war an archer and a hoplite will be cavalryman, whereas the cavalryman will shoot with the bow, so that everyone will do what he does not know and what he cannot do. (5) They also say that this system is good and extremely democratic, but I personally deem it the least democratic. For in the cities there are some men who hate the people and if the bean chances upon them, they will lead the people to ruin. (6) In fact, it is necessary that the people, by means of a personal observation, elect all those who are well disposed towards them, and that suitable persons be generals of the army, that others be guardians of the laws and that the same go for all the other positions.

8. (1) τῷ δ' αὐτῷ ἀνδρὸς καὶ τὰς αὐτὰς τέχνας νομίζω κατὰ βραχὺ τε  
 δύνασθαι διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ τὰν ἀλάθειαν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασθαι,  
 καὶ δικάσασθαι ὀρθῶς, καὶ δαμαγορεῖν οἷόν τ' ἤμεν, καὶ λόγων τέχνας  
 ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ περὶ φύσιος τῶν ἀπάντων ὥς τε ἔχει καὶ ὥς ἐγένετο,  
 5 διδάσκειν. (2) καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ὁ περὶ φύσιος τῶν ἀπάντων εἰδὼς πῶς οὐ  
 δυνασεῖται περὶ πάντων ὀρθῶς καὶ πράσσειν; (3) ἔτι δὲ ὁ τὰς τέχνας τῶν  
 λόγων εἰδὼς ἐπιστασεῖται καὶ περὶ πάντων ὀρθῶς λέγειν. (4) δεῖ γὰρ  
 τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς λέγειν περὶ ὧν ἐπίσταται περὶ τούτων λέγειν. περὶ  
 πάντων δὲ ἐπιστασεῖται· (5) πάντων μὲν γὰρ τῶν λόγων τὰς τέχνας  
 10 ἐπίσταται, τοῖς δὲ λόγοι πάντες περὶ πάντων τῶν ἑόντων ἐντί. (6) δεῖ δὲ  
 ἐπίστασθαι τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς λέγειν περὶ ὅτων κα λέγη \*\*\* <τὸν δὲ  
 δαμαγορεῖν ἐπιστάμενον δεῖ> καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ ὀρθῶς διδάσκειν τὴν  
 πόλιν πράσσειν, τὰ δὲ κακὰ τῶς κωλύειν. (7) εἰδὼς δὲ γε ταῦτα εἰδήσει  
 καὶ τὰ ἄτερα τούτων· πάντα γὰρ ἐπιστασεῖται· ἔστι γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν  
 15 πάντων, τῇνα δὲ ποτὶ τούτων τὰ δέοντα παρέξεται, αἱ χρή. (8) καὶ μὴ  
 ἐπίσταται αὐλέν, αἱ δυνασεῖται αὐλέν, αἱ κα δέη τοῦτο πράσσειν. (9) τὸν  
 δὲ δικάζεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον δεῖ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπίστασθαι ὀρθῶς·  
 περὶ γὰρ τούτω ταὶ δίκαι. εἰδὼς δὲ τοῦτο εἰδήσει καὶ τὸ ὑπεναντίον  
 αὐτῷ καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄτερα. (10) δεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ τῶς νόμῳς ἐπίστασθαι  
 20 πάντας· αἱ τοίνυν τὰ πράγματα μὴ ἐπιστασεῖται, οὐδὲ τῶς νόμῳς.

9 δὲ Roh.] γ' ἄρ' Ro.      11 κα λέγη Bl.] καὶ λέγοι Ro.      <τὸν δὲ δαμαγορεῖν  
 ἐπιστάμενον δεῖ> tentavi      16 ἐπίσταται codd.] ἐπιστᾶται Ro.      19 πάντα τὰ ἄτερα  
 Wi.] τὰ <ἄλλα αὐτῷ? ἐ>τεροῖα Ro.

8. (1) I believe that it belongs to the same man and to the same art to be able to converse in short questions and answers, to know the truth of things, to be able to plead one's case in the right way and to address the assembly, to know the techniques of speeches, and to teach the nature of all things, both how they are and how they came into being. (2) And, to begin, how is it possible that he who has knowledge of the nature of all things will not also be able to act correctly in relation to all of them? (3) Furthermore, he who has knowledge of the techniques of speeches will also know how to speak in the correct way about everything. (4) In fact, he who desires to speak correctly must speak of the things he knows. But he will know about all things: (5) for he knows the techniques of all speeches and, at the same time, all speeches are about all the existing things. (6) Also, he who desires to speak correctly must know whatever things he speaks about. \*\*\* <He who knows how to address the assembly, then, must> also teach in the right way the city to do good actions and to prevent evil ones. (7) By having knowledge of these things, he will also have knowledge of those different from them. He will know, in fact, everything: for these are among all things, whereas the others, in a similar way, will be provided by the need, if necessary. (8) Even if he does not know how to play the aulos, he will always be able to do it, if necessitated to do it. (9) He who knows how to plead one's case, then, must correctly know what is just; that, in fact, is what lawsuits are about. But by having knowledge of that he will have knowledge also of both its contrary and all the things which differ from it. (10) That man needs also to know all the laws; again, if he does not know the legal issues, he will not know the laws either.



(11) τὸν γὰρ ἐν μωσικᾷ νόμον τις ἐπίσταται, ὅσπερ καὶ μωσικάν· ὃς δὲ μὴ μωσικάν, οὐδὲ τὸν νόμον. (12) ὅς γα τὰν ἀλάθειαν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίσταται, εὐπετὴς ὁ λόγος ὅτι πάντα ἐπίσταται. (13) ὃς δὲ κατὰ βραχὺ διαλέγεσθαι δύναται, δεῖ νιν ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνασθαι περὶ πάντων· οὐκῶν δεῖ νιν πάντ' ἐπίστασθαι.

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1 τις Fa.] τίς Ro. ἐπίσταται, codd.] ἐπίσταται; Ro. 2 γα codd.] γα <μάν> Ro.

(11) For he who knows the 'law' in music knows also music; whoever does not know music will not know its 'law' either. (12) It is easy to say that the very person who knows the truth of things knows everything. (13) And he who can converse in short questions and answers must answer on every subject, when asked; he surely must know everything.

9. (1) μέγιστον δὲ καὶ κάλλιστον ἐξεύρημα εὑρηται ἐς τὸν βίον, μνάμα,  
καὶ ἐς πάντα χρήσιμον, ἐς φιλοσοφίαν τε καὶ σοφίαν. (2) ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο,  
ἐὰν προσέχῃς τὸν νοῦν· διὰ τούτω γὰρ ἐλθοῦσα ἅ γνώμα μᾶλλον  
αἰσθησεῖται σύνολον ὃ ἔμαθες. (3) δεύτερον, δεῖ μελετᾶν ἅ κα ἀκούσης·  
5 τῷ γὰρ πολλάκις ταῦτ᾽ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ εἶπαι ἐς μνάμαν παρεγένετο. (4)  
τρίτον ἅ κα ἀκούσης, ἐπὶ τὰ οἶδας καταθέσθαι, οἷον τόδε· δεῖ  
μεμνᾶσθαι Χρῦσιππον· κατθέμεν ἐπὶ τὸν χρυσὸν καὶ τὸν ἵππον. (5)  
ἄλλο, Πυριλάμπη· κατθέμεν ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ καὶ τὸ λάμπειν. τάδε μὲν περὶ  
τῶν ὄνυμάτων. (6) τὰ δὲ πράγματα οὕτως· περὶ ἀνδρείας ἐπὶ τὸν Ἄρη  
10 καὶ τὸν Ἀχιλλῆα, περὶ χαλκείας δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν Ἥφαιστον, περὶ δειλίας ἐπὶ  
τὸν Ἐπειόν\*\*\*

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1 μνάμα, codd.] μνάμα Ro.      4 μελετᾶν scripsi] μελετᾶν Ro.      ἅ κα Bl.] αἷ κα Ro.  
6 ἅ κα Bl.] αἷ κα Ro.

9. (1) A very mighty and noble invention has been found, memory, useful for life and for every activity, both for philosophy and for wisdom. (2) And this is the case, whenever you focus your attention; for by going through this process, your mind will better perceive what you learn as a whole. (3) Secondly, you must go over what you read; for by frequently listening to and repeating aloud the same words, these come to your memory. (4) In the third place, you must associate what you hear with what you know, such as in the following: does one need to call to mind 'Chrysippus'? One must associate it with 'gold' (*chrys-*) and 'horse' (*hippus*). (5) Another case is that of 'Pyrilampes'; one must associate it with 'fire' (*pyr-*) and 'to shine' (*lampein*). So much about names. (6) To things, instead, the following applies: concerning manliness, one must associate it with Ares and Achilles; concerning the smith's work, with Hephaestus; concerning cowardice, with Epeius \*\*\*

### 3. Commentary

#### Chapter 1

##### Title

**Περὶ...κακῶ]** The titles of chapters 1-3 have been handed down in a questionable form both from a linguistic and a grammatical point of view. Except P1 and P2, which lack them, all the other codices read Περὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ, Περὶ καλοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ, and Περὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου. In these titles, the Attic-Ionic endings -ου of the singular masculine genitive clash with the Doric variant -ω used soon after, in the first sentence of each chapter. As we earlier saw, that in itself would not be problematic, as dialectal inconsistency is a distinctive feature of the work. Nonetheless, suspicion grows if one considers, firstly, that titles are parts of a text more likely than others to be interpolated over the textual transmission. Secondly, in ancient Greek, ‘preposition + singular neuter adjective’ constructions such as these usually stand for adverbial locutions,<sup>177</sup> while for an adjective to be nominal, such as in Robinson’s translations ‘on good and bad’, ‘on seemly and shameful’, ‘on just and unjust’, it needs to be preceded by an article.<sup>178</sup> Again, that, by contrast, immediately occurs in the opening sentences of the chapters.

Therefore, I have opted for Stephanus’ Περὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ, Περὶ τῷ καλῷ καὶ τῷ αἰσχρῷ, and Περὶ τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ, differently from Robinson, who printed the above non-articulated manuscript forms, but who also surprisingly turned chapter 1’s title into the Doric Περὶ ἀγαθῷ καὶ κακῷ — as Fabricius had suggested first — without justifying this choice.<sup>179</sup> On my translation of this and the following occurrences of τὸ ἀγαθόν and τὸ κακόν (as well as of the couples τὸ

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<sup>177</sup> See f.e. *LSJ*, s.v. περί, V: ‘to denote value, ἡμῖν π. πολλοῦ ἐστι it is of much consequence, worth much, to us, Hdt.1. 120, cf. Antipho 6.3’.

<sup>178</sup> By contrast, in English sometimes, but not always, the determiner drops when ‘the singular nominal adjective is the complement of a preposition’ (Greenbaum (1996), 138).

<sup>179</sup> Robinson (1979), 98.

καλόν/τὸ αἰσχρόν and τὸ δίκαιον/τὸ ἄδικον), as opposed to Robinson's one, see *infra*, 92-94.

## § 1.1

**δισσοὶ λόγοι**] The notion of λόγος which is here introduced and which dominates the first six chapters of the work has received a few possible translations, namely 'opinion',<sup>180</sup> 'speech',<sup>181</sup> 'argument' or 'argumentation',<sup>182</sup> 'account',<sup>183</sup> 'saying',<sup>184</sup> 'reasoning',<sup>185</sup> 'view',<sup>186</sup> 'thesis'.<sup>187</sup> My choice of 'speech' is grounded on some passages throughout the text suggesting some features the author may have wanted this notion to have, the first of which is in § 1.11. Here ἄλλος δὲ λόγος expresses the thesis of the difference between the good and the bad thing (λέγεται...πρᾶγμα), and, *contra* Robinson and others,<sup>188</sup> that is not what we would expect an argument, or a reasoning, to do. For the latter are supposed to support, establish, or motivate a thesis or a statement, rather than formulating it.<sup>189</sup> Not by chance, in chapter 6 each of the arguments in favour of the two opposite positions is called ἀπόδειξις ('argument in proof'), and in § 6.13 they are avowedly kept apart from λόγος which cannot therefore be synonymous with ἀπόδειξις. Furthermore, in the same paragraph, the second λόγος is also described as having had a beginning, an intermediate part, and a conclusion. The mention of these three components, then, favours 'speech', 'account' and 'saying' over

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<sup>180</sup> 'Sententia' (North (1671), 48, Meibom (1688), 704, Fabricius (1724), 617, Von Orelli (1821), 211, Mullach (1875), 544).

<sup>181</sup> 'Rede' (Teichmüller (1884), 205), 'discour' (Dupréel (1948), 41), 'discorso' (Reale (2008), 1843).

<sup>182</sup> 'Argument' (Guthrie (1971), 316, Sprague (1972), 279, Robinson (1979), 99, Kerferd (1981), 54, Waterfield (2000), 287, Dillon/Gergel (2003), 320), 'argument' (Dorion (2009), 131), 'argomentazioni' (Maso/Franco (2000), 179).

<sup>183</sup> 'Account' (Graham (2010), 879).

<sup>184</sup> 'Dit' (Poirier (1988), 1167).

<sup>185</sup> 'Ragionamento' (Timpanaro Cardini (1954), 213, Untersteiner (1954), 559, Bonazzi (2008), 427), 'razionamiento' (Solana Dueso (1996), 179).

<sup>186</sup> 'Ansicht' (Becker/Scholz (2004), 49).

<sup>187</sup> 'Thèse' (Dumont (1969), 232).

<sup>188</sup> See above, n. 181.

<sup>189</sup> *OED*, s.v. 'argument', 3a, 4, 5.

the remaining possible meanings, namely ‘opinion’, ‘view’, and ‘thesis’, and, within the first group, the first one appears thus more fitting than the other two. Ultimately, what I consider δισσοί in the first six chapters of this work are the two speeches which each time clash and have the form of an initial thesis followed by its supporting case, and, in chapters 1-3 and 6 by a conclusion too.

ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων] This clause is absent at the beginning of chapters 2-4, but one could take it as understood there too. For on those occasions too the author recalls that contrasting speeches are made about a certain pair of philosophical opposites, and in so doing he also uses an introductory καί hinting at a connection with what has been already stated here.<sup>190</sup>

τοὶ μὲν γὰρ λέγοντι...τοτὲ δὲ κακόν] The similarity with the beginnings of chapters 2-4 goes on, because there too the second sentence displays the enunciations of the two rival theses about the couple of opposites: first comes the thesis about the difference between them (shortened to ‘DT’), and in this case corresponding to τοὶ μὲν γὰρ λέγοντι...ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κακόν; then it is the turn of the thesis about the identity of those same opposites, or ‘identity thesis’ (‘IT’), which here is given by τοὶ δὲ ὡς τὸ αὐτό...τοτὲ δὲ κακόν.

But what are these opposites? And in which way do the two theses contrast? These questions are interconnected, because the assessment of the logical relation between the theses depends on how we understand the two opposites. The traditional approach to these issues<sup>191</sup> consists in the following four key-points:

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<sup>190</sup> λέγονται δὲ καὶ περὶ τῷ καλῷ καὶ αἰσχυρῷ δισσοὶ λόγοι (§ 2.1); δισσοὶ δὲ λόγοι λέγονται καὶ περὶ τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ (§ 3.1); λέγονται δὲ καὶ περὶ τῷ ψευδέος καὶ τῷ ἀλαθέος δισσοὶ λόγοι (§ 4.1).

<sup>191</sup> Just to quote the most recent reflections on the matter, Robinson (1979), 149-151, Solana Dueso (1996), 139-144, Waterfield (2000), 333-334, Becker/Scholz (2004), 93-94, 138-139, Dorion (2009), 204, Graham (2010), 900-901.

(a) The articulated neuter forms of the couple of opposites in chapters 1-3 (chapter 4 contrasts, firstly, ἀλάθεια and ψεῦδος, then, ἀλαθής λόγος and ψεύστας/ψευδής λόγος) are taken as referring ‘to the universal’,<sup>192</sup> namely as expressing the property shared by all the things of which that adjective is predicated. For example, in this chapter τὸ ἀγαθόν stands for ‘the good’, in the sense of ‘goodness’, while τὸ κακόν means ‘the bad’, namely ‘badness’;

(b) DTs exclusively distinguish between these opposite concepts, in other words their only aim is to deny the truth of enunciates such as ‘the good is the same as the bad’ which we classify as ‘identity-statements’;<sup>193</sup>

(c) ITs, instead, by featuring the neuter adjectives without article, come down only to a ‘predicative statement’,<sup>194</sup> that is to ‘the same thing is good under certain circumstances, bad under others’;

(d) Considering (b) and (c), it follows that DTs and ITs do not really conflict, that they are not actually δισσοί. Rather, precisely because the good is different from the bad, any predicative judgement such as those expressed by ITs is meaningful.

I find this interpretation not satisfactory for the following three reasons, one for each of points (a)-(c), as signalled by the letters (a’)-(c’):

(a’) As Robinson himself recognizes, the articulated neuter forms of two opposites can be also taken with reference ‘to the particular’,<sup>195</sup> namely as expressing the single thing to which the adjective is referred. For example, in this chapter τὸ ἀγαθόν can stand for ‘that which is good’,<sup>196</sup> namely ‘what is good’, and τὸ κακόν for ‘that which is bad’, namely ‘what is bad’;

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<sup>192</sup> Robinson (1979), 151.

<sup>193</sup> Ibid., 149.

<sup>194</sup> Ibid., 150.

<sup>195</sup> Ibid., 151.

<sup>196</sup> Ibid.



(b') Secondly, as for (b), it is not true that identity-statements are the exclusive target of DTs, as shown, e.g., in §§ 1.14-16, where DT denies formulations of IT in predicative form (αἴπερ τὸ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν);

(c') ITs are not given exclusively in the form of predicative statements, as emerges from [τὸ ἀγαθόν καὶ τὸ κακόν understood] τὸ αὐτό ἐστὶ of the current passage, which Robinson himself recognizes as an identity-statement and explains by appealing to the 'ambiguities' and 'paradoxical effect' which would characterize the work.<sup>197</sup>

Having said that, I conversely think that by adopting the translation of the articulated forms of the neuter adjectives suggested in (a'), a different interpretation of DTs and ITs too becomes possible, which also has the advantage of better accounting for the description of the two theses as δισσοί, and for the otherwise elusive cases mentioned in (b') and (c').

τοὶ μὲν [...] τοὶ δέ] τοί is the western form of the plural masculine article<sup>198</sup> and it assumes a pronominal function in both the objects of this μὲν...δέ correlation. Although λόγοι could be a grammatically sound antecedent, I suspect that here the articles take up, and differentiate, οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες περὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ, thus pointing more to the participants of the discussion, rather than to their speeches, in analogy with the following ἐγὼ ποτιτίθεμαι of § 1.2, through which the author in person decides to take the floor of the debate.<sup>199</sup> The same happens in §§ 2.1 and 3.1, whereas in § 4.1 a slightly different construction is the case, as we will see.

## § 1.2

ἐγὼ...ἀγαθόν] Along with § 1.3, the current paragraph casts light on the natural aspects of human life (ἀνθρώπινος βίος), the good or bad value of which is said to

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<sup>197</sup> Ibid., 149-150.

<sup>198</sup> Buck (1973), 100.

<sup>199</sup> The same will be the case at §§ 2.2, 3.1, 4.2.

depend on the specific criterion one adopts. Here, in particular, food, drink and sex, being introduced as every man's main objects of care (ἀνθρωπίνῳ βίῳ ἐπιμελές), in the end prove to be good for the healthy only and not for the sick. The fact that from the two extremes of health condition can spring two opposite judgements concerning human life is propounded by Sextus Empiricus too, at *P.* I.102-103 and *M.* VIII.53-54. As for the human body in general as pivotal for contrasting judgements see, instead, *Pl. Prt.* 334b6-c6 and *S.E. P.* I.79-93.

ἐγώ...ποτιτίθεμαι] The actual degree of the author's commitment to this stance will result only in § 1.11, when, after introducing the statement of DT once again, he will similarly comment ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτον διαίρεῦμαι τὸν τρόπον.

### § 1.3

καὶ ἀκρασία...τυμβοποιῶς ἀγαθόν] Other aspects of human biology are treated here, in continuity with those of the former paragraph as they begin from the intemperance in the above pleasures; they follow a reverse logic, though, as this time the author's interest is in how what harms human wellness can be evaluated positively, provided one adopts a particular criterion. This is the economic one and here it is revealed for its sharp antithesis to human life: intemperance, illness and death are bad for human beings in general to the same extent to which they are good for those individuals who make money out of them, namely dealers, physicians and undertakers. Admittedly, a common utilitarian rationale (underscored by the usage of the dative of advantage and disadvantage for the individuals for whom the objects are bad or good) underlie both the biological and the economic criteria.<sup>200</sup> But this just accentuates the contrariety between them, enabling the author to say that what is considered as a biological *harm* is nonetheless a source of economic *utility*. Cf. *Pl. Prt.* 334a1-c6 for a

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<sup>200</sup> See also Robinson (1979), 150.

similar prospect, but formulated more explicitly by the use of the adjectival pairs ὠφέλιμος/ἀνωφελής and ἀρωγός/πάγκρακος along with ἀγαθός/κακός.<sup>201</sup> A relativistic questioning of the preferability of health over illness is also carried out at S.E. M. V.47-67.

## § 1.4

γεωργία...ἀγαθόν] Having been inquired as to its corporeal and private dimension, man's life is now described to a social level, that is as regards some of its public manifestations such as economy (§§ 1.4-5), culture (§§ 1.6-7), and war (§§ 1.8-10). What emerges confirms the result just obtained about the individual's sphere, namely that every situation considered good by one person is bad to another one. As far as the competing occupations here mentioned are concerned, Mazzarino is right in taking the paragraph as laying down the premises of an actual fight between professions.<sup>202</sup> But his identification of the contrast between farmers and traders with the one, fundamental for Greek history, between landowners and sailing merchants seems far-fetched.<sup>203</sup> For γεωργός denotes the worker, not the owner, of a piece of land, and, on the other hand, an ἔμπορος does not necessary trade by sea.

## § 1.5

τὰ δὲ ὑποδήματα...τῷ δὲ σκυτῇ ἀγαθόν] Teichmüller quotes this passage among those which make him think that the author of *Dissoi Logoi* is Simon the Athenian, and this because of the reference to the same job of cobbler (σκυτεύς), in the first place, and for the emphasis on the crafts, in general.<sup>204</sup> But we will see throughout the chapter and over the dialogue that the range of the author's examples is anything but restricted to

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<sup>201</sup> See also *ibid.* and Solana Dueso (1996), 180, n. 5.

<sup>202</sup> Mazzarino (1966), 287.

<sup>203</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>204</sup> Teichmüller (1884), 117.

some social categories only, and therefore this passage can hardly be indicative for such an attribution.

### § 1.6

ἐν τοίνυν...ήσασμένοις κακόν] Cultural aspects such as arts and sports are discussed here and in § 1.7, in compliance with the usual relativistic pattern. The stress on the athletic competitions (ἀγώνες γυμνικοί) as chiefly fraught with contrasting fortunes, as they are bound to proclaim a winner and a loser, recurs in Greek literature, like, for example, at Isoc. *Archidamus* 95, where the victory in the games is paradigmatically presented as a source of admiration, and even envy, for every citizen, or at [Arist.] *Pr.* 18.2, where the losers are said to be always in search of a revenge, not standing the scorn of the loss.

### § 1.7

κιθαρωδία] Robinson's 'lyre-playing'<sup>205</sup> is not appropriate, firstly because it refers to a broader kind of instrument, the lyre (λύρα), of which the kithara (κιθάρα) here implied represented a specific class, namely the box lyre.<sup>206</sup> Secondly, Robinson's translation fits κιθαρίζω rather than κιθαρωδία, as the latter derives from κιθαρωδέω,<sup>207</sup> one component of which is the verb αἰδω, meaning 'to sing', and which Robinson ends up obscuring.

### § 1.8

ἐν...βαρβάροις κακόν] The opposite light under which a victory is seen by the victor and by those on the losing side is thrown on the stage of war, in a passage spread across

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<sup>205</sup> Robinson (1979), 101.

<sup>206</sup> West (1992), 50. As a rule, in translating the names of ancient Greek musical instruments and instrumentalists, I simply transliterated them in Latin alphabet, in line with West's admonishment not to use the inadequate terminology of modern music (ibid., 1-2).

<sup>207</sup> DELG, s.v. κιθάρα.

§§ 1.8-10, and always at the centre of the discussion about the dating of the work. For in these three paragraphs the author looks through some crucial military conflicts in the history of the Hellenic world, following a reverse chronological order which goes from a not specified clash between Athens and Sparta back to the remote time of the mythical battle of gods and giants.

### § 1.9

ἀ...πάθη] Clearly, the author is here referring, firstly, to the Achaean conquest of Troy, typified by the deceit of the fatal wooden horse (see especially Verg. *A.* 2), then, to Thebes' resistance to Argos' siege, such as narrated in Aeschylus' *Seven against Thebes*.

### § 1.10

καὶ ἃ τῶν Κενταύρων...Γίγασι κακόν] At Hom. *Il.* 1.262-268, 2.738-744 we can read about the so-called centauiromachy, the battle in which the Lapiths, legendary people of Thessaly, defended their land from the assault of the fearful Centaurs. Finally, the last battle to be presented, and therefore to be chronologically first, is the gigantomachy, namely the battle in which the Olympian gods affirmed their superiority over the Giants, as first narrated at Pi. *N.* I.66-69.

λεγομένα] Mazzarino correctly emphasizes how this attribute is the only element hinting at a principle of critical distinction between myth and history within this war section. Furthermore, by applying it to the battle of gods and Giants only, the author proves to distinguish between this time of legend and the rest of the past, but not between the history of heroes (the battle between Lapiths and Centaurs, Argos' siege of Thebes, and War of Troy) and that of humans (Persian Wars and Peloponnesian War).<sup>208</sup> From this angle, Mazzarino argues, the author acts differently from Herodotus, for

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<sup>208</sup> Mazzarino (1966), 295.

whom the progeny of the humans is markedly separated from that of the heroes (see, e.g., Hdt. 3.122.2), and from Thucydides, who adopts a critical attitude towards the ancient sagas which he does not even mention.<sup>209</sup> Untersteiner observes how a similar continuity between mythological and historical ages can be traced in the epitaphs, instead.<sup>210</sup>

### § 1.11

**ἄλλος...πρᾶγμα]** The second speech comes in and this first sentence reminds the reader of DT, through a formulation which does not change noticeably from what seen in § 1.1, except for the addition of ὥσπερ καὶ τῶνυμα οὕτω καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα. As noticed above, this is a stock phrase of DTs, and it intensifies the idea of difference (διαφέρον) between what exemplifies a certain quality and what exemplifies the opposite one. With reference to this chapter, the locution points out how the nominal difference between what is good and what is bad, namely as far as the predication of the opposite attributes 'good' and 'bad' (τῶνυμα) is concerned, corresponds to (ὥσπερ...οὕτω...) the substantial difference between the states of affairs (τὸ πρᾶγμα) involved. Correspondence between the level of words and that of the world is thoroughly discussed in Pl. *Cra.* 436c and Arist. *Metaph.* Γ 1006b22-34, whereas in the first speech of chapter 4 falsity will be represented precisely as a mismatch between these two levels.

Furthermore, this locution might also conceal a veiled attack on IT. For the author may also be alluding at how the second speech makes use of opposite attributes (διαφέρον [...] τῶνυμα), just as the first speech did, but also at how, unlike the first speech, the second one considers two numerically distinct states of affairs (διαφέρον [...] τὸ πρᾶγμα). Clearly, if this reading is the case, the DT upholder is here omitting the couples of conditions under which IT had the same state of affairs be either good or bad. On the contrary, one may regard these conditions as crucial, because they can join

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<sup>209</sup> Ibid., 296.

<sup>210</sup> Untersteiner (1954), 152.

the single state of affairs and form two new ones. However, in the next commentary note we will see how the fallacious path taken by the second speech to refute IT turns precisely around omission of these relativizing conditions, which hence makes this second interpretation of ὥσπερ...πρᾶγμα which I have just been giving perfectly aligned with the rationale of the speech.

**δοκῶ...κ' εἶη]** This argument in favour of DT illustrates the rationale of the following supportive examples (§§ 1.12-16), both in form and in content. For there too the conditional clause (here οὐδὲ διάδαλον ἦμεν...αἰ ἐκάτερον εἶη...) features an absurd consequence in the apodosis (οὐδὲ διάδαλον ἦμεν ποῖον ἀγαθὸν καὶ ποῖον κακόν), and in the protasis an absolute version of the original IT (αἰ [ποῖον understood] τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ἐκάτερον εἶη), where the conditions which then made something either good or bad are omitted.

DT thus proves to operate in two steps. Firstly, it exploits what Aristotle classified as the fallacy connected to the absolute or the relative use of the same predicate (Arist. SE 166b38-167a21), which is similar, but not identical to the fallacy due to the ignorance of the nature of the refutation, also known as *ignoratio elenchi* (cf. Arist. SE 167a22-36), which a tradition starting from Barnes prefers to see here,<sup>211</sup> instead. In other words, DT does tactically attack 'a straw man', as Robinson states;<sup>212</sup> but such a fabrication (whose form is 'the same thing is good and bad') is closer to the original one ('the same thing is good under certain circumstances, bad under others') than the one Barnes and Robinson maintained ('the good is the same as the bad'). For, if anything, the first two are predicate-statements with an identical subject ('the same thing') and a predicate ('is good and bad') which just changes its range (from a relativization 'under certain circumstances' to an absolute value), whereas the third one is an identity-statement connecting two elements ('the good' and 'the bad') absent in the other two formulations.

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<sup>211</sup> Barnes (1979), 218.

<sup>212</sup> Robinson (1979), 150.

Consequently, both here and in chapters 2-4, the contrast between DT and IT, albeit still logically flawed, is nonetheless more rhetorically effective, and these two kinds of λόγοι are thus more δισσοί, than what is traditionally said.

Having identified the thesis which DT really targets, it is easy to recognize the second passage of its argumentative strategy in a *reductio ad absurdum* of that. This procedure, which Aristotle calls ἡ εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον ἀπαγωγή and describes at *APr.* 41a22-38, is particularly dear to the author who consistently adopts it also for the DTs of chapters 2-4 and 3, as well as for the argument of § 6.3.<sup>213</sup>

### § 1.12

οἶμαι...κακῶ] Here and in the following two paragraphs the author imagines addressing an unnamed supporter of IT, establishing with him a direct speech the pretended realism of which aims to emphasize the alleged absurdities derived from his position. §§ 1.12-13, in particular, reflect on the relationships with those dear to us. At first, here in § 1.12, the author's questions are put in a prescriptive way and in view of the future, inviting the interlocutor to pay back his parents in evil actions for the good ones he received from them.

τύ τι...ἐποίησαν;] Robinson prints the manuscript reading τι τῶς γονέας ἀγαθὸν ἐποίησας, which he read on P1, P2, P4, P6, and V2 and which differs from that of the remaining codices only in the Doric τῶς in place of τούς. He rephrased the point of the whole imaginary dialogue with these alternative lines: "You already performed acts of kindness to your parents? Then you ought to perform a number of acts of unkindness toward them, since good and evil are identical".<sup>214</sup> But that is a *non sequitur*, and also sinks the necessity of paying one's own debts, conveyed by the verb ὀφείλω in the following τὸ ἄρα κακὰ καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ τούτοις ὀφείλεις. For this reason, I

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<sup>213</sup> For its application in this chapter see also Nestle (1966), 438.

<sup>214</sup> Robinson (1979), 156.



found Schulze's emendation *τύ τι τοὶ γονέες ἀγαθὸν ἐποίησαν* more fitting, insofar as making for a sort of *lex talionis* when taken in connection with the immediately following remark. After all, at *R. I 331b-e* Plato too presents 'returning to each one what is owed to them' (*τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἐκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι*, at 331e3), that is to say 'returning to someone what one has received from them' (331c3-4), as the core of the popular idea of justice, approved by Simonides too, which the character of Socrates then proceeds to criticise. In conclusion, the author's point here is that since what is good is identical to what is bad, and since one owes to the others the same acts they did to him (implicit premise), then when it comes to the parents, who did good to us, we need to repay them with evil deeds.

### § 1.13

*τί δέ, τῶς...ἀγαθὰ ἐποίησας*] Now the author's interrogation turns to a descriptive modality and a view of the past, through which the upholder of IT is shown that, if his thesis is to stand, then he has always damaged his relatives and benefitted his enemies every time he acted in the opposite way towards those people. Again, an interesting parallel can be drawn with *Pl. R. I 332d6*, where another similar and popular definition of justice, backed by Simonides as well, is given, i.e. 'benefiting friends and damaging enemies' (*τὸ τοὺς φίλους ἄρα εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κακῶς*), which exactly corresponds to what here counts as the right conduct endangered by IT.

### § 1.14

*ἄγε...ἀγαθόν;*] By again enlarging the range of his observation from a private to a public dimension, in §§ 1.14-15 the author tests the undesirable consequences of IT with two individuals which were poles apart in terms of wealth: the beggars (*οἱ πτωχοί*), in this paragraph, and the Great King (*ὁ βασιλεύς μέγας*), in the following one. Since the former would unexpectedly end up being in a condition enviable by everyone, the

absurdity of such a scenario is again sufficient to exclude the tenibility of IT, on which that is conditional.

**πολλὰ...πάλιν]** All the manuscripts feature *πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἔχοντι· πάλιν*, where, however, *πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα* does not match the following *πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ* with that semantic correspondence we would expect from the parallel patterns *οἰκτεῖρεις, ὅτι...* and *εὐδαμονίζεις, ὅτι...* which host them. Robinson's *πολλὰ καὶ κακὰ ἔχοντι, πάλιν*<sup>215</sup> works better, in this sense, but one still might feel the need of a more fluid connection when passing from the first clause, ending with *ἔχοντι*, to the second one, opening with *πάλιν*. That is why at this point I have preferred to bring back the text to the reading of Diels and Kranz, namely *πολλὰ καὶ κακὰ ἔχοντι, <καὶ> πάλιν*.<sup>216</sup> Other conjectures — Mullach's *πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἔχοντι <κακά, τὼς δὲ πλουσίως> πάλιν*<sup>217</sup> above all — force too much the original, as noticed also by Classen.<sup>218</sup>

## § 1.15

**τὸν...εἰρήσθω]** Since he is known to carry on an existence at the opposite extreme of wealth to that of the beggars, the example here construed around the Great King too goes in the opposite sense to the previous one about the beggars, though sharing the same logic. For whereas earlier the evils suffered by the beggars turned out to be fortunes, now the King's fortunes turn out to be evils such as those which the beggars are supposed to suffer (*ὁμοίως διακεῖσθαι τοῖς πτωχοῖς*).

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<sup>215</sup> Ibid., 102-104.

<sup>216</sup> Diels-Kranz (1952), 407.

<sup>217</sup> Mullach (1875), 545. The others are *πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα <κακά> ἔχοντι· πάλιν* (De Varis in Robinson (1972), 196), *πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα <κακά> ἔχοντι; ἢ πάλιν* (North, who also suspected that *πάλιν* should be deleted: North (1671), 52, n.11), *πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα <κακά> ἔχοντι; <...τὼς ἄρα πτωχῶς> πάλιν* (Blass in Weber (1897), 38)), *πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἔχοντι <κακά>...τὼς ἄρα πτωχῶς> πάλιν* (Weber in ibid.), *πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἔχοντι; <πῶς οὐ τὼς πτωχῶς> πάλιν* (Wilamowitz in Diels (1907), 637), *πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα κακὰ ἔχοντι, <καὶ> πάλιν* (Becker/Scholz (2004), 52).

<sup>218</sup> Classen (2001), 112.

Although hence being on the same wavelength as the reflection of the previous paragraph as for content, yet the current one diverges in the form, as it is no longer expressed through direct interrogation, but back in a declarative mode.

## § 1.16

εἶμι...κακῶ] An interesting revision of the supportive examples brought forward in IT is here announced. But the intent gets shattered soon after, as this recapitulation stops with the second one, about illness. That disappoints Robinson who believes that if the author had completed this opposite reading of the same examples of IT, he would have then been in the right position to choose between the two sides of the contrast.<sup>219</sup>

Nonetheless, this break does not affect the actual value of the paragraph, which lies in its offering the reader the possibility of better understanding the usual tactics adopted by the second speech against the first, through a comparison between the ways the two deal with the same examples. Looking at the first case presented, in fact, it clearly emerges that those same pleasures which in § 1.2 had only a negative value when assessed with reference to the ill, become also good to those persons, now that the second speech has the rival simply say that ‘the same thing is good and bad’ (τὸ αὐτὸν ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν) and therefore that ‘eating, drinking and having sex’ too are good and bad. The ill, that is the reference-subjects to which the first speech originally limited its judgements, are now called in just to enhance the paradoxical result to which IT is alleged to lead (τοῖς ἀσθενεῦντι ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἀγαθόν ἐστὶν). The same applies to the following case about illness (τὸ νοσεῖν), to be compared with the original one of § 1.3.

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<sup>219</sup> Robinson (1979), 158.

### § 1.17

**καὶ δὲ...εἴρηται]** By this remark the second speech virtually projects its appropriation of the examples of the first one into all the other cases not dealt with in the previous paragraph.

**καὶ οὐ...ἄλλο ἐκάτερον]** This last sentence closes the second speech by clarifying what its goal has been. By refraining from defining what is good (οὐ λέγω τί ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν), and limiting himself to distinguishing it from what is bad (οὐ τὸ αὐτὸν εἶη κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἄλλο ἐκάτερον), the author concludes the speech and the chapter with a principle of caution which Kranz did not miss and on which he drew a fitting parallel with the conclusion of § 6.13.<sup>220</sup> He also read this attitude as Socratic, and so did Taylor, who appealed to an analogy with the conclusion of Plato's *Theaetetus*, where 'we do not know what knowledge is, but we have satisfied ourselves that it is not the same as sensation, nor yet as right opinion'.<sup>221</sup> Although that may indeed sound similar to our text, I find an even higher similarity with a few passages of Sextus Empiricus. Firstly, the negative part of our conclusion can be likened to the point made by Sextus when criticising Plato for his taking position on the nature of ideas (*P.* I.222), thus blocking the inquiry about these objects (II.11), of which we do not have even appearances, as they are non-evident (I.225). Secondly, according to Pl. *Euthphr.* 6d14-17 and, broadly speaking, what we have called 'Socratic fallacy' since Geach,<sup>222</sup> the lack of the knowledge of a property should prevent one from predicating it of something. However, that is what our author does throughout the chapter, and an operation which belongs to the Sceptic too, because, as we read in S.E. *P.* I.226, in so doing he expresses only his appearances, without any belief as to the probability of these. Thirdly and lastly, our author's final assent to the impossibility for the same thing to be good and

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<sup>220</sup> Kranz (1937), 230.

<sup>221</sup> Taylor (1911), 101.

<sup>222</sup> Geach (1966), 371-372.

bad can hardly be taken as his final opinion on the matter, rather it must be considered along with IT, which he previously defended, as forming that couple of contrasting speeches which are dear to the Pyrrhonian Sceptic too, as we will also better see later.

## Chapter 2

### Title

Περὶ...αἰσχρῶ] See my comment on chapter 1's title, *supra*, 90-91.

### § 2.1

τοὶ μὲν...σῶμα] On the recurrent clause ὥσπερ καὶ τῶνυμα οὕτω καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα, already encountered in § 1.11, and to which the current one is reminiscent, see *supra*, 99-100. The substitution of πρᾶγμα with σῶμα could be due, with Kranz, to the couple of opposites under discussion in the chapter, καλός and αἰσχρός, whose first meanings of 'beautiful' and 'ugly' inevitably involve the idea of body.<sup>223</sup> Nonetheless, I have followed Robinson in translating them with two adjectives, such as 'seemly' and 'shameful', with a stronger moral connotation, because all the examples examined in the chapter will deal with moral conventions and cultural habits.

τοὶ δέ...αἰσχρόν] The statement of IT we have here calls for elucidation, because it forgets those relativizing clauses on the basis of which only such an identity can stand, in accordance with the supporting examples offered afterwards whose pattern is 'the same thing is seemly *under certain circumstances* and shameful *under others*'. This absence looks particularly striking if one compares the current statement with the counterpart in chapter 1, which features such specifications (καὶ τοῖς...τοτὲ δὲ κακόν, § 1.1). On the other hand, since the ITs statements at §§ 3.1 and 4.1 too lack these clauses, I am inclined to think that the author so clearly felt them applicable to the following ITs too, that he

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<sup>223</sup> Kranz (1937), 224.

did not deem it useful to repeat them, in the same way as hypothesized about δισσοὶ λόγοι λέγονται ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων of § 1.1.

## § 2.2

**καὶ...αἰσχρόν]** The portion of text from here to § 2.6 is devoted to body care and sexuality. The current paragraph recalls, in language and content, some observations about love of youths in Plato's *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*. For at *Smp.* 178c4, according to *Phaedrus* there is no higher bliss for a person in his early youth (εὐθὺς νέος ὢν) than having a worthy suitor (ἐραστὴς χρηστός). Some pages later, Pausanias even draws the profiles of the worthy and of the unworthy suitor, starting with the latter, who loves the body of the boy more than his soul (181b4-5), which inconveniently leads people to deem it shameful to grant favours to suitors like him (αἰσχρόν χαρίζεσθαι ἐρασταῖς, 182a4-5). At 184c10-d3, then, he remarks that the boy's indulgence to the suitor is seemly (καλὸν γενέσθαι τὸ ἐραστῇ παιδικὰ χαρίσασθαι) only when the love of the youngsters and that of philosophy converge, namely when the boy accepts the love of the suitor and the latter helps the former to become wiser and better (184d4-e5). Likewise, in *Phdr.* 233e-234a, a youth is spurred to gratify not lovers who are merely interested in the bloom of his youth (ἡ ὥρα, cf. also *Smp.* 217a for this phrase), but those who will prove their value 'once the bloom of his youth has faded' (παυσαμένου τῆς ὥρας 234a), by sharing their goods with him, by remaining steady friends throughout their lives, and by being discreet in public about their relationship.

## § 2.3

**καί...καλόν]** Women washing in public constituted a contravention of ancient Greek morals, as emblematically exemplified in Callimachus' version of the myth of Artemis and Actaeon (Call. *Lav. Pall.* V.107-116), and as we can infer, for example, from S.E. *M.* II.53, where we read that "'a bath" is called ἀνδρεῖον according to common usage from

the fact that it washes ἄνδρας (men)'.<sup>224</sup> In this connection, one may also recall the taboo of women being naked in public, which Herodotus makes famous in his tale of Gyges and Candaules (Hdt. 1.8-12), where the prohibition is justified by the fact that 'with the stripping off of her tunic a woman is stripped of the honour due to her' (1.8).<sup>225</sup>

## § 2.4

καὶ...ὄψεται] Plato maintains the same idea both at *Phlb.* 65e10-66a3, where men are said to intentionally hide their most intense pleasures and relegate them to the night, far from the sight of the day, and at *Lg.* 841b, where the Athenian suggests men should regard privacy in sexual acts as καλόν, and lack of that as αἰσχρόν (see also *Hp.Ma.* 299a). A similar assessment of outdoor sex will be later made by Sextus Empiricus, who observes that it is regarded as shameful by most peoples, except some Indians (*P.* I.148-149, III.200). This is also the first instance of a notable correspondence of this chapter with S.E. *P.* III.199-234. Some of the behaviours which Sextus proposes there as examples of the high variability of the human criteria of beauty and shamefulness appear in *Dissoi Logoi* 2 too. However, whereas Sextus consistently bases an intercultural comparison on them, in some passages of our chapter, such as the current one, these behaviours are rephrased within the context of a single set of values, which the author does not attribute to any particular people. They may stand either for Greek morals only (again on the assumption that δισσοὶ λόγοι λέγονται ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων of § 1.1 applies to the following chapters as well) or for universal ones.

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<sup>224</sup> Translation from Bury (1971), 215.

<sup>225</sup> Translation from Godley (1920), 13.

## § 2.5

καὶ τῷ μὲν...αἰσχρόν] Sextus Empiricus examines this issue at *P.* I.152 and III.209, but differentiates the Greeks' condemnation and punishment of adultery from its acceptance among other peoples and some philosophers.

αἰσχιστον...αἰσχρόν] As Solana Dueso too notices, the degree of intensity of the adjectives used to censure adultery varies depending on whether the offender is the wife (αἰσχιστον), or the husband (αἰσχρόν), which, I add, indicates the author's assumption of male superiority.<sup>226</sup>

## § 2.6

καὶ κοσμεῖσθαι...καλόν] Male recourse to embellishment is discussed also at *S.E. P.* III.203, where wearing earrings, in particular, is said to be fit for barbarian men, but not for the Greek ones.

## § 2.7

καὶ τὼς μὲν φίλως...ἀγωνιστὰς καλόν] This and the following paragraph are concerned with three basic possibilities of human relationship, presented in descending order from a peak of human sociability, consisting in doing good (εὖ ποιέν), then to the indifference entailed in fleeing (φεύγεν), through which one avoids any form of personal contact, finally to the most radical hostility, expressed by killing (φονεύεν). These actions are said to be seemly or shameful depending on whom they are directed towards, and, more precisely, according to the popular morals of benefitting friends and damaging enemies, already seen in § 1.13. Another interesting narrative movement in §§ 2.7-8 is that from the generic and private hostility of οἱ ἐχθροί to the warlike and public one of οἱ πολέμιοι. This shift provides the perfect link between the first part of

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<sup>226</sup> Solana Dueso (1996), 183, n. 10.



the first speech, ending at § 2.8 and devoted to intracultural relativism, and the second part, opening with § 2.9 and concerned with intercultural relativism.<sup>227</sup>

καὶ τὼς μὲν πολεμίως...ἀγωνιστὰς καλόν] At S.E. *P.* III.216 too, fleeing one's enemy at war is recalled both as a reprehensible and somewhere even illegal act, and as a source of pride if one adopts the same perspective as Archilochus when he throws away his shield (Archil. Fr. 5).

## § 2.8

καὶ τὼς μὲν...πάντων] Likewise, at S.E. *P.* III.212 killing is deemed a crime, unless it occurs in gladiatorial combats, or in athletic contests, where one is even awarded a prize for it.

## § 2.9

εἴμι...αἰσχρόν] In the section starting here and concluding at § 2.17, which constitutes the core of the first speech, the author enhances the demonstration of IT by widening his focus from just one value system to those of different populations. The issue of the author's sources for this piece has been extensively explored and, like any other matter ultimately connected with the authorship of this work, with little profit.<sup>228</sup> In commenting on these paragraphs, I will thus content myself with highlighting the striking affinities which this ethnographic survey has with the alike ones in Herodotus, on the one hand, and in Sextus Empiricus, on the other. The similarities with the latter, in particular, have been considerably neglected,<sup>229</sup> despite the fact that this section gets even closer to the above S.E. *P.* III.199-234, as it does not simply feature the same human behaviours as examples, as happened so far, but it too uses them to compare cultures.

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<sup>227</sup> See also Solana Dueso (1996), 183, n. 11.

<sup>228</sup> Cf. Robinson (1979), 165-166.

<sup>229</sup> The best we can find is Bett's description of this passage of our work as 'the closest to parts of the writings of Sextus Empiricus' (Bett (2002), 239).

On the other hand, what here is missing compared to Herodotus and Sextus Empiricus is any further reflection about the nature or the origin of these customs. For here we cannot find anything such as Hdt. 1.8 ('men have long ago made wise rules for our learning'),<sup>230</sup> or S.E. *P.* I.146 ('a habit or custom [...] is the joint adoption of a certain kind of action by a number of men, the transgressor of which is not actually punished').<sup>231</sup> Similarly, nothing here could be used for the 5<sup>th</sup> century BCE debate about φύσις and νόμος, although Hippias, one of its most famous voices (cf. *Pl. Prt.* 237c), does not act differently from our author when, according to *Hp.Ma.* 294c-d, he observes that among men there is more contention about what is believed to be seemly than about anything else. Finally, as far as the current paragraph is concerned, at *Pl. Smp.* 182b-c Ionians are similarly said to spurn physical exercise, but as such, without gender qualifications.

## § 2.10

καὶ <τοῖς μὲν>...πάντα] As a complement to the former comparison between the different attitudes of Lacedaemonians and Ionians towards physical exercise, now the author adds that when it comes to arts and letters, the former are happy to ignore them, the latter ashamed. On this respect, the aforesaid parallel with *Pl. Smp.* 182b-c ceases here, because there Plato has Pausanias say that Ionians, like all barbarians, consider training in philosophy to be as shameful as training in sports, whereas our author seems here to be paying tribute to the historical Ionian pre-eminence in culture. Solana Dueso mentions Sappho and Aspasia as representative figures of Ionian female education of whom the author might have thought, but we must not forget Cleobulina of Rhodes either, who is quoted at §, 3.11, along with a riddle of hers.<sup>232</sup>

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<sup>230</sup> Translation from Godley (1920), 13.

<sup>231</sup> Bury (1976), 87.

<sup>232</sup> Solana Dueso (1996), 184, n. 12.

<τοῖς μέν>] As Classen observes,<sup>233</sup> the supplement of this article with pronominal function, as first conjectured by Diels,<sup>234</sup> or, alternatively, that of the Doric demonstrative pronoun τήνοις, by Wilamowitz,<sup>235</sup> is here required, if the correlation Λακεδαιμονίοις...Ἰῶσι δέ of the previous paragraph is, as it seems, to go on, *contra* Robinson who follows the manuscripts.<sup>236</sup>

## § 2.11

**Θεσσαλοῖσι...ἔργα]** The same farming habits held as seemly among Thessalians are considered shameful, and even slavish (δώλων), in a more civilized land like Sicily. Many sources reveal the importance of horses in the Thessalian culture, but Taylor is right when looking at E. *El.* 815-817 ('they say that the Thessalians regard it as a seemly accomplishment to butcher a bullock or break a horse')<sup>237</sup> as the most suitable parallel with what we have here.<sup>238</sup>

## § 2.12

**Μακεδόσι...ἄμφω αἰσχρόν]** The author comes back to habits concerning love and sex, this time with reference to Macedonians, described as allowing a girl a pre-marital sexual life, but also condemning any other extramarital intercourse of hers, once she is wed. By contrast, Hellenes are said to be stricter, and censure any sexual relations a girl has before marriage, which is consistent with the Greek woman's fidelity and conjugal devotion, in § 2.5.

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<sup>233</sup> Classen (2001), 115.

<sup>234</sup> Diels (1903), 582.

<sup>235</sup> Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff in Diels (1907), 638.

<sup>236</sup> Robinson (1979), 108.

<sup>237</sup> Kovacs (1998), 243.

<sup>238</sup> Taylor (1911), 96.

### § 2.13

τοῖς δὲ Θραξί...ἀδικέοντι] That the Thracian woman finds seemly what women from other cultures see as a form of punishment represents an overturn of aesthetical and social criteria, along the lines of the former comparison between Thessalian and Sicilian farming customs in § 2.11. What we read here is backed up by Hdt. 5.6, where in Thracian culture ‘to be tattooed is a sign of noble birth, while to bear no such marks is for the shameful sort’.<sup>239</sup> At S.E. *P.* III.202, also, we find that whereas with Hellenes ‘tattooing is held to be shameful and degrading’, nonetheless ‘many of the Egyptians and Sarmatians tattoo their offspring’.<sup>240</sup>

τοὶ δὲ Σκύθαι... ποιήσαντι] The whole passage appears to be a summary of what is expounded in Hdt. 4.64-66. There, the description opens with the technical procedure of flaying an enemy’s head. The scalps obtained from it are said to serve not only as a trophy to be fastened to one’s own horse, but in the first place as a hand towel; similarly, the enemy’s skin in general and even his nails are said to be used in the manufacture of a few items for both the knight’s wear and that of the horse. Herodotus then specifies that the tradition of gilding and silvering the skull is observed just by the few who can afford it, whereas what everyone does is ‘to cover the outside [*scil.* ‘of the skull’] with a piece of raw hide’ (4.65). Not differently from our text, Pl. *Euthd.* 299e too reports that Scythians are accustomed to drinking from these skulls, and this, according to Hdt. 4.66, happens only once a year, when the king gathers the province governors for a drinking-party where the more skulls one proves to have collected, the more his reputation grows. Finally, even though Herodotus does not compare this people with Hellenes, as our author does, he nevertheless recalls that when the Scythian king hosts guests, it is customary for him to offer a drink from these skulls (4.65). This may help us better understand ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἑλλασιν...ποιήσαντι at the end of this paragraph; for the

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<sup>239</sup> Translation from Godley (1922), 7.

<sup>240</sup> Translation from Bury (1976), 463.

concessive force of οὐδέ would seem to suggest that the author oddly considers visiting one's house as an ordinary action, and one not implying any particular degree of acquaintance with the host. This final observation would make more sense, if instead taken as an implicit rejoinder to that Herodotean anecdote about the Scythian king's hospitality.

**καὶ σπένδῃ...ποιήσαντι]** Concerning the varied and often contrasting ways in which different peoples communicate with the divine, Sextus Empiricus as well points out how 'sacrificial usages, and the ritual of worship in general, exhibit great diversity. For things which are in some cults accounted holy are in others accounted unholy'<sup>241</sup> (*P.* III.220).

## § 2.14

**Μασσαγέται...ποιέων]** Burial was an issue of the utmost importance for Hellenes, as we read, for example, in *Pl. Hp.Ma.* 291d-e, where Hippias says that among the things seemly for a man there is the giving of a seemly funeral to one's own parents and to receive the same from one's own offspring. The remains of the body, sometimes cremated, were always buried, so as to safeguard the dead's rest and keep the living from their impurity. This is clearly a far cry from the Massagetae's custom here narrated, which, however, represents just the last phase of a longer death ritual, according to *Hdt.* 1.216. For there we read also that this people believe that the happiest death for an old man is to be killed by his relatives, who then usually boil his flesh and feast on it. So much so that if, instead, he happens to die of some illness before reaching the old age, 'they do not eat him, but bury him in the earth, and lament that he did not live to be killed'.<sup>242</sup> Ultimately, this ritual ends up contrasting not only with that

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<sup>241</sup> Translation from Bury (1976), 473.

<sup>242</sup> Translation from Godley (1920), 271.

belonging to Hellenes, but with the Hellenic condemnation of killing one's kin, seen in § 2.8, in the first place.

### § 2.15

**τοὶ δὲ Πέρσαι...παράνομα]** Proceeding from discussing male cosmetics, the extent to which incest shocked Hellenes can be seen on the basis of Oedipus' myth (see S. *OT*). By contrast, Persians judge it favourably, but Herodotus tells us that it was not so before their king Cambises married his sister (3.31). Evidence of Persian intercourses with and marriages to mother and sister is also in S.E. *P.* I.152 and III.205, in both of which these practices applied also to Egyptians.

### § 2.16

**Λυδοῖς...γάμαι]** Prostitution as a way for Lydian girls to collect a dowry and find a husband is described at Hdt 1.93. In S.E. *P.* III.201, instead, the usage is attributed to Egyptians, but also used to contrast them with Hellenes, for whom prostitution is said to be shameful, just as it occurs here.

### § 2.17

**Αἰγύπτιοι...ἐναντίον]** By swapping the tasks usually assigned to men and women, the Egyptian case shows, in particular, how weaving is not necessarily a female business, as typified by the Odyssean Penelope (Hom. *Od.* 2.82-128). Once again, the same observation can be found in Herodotus (2.35) who also confirms that Egyptians 'knead dough with their feet, and gather mud and dung with their hands'<sup>243</sup> (2.36), similarly to what is said at the end of our paragraph. According to the historian, the peculiarity of their customs must also be associated with that of their climate and of the river Nile (2.35).

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<sup>243</sup> Translation from Godley (1920), 319.

<ἔργια>] In contrast to Robinson, I accepted this supplement by Valckenaer<sup>244</sup> because in a passage such as this one, where specific duties are attributed either to women or to men, the only ἐργάζεσθαι ('to work') would have been too generic.

## § 2.18

οἶμαι...νομίζοντι] The moral lesson of the ethnological excursus that has just ended, namely that the same habit can be highly regarded as well as despised depending on cultures, is here defended through a thought experiment, an epistemic device used on two other occasions in the work - the first at the end of this chapter (§§ 2.26-28, 6.12) - and to which Gera pays special attention. Relying on the common dating of the work, she counts these three *Dissoi Logoi* instances of thought experiment among the earliest in Greek literature, the very first being Xenophanes' famous argument against anthropomorphic gods (DK 21B15).<sup>245</sup> Of the current experiment she highlights especially the pattern, which she sees as typical, as it starts with 'an initial hypothetical situation' (αἶ τις...ἕκαστοι νομίζοντι), then it introduces 'a further action which affects the original circumstances' (καὶ πάλιν...ἄγινται), finally it assesses whether the results of this action confirms or denies the 'original thesis' (οὐδέν κα...ταῦτα νομίζοντι).<sup>246</sup> Since the thesis was 'that moral judgments are not absolute', the results are positive, but Gera notices that the reader is not given 'any means to prove – or disprove' them, and the experiment therefore lacks any 'control' and 'sense of rigorousness'.<sup>247</sup> Ultimately, in our author's hands, the thought experiment does not have its usual epistemological purpose, but rather gains a rhetorical one, or, in Gera's words, becomes 'one of the tools of the sophist's trade'.<sup>248</sup> So much so that the second thought experiment of this chapter will have 'an outcome which is the very reverse' of

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<sup>244</sup> Valckenaer (1802), 263.

<sup>245</sup> Gera (2000), 40-41.

<sup>246</sup> Ibid., 35.

<sup>247</sup> Ibid., 39.

<sup>248</sup> Ibid., 43.

the current one, albeit starting from the same conditions.<sup>249</sup> Finally, when looking for other similar experiments in ancient sources, one will find them in Hdt. 3.38 and 7.152, which, however, insist on a people's preference for their own customs over those of the others, and not on the nature of the things considered seemly and shameful, as here.

## § 2.19

**παρεξοῦμαι...καλά]** An unspecified poem (ποίημά τι) offers another case in which the attributes of seemly and shameful are swapped (διαλλάξας) with reference to the same object, stressing again the variability of such judgements. A tradition starting from Meineke has been attributing these verses to Euripides (Fr. TGF adesp. 26), but without reporting any evidence to corroborate this ascription, except Craik, who draws attention to E. *Ph.* 469-471, and *Hipp.* 383-390.<sup>250</sup> However, these examples are arguably relevant for our case, as they feature καίρος in the sense of 'proper measure'.<sup>251</sup> Surely enough, Euripidean plays depict human vicissitudes as challenging the tenability of a neat distinction between what is seemly and what is shameful, as well as what is pious and impious, just and unjust, etc.; but this applies to the other tragedians too. In questioning this Euripidean attribution, I also would like to point out another possible source for the poem, Simonides. For he must have been known to our author, as other implicit hints to him can be spotted in § 3.10 and chapter 9, and he is held to have agreed on the idea that ὁ καίρος determines τὸ καλόν and τὸ αἰσχρόν (Fr. PMG 36).<sup>252</sup>

**διαθρῶν]** I have picked this conjecture by Valckenaer in place of διαιρῶν in the manuscripts, to which Robinson adheres,<sup>253</sup> because the idea of distinction conveyed by the latter seems at odds with the case for the identity of seemly and shameful deeds

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<sup>249</sup> Ibid., 39.

<sup>250</sup> See Meineke (1823), 200-201, and Craik (1993), 56-57.

<sup>251</sup> Translation from Kovacs (2002), 259, and Kovacs (1995), 163.

<sup>252</sup> See also Pellizer (1978), 90.

<sup>253</sup> Valckenaer (1802), 268, Robinson (1979), 110.



made in the poem. The same applies to Nauck's suggestion διαρθρῶν.<sup>254</sup> By contrast, the previous observation of the variety of human customs is perfectly reflected in the construction διαρθρῶν τὸν ἄλλον θνητοῖσιν νόμον.

**ὁ καιρός]** Whereas so far culture has been the factor on which the judgements of what is seemly and what is shameful has depended, here a different and temporal one is introduced. As a result, the author seems to say that not only do such judgements change between peoples, but also within the same people as the time changes, which in a sense brings us back to the intracultural relativism of the first part of the speech. If so, however, in this poem I cannot see a trace of the rhetorical καιρός for which Gorgias was famous (DK82 A1a, A24, B11a.32, B13), as instead Rostagni maintained, with Robinson's approval.<sup>255</sup>

## § 2.20

**ὥς...παῖσι]** After a brief summary of the message of the poem, the author concludes the first speech by bringing out the rhetorical success that he believes to have obtained with it. An alike meta-rhetorical remark, aiming to improve the persuasiveness of what has been just said, occurs in § 6.13, where the author concludes his second speech by underscoring its even structure.

## § 2.21

**λέγεται...τὸ καλόν]** The second speech, in defence of DT, starts here and a connection between it and the second speech of chapter 1 is suggested by the καί anticipating and modifying περὶ τῷ αἰσχροῷ καὶ καλῷ, which implies the existence of a previous discussion about another couple of opposite things which were ἄλλο ἐκάτερόν.

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<sup>254</sup> Nauck (1889), 844.

<sup>255</sup> Rostagni (1922), 172-173, Robinson (1979), 171.

ἐπεὶ...τὸ καλόν] Like in chapter 1, the rationale of the second speech, here epitomized, consists in a combination of the fallacy about the absolute and relative use of the same predicate (the oversimplification of the first speech as just saying that τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα αἰσχρὸν καὶ καλόν ἐστιν), and the *reductio ad absurdum* (the impossibility of receiving a seemingly thing which is not shameful either, if the suggested interpretation of the first speech is the case; see αἶ ποκά...τὸ καλόν). However, this time the degree of the former fallacy seems lesser, as the statement of IT did feature a predicate used in the absolute sense, at least at its face value, as previously stated. Nonetheless, the fallacy does occur from § 2.23 on, when the author tackles some of the arguments for IT as if they too predicated identity in the absolute sense.

## § 2.22

καὶ αἶ τινά γα καλὸν...καλόν ἐστι] The same argumentative strategy occurs here, where, however, it is noteworthy that only the first (καὶ αἶ τινά... αἰσχρὸν τὸν αὐτόν) and the last (καὶ αἶ καλόν...καὶ καλόν ἐστι) of the three paradoxical situations depicted represent relevant cases for DT. In the second one (καὶ αἶ τινά γα λευκόν...τοῦτον τὸν αὐτόν), in fact, the author exaggerates the alleged drawbacks of accepting IT even more, by moving from the theoretical properties of being seemingly and being shameful to the empirical ones of being white and being black. The same will occur in §§ 3.14, and 5.3-5, and it has a parallel in Pl. *Prt.* 331d, where Protagoras argues that everything resembles any other thing, so that we can say both that justice resembles holiness and that white resembles black. As I will better discuss later,<sup>256</sup> such a standpoint is that of doxophilists, as in Pl. *R.* V 480a Plato terms those who do not seek knowledge of immutable ideas, but content themselves with opining the multitude of mutable things in the world.

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<sup>256</sup> See *infra*, 282-283.

### § 2.23

**καὶ...λέγοντι]** Similarly to what happened in § 1.16, the second speech announces the intention of countering the examples of the former one (τὸν λόγον αὐτῶν ὃν λέγοντι) by applying the line of reasoning just introduced (τάδε). Yet, this time no promise of recapitulating all of them is made, in a more consistent way with the following paragraphs, where the author takes up just three of the cases previously encountered, along with the recourse to poetry.

### § 2.24

**αἰ...τωῦτόν]** This argument counters that of § 2.6 in a way analogous to that by which § 1.16 contrasted §§ 1.2 and 1.3, and which again instantiates the characteristic logic of the second speech, presented in § 2.21.

### § 2.25

**ἐν Λακεδαιμονί ἐστι καλὸν...οὕτως]** This paragraph too replies to an argument used in support of IT against it, though with a slight change from the original version in § 2.9, which focussed on girl's exercise, as opposed to children's.

### § 2.26

**λέγοντι...ἤνθεν]** From here to the end of the chapter the author scrutinizes the thought experiment of § 2.18, in order to argue for the untenability of its conclusion. Such disbelief of his already appears in this paragraph (ἐγὼ...ἤνθεν), soon after recalling the statement of the experiment (λέγοντι...ἀπενειχθῆμεν).

**λέγοντι [...] ὥς [...] ἀπενειχθῆμεν]** A contamination occurs between two distinct modes in which indirect quotations are usually introduced, namely ὅτι/ὥς with a finite verb, and the infinitive (ἀπενειχθῆμεν is the aorist passive infinitive of ἀποφέρω),

without affecting the usual way of translating the clause.<sup>257</sup> The same phenomenon is attested in Th. 8.78.3-6, X. *Cyr.* II.4.15, and Pl. *Lg.* 892d.<sup>258</sup>

## § 2.27

αἱ γοῦν...ἀπέφερον] The paragraph clarifies what makes the proponent of the second speech doubt the results of the example of § 2.18, namely the possibility of a change in the *nature* of things gathered together in a pile. But, as Robinson comments, in the former experiment ‘things themselves suffered no transmutation’,<sup>259</sup> rather it was the judgement of them as seemly or shameful to be overturned by the different opinions of different peoples (οὐ γὰρ πάντες ταῦτα νομίζοντι, § 2.18). Therefore, in forgetting about the importance of cultural diversity in this matter, the author applies the fallacy of the relative and absolute use of the same predicate once more. For compared to the original version of the experiment, the sentence ‘the shameful things gathered will be seemly’ (τὰ αἰσχρὰ συνενεχθέντα καλὰ ἐσεῖται) of § 2.26 lacks two clauses specifying which people gathered them as shameful, and who picked them up as seemly, instead. However, although misinterpreting its counterpart, the new experiment makes a methodological point over that, in presenting to the reader a supposed parallel situation, such as the pile of physical objects, on the nature of which different people cannot, similarly, hold different opinions, as Socrates points out in Pl. *Alc. I* 111b-d. For this move, besides contributing the argumentative strength of the experiment, also counts as an invitation to the reader to check the soundness of the conclusions by themselves, which is what the first version of the experiment lacked.

χαλχόν κα ἀπήνεικαν] The manuscripts have χαλχόν ἀπήνεικαν, which seemingly functions as the apodosis of a conditional sentence having αἱ χρυσὸν ἤνεικαν as

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<sup>257</sup> Goodwin (1898), 315.

<sup>258</sup> Kühner/Gerth (1904), 357, Humbert (1972), 183.

<sup>259</sup> Robinson (1979), 174.

protasis, and therefore containing a present supposition implying nothing as to the fulfilment of the condition. However, this conditional sentence is between two others containing a past supposition implying that the condition is not fulfilled, and thus featuring a *κα* before the verb of their apodoses. Therefore, for the sake of consistency, I have integrated *κα* here as well, along the same line as Mullach,<sup>260</sup> whose *ἄν* seems yet formally at odds with the other two *κα*, and as Trieber,<sup>261</sup> whose *κά* is yet wrongly tonic. Similarly, the accent of *ἀπὴνείκαν* does not need to move forward, as instead Blass<sup>262</sup> (applying the Doric accentuation) does with his *χαλχόν κα ἀπηνείκαν*, especially considering the analogue *ῥνείκαν* immediately before. Finally, Wilamowitz opts for an excision rather than for a supplement, deleting *ἀπὴνείκαν* and reading the sole *χαλχόν*.<sup>263</sup> But this solution too, followed by Robinson,<sup>264</sup> is puzzling, when one compares this apodosis with those of the two nearby conditional sentences, neither of which leaves its own verb implicit.

## § 2.28

*ἀντί...ἀπάγαγε;*] In line with the start of the thought experiment (*ἐγὼ θαυμάζω...ῥνθεν*, § 2.26), here, at its end, the author confirms his disbelief in the outcomes of the first version of the test through two questions worth analysing, namely *ἀντί...ἀπάγοντι;* and *αἰ...ἀπάγαγε;.* For they conclude a reasoning whose premises are (i) the result of the original version of the thought experiment (*αἰ τά...ῥνθεν*, in § 2.26), and (ii) the impossibility of changing the nature of things simply by making a heap of them (§ 2.27). More precisely, the first question is just a reminder of (i), whereas the second represents the impossible conclusion following from (i) and (ii), or, in other words, the conclusion which we are bound to accept if we assume (i) despite the

<sup>260</sup> Mullach (1875), 547.

<sup>261</sup> Trieber (1892), 229, n. 2.

<sup>262</sup> Blass in Weber (1897), 42.

<sup>263</sup> Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1889), 628.

<sup>264</sup> Robinson (1979), 114.

admonishment of (ii). Thus, in leading the rival opinion to an impossible result, the author turns out to resort to a *reductio ad absurdum* yet again.

**ποιητάς...ποιεῦντι]** This final thrust to the upholders of IT undermines the credibility of the poetic testimony which those adduced in § 2.19, on the basis of a more general reflection about the aim of poetry. That poetry aims at pleasure and not truth is pointed out by Plato too at *Grg.* 501e-502a and *R.* X 607c. That true philosophers do not make use of poetry, because poets sing whatever they please with no concern whatsoever for truth is reported at *S.E. M.* I.280-281. Then, at 297, Sextus distinguishes between prose-writers and poets in a rather similar way to what we have here, saying that ‘the former aim at the truth, but the latter seek by every means to attract the soul, and the false attracts more than the true’.<sup>265</sup>

**ποιητάς...ἐπάγονται]** This is a stock phrase used by a few authors, among whom, especially, Plato. According to *LSJ*, s.v. ἐπάγω, II 3, μάρτυρας ποιητάς ἐπάγεσθαι features, in fact, at *Ly.* 215c, *Prt.* 347e, *R.* II 364c, and *Lg.* 823a.

## Chapter 3

### Title

**Περί... ἀδίκῳ]** See my comment on chapter 1’s title, *supra*, 90-91.

### § 3.1

**καὶ τοὶ μὲν...τοὶ δέ...]** This μὲν...δέ... correlation of two plural masculine articles used in a pronominal function implies that the third plural person of some verb of saying is understood. Blass hypothesized λέγοντι, which I too deem as the most likely one, in the light of the close previous occurrence of λέγω at the very beginning of the sentence

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<sup>265</sup> Bury (1971), 171.

(λέγονται). Its echo may thus extend to this coordinate clause, albeit in a different form and taking a different subject.<sup>266</sup>

**τοὶ δὲ...ἄδικον]** Similarly to what we saw in chapter 2, here IT is phrased in absolute terms, despite the arguments in support of it taking the opposite attributes of justice and injustice relatively. The contention of the first speech will be, in fact, that the same action holds the opposite values of justice and injustice depending on the circumstances under which it is performed. ‘Circumstance’ stands for a state of affairs, namely a hypothetical scenario of beings and events which can take place in the world, and is reminiscent of the notion of *καῖρός* featuring in the first speech of chapter 2; in this connection, ‘state of affairs’ is one of the possible meaning of *καῖρός* when it occurs in the plural (*LSJ*, s.v. *καῖρός* III 4). From this perspective, a parallel can be drawn with [Pl.] *Just.* 375a2-6 where things are said to be just *ἐν μὲν τῷ δέοντι καὶ τῷ καίρῳ* and unjust *ἐν δὲ τῷ μὴ δέοντι*. This dialogue will then introduce knowledge as the necessary means to distinguish between these two opposite conditions, which never occurs in our text, though.

There is another difference in the criterion of circumstance of the ITs of chapters 2 and 3. For in the IT of the former, the author always clarifies the two circumstances under which a certain object is either beautiful or ugly, whereas here his focus is only on the exceptional conditions under which an object usually deemed as unjust is just, and which always consist in some major issue to which our everyday conception of what is unjust is bound to yield, by a logic of *ubi maior minor cessat*.

### § 3.2

**καὶ πρῶτον...ἐνήμεν;]** The first speech of this chapter (§§ 3.2-12), in defence of IT, starts by announcing the intention of considering lies and deception (*καὶ πρῶτον...καὶ*

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<sup>266</sup> Blass in Weber (1897), 42.

ἐξαπατᾶν), although the example it brings here (αἰ...ἐνῆμεν;) addresses only the latter. Before expounding this case, the author distinguishes between the possible recipients of the action, namely between enemies, whose deception seems generally condemned (τῶς μὲν πολεμίως...ἐξείποιεν), and those dearest to us, whose deception is allowed in some specific cases (τῶς δὲ φιλτάτως...ἐνῆμεν;). Such a treatment of enemies seems counterintuitive, and opposed to its counterparts in analogous discussions from other ancient sources (Pl. *R.* II 382c-d, [Pl.] *Just.* 374c, X. *Mem.* IV.2.15-16), where enemies are the only ones whom it is always just to lie to and to deceive. Hence Diels opts for two corrections of the text, by adding καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, τῶς δὲ φίλως between ταῦτα ποιεῖν and αἰσχροῦν, then πῶς δὲ τῶς πολεμίως immediately before τῶς δὲ φιλτάτως οὔ, soon after the colon.<sup>267</sup> This results in a translation such as Sprague's 'my opponents would declare that it is <right and just> to do these things to one's enemies but disgraceful and wicked to do so <to one's friend>. <But how is it just to do so to one's enemies> and not to one's dearest friends?'<sup>268</sup> However, besides being very speculative, these emendations also cause the final question to cast doubt on the possibility of an ethics favouring friends over enemies, though that is precisely what we read in Plato and Xenophon as cited above, for example. Alternatively, Robinson assumes 'the holders of the difference thesis' as the understood subject of ἐξείποιεν, and paraphrases everything as follows: 'even if (*per impossibile*) they (i.e., "the holders of the difference thesis") thought that it was αἰσχροῦν and πονηροῦν to lie to and deceive one's enemies, they would never deny that it is, in certain circumstances, proper to lie to and deceive one's φίλτατοι'.<sup>269</sup> However, in the first place, when the author needs to refer to the supporters of either thesis, he regularly does so expressly, in a way which enhances the antilogic character of the work (see e.g. τῶς λέγοντας ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶν ἄδικον καὶ δίκαιον, in § 3.13). Secondly, the sole ἂν ἐξείποιεν expresses a possibility,

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<sup>267</sup> Diels (1903), 583.

<sup>268</sup> Sprague (1972), 285.

<sup>269</sup> Robinson (1979), 179.



and not the hypothesis of a conditional sentence such as the one Robinson recognizes in τὼς μὲν πολεμίως...ἐξείποιεν. In conclusion, the most compelling way I see to understand this passage is to suppose that the people maintaining this view (ἄν ἐξείποιεν) adhere to a heroic ethics similar to that expressed in §§ 2.7-8, which condemns fleeing from the enemy and praises killing him, and on the basis of which lies and deception could therefore be considered acts of cowardice.

Coming to the example of the child giving medicine to either of his reluctant parents (αὐτίκα...ἐνῆμεν;), in it the reader may recognize a reversal of the usual dynamics in which the parent cares for the child as he grows up, if necessary also with the aid of lies or deceptions. For example, in the similar *X. Mem.* IV.2.17 it is the father who gives the medicine to the child by pretending that it is food. Here, our author turns this logic upside down, maybe to test his thesis against a more probative case, under the assumption that it is more shocking to think of children lying to parents than the other way around. The point of the example is that an action otherwise unjust is just if directed towards a person (in our case, the parent) who is not doing what is necessary for their own wellbeing (taking medicines to recover from some illness), because of some form of mental impairment of theirs (caused perhaps by that illness itself). As Zembaty observes, the next example, which will involve a depressed friend, will be based on the same rationale (§ 3.4).<sup>270</sup>

### § 3.3

οὐκῶν...δίκαιον] Lying and deceiving of § 3.2 are now placed alongside stealing (κλέπτειν) and using force against someone (βιῆσθαι) of § 3.4, in a connection which sums up the two kinds of objects taken in examination throughout the first speech, namely words and actions.

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<sup>270</sup> Zembaty (1988), 524-525.

### § 3.4

αὐτίκα...βίᾳ] Again on the *ubi maior minor cessat* principle, when a friend's life is threatened by the possibility of his own misuse of some object, the respect of the ownership of that object takes second place, and one must do all possible to remove it from him, even by means of force. A similar reflection appears at Pl. *R.* I 328c-d, whereas 331c-d offers the analogous example of returning a weapon to a friend gone mad during the time of the loan. Even closer is the crosstalk between Socrates and Euthydemus at the already quoted X. *Mem.* IV.2.17: "'and again, suppose one has a friend suffering from depression and for fear that he may make away with himself he takes away his sword or something of the sort, under which heading will we put that now?" "That too goes under justice, of course."'<sup>271</sup>

Many scholars have drawn on these moments of the two texts to establish some dependence between the second speech of this chapter and X. *Mem.* IV.2.2-18. Trieber, in particular, argued for the higher degree of elaborateness of our author's exposition, pointing to cases absent in Xenophon such as perjury, temple robbing and killing one's own kin, in order to conclude that it was our author who inspired Xenophon.<sup>272</sup> However, by saying so, Trieber passes over examples such as those of stealing, of plundering an enemy's goods, and of a general lying to encourage his army, which appear in Xenophon (IV.2.15,17), but not in our text. Furthermore, precisely by assuming, with Trieber, that when one text depends on another, the latter is more elaborate than the former, our chapter cannot be the source for Xenophon's passage. For here the author just limits himself to providing as many examples in favour of IT as possible, whereas Xenophon sets them in a more articulate dialectical structure, which is necessary to attain a higher epistemic goal, namely the definition of a criterion to discern what is just and what is unjust. By contrast, the only generalization which our author touches upon, that deceiving the enemies is unjust (§ 3.2), goes against the

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<sup>271</sup> Translation from Marchant/Todd (2013), 295.

<sup>272</sup> Trieber (1892), 218-219.

counterpart formulated by Xenophon at IV.2.15, where this behaviour is said to be just. In conclusion, while it is never easy to determine influences, in either sense, between this work and other ancient sources, yet in this case a close examination of the two texts clearly excludes the possibility that Xenophon is indebted to our author.

βίᾱ.] Some editors starting from North have turned the full stop which one reads in the codices into a question mark, probably in analogy with the following direct questions over §§ 3.5-8. At the same time, they translated the resulting clause δίκαιόν...βίᾱ; as a rhetorical question expecting an affirmative answer; see e.g. North's 'annon justum est hoc clanculum subripere si quis posset, aut si tardior adveniens jam in manibus habentem deprehenderit, per vim auferre?'<sup>273</sup> But if that was the author's intended meaning, the Greek would have a οὐ before δίκαιον, which, in fact, Untersteiner added along with the quotation mark.<sup>274</sup> Unlike him, Robinson thought that there is no point in changing the text, and that this sentence has rather its parallel in the affirmative φονεύεν...ποιῆσαι of § 3.9. He, in fact, translates 'it is just to steal these implements, should one be able to, or, should one arrive late on the scene and come upon him with the implement in his hand, to take it away from him by force'.<sup>275</sup> However, this translation does not match his Greek text, which has the combination δίκαιόν [...] βίᾱ; probably mistakenly taken on from Diels and Kranz's edition of the text, the last one before his own.<sup>276</sup> Therefore, in my rendition of the text I have restored the original full stop in place of the question mark.

### § 3.5

ἀνδραποδίσσασθαι...πατέρα;] Similarly to what is seen in the transitions from §§ 1.2-3 to §§ 1.4-10, and from §§ 2.2-8 to §§ 2.9-17, the author switches from the private

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<sup>273</sup> North (1671), 62.

<sup>274</sup> Untersteiner (1954), 164.

<sup>275</sup> Robinson (1979), 117.

<sup>276</sup> Cf. Diels/Kranz (1952), 410.

dimension of the affections for parents and friends of §§ 3.2-4, to a public one, about conflicts both internal and external to a community, in §§ 3.5-8. Over the history of Greek legislations, it is frequent to find the actions analysed in these new paragraphs — enslavement (ἀνδραποδίξασθαι, § 3.5), burglary (τοιχωρυχέν, § 3.5), false swearing (ἐπιιορκέν, § 3.6), and robbing a temple (ἱεροσυλέν, § 3.6) — featuring in the same list of crimes, as a large corpus of textual evidence from Xenophon to Constantine Harmenopoulos' *Hexabiblos*. In particular, at Pl. *R.* I 344b the character Thrasyarchus recalls how among Athenians these offences are condemned and punished, while X. *Mem.* I.2.62 and *Ap.* 25 specify that the punishment was the death penalty. However, by pointing out how in some exceptional cases these crimes need to be allowed for the sake of justice itself, §§ 3.5-8 undermine the belief of a simple and coherent corpus of moral norms; an operation with a clear sophistic flavour.<sup>277</sup> Though with a specific reference to laws, Aristotle too offers a similar reflection at *EN* 5.10.3-8 and *Rh.* I.13.13-17, also explaining these exceptions as due to the fact that whereas norms are endowed with a regular form, 'the material of conduct is essentially irregular' (*EN* 5.10.4-5) and cannot therefore fit the former.<sup>278</sup>

ἀνδραποδίξασθαι...ἀποδόσθαι;] In a strikingly similar way, at X. *Mem.* IV.2.14 Socrates and Euthydemus describe enslavement as an unjust act, but soon after, at IV.2.15, they add that a military general who enslaves his enemies' city acts justly. As Gaca recalls,<sup>279</sup> at *Cyr.* VII.5.73 Xenophon also adds that: 'it is a law established for all time among all men that when a city is taken in war, the persons and the property of the inhabitants thereof belong to the captors'.<sup>280</sup> Once again, a *maior* concern, i.e. the hostility between cities, gets the better of one perceived as *minor*, i.e. the badness of the action as such. This principle applies to other cases, as Socrates and Euthydemus

<sup>277</sup> Similarly, Barnes (1979), 219, Mureddu (2014), 21, *contra* Hoffman (1997), 349.

<sup>278</sup> Translation from Rackham (1926), 315.

<sup>279</sup> Gaca (2010), 119, n. 6.

<sup>280</sup> Translation from Miller (1914), 293.

conclude at *Mem.* IV.2.16, where they realize that all the actions they previously recalled as unjust are actually so if directed against a friend, but just if directed against an enemy.

**τοιχωρουχέν...πατέρα;**] A former ruler of a city has been overpowered, imprisoned and sent to death by his opponents. In this case, his son may exceptionally act with justice if he breaks into the prison — in this I recognise the ‘one’s own city’s building’ (τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν κοινὰ οἰκήματα) the author has just been mentioning in the formulation of the general rule (τοιχωρουχέν...φαίνεται) which underlies this example — and free him.

### § 3.6

**ἐπιορκέν...εὐορκήσας;**] If we recall the two categories of objects with which the first speech is concerned, words and actions, we can see how the current example involves both of them on their specific levels. Forswearing an oath taken with enemies (§ 3.6) for the defence of one’s city (§ 3.7), in fact, implies to act in a way which contravenes the words uttered in the oath.<sup>281</sup> From this point of view, to quote Chrysippus’ reflection at *Fr. Log.* 197, only once we have kept the oath (εὐορκέω) or broken it (ἐπιορκέω), can we retrospectively say whether our oath was a true or a false one.

Furthermore, a particularity of this example, if compared with the other ones in the chapter, is that in bringing forth the case of forswearing an oath contracted with the enemies, it takes for granted another controversial case, namely that someone can connive with the enemies for his own freedom. On the other hand, at §§ 3.5 and 3.8 two other actions harming the community (τοιχωρουχέν [...] τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν κοινὰ οἰκήματα and τὰ δὲ κοινὰ τᾶς Ἑλλάδος...λαβεῖν καὶ χρῆσθαι) are considered just nonetheless. In particular, the former is said so for the sake of the individual’s safety,

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<sup>281</sup> A similar coming apart between actions and words will also underpin the first speech of chapter 4 (§§ 4.2-5).

similarly to the current case, which the author would thus not seem to be in trouble to justify either, if required.

### § 3.7

ἐγὼ...ἱεροσυλέν] After answering the question concluding § 3.6 in the negative, by appealing to the *ubi maior* of the city's salvation, the paragraph introduces a new case, expounded in § 3.8, which will again interweave the themes of national security and sacredness (ἱεροσυλέν). A religious component is, in fact, already implied in the actions of the verbs εὐορκέω and ἐπιορκέω of the last two paragraphs, as they derive from ὄρκος, a sacralizing object by which a Greek swore.<sup>282</sup>

### § 3.8

τὰ μὲν...πόλεμον;] It is not clear whether the author is presenting this event as something that really occurred or 'is trying to universalize a moral point', by using the genitive absolute μέλλοντος τῷ βαρβάρῳ as 'the protasis of a general condition', as Robinson believes.<sup>283</sup> Nonetheless, I would lean, rather, to the former case, as all the conditional sentences we have encountered so far, and which have underpinned all the examples of the first speech, featured an explicit protasis introduced by αἰ (see §§ 3.2,4,5,6). A similar exploitation of the wealth of the temples of Delphi and Olympia in defence against a looming Persian menace seems, however, to be missing from the ancient Greek history.<sup>284</sup>

### § 3.9

φρονεύεν...ποιῆσαι] The search for exceptional situations in which actions usually held to be unjust are justified ends here, with this last example about the murder of one's kin.

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<sup>282</sup> DELG, s.v. ὄρκος.

<sup>283</sup> Robinson (1979), 183.

<sup>284</sup> See also *supra*, 39.

By resorting to the myth of Orestes and Alcmaeon, the author shows that these deeds are justified if undertaken to avenge the loss of other kin. More precisely, Orestes' and Alcmaeon's mothers are guilty of murdering their fathers respectively, acts that prompted the two sons to kill their mothers in retribution. As for Orestes, the story has it that he is one of the sons of the king of Mycenae, Agamemnon, and of the Spartan princess Clytaemnestra. During the famous Greek expedition to Troy, Clytaemnestra falls in love with Aegisthus and the two plot to kill Agamemnon on his return (cf. Hom. *Il.* 3,266-71, A. A. 1577-1673). Some time after the murder, Orestes, with the aid of the sister Electra, avenges his father, by slaying the murderous couple (E. *El.* 1165-1232). The story of Alcmaeon proceeds in similar fashion, the most extensive treatment of which was given by Apollodorus, and is set in Argos (Apollod. *Bibliotheca* 3.6-7). It begins with the death of Amphiaraus, a seer who foresaw the tragic end of the expedition that Argos was preparing against Thebes. Amphiaraus is nonetheless compelled to join it, being persuaded by his wife, Eriphyle, who was bribed to do so by the Theban Polynices, in return for the necklace of the goddess Harmonia. But before leaving to war, Amphiaraus, aware of this machination and of his tragic destiny, tells everything to his sons Alcmaeon and Amphilochus, so that they will be able to avenge him when they have heard of his death.

An interesting testimony of the reception of this myth, is that of the Latin poet Ovid, who sketched it thus in his *Metamorphoses*:

His own son, dutiful to him, shall be both just and unjust in a single deed [*'facto pius et sceleratus eodem'*]; for he, in vengeance for his father's death, shall slay his mother, and confounded lose both home and reason, persecuted both by the grim Furies and the awful ghost of his own murdered mother.<sup>285</sup> (Ov. *Met.* 9.407-410)

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<sup>285</sup> Translation from More (1922).

What Ovid insists on is the twofold character of Alcmaeon's murder, which, by force of analogy, also applies to Orestes'. In the first place, Ovid deems this sort of crime just and unjust at the same time, which fits the rationale of the IT of this chapter (ἄλλο δὲ...ἄδικον, § 3.1). In second place, new divine characters are recalled, namely the Furies, who start to torment Alcmaeon as punishment for their extreme acts of revenge, just as they do to Orestes, in his story. At the same time, another god, Apollo, plays an important part in the two heroes' stories. Of him Ovid does not speak, whereas our paragraph refers to a certain god's oracle (καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἔχρησε) about the justice of Orestes' and Alcmaeon's deeds. Some versions of the myths, by contrast, go even further than that, representing Apollo bidding the two main characters to commit their crime (cf. e.g. E. *El.* 1301-1304, Apollod. *Bibliotheca* 3.7.5). At any rate, what here we have is thus a balance between a divine support and a divine opposition towards the matricide, with Apollo championing the memory of the dead fathers, and the Furies that of the mothers.<sup>286</sup> The painful and hard dilemma before which the two characters are put (Aristotle will describe it as the one between two evils: *Po.* 13, *EN* 3.1) represents a perfect case for the IT of this chapter.

φονεύειν δὲ τῶς φιλτάτῳς] It is worth noticing that after the author's display, in the previous paragraphs, of *ubi maior* causes for the sake of which what is usually deemed as unjust becomes just, we here reach a point where even the fundamental idea to which all those causes boil down, namely the defence of the people dear to us (see especially §§ 3.2,5,7), is put into question, making the relativism of this chapter, according to Barnes, 'the most interesting and the most dangerous of the Sophistic relativisms'.<sup>287</sup>

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<sup>286</sup> As far as Orestes' story is concerned, Aeschylus' *Eumenides* depicts this opposition in the guise of a trial before Athena and a jury of Athenian citizens. On the one hand, Apollo, acting as advocate for Orestes, recalls the greatness of the dead Agamemnon (625-637), on the other, the Furies speak on behalf of the dead Clytaemnestra. This balance of opposing forces is further reflected in the result of the jurors' voting, which is a tie (but which is sufficient to acquit Orestes of his mother's murder).

<sup>287</sup> Barnes (1979), 220.



ἐπεὶ...ποιῆσαι] A causal clause introduced by ἐπεὶ and justifying φονεύεν δὲ τὼς φιλτάτως δίκαιον would be here expected, but the verb which the nominatives Ὀρέστας and Ἀλκμαίων should take is missing. Like the previous translators, Robinson rendered the clause as 'since both Orestes and Alcmaeon did',<sup>288</sup> assuming that a verb of doing is here understood, in a way which is rather uncommon, though. Furthermore, the reason why 'it is just to kill one's most loved people' can hardly be simply that two characters of the Greek myth have done it. More relevant, instead, is the fact that according to the myth, the god approved what those characters did, as it is said in the following clause (καὶ ὁ...ποιῆσαι). Hence, I believe that originally ἐπεὶ...Ἀλκμαίων was indeed completed by a verb of doing, and I also suspect that such a verb took the place of the raised dot which now separates Ἀλκμαίων from the following καί. For only in this way, the explicatory power of the coordinate clause can be successfully transmitted to the ἐπεὶ clause preceding it, and the murder of one's loved people can be efficiently justified.

### § 3.10

ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς τέχνας...ἄριστος] That arts, and poetry in particular, consist in the production of objects similar to real ones, in a form of deception, is a well-known theory in ancient Greek literature. It can be traced back to the proverb 'poets tell many lies' (πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἀοιδοί, [Pl.] *Just.* 374a, Arist. *Metaph.* A 983a3-4), which scholars attributed to Solon (*Fr.* 29), and it receives its first substantial philosophical treatment in Pl. *R.* I 595a-608b. Here the stress is especially on tragedy (τραγωδία) which is coupled precisely with painting (γραφική), as exemplary of arts whose products are imitations of appearances. For this reason, Plato considers them as three time removed from the truth (598e-599a), and thus a form of deception (598d, where ἐξαπατάω occurs too). As far as the deceitful character of painting (ζωγραφία in our text) is concerned,

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<sup>288</sup> Robinson (1979), 119.

the following contest between the painters Zeuxis (c. 435/25-390 BCE) and Parrhasius (active c. 440-380 BCE) has become particularly famous:

Zeuxis [...] produced a picture of grapes so successfully represented that birds flew up to the stage-buildings; whereupon Parrhasius himself produced such a realistic picture of a curtain that Zeuxis, proud of the verdict of the birds, requested that the curtain should now be drawn and the picture displayed; and when he realized his mistake, with a modesty that did him honour he yielded up the prize, saying that whereas he had deceived birds Parrhasius had deceived him, an artist.<sup>289</sup> (Plin. *Nat.* 35.65-66)

Our author himself already warned us of the risk of relying on what poets say, pointing out their preference for pleasure over the truth (§ 2.28).

However, what differentiates the current passage from these is that here the artistic deception is connected with the notion of justice, owing to the argumentative function of this paragraph within the first speech. Despite the fact that the author declares him who deceives the most (ὅστις πλεῖστα ἐξαπατῇ) to be the best (ἄριστος) and not the most just, the latter qualification is clearly the one he really has in mind, as also expressed in the poetic examples of the next two paragraphs. From this perspective, then the authors most likely to have influenced the passage are other two.

As first comes Simonides, who, like our author, recognises the intellectual value of poetical deception, but focussing on the audience rather than on the poet, highlighting the necessity of a certain degree of education on their part for this effect to work (Plut. *aud. poet.* 15c). Furthermore, our author's reference to the resemblance of artistic products to real objects (ὅμοια τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς ποιέων) can be read in parallel with Simonides' saying that the word is the image of the thing (ὁ λόγος τῶν πραγμάτων εἰκὼν ἐστίν, Mich. Psell. π. ἐνεργ. δαμ. (P.G. CXXII 821)). The importance which Simonides attaches to the visual component of poetry can be best

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<sup>289</sup> Translation from Rackham (1952), 309-311.

grasped by referring to his famous descriptions of painting (ζωγραφία, like in our passage) as silent poetry (ποίησις) and of poetry as speaking painting, as reported in Plut. *de glor. Ath.* 3.346f5-7.

As a second influential author one must name Gorgias, who some pages later in the latter Plutarchan work is described as propounding a very similar message (3.348c1-8), but in connection with τραγωδία, the other art mentioned in our paragraph. Besides it too associating the fact that a spectator can be deceived by tragedies to his understanding and sensibility (ὁ δ' ἀπατηθεὶς σοφώτερος τοῦ μὴ ἀπατηθέντος), this passage finally introduces the category of justice within this aesthetical reflection, by saying that 'he who deceives is more just than he who does not deceive' (ὅ τ' ἀπατήσας δικαιότερος τοῦ μὴ ἀπατήσαντος). For only the tragedian who deceives proves to be doing what he promised to (ὅτι τοῦθ' ὑποσχόμενος πεποίηκεν), which is as much as to say that tragedy is a declared deception. Hence, the justice Gorgias implies here reflects an idea of consistency with what one has committed to do, which, as Falkner notices, can count as a particular instance of a more general definition of justice as 'giving back what one owes'.<sup>290</sup> The latter already came up in connection with § 1.12 and is introduced as typical of Simonides rather than of Gorgias at Pl. *R.* I 331e. That is not problematic, rather it proves the similarity between the ideas of these two figures, both echoed in a few passages of our work.

### § 3.11

**θέλω...δικαιότατον]** As already seen in § 2.19, in order to corroborate and solemnly conclude his first speech the author uses a poetical quote which, in this circumstance, serves also to enter into poetry, a topic generally introduced in § 3.10. However, here the attention is not as much on the artistic deception of Cleobuline's words as, instead, on the character she describes, which, in line with the previous examples, is just despite

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<sup>290</sup> Falkner (1998), 44.

performing actions seemingly antithetical to justice, such as stealing (κλέπτοντα) and deceiving (ἐξαπατῶντα). Yet, seemingly this composition is far from being argumentatively effective, not telling who the man is whom the poetess has seen (ἄνδρ' εἶδον) and of whom such description is true. This is in fact a riddle, a poetic form in which Cleobuline (6<sup>th</sup> century BCE) excelled, and which she inherited from her father Cleobulus, tyrant of Lindus, according to D.L. I.89.

A few solutions have been proposed for these lines, from Wilamowitz's 'the wrestler', followed by Robinson, to Romagnoli's 'the artist', up to Matelli's most recent 'the warrior'.<sup>291</sup> All of them, however, follow the traditional translation of both βιάίως and βία with something like 'by force'. Such rendering is required by the former word, but not by the latter, of which another possible translation is 'perforce' (see *LSJ*, s.v. βία, II 2). The advantage of taking βία in this second way, as I have done, is that the variation between the two adverbial forms is no longer due to merely stylistic reasons, but to more substantial ones of meaning. As a result, the man who is described in the riddle emerges more clearly as Matelli's warrior: a soldier at war acts *violently* by stealing and deceiving (ἄνδρ' ...βιάίως), but since he is *compelled* to do so by the state for which he fights, he behaves in the most just way (καὶ τὸ ...δικαιότατον).

### § 3.12

ἦν...τιμῇ θεός] Two other poetic verses, this time from Aeschylus, are given here. Although dealing with closely related subjects such as deception and lies (our author too coupled them in § 3.2), they do not seem to be parts of the same reasoning, as first noticed by North.<sup>292</sup> In the first the god is directly responsible (ἀποστατεῖ) for an act of deception, whereas in the second he just praises (τιμῇ) someone else's, and hence some human, lies. For this reason, they now figure as two separate unattributed fragments of

<sup>291</sup> Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1933), 97, n. 179, Robinson (1979), 185, Romagnoli (1932), 270, Matelli (1997), 19.

<sup>292</sup> North (1671), 64, n. 9.

Aeschylus, namely ἀπάτης δικαίας οὐκ ἀποστατεῖ θεός as *Fr.* 301, and ψευδῶν δὲ καιρὸν ἔσθ' ὅπου τιμῇ θεός as *Fr.* 302.

ἀπάτης...ἀποστατεῖ θεός] That Aeschylus was known for representing the divinity as deceptive is something that appears also in the following fragment, handed down in *Pl. R.* II 383a-b, and which has been ascribed to *The Weighing of Souls* by Stanley, and to *The Award of the Arms* by Lachmann:<sup>293</sup>

Thetis: <And> he [*scil.* 'Apollo'] dwelt on the excellent offspring I would have, which would have length of life and never know sickness, and after completing these words he struck up a holy paeon-song about my good fortune in being loved by the gods, which delighted my heart. And I supposed that the divine voice of Phoebus, pregnant with prophetic skill, was incapable of falsehood. But he who himself sang that song, who himself attended that feast, who himself spoke those words, he himself it is who has killed my son!<sup>294</sup> (*A. Fr.* 350)

As for our *Fr.* 301, it has been usually variously attributed 'to *Danaids*, *Aiguptioi*, *Prometheus Pyrkaeus*, *Thalamopoioi*, or *Philoktetes*'.<sup>295</sup> In contrast, Griffith thinks of the lost satyric drama *Proteus*, assuming that the latter did not represent, as usually maintained, the events told in *Hom. Od.* 4, namely Menelaus' landing at the island of Pharos, home of Proteus. Rather, Griffith looks to the events described in Stesichoros' *Palinode* of Helen, according to which Proteus brings Helen to Egypt leaving Paris with just a phantom of her over which the war of Troy was fought. This substitution would thus be the deception (ἀπάτη) which our passage attributes to a god (θεός), such as Proteus. Furthermore, it is also just (δίκαια), because it is done 'for the good of Helen (and Menelaus too) and for the good of the institution of marriage —as well as for the

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<sup>293</sup> Sommerstein (2009), 308.

<sup>294</sup> Translation from *ibid.*, 309-311.

<sup>295</sup> Griffith (2002), 250, n. 176.

reputation of the Olympian gods, who otherwise must bear the responsibility for the Judgment of Paris and resultant sack of Troy'.<sup>296</sup>

ψευδῶν...τιμῇ θεός] Robinson's translation 'there are occasions when god respects an opportune moment for lies',<sup>297</sup> weakens the value of τιμῇ, which indicates not mere respect, but esteem, which I have hence rendered with 'holds in honour'.<sup>298</sup> The whole translation I so obtained and which I proposed, namely 'there are cases when god holds in honour the right moment for lies', keeps the poetic diction to the detriment of its perspicuity, though. It is, in fact, worth observing that what the god is likely to be interested in, and to honour, are the lies told at the right moment, rather than 'the right moment' in which these are said, as Teichmüller first clarified with his semantic translation of ψευδῶν καιρὸν with 'eine lüge zur rechten Zeit'.<sup>299</sup>

### § 3.13

ἀντίος λόγος] The adjective which is used here characterizes the new speech for its contrast with the former one more emphatically than the still similar ἄλλος δὲ λόγος of § 1.11. A closer parallel can be drawn with Protagoras' and Sextus Empiricus' λόγοι ἀντικείμενοι ('counter-balancing arguments'), for which see *supra*, 25 and *infra*, 287.

### § 3.14

γινώσκεις] The manuscripts have the 3<sup>rd</sup> singular person forms γινώσκη, γινώσκη, and γινώσκει. The last one, preserved in L and firstly chosen by Blass,<sup>300</sup> is that which Robinson too prints. He then translates the conditional clause αἴ γινώσκει as 'if somebody knows'.<sup>301</sup> However, no τις is present either in the current sentence nor in

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<sup>296</sup> Ibid., 250.

<sup>297</sup> Robinson (1979), 119.

<sup>298</sup> Most translations are of this kind and date back to North's 'laudat' (North (1671), 64).

<sup>299</sup> Teichmüller (1884), 213.

<sup>300</sup> Blass in Weber (1897), 44.

<sup>301</sup> Robinson (1979), 121.

that before and one must go back to ἐπεὶ αἱ τις ἐρωτάσαι of § 3.13 to find one; it seems to me too far for the author to keep it understood here. In the absence of a suitable subject in general, I have preferred to depart from Robinson's γινώσκει, and, instead, to accept Diels' emendation γινώσκεις,<sup>302</sup> which also fits the 2<sup>nd</sup> singular person φέρε few words before.

**καὶ μέγαν...τῶτόν]** The reasoning shifts from theoretical properties (δίκαιον and ἄδικον) to empirical ones (μέγαν and μικρόν), in the same controversial way as in § 2.22 (καὶ αἱ τινά...τοῦτον τὸν αὐτόν). See also *supra*, 119.

**καὶ τοι πολλά]** This is the reading of the manuscripts and it was kept by the editors until Diels, who proposed καὶ τοι <ὁ> πολλά,<sup>303</sup> through which the next ἀδικήσας becomes an articulated participle, subject of the imperative 3<sup>rd</sup> singular person ἀποθανέτω. Although producing a sound meaning, namely 'let him who has performed many unjust actions be put to death', this supplement is not necessary, because ἀποθανέτω can already find an adequate implicit subject in ἄνδρα of the former sentence. In accordance with this reading, ἀδικήσας may become a circumstantial participle representing a conditional clause ('if he performs many unjust actions').<sup>304</sup> Likewise, there is no need of an even more substantial supplement such as Friedländer and Kranz's καὶ <αἱ λέγοιτο> 'πολλά'.<sup>305</sup> Nor does it seem that the overall state of corruption of the passage (see the following lemma, below) and the author's rare habit of starting a sentence with a καὶ followed by particles do justify Classen's

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<sup>302</sup> Diels (1903), 584.

<sup>303</sup> Diels (1912), 340.

<sup>304</sup> One might see this interpretation as inconsistent with § 3.8, to comment on which I relied on the author's preference for explicit conditional clauses. However, in this case an explicit conditional clause has just been adopted in the former sentence, which therefore may have pushed the author to vary its phrasing here, where he needs to introduce a further assumption logically dependent on the former.

<sup>305</sup> Diels/Kranz (1952), 411.

expunction of *τοι* in Diels' conjecture, and, as a result, the reading *καί <ό> πολλά*.<sup>306</sup> On the contrary, the emphasis brought in by this particle 'implying a real or imaginary audience'<sup>307</sup> ('mark you') perfectly matches with the *φέρε* starting the paragraph, as it continues the direct speech opened by it. Finally, Robinson's *καίτοι* in place of *καί τοι* and its translation with 'but'<sup>308</sup> would turn what follows into an objection to what is said before,<sup>309</sup> which seems quite counterintuitive, and which in fact makes sense only by accepting his questionable next intervention on the text as well (see the following lemma, below).

**ἀποθανέτω...διαπραξάμενος]** Here most manuscripts have *ἀποθανέτω πραξάμενος*, three have *ἀποθανέτω ἀποθανέτω πραξάμενος* (C, P6, and V2), and two *ἀποθανέτω. ἀποθανέτω πραξάμενος* (Y1, Y2). Clearly, none of these solution returns a meaningful text when joined to the first part of the sentence (*καί τοι πολλά ἀδικήσας*). Many conjectures have been brought forward, and all of them are extremely speculative and integrate many and various words. I, instead, have looked for the most measured supplement, both regarding number of words and content, and I have reckoned it likely that here the author keeps on pinpointing the paradoxes that originate from treating an object as just and unjust at the same time. Under these conditions, I have refused Blass' *ἀποθανέτω, ἀποθανέτω <πολλά καὶ δίκαια δια>πραξάμενος*,<sup>310</sup> in which the coordination of the two *ἀποθανέτω* by mere comma is too abrupt to express the passage from the right death sentence to the wrong one. On the other hand, this proposal has the merit of fostering the logic of paradox, by using a phrase such as *πολλά καὶ δίκαια* which produces a perfect mirroring of *πολλά ἀδικήσας* in the first part of the sentence. This is also reminiscent of *τὰ γὰρ πολλά καὶ*

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<sup>306</sup> Classen (2001), 124.

<sup>307</sup> *LSJ*, s.v. *τοι*.

<sup>308</sup> Robinson (1979), 121.

<sup>309</sup> *LSJ*, s.v. *καί τοι*, II.

<sup>310</sup> Blass in Weber (1897), 44.



μεγάλα ἀγαθὰ αὐτῷ πολλὰ κακὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἐστὶν in § 1.15, a paragraph which we saw having the same function as this one. For this reason, my choice has gone to Diels' ἀποθανέντω <καὶ πολλὰ καὶ δίκαια δια>πραξάμενος,<sup>311</sup> which takes up again πολλὰ καὶ δίκαια and also adds a καί before this adjectival couple, which underscores the addition of unwanted properties, similarly to καὶ ἄδικον ἄρα τὸν αὐτὸν of the previous sentence. Conversely, Becker and Scholz have printed the same solution, but devoid of this καί.<sup>312</sup>

Coming to other conjectures which have been propounded, Schanz' ἀποθανέντω <καὶ πάλιν πολλὰ δίκαια ἐργασά>μενος and Wilamowitz's ἀποθανέντω <ὁ πολλὰ καὶ δίκαια τὸν πατέρα ἐργα>ξάμενος include ideas such as those expressed by πάλιν and τὸν πατέρα which are neither necessary for the reconstruction of the sentence, nor suggested by the context.<sup>313</sup> Diels and Kranz's ἀποθανέντω," ἀποθανέντω <καὶ πολλὰ καὶ δίκαια δια>πραξάμενος<sup>314</sup> depends, instead, on Friedländer and Kranz's excessively speculative insertion of αὐτὸν λέγοιτο, discussed above. Robinson's ἀποθανέντω <ἄτε θανάτω ἄξια δια>πραξάμενος omits πολλὰ καὶ δίκαια and, what is more, causes the whole argument of the paragraph to proceed as follows: 'if somebody knows that some man is just, he in that case knows that the same man is unjust [...] but if a man has been very unjust in his actions he ought to be executed! For he has brought about a situation that warrants death'.<sup>315</sup> However, the fallacious move from being unjust ('the same man is unjust') to being very unjust ('a man has been very unjust') on which this line of reasoning turns is too big for our author to use it to make his case here. Finally, Classen's ἀποθανέντω, ἀποθανέντω ὡς δίκαια <δια>πραξάμενος repeats the above awkward coordination ἀποθανέντω, ἀποθανέντω as Blass, and leaves out the useful πολλὰ.<sup>316</sup>

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<sup>311</sup> Diels (1912), 340.

<sup>312</sup> Becker/Scholz (2004), 68.

<sup>313</sup> Schanz (1884), 380, Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1889), 629.

<sup>314</sup> Diels/Kranz (1952), 411.

<sup>315</sup> Robinson (1979), 120-121.

<sup>316</sup> Classen (2001), 124.

### §§ 3.15-17

**καὶ περὶ... ποιέοντι]** These last three paragraphs show the author's intent of replying more closely to the arguments adduced by the first speech, as already seen in §§ 1.16-17 and 2.23-28. Once again, the arguments which have been used by the rival speech do not receive the promised reply. The only case mentioned as representative of all the others, that of robbing one's enemies (κλέπτειν τὰ τῶν πολεμίων), follows the spirit but not the letter of the first speech.

**ἀποδεικνύει]** The manuscripts read ἀποδεικνύεν, the Doric form of the infinitive ἀποδεικνύειν, which, if assumed, would leave the whole sentence without a finite verb, and hence without a main clause governed by that. Teichmüller supposed a dependence of the whole sentence on the ἀξιούντι of the former one, which already governed ἀποδεικνύεν. He thus worked out a translation such as 'for they <mean to> prove that stealing the goods of the enemies is as just as unjust, if their words are true, and the rest as well'.<sup>317</sup> However, the condition 'if their words are true' seems redundant here, because the fact that one merely thinks that he is proving something does not depend on the truth of the demonstration he actually performs; the same second speech is devoted to show precisely how the first one has failed in such ambitions.

Many ways to obviate this textual difficulty have been explored. Stephanus<sup>318</sup> altered the punctuation and broke down the sentence, obtaining the following: τὸ γὰρ κλέπτειν τὰ τῶν πολεμίων, δίκαιον καὶ ἄδικον ἀποδεικνύεν. τοῦτ' αὐτό. αἱ κ' ἀληθῆς ὁ τήνων λόγος καὶ τᾶλλα καὶ τούτο.<sup>319</sup> On the one hand, by placing ἀποδεικνύεν and αἱ...λόγος in two different sentences, this formulation would allow the dependence of the former on the ἀξιούντι of the previous sentence. On the other

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<sup>317</sup> 'Denn (sie wollen) das Stehlen des feindlichen Eigenthums als gerecht und wieder als ungerecht erweisen, wenn jene Rede wahr sei, und das übrige ebenso' (Teichmüller (1884), 214).

<sup>318</sup> Stephanus (1570), 476-477.

<sup>319</sup> Where I read καὶ τᾶλλα κατ'αὐτό, with Robinson (Robinson (1979), 120) and the codices.

hand, we would then struggle to make sense of the newly originated sentences which follow, especially of τοῦτ' αὐτό, which looks even more elliptic than what precedes it.

Robinson, then, refrains from altering the punctuation and tries to obviate the difficulty, by assuming the sentence to be an abridged version, and full of understood elements, of either of these: (a) τὸ γὰρ κλέπτεν τὰ τῶν πολεμίων δίκαιον <εἶναι ἀποδεικνύεν> καὶ ἄδικον <ἐστίν> ἀποδεικνύεν τοῦτ' αὐτὸ <εἶναι>, αἶ κ' ἀληθὴς ὁ τήνων λόγος. ('For make no mistake about it: <to demonstrate> the fact that stealing the enemy's possessions is just is eo ipso to demonstrate the truth of the antithetical position as well, if their reasoning is sound'); (b) τὸ γὰρ κλέπτεν τὰ τῶν πολεμίων δίκαιον <εἶναι> καὶ ἄδικον <ἐστίν> ἀποδεικνύεν τοῦτ' αὐτὸ <εἶναι>, αἶ κ' ἀληθὴς ὁ τήνων λόγος. ('For make no mistake about it: the fact that stealing the enemy's possessions is just is eo ipso a demonstration of the truth of the antithetical position as well, if their reasoning is sound').<sup>320</sup> Both would be suitable for the point the author means to make here, but unfortunately neither would be compatible with the author's usually plain style which nowhere else presents such a syntactical *tour de force*.

It has thus seemed clear to the rest of the scholars that some interventions in the text are required. As first, North observed that 'deest verbum forsan ῥάδιον aut huiusmodi',<sup>321</sup> and although printing the original text, he inserted a 'licet' in the translation, which then inspired Mullach's supplement ἄδικον <ἔξεστιν> ἀποδεικνύεν.<sup>322</sup> Alternatively, Blass decided to expunge ἀποδεικνύεν.<sup>323</sup> Both these solutions allows a finally intelligible text, presenting just two innocuous occurrences of understood εἶναι: 'it is possible to show that stealing the enemies' goods <is> just and that this same action <is> unjust, if their speech is true...' and 'stealing the enemies' goods <is> just and this same action <is> unjust'. However, a similarly successful result can be achieved by a minor, and thus preferable, intervention, that is Wilamowitz's

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<sup>320</sup> Robinson (1979), 189.

<sup>321</sup> North (1671), 65, n. 11.

<sup>322</sup> Ibid., 65, Mullach (1875), 548.

<sup>323</sup> Blass in Weber (1897), 44.

correction of ἀποδεικνύεν in ἀποδεικνύει.<sup>324</sup> For this 3<sup>rd</sup> singular person verb can easily be taken by the following ὁ τήνων λόγος, which thus becomes the subject both of the protasis and of the apodosis of a conditional sentence containing a general present supposition implying nothing as to the fulfilment of the condition.<sup>325</sup>

**τέχνας...ποιέοντι]** In rather similar words to the ones used to part from the reader at § 2.28, the author reminds the upholders of IT that the poets' testimony they adduced in the first speech (§ 3.11-12) does not have value, as poetry aims to please and not to tell the truth (καὶ τοὶ ποιηταὶ...ποιέοντι). As seen above, §§ 3.11-12 featured Cleobuline's and Aeschylus' representations of an unjust divinity in a way comparable with Aeschylus' Fr. 350. Likewise, the author's current attack on the programmatic carelessness for truth of poetry can be put in parallel with *R.* II 383a and c, where Plato criticizes the poetical misrepresentation of a deceiving and murdering Phaebus in that Aeschylean fragment.

## Chapter 4

### Title

**ψεύδους]** This reading is shared by all codices, including F1 and F2, which have been wrongly believed to transmit ψεύδεος by Weber onwards.<sup>326</sup> The two forms are equivalent, both being the genitive singular of the noun ψεύδος, but whereas ψεύδους, the Attic uncontracted one, has been printed only by Fabricius,<sup>327</sup> ψεύδεος, the Doric contracted one, has been picked by all the other editors. Robinson represents a seeming

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<sup>324</sup> Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1889), 629.

<sup>325</sup> Later, Wilamowitz proposed the following new emendation, which gets at a very similar result in terms of meaning, but is less preferable because more corrective: τὸ γὰρ κλέπτειν τὰ τῶν πολεμίων δίκαιον, καὶ ἄδικον <κ'> ἀπεδείκνυεν τοῦτο τῶντό, αἱ κ' ἀληθῆς <ῆς> ὁ τήνων λόγος, καὶ τὰλλα καττῶντό (Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff in Diels (1907), 642).

<sup>326</sup> Weber (1897), 45. I come to this revisionary conclusion after a personal inspection of the two codices. Robinson seems to have gone in the same direction, but he referred ψεύδεος to F2 only (Robinson (1979), 122).

<sup>327</sup> Fabricius (1724), 627.

exception among the latter, as in his text we read ψευδέος, genitive of the adjective ψευδής,<sup>328</sup> but this is nothing more than a misprint as one can ascertain in his commentary *ad locum*, where he defends ψεύδεος, instead.<sup>329</sup>

#### § 4.1

λέγονται...αὖ] The beginning of the previous three chapters were characterized by a consistent use of the articulated neuter singular adjectives to indicate the two things exemplifying the opposites in question. Here, instead, the author opts for a twofold solution, by referring both to the opposite concepts, through their proper nouns (τῷ ψεύδεος, τᾷς ἀλαθείας), and to the objects exemplifying either property, through the medium of the term λόγος (τὸν ψεύσταν λόγον, τὸν [λόγον] ἀλαθῆ). Given the overall similarity between the first four chapters of the work,<sup>330</sup> this new phrasing may surprise, but on closer inspection it, rather, turns out to be wholly consistent with how chapters 1-3 fared. First of all, one may observe how it is the predication of truth and falsehood of speeches, and not the two concepts themselves, that is the matter at issue in the chapter. Truth and falsehood appear just here, and in §§ 4.5 and 9, where, furthermore, they are considered exclusively for the relation between them and the objects of which they are predicated.

It is not by chance that these objects — and this is the second point to notice — are qualified as speeches and not referred to generically, in articulated neuter singular adjectives, like in chapters 1-3. For if, as it is the case in this chapter, truth and falsehood are taken in an epistemic sense, these apply chiefly to propositional objects, such as speeches. One may then proceed to predicate these concepts of the individuals who make true or false assertions (cf. § 4.4, 6, where ἀλαθής and ψεύστας are attributed to people), but what he cannot do is to use a phrase like ‘a true/false thing’ without either

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<sup>328</sup> Robinson (1979), 122.

<sup>329</sup> Ibid., 190.

<sup>330</sup> See also *infra*, 279-286.

sounding sloppy — if ‘true’ and ‘false’ are still taken in an epistemic sense — or ending up to convey something like ‘an authentic/inauthentic thing’, and hence a different, non-epistemic sense of truth and falsity.

As a marginal note, the overall analogy between chapters 1-4 combined with the unusual use of concepts in this chapter makes it not far-fetched to think that if in chapters 1-3 too the author had wanted to mean concepts and not things of which those concepts were predicated, he would have resorted to proper nouns — such as ἀγαθότης/κακία, κάλλος/αἰσχρότης, δικαιοσύνη/ἀδικία — there as well, which, conversely, confirms my translation of the articulated neuter singular adjectives there.

**ψεύδεις]** In this case all manuscripts and editors agree on this reading, except for Robinson, who again chooses ψευδέος, but now intentionally, as one can conclude from his translation of it as ‘what is false’.<sup>331</sup>

**τᾱς ἀλαθείας]** Most manuscripts read τῶ ἀληθείας, P3 reads τᾱς ἀλαθείας, and P4 τῶ ἀλαθείας. As Classen too observes, for the sake of the agreement in gender the second solution is the most likely to have been meant, along with Stephanus’ proposal τᾱς ἀληθείας, which, however, oddly combines a Doric form (τᾱς) with an Attic one (ἀληθείας).<sup>332</sup> There is, hence, no need of any emendations, such as Matthaeus De Varis’ Ionic τῆς ἀλαθείης, or Diels’ τῶ ἀλαθέος which Robinson picked up, instead.<sup>333</sup>

**ὁ μὲν [...] τοὶ δέ]** The two articles in pronominal function in this μὲν...δέ... correlation oddly differ in number. Robinson takes both of them to denote speeches, presumably on the basis of the partitive genitive ὧν which introduces the former, and which refers to the previous λόγοι. On this reading, the shift from the singular ὁ (which Robinson

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<sup>331</sup> Robinson (1979), 123.

<sup>332</sup> Classen (2001), 125, Stephanus (1570), 477.

<sup>333</sup> De Varis in Robinson (1972), 197, Diels (1907), 643, Robinson (1979), 122.

translates as ‘one view’) to the plural τοί (‘the other group’), would not be particularly significant, as much as in § 4.6 the IT defenders are first addressed in the plural (τῶς λέγοντας), then referred to in the singular (ἀποκρίναιτο) in the space of two consecutive sentences, without particular import. However, we have seen how at the beginnings of chapters 1-3 the statements of DT and IT are formulated within a τοὶ μὲν...τοὶ δέ... structure, the plural articles of which are likely to distinguish two opposite groups among οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι of § 1.1. Therefore, I am inclined to think that in the current passage a fusion has occurred between a new rhetorical construct, in which ὁ μὲν takes part, and aiming to contrast two speeches, and the usual one where two groups of people committed to philosophy bring forward opposing theses, and here signalled by τοὶ δέ. For this reason, I have rendered the couple as ‘one [*scil.* ‘speech’]...other people...’, as done by Waterfield and Graham alone,<sup>334</sup> whereas all the other editors have translated similarly to Robinson, except for Sprague and Dillon/Gergel who read both articles as referring to people, despite the previous ὧν preventing ὁ μὲν from doing so, as noted above.<sup>335</sup>

## § 4.2

**πρῶτον...λέγονται]** Formulated as such, this first statement in support of IT is somewhat obscure, and the reader is left to assume some understood premise or to understand some dropped word, in order for the text to communicate meaning. A possibility could be that the sameness of the words mentioned here (τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὀνόμασι) is actually very loose and weak, consisting only in the fact that they belong to the same language. Alternatively, we can suspect that the sentence originally featured some relativizing clause able to restrict its absolute value in some way, for example by saying that only ‘sometimes’ the two speeches share the same words. One such exceptional case is that of ‘I am an initiate’, in § 4.4. For this utterance remains the

<sup>334</sup> Waterfield (2000), 294, Graham (2010), 889.

<sup>335</sup> Sprague (1972), 287, Dillon/Gergel (2003), 327.

same, despite changing its truth value, depending on the person who speaks it. Alternatively, one could think of a true sentence such as ‘all cats are animals’ whose words can produce another and false one such as ‘all animals are cats’, just by being reshuffled.

**τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὀνόμασι]** In his attempt to inquire into the nature of these words (ὀνόματα), Bailey comes to a standstill between two alternatives. Either they are perceptible, but not meaningful parts of a speech (λόγος) which, as a consequence, is purely phonetic and devoid of semantic properties, namely ‘a mere token’,<sup>336</sup> corresponding to the Stoic φωνή;<sup>337</sup> or they are incorporeal and semantic objects, also known as ‘names’, comprising a speech which can be also called ‘proposition’, or, in Stoic terminology, λεκτόν.<sup>338</sup> This dichotomic interpretation, however, fails to account precisely for what the author here requires, namely cases where the same words make up both a true and a false sentence. For it contrasts both with the above example of ‘I am an initiate’, as we will see in § 4.4, and also with that of words being reshuffled: the words of the true ‘all cats are animals’ and of the false ‘all animals are cats’ are indeed the same from a phonetic point of view, but in order to produce sentences bearing some truth value, they clearly must be involved in some relation of meaning with the objects of the world too.

**ἔπειτα...αὐτὸς λόγος]** This second argument for IT works as a generalization of the point made by the examples in §§ 4.3-4. In doing so, the author is also providing a criterion of truth and falsehood according to which a speech will be true if the state of affairs (a notion which we already saw in the first speech of chapter 3) which it describes occurs, or false otherwise. One can see it more perspicuously in the second formulation

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<sup>336</sup> Bailey (2008), 253.

<sup>337</sup> Ibid., 251. He draws this terminology from Martha Kneale, who about § 4.4 comments thus: ‘we may have [...] the origin of the Stoic distinction between φωνή and λεκτόν’ (Kneale/Kneale (1962), 16).

<sup>338</sup> Bailey (2008), 251-253.



of this principle, in § 4.7, where the state of affairs is in fact explicated through the word *πραγμα* (γενομένω μὲν τῷ πράγματος ἀλαθῇ τὸν λόγον, ἀγενήτω δὲ ψεύσταν).<sup>339</sup> In other words, truth lies in the agreement between what a speech says and how things stand in the world, as we also find, for example, in Pl. *Cra.* 385b2-10, *Sph.* 263b2-11, Arist. *Metaph.* Γ 1011b26-29, S.E. M. II.9 (reporting Epicurus' view), and 323. From a syntactic point of view, we see a construction of the verb γίγνομαι equivalent to one of εἰμί, which Kahn has defined as 'veridical': 'a clause with εἰμί [...] joined to a clause with a verb of saying [...] in a comparative structure which has the general form "Things are as you say"',<sup>340</sup> and which typically features locutions such as the οὕτω...ὥς...which we have here.<sup>341</sup> Here 'things' stands for descriptive linguistic content which a speaker 'poses or affirms as present in the world',<sup>342</sup> and Kahn likens it to what in Wittgenstein's picture theory is known as 'Sinn' ('sense'), namely 'an alleged or possible state of affairs as pictured in or specified by a sentence'.<sup>343</sup> The parallel with Wittgenstein becomes all the more interesting for the current passage, as he makes it clear that the sense of a proposition is independent both of facts (*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* 4.061), and of its truth value; the latter, in particular, is assessed only as a result of a comparison between the sense of a proposition and facts (4.03, 2.221, 2.222). In other words, one may well understand a proposition without knowing whether the latter is true (4.024). The same seems to be said by our author here, who deems the situation which a speech describes as logically prior to the assessment of its occurrence in the world (ἂν μὲν...ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος).

**ἂν μὲν...αὐτὸς λόγος]** This is what we read in most manuscripts and seems to make perfect sense grammatically, presenting two conditional sentences (ἂν μὲν... ἀλαθῆς

<sup>339</sup> Cf. *LSJ*, s.v. *πραγμα* II.1. Dorion was the first to identify the content of a speech such as this one with an 'état de choses' (Dorion (2009), 210).

<sup>340</sup> Kahn (2003), 331.

<sup>341</sup> *Ibid.*, 337.

<sup>342</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>343</sup> *Ibid.*

ὁ λόγος, and ἄν δὲ μὴ...αὐτὸς λόγος) containing a present general supposition (ἄν [...] γένηται, and ἄν [...] μὴ γένηται) which fits well with the idea of ‘general truth’<sup>344</sup> implied in the statement of a criterion, such as this one.

But Weber prints αἰ (Doric of εἰ and transmitted only by P3) in place of ἄν (contracted form of ἐάν), and γεγένηται in place of γένηται, an emendation by Blass, but already annotated on the margins of P4.<sup>345</sup> The following editors, including Robinson, did the same, but only with the result of affecting the generality of the alethic principle stated here. For with the failure of ἄν the general supposition too fails, and by abandoning the aorist tense in favour of the perfect, the idea of an unlimited and unqualified past is inconveniently narrowed down to that of an action finished in the present.<sup>346</sup>

**λέγεται]** The manuscripts show this seemingly odd use of ὥς followed by the subjunctive λέγεται, which can be explained as a case of attraction to the mood of γένηται, the verb on which the ὥς clause depends. Therefore, there is no need to change the verbal mood into indicative, like Mullach’s λέγεται,<sup>347</sup> or to force the value of the verb by inserting an ἄν before it, as Robinson hypothesized and Blass had already suggested, though with the Doric equivalent κα.<sup>348</sup>

### § 4.3

**αὐτίκα...κρίνουντι]** The trial represents an excellent example of the criterion of truth introduced in § 4.2. For the plaintiff’s speech, as well as the defendant’s one, does not manifest a definite truth value in itself, but it receives one which varies according to whether the asserted action (τῷργον) occurred or not (αἶ γ’ ἐγένετο [...] αἰ δὲ μὴ

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<sup>344</sup> Goodwin (1898), 297.

<sup>345</sup> Weber (1897), 45.

<sup>346</sup> Goodwin (1898), 268, 270.

<sup>347</sup> Mullach (1875), 549.

<sup>348</sup> Robinson (1979), 122, Blass in Weber (1897), 45.

ἐγένετο). Such a decision rests with the courts, which are supposed to ascertain, to the best of their ability, whether facts correspond to what speech describes, as we will gather from § 4.8 where the actual feasibility of this comparison is questioned. This should not be surprising, as the last sentence of this paragraph (καὶ τὰ...κρίνοντι) itself hints at some issue with this procedure, observing how the courts (τὰ δικαστήρια) judge the truth of the same speech differently. As Becker and Scholz point out, this variance could be meant as internal to each one of the courts, and therefore among the judgements of jurors belonging to the same court, or external to it, and thus consisting in different courts (hence from different trials) coming up with different collegial agreements.<sup>349</sup> The former reading seems to me the more likely, as North first suggested by unpacking the collective τὰ δικαστήρια into the plural ‘judices’ in his translation.<sup>350</sup> For it is hard to think of the same speech being given at more than one trial, particularly if we keep the ancient Greek legal system as a benchmark, in which appeals against the sentence were not allowed.

#### § 4.4

ἐπεὶ...εἰμί] This mental experiment in support of IT spells out the double nature, phonetic and semantic, of the speech which the author conceives in this chapter, for which I argued earlier. On the one hand, ‘I am an initiate’ (μύστας εἰμί) is certainly the same string of sounds which many people pronounce (ἐξῆς...ἐροῦμεν). On the other hand, it cannot be just that, because a mere sound, such as those which animals too produce, could not render anyone truthful (ἀλαθῆς...ἐγώ), or false either. Inside the speech, there must, hence, be something further, which allows us to say whether that is true or false, on the basis of how things stand in reality (ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰμί).

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<sup>349</sup> Becker/Scholz (2004), 96, n. 2.

<sup>350</sup> North (1671), 66.

By contrast, Bailey finds in this paragraph ‘the strongest evidence’<sup>351</sup> to understand the speech described in this chapter as a merely phonetic object, observing that in the current sentence ‘only the sounds [...] are the same’ and that, conversely, ‘once those sounds are understood as having semantic properties, then there is a sense in which they [*scil.* ‘the present ones’] do *not* all say the same thing’, because each of the uttered ‘I am’ (εἰμὶ) refers to the person who says it and to no one else.<sup>352</sup> However, hardly would the author have used this argument in support of IT, if it both asserted and denied the identity of a speech. Surely a phrase such as ‘I am’ gives the impression of multiplying the sentence which features it by as many speakers as pronounce it; no doubt this represents a possible side to take about the philosophical problem of indexicals, of which this chapter does represent a first evidence, as Goldin notes.<sup>353</sup> But besides oddly countering IT, this is not the only possible way to interpret this sentence and the problem of indexicals in general. For it can be observed that when pronouncing ‘I am an initiate’, each speaker also attributes the same properties which define an initiate, and hence the same mental image of this definition, to himself. It is only when compared with reality that this attribution, identical for every one of the speakers, becomes true (in the case of our author, who really is an initiate) or false (in the case of the others). Bailey himself, quoting McGinn,<sup>354</sup> acknowledges the possibility of this alternative reading, but not its being the only one which the author can reasonably adhere to, if this paragraph is really to bring any support to IT.<sup>355</sup>

ἐξῆς καθήμενοι] For the first and only time in the work, a hint may be given as to the setting in which the voice of the author rings. He refers to a situation in which he is seated in a gathering with an audience, and this has been advanced to support the

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<sup>351</sup> Bailey (2008), 254.

<sup>352</sup> Ibid.

<sup>353</sup> Goldin (2002), 247.

<sup>354</sup> Mc Ginn (1983), 58.

<sup>355</sup> Bailey (2008), 254.

didactic nature of the text, perhaps a collection of the transcripts of a teacher's lectures.<sup>356</sup> Unfortunately, no other internal or external element supports the actuality of this scenario, which may well be imaginary.

μύστας] Knowing into which mysteries the author is an initiated could have helped locate him in place and time, but unfortunately no information is given about them. Rostagni's certainty about Pythagoreanism,<sup>357</sup> as well as Waterfield and Becker and Scholz's conviction about the Eleusinian mysteries<sup>358</sup> are grounded on the similarly speculative contentions of the Pythagoreanism of the work, and of the author's stay in Athens respectively.

#### § 4.5

δᾶλον...γέρων, ἐστίν] In this new argument a speech is again presented as not possessing a truth value of its own, but this time it is said to be affected by the presence (παρῇ) of the false (τὸ ψεῦδος) and of the true (τὸ ἀλαθές). In temporally benefitting of them, and hence in passing from being true to being false, or *vice versa*, the speech remains nonetheless the same, in the same way as a man who ages (ὥσπερ...ἐστίν). Despite leading to a similar point as to the identity of a speech, and although being thought of as in logical continuity with what precedes, as suggested by the inferential adverb ὥν (Doric for οὖν),<sup>359</sup> one cannot fail to see that this paragraph offers a criterion of truth and falsehood rather different from that of §§ 4.2-4. For not only is any idea of comparison of words with facts missing here, but more generally the author presents the concepts of truth and falsehood as directly relating to speech, without any apparent contribution of the world.

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<sup>356</sup> Rostagni (1922), 175, Robinson (1979), 89, n. 68, 192.

<sup>357</sup> Rostagni (1922), 175.

<sup>358</sup> Waterfield (2000), 334, Becker/Scholz (2004), 14, and, less assertively, Dillon/Gergel (2003), 408.

<sup>359</sup> See also Goldin (2002), 237.

Rightly, a few commentators have regarded the passage as drawing on the Platonic theory of παρουσία, according to which, quoting from Taylor, ‘if “I am hot”, that is because of the existence of a relation between me and the entity τὸ θερμόν, which may be expressed either by saying “I partake of τὸ θερμόν”, or conversely “τὸ θερμόν is present to me”’<sup>360</sup> (Taylor mentions Pl. *Phd.* 100d, but see also, e.g., *Ly.* 217b-e, *Sph.* 247a-b). What is more, as if in order to stress his Platonic debt, here the author substitutes ἡ ἀλάθεια (used in the title and in § 4.1) with τὸ ἀλαθές which in Plato typically features precisely in tandem with τὸ ψεῦδος, to indicate the ideas of truth and falsehood (*Grg.* 505e, *R.* II 382d, cf. also *LSJ* s.v. ψεῦδος III).

This passage, thus, further testifies the author’s habit of reusing material drawn from other sources without concern as to how it fits within the new context. Moreover, precisely in light of the author’s tendency to appropriation, the above leap from the previous criterion of truth to the current one can be somehow eased, since we have seen that Plato is the first philosophical source of the former criterion too (Pl. *Cra.* 385b2-10, see *supra*, 150). After all, the main respect in which the two theories differ, namely that one pertains to knowledge and language only, whereas the other is concerned with the metaphysical ‘participation of a particular in a characteristic or Form’,<sup>361</sup> make them potentially compatible.

**ὅταν μὲν..ἀλαθής]** Again on the Platonic import of this argument, if some scholars agree with Kranz that a reflection of this kind ‘niemals ohne sokratisch-frühplatonische Gedankenarbeit möglich wäre’,<sup>362</sup> others, instead, such as Taylor, preferred to adduce this passage to show how ‘the fundamental notion of the “Ideal Theory”, together with a characteristic piece of its technical terminology, was familiar possibly before the death of Socrates, and, hence, ‘how contrary to fact is the popular notion that Plato invented

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<sup>360</sup> Taylor (1911), 109-110.

<sup>361</sup> Goldin (2002), 237, n. 19.

<sup>362</sup> Kranz (1937), 231.

ex nihilo the doctrine of εἶδη or the technical terms in which it is expressed'.<sup>363</sup> On my views about *Dissoi Logoi's* relation with ancient authorities which present similar ideas, see *supra*, 25-35.

ὥσπερ...ἐστίν] This example depicts the case for IT made in the first part of the paragraph. A man keeps his identity (τὸ αὐτό [...] ἐστίν) despite the changes he undergoes throughout the different stages of his life, in the same way that a speech remains the same although its truth value changes. The same simile appears in Pl. *Smp.* 207d-e, but the point made there is contrary to ours, with the man's identity remaining the same on a purely conventional level. What better suits its rationale is, instead, Arist. *Cat.* 4a22-b16, where we read that although statements can turn from true to false, when this happens, it is due to a change not in them, but in the facts which they describe. In short, an alteration in the world can cause one in the truth value of a sentence, but not in the sentence itself, in the same way as aging causes changes in the forms which a human being takes on, but not in their personal identity.

If, then, the simile between this image and the argument of the first part of the paragraph holds true in a broad sense, it does not with regard to a detail which was pivotal there, namely the notion of παρουσία. On the other hand, the comparative ὥσπερ is supposed to require a full correspondence between the two terms of the simile. Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that each of the four secondary predicates indicating the stages of a man's life (παῖς, νεανίσκος, ἀνὴρ, γέρον) is meant as an effect of παρουσία as well: that is to say, for example, that 'as a child' (παῖς) is a shortened form for 'when childhood is present to him and hence he is a child'. Perhaps also because of not seeing this implicit passage, Wilamowitz decided to move ὥσπερ...ἐστίν to § 5.4,<sup>364</sup> a place where it does not seem to better suit either, whereas

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<sup>363</sup> Taylor (1911), 110.

<sup>364</sup> Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf in Diels (1903), 584.

Diels and the editors after him, including Robinson, limited themselves to bracketing the clause, leaving it in its place.<sup>365</sup>

#### § 4.6

λέγεται...αὐτόν] Like in chapters 1-3, the second speech starts with a reminder of the statement of DT (ὁ ψεύστας...πρᾶγμα)<sup>366</sup> and then offers a few *reductiones ad absurdum* following the same sequence of rhetorical topics. As far as this paragraph is concerned, firstly (αἱ γὰρ...ταῦτα) the IT supporters are shown the extreme consequences of an absolute version of their thesis ('the same speech is false and true'), not corresponding to the one which they argued for in the first speech ('the same speech is true under a certain circumstance, false under another one'). We already saw this in §§ 1.12-13, 2.21 (ἐπεὶ...τὸ καλόν) and 3.13 (ἐπεὶ...ἤμεν), and in an almost identical fashion (the starting phrase αἱ τις ἐρωτάσαι τὼς λέγοντας ὥς features in §§ 2.21 and 3.13 too). Then (καὶ αἶ...αὐτόν), the focus shifts to the absurd way in which the IT supporters are alleged to regard other people as a result of their own tenet, like in § 1.14, and especially 2.22 (καὶ αἶ τινά...τοῦτον τὸν αὐτόν) and 3.14, where the arguments also issue from phrases similar to the current αἶ τινὰ ἄνδρα ἀλαθῇ οἶδε.<sup>367</sup>

ὥσπερ...πρᾶγμα] The manuscripts agree on διαφέρων τῶνυμα as the closing words of the sentence. Despite the fact that Schanz deletes them,<sup>368</sup> they aptly state a point in which DT and the second speech in general are likely to be interested, as the first speech appealed precisely to the identity of words to support IT (§ 4.2). Furthermore, a supplement of πρᾶγμα, as some scholars proposed, seems opportune here, considering both the frequency with which the stock phrase ὥσπερ καὶ τῶνυμα οὕτω καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα features in the work (§§ 1.11, 3.13, and 2.1 where πρᾶγμα is replaced by σῶμα,

<sup>365</sup> Diels (1903), 584, Robinson (1979), 122-124.

<sup>366</sup> Cf. ἄλλος...πρᾶγμα (§ 1.11), λέγεται...εἶη (§ 2.21), λέγεται...πρᾶγμα (§ 3.13).

<sup>367</sup> αἶ τινὰ γὰ καλὸν οἶδαντι ἄνδρα (§ 2.22), αἶ τινὰ γινώσκεις δίκαιον ἄνδρα (§ 3.14).

<sup>368</sup> Schanz (1884), 382.



though), and the author's belief in speech as an object not only phonetic, but also semantic (§§ 4.2-4), and, hence, in connection with the things it describes. However, for reasons of consistency, in my text I followed Blass in adopting the same stock phrase, rather than Diels' τῶνυμα <ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα>,<sup>369</sup> which Robinson printed,<sup>370</sup> North's τῶνυμα <οὕτω καὶ πρᾶγμα>,<sup>371</sup> Mullach's τῶνυμα <καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα>,<sup>372</sup> or Wilamowitz's διαφέρων <τὸ πρᾶγμα ὥσπερ καὶ> τῶνυμα.<sup>373</sup>

**αἰ γὰρ...οὕτως]** Besides the similarities already shown, this very first *reductio ad absurdum* strays from those of chapters 1-3 as here the objects possessing the properties which IT discusses, namely speeches, are also of the same kind as IT itself. That makes this passage one of the most ancient testimonies of self-refutation arguments, as Castagnoli points out.<sup>374</sup>

The author starts with imagining asking the IT supporters whether their speech, namely 'the same speech is false and true' (ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος εἴη ψεύστας καὶ ἀλαθής) is true or false (ὄν...ἐστίν). The 'dilemmatic form' of this question is another distinctive feature of self-refutation arguments, and, at the same time, a point of divergence from the parallel interrogations of chapters 1-3,<sup>375</sup> where only the hypotheses of IT being true were developed, in compliance with the logic of a *reductio ad absurdum*. Here, instead, the *reductio* comes after an inquiry into the opposite scenario, that of IT being false (αἰ μὲν "ψεύστας"), which leads the author to conclude that the false speech and the true one are two (δᾶλον ὅτι δύο εἴη), which is another way to phrase DT. But a logical difficulty then rises, because on the one hand, in doing so the supporter of IT aims to

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<sup>369</sup> Diels (1903), 584.

<sup>370</sup> Robinson (1979), 124.

<sup>371</sup> North (1671), 66.

<sup>372</sup> Mullach (1875), 549.

<sup>373</sup> Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf in Diels (1907), 643.

<sup>374</sup> Castagnoli (2010), 24.

<sup>375</sup> §§ 1.12-13, 2.21, 3.13; see also *supra*, 157.

concede ‘the contradictory of his IT (as long as he endorses the platitude  $Fp \rightarrow \neg p$ )’,<sup>376</sup> to quote Castagnoli.<sup>377</sup> On the other hand, *contra* Castagnoli, ‘the false speech and the true speech are two different things’ is actually not the contradictory of ‘the same speech is false and true’, but its contrary, as its logical contradictory would be ‘some speech is either true or false’. This can be better seen moving from the formalization proposed by Castagnoli himself.<sup>378</sup> He paraphrases the absolute version of IT as ‘*any λόγος whatsoever* is (unqualifiedly) *both false and true*’ which he formalizes in first-order logic as:

$$(\forall p) (Tp \wedge Fp),$$

with ‘ $p$ ’ being a speech, and ‘ $Tp$ ’ standing for the predicate ‘ $p$  is true’, and ‘ $Fp$ ’ for ‘ $p$  is false’. If that is the case, then  $F(\text{IT})$ , namely ‘it is not true that any λόγος whatsoever is both false and true’, would be of the form:

$$\neg (\forall p) (Tp \wedge Fp),$$

which is equivalent to ‘there is at least one speech which is not both true and false’:

$$(\exists p) \neg (Tp \wedge Fp),$$

or, by the negation of conjunction rule, to ‘there is at least one speech which is either true or false’:

$$(\exists p) (Tp \vee Fp).$$

This one is clearly different from ‘the false speech and the true speech are two different things’ (the two are subalterns) which the author here unduly concludes, though, and which can be formalized as:

$$(\forall p) (Tp \vee Fp).$$

As a result, one can notice how in this first horn of the dilemma the author strains logic in order to obtain what he is really interested in, namely rhetorical support for DT.

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<sup>376</sup> With ‘ $p$ ’ being a speech, and ‘ $Fp$ ’ standing for the predicate ‘ $p$  is false’.

<sup>377</sup> Castagnoli (2010), 27-28.

<sup>378</sup> Ibid., 25-26.

As for the second horn, we finally encounter the self-refutation argument proper, analysing the possibility of IT being true (αἰ δ' "ἀλαθῆς" ἀποκρίναιτο) and the paradoxical consequence to which this assumption leads, namely that IT, being a speech itself, must then be false too (καὶ ψεύστας ὁ αὐτὸς οὔτος). Recalling the formalization of IT as  $(\forall p) (Tp \wedge Fp)$ , the first passage the author presents here can be expressed as:

$T(IT)$ .

Then, he understands two steps: firstly, if IT is true, then IT is the case (semantic descent), namely that 'the same speech is false and true':

$T(IT) \rightarrow (IT)$ .

Secondly, since IT is a speech, by self-application and hence substitution of the variable  $p$  in IT, namely in  $(\forall p) (Tp \wedge Fp)$ , we obtain:

$T(IT) \wedge F(IT)$ .

This conjunction is what the author expressly concludes through καὶ ψεύστας ὁ αὐτὸς οὔτος, where the καί is fundamental in indicating that  $T(IT)$  too, although left understood, comes along with  $F(IT)$  as the outcome of this second branch of the reasoning. Furthermore, a conclusion as such represents the simplest and clearest case of contradiction, boiling down to the form  $p \wedge \neg p$ . But if so, then the author has proven that the assumption of  $T(IT)$  entails a contradiction, which is tantamount to saying that he has refuted IT by *reductio ad absurdum*. Therefore, albeit not openly stating so, the conclusion at which he has arrived is  $F(IT)$  and the path to get it can be contracted in:

$T(IT) \rightarrow F(IT)$ .

As a result, this whole dilemmatic construal is not to be viewed, as Castagnoli argues, just as a 'dialectical silencer'<sup>379</sup> of IT, with the aim of pointing out the 'dialectical defeats'<sup>380</sup> which the thesis inevitably encounters 'as soon as it is posed under

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<sup>379</sup> Ibid., 35.

<sup>380</sup> Ibid., 28.

scrutiny'.<sup>381</sup> In its second horn it, instead, displays an effective logical proof that IT is not the case, namely that it is false. After all, the second horn simply gives relevance to a feature of IT which has been clear since IT's first appearance, namely that its propositional form is the contradiction ' $p \wedge \neg p$ ', with  $p$  standing for 'all speeches are true' and under the reasonable assumption, on which Castagnoli agrees, that the author accepts the principle of bivalence, namely that a speech is either true or false.<sup>382</sup> But if that is the case, *pace* Castagnoli who excludes that this argument means 'to prove the necessary falsehood'<sup>383</sup> of IT, and who keeps self-refutation and self-contradiction separate,<sup>384</sup> here the author reveals that IT is bound to fall into self-refutation precisely for its being a self-contradiction, and hence a 'necessary falsehood[s]', to quote Castagnoli himself.<sup>385</sup>

Finally, as the scholar highlights, self-refutation arguments must be assessed also in consideration of their rhetorical aims.<sup>386</sup> From this perspective, it is then possible to spot a single plan underlying our dilemma and indicate a way to reconcile the latter. First of all, we must recall that the second speech, in which this dilemmatic argument lies, is devoted to support DT. Secondly, T(DT) is exactly the result at which the first branch of the argument has led to, moving, though invalidly, from F(IT). Thirdly, it is reasonable to think that precisely in order to conclude in support of DT the author sets up the first horn of the dilemma: for this, if taken in itself, would otherwise be odd, for not having a parallel in the DTs of chapters 1-3, and, especially, for its moving from, and not towards, the falsity of IT, contrary to what one would expect a credible attack on a thesis to do. As a result of these three premises, it is reasonable to think, *contra*

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<sup>381</sup> Ibid., 29.

<sup>382</sup> Cf. ibid., 26, n. 14: 'nothing in our text suggests that the author of the *Dissoi Logoi* envisaged the possibility of truth-value gaps'. This is confirmed by analogy with the two contrasting attributes of each of chapters 1-3 too, between which no intermediate value is ever given, and which are, hence, to be conceived as opposites rather than as contraries.

<sup>383</sup> Ibid., 28.

<sup>384</sup> Ibid., 5.

<sup>385</sup> Ibid.

<sup>386</sup> Ibid., 16, *et passim*.

Castagnoli, that at the height of the second horn of the dilemma the author is highly interested in demonstrating the falsity of IT,<sup>387</sup> because that has just been proven to be a secure way to get T(DT) too. But if that is the case, then it would not be hazardous to think that the tacit F(IT) with which the second horn concludes is the key for a last, additional, and again understood, logical step, by which to connect the two horns of the whole dilemma, so far kept apart. In formal terms, we would, in fact, have:

- |                               |                                     |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| (1) $F(IT) \rightarrow T(DT)$ | First horn;                         |
| (2) $T(IT) \rightarrow F(IT)$ | Second horn;                        |
| (3) $T(IT) \rightarrow T(DT)$ | From (2) and (1), by concatenation. |

Granted, this reconstruction is speculative and does not autonomously emerge from the text. Nonetheless, by showing how the truth of IT entails not only its self-refutation, but also that of the rival DT, this reading would justify the presence, unique in the work, of this whole self-refutation construct with the goal of the second speech itself, namely T(DT).

To conclude, despite not having any really close parallel among the other testimonies of ancient self-refutation, the second branch of this argument can be compared with Pl. *Euthd.* 287e2-288a4, *Tht.* 171a6-c4, S.E. M. VII.389-390, and D.L. IX.76. Things stand differently with the Liar paradox, a long debated one, whose ancient origins go back to Eubulides of Miletus (D.L. II.108) and whose first formulation we have in Arist. *SE* 180b2-7. Castagnoli's denial of the similarity between the two, on the grounds that our argument is not equally conceived to prove the truth-value of the thesis at stake<sup>388</sup> should be revised, as such intention does seem to belong to our author too, as just seen. The difference between them may be found, rather, in the fact that at the end of our argument the sentence in question receives a precise truth-value, differently from the Liar, which is a paradox precisely for this reason. For, on the one

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<sup>387</sup> Castagnoli excludes it both here (*ibid.*, 28) and in any other ancient self-refutation argument in general, as they 'did not aim at establishing the truth value of a certain proposition' (*ibid.*, 15-16).

<sup>388</sup> *Ibid.*, 15-16, 28-29 (esp. n. 19).

hand, the truth-value of a sentence such as ‘this sentence is false’ cannot be decided on the basis of the principle of bivalence, because if it is assumed to be false, then it turns out to be true, and *vice versa*. On the other hand, IT proves to be nothing but false, because F(IT) follows from T(IT) itself, and the converse is not the case. This asymmetry is crucial to draw a line between our argument and the Liar, as the latter is characterised precisely by double truth-value reversal, whereas our author is so far from concluding T(IT) by force of F(IT), that he, rather, chooses to go in the contrary direction, irregularly deriving T(DT).

καὶ ἀλαθέξ...ταῦτα αὐτόν] The truth-value of the IT supporter’s words is now inquired to a larger extent, abandoning self-refutation. Yet *reductio ad absurdum* is still operative and subverts the truth of his speeches, and particularly of his testimonies (another hint at trials, where speaking the truth is a duty), in the same way as this mechanism inconveniently turned the acts done and received by the IT supporters of chapters 1-3 from good to bad, from beautiful to ugly, and from just to unjust, or *vice versa* (§§ 1.12-13, 2.21, 3.13).

καὶ] This crasis of καί and αἰ (Doric for εἰ) in place of the manuscripts’ καί has been suggested by Diels,<sup>389</sup> to make the sentence fit among the conditional ones which make up the rhetorical pattern of the paragraph. Blass’ supplement καὶ <αἰ>, taken by Robinson, is hence avoidable.<sup>390</sup>

#### §§ 4.7-8

ἐκ...πράγμασιν] Resuming and criticizing the arguments deployed in the first speech is what happened at the end of the second speeches of chapters 1-3 (cf. §§ 1.16-17, 2.23-28, 3.15-16). Likewise, in these two paragraphs firstly the author takes up the criterion

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<sup>389</sup> Diels (1907), 643.

<sup>390</sup> Blass in Weber (1897), 46, Robinson (1979), 124.

of truth produced in support of IT in § 4.2 (ἐκ...ψεύσταν); then, he attacks IT through an example (οὐκῶν...πράγμασιν) which, in parallel with that of § 4.3, is drawn from courts.

**οὐκῶν...πράγμασιν]** Rightly, Taylor points out that, just ‘as in the previous cases’, this argument too is ‘apagogic’, as it contends that if the criterion of truth as agreement of words and facts were the case, then one should seriously doubt something usually taken for granted such as the soundness of jurors’ judgement of the speeches they listen to.<sup>391</sup> This line of reasoning distinguishes the passage from the similar Pl. *Tht.* 201a-c, Antisth. *Aj.* 1, and Isoc. *Antidosis* 52-54,<sup>392</sup> where the fact that jurors assess speeches in that way is acknowledged and triggers the criticism of the trial system, in which persuasion has the better of knowledge.

**κρίνοντι]** The manuscripts read κρίνοιντο, which Robinson prints, but the middle diathesis of this form is not compatible with the meaning ‘to judge’ (*LSJ*, s.v. κρίνω, II 2.a.b) expected here.<sup>393</sup> Schanz’s correction with the active κρίνοντι is, hence, preferable, as Classen too observes.<sup>394</sup>

**οὐ γὰρ πάρεντι τοῖς πράγμασιν]** In this γὰρ clause lies the justification of the argumentative point made in these two paragraphs. Hence, reasonably the manuscripts connect it with the previous sentence through a semicolon and do not bracket it, as is done by Diels, whom Robinson follows.<sup>395</sup>

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<sup>391</sup> Taylor (1911), 108.

<sup>392</sup> See also Burnyeat in Burnyeat/Barnes (1980), 173-191.

<sup>393</sup> Robinson (1979), 124.

<sup>394</sup> Schanz (1884), 383, Classen (2001), 127.

<sup>395</sup> Diels (1907), 644, Robinson (1979), 124.

## § 4.9

**ὁμολογέοντι...διαφέρει]** Having come to the end, the author counters the first speech for the last time and in two ways. In line with what the second speech has already been doing, he targets a particular argument of the first speech, highlighting its intrinsic flaws (ὁμολογέοντι...ἄλαθῇ). At the same time, he also attempts to show how that argument seems to conflict with another one used by the IT supporters (τοῦτο...διαφέρει).

**ὁμολογέοντι...ἄλαθῇ]** In the first place, the sentence is a reminder of § 4.5, where the first speech expounded its second criterion of truth and falsehood as presence of these concepts to speech. That this is the author's target now we can infer especially by considering firstly the use of the same Platonic phrases τὸ ψεῦδος and τὸ ἀλαθές to indicate the couple of opposites; secondly, the immediacy which characterizes the relation of mixture (ἀναμέμικται) involving these concepts and speech, and which was proper to the criterion of truth as presence too. However, this time the author uses Platonic metaphysics even more freely than in § 4.5, as Plato never resorts to a vocabulary of mixing to explain why an attribute can be predicated of some subject, i.e. to expound his doctrine of παρουσία; in Plato, mixture is chiefly a relation between general kinds, instead (see especially *Philebus* and *Sophist*). Nonetheless, recalling Taylor's observation that 'παρουσία is [...] the logical converse of μέθεξις',<sup>396</sup> one may think that the latter has been the middle term on which the author tacitly pivoted, in order to shift from the criterion of truth as presence to that of mixture. For, firstly, both in Platonic participation and according to the idea of mixture here sketched, an object (a speech), is in so deep a connection with a theoretical entity (truth or falsehood), that the boundaries between these two *relata* partially fade, and they end up resembling each other (cf., e.g. Pl. *Prm.* 132d). Secondly, we may observe that in Plato participation

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<sup>396</sup> Taylor (1911), 109.



is precisely halfway between presence and mixture, being a relation sometimes between things and ideas, like presence, sometimes between general kinds, like mixture. Indicative of this double characterization of its are *Phd.* 100c-d, where it occurs along with, and with the same meaning as, presence, and *Sph.* 259a, where the same is true of participation and mixture.

But this remark also has the dialectical function of showing how the criterion of truth as presence actually belongs to DT, rather than to IT. We may see it, by reflecting on phrases such as καὶ αὐτοί and the correlation ᾧ μὲν...ᾧ δέ, both testifying to an appropriation, by the current speech, of this criterion. For καὶ αὐτοί implies that the IT upholders do not act differently from others and, as far as the dispute of this chapter is concerned, from their rivals of DT. Secondly, as Robinson observes, the correlation ᾧ μὲν...ᾧ δέ indicates two distinct objects, in accordance with DT, and in contrast with § 4.5 where the argument spoke of one and the same speech.<sup>397</sup> Such a contrast emerges even more in my translation, where, reasoning by analogy with the author's habit of attributing truth and falsehood chiefly to speeches, I have read the two dative relatives ᾧ as masculine and as referring to λόγος of § 4.7 — as Mullach first did<sup>398</sup> — rather than as generic neuters like in Robinson's 'that with which' — first appeared in North.<sup>399</sup>

**τοῦτο...διαφέρει]** These last words laconically warn the reader about some unwanted, but not specified difference involving what has just been said (τοῦτο). Since the first speech offered two different criteria of truth, one may legitimately think that this duality of positions is what is hinted at here. All the more so because the δέ of the initial ὁμολογέοντι δὲ καὶ αὐτοί presents the following paragraph as in contrast with what was discussed immediately before, namely precisely the criterion of truth as agreement of words and facts. If that is the case, then it seems reasonable to assume that originally

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<sup>397</sup> Robinson (1979), 197.

<sup>398</sup> He translated it as 'sermonem cui' (Mullach (1875), 549).

<sup>399</sup> He translated it as 'cui' (North (1671), 67).

other words followed διαφέρει, and that they made the case for that contrast. I therefore believe, with North and others, that a lacuna, not signalled in the manuscripts, follows διαφέρει, and not as small as deemed by Robinson who conjectures the loss of as short a phrase as 'from their original thesis', and who also forgets to flag it in the Greek text.<sup>400</sup> After all, such an abrupt and elusive ending would also break the structural similarity usually shared by chapters 1-4, as all the former three conclude with clearer and fully developed reflections (§§ 1.17, 2.28, 3.17).

## Chapter 5

### § 5.1

ταὐτὰ...πράσσοντι] Because of the lack of an opening phrase of the kind of the usual δισοὶ λόγοι λέγονται, North believed that originally the chapter was not disjoined from the previous one, as in fact manuscripts transmit, but also that it had a rather different shape than the one it has now.<sup>401</sup> He suggested to move §§ 5.1-5 between §§ 4.5 and 4.6, and to put §§ 5.6-15 after the interrupted ending of chapter 4. Alternatively, in order to fill that same suspected lacuna (end of § 4.9), Blass supplemented the start of this chapter with <λέγοντι δέ τινες, ὥς> before ταὐτὰ.<sup>402</sup> Finally, Diels put §§ 5.1-5 between direct speech quotes, which many scholars after him, including Robinson, decided to do.<sup>403</sup> However, none of these three emendations is really necessary for the chapter to make sense. This, in fact, consists in another contrast between an IT which asserts that a life lived according to reason and knowledge is the same as one not so lived (defended in §§ 5.1-5), and a DT which maintains the difference between the two ways of life (defended in §§ 5.6-15). Hence, *contra* North, splitting these two parts and relocating them into two different chapters affects this clear-cut antithesis. Blass' supplement, then, seems pleonastic, as it just takes arriving at § 5.6 to see the author

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<sup>400</sup> Robinson (1979), 124-125.

<sup>401</sup> North (1671), 67, n. 6.

<sup>402</sup> Blass in Weber (1897), 46.

<sup>403</sup> Diels (1903), 585, Robinson (1979), 124-126.

himself attributing IT to people other than him (τοὶ τῆνα λέγοντες). Similarly, the demonstrative τῆνα there used will be sufficient to mark the boundary of the first speech just concluded, with no *oratio recta* to be introduced, *contra* Diels.

For the first time in the work, then, the opening paragraph only shows the statement of IT and not of both theses. It also describes a seemingly new kind of identity of opposites, which is no longer related to objects possessing opposite qualities, but to properties (actions and words) of such objects (the insane and the sane, the wise and the ignorant). However, in §§ 5.7-9, the actions and words of the insane, sane, wise and ignorant are said to be sufficient to distinguish between insanity and sanity, and between wisdom and ignorance (αἱ γὰρ τις....ὁμολογησοῦντι). If so, then it implicitly follows that on the basis of actions and words one can also distinguish between the individuals who are characterized by those opposite qualities. As a result, objects exemplifying opposites are at issue in this chapter too, though indirectly.

The debate portrayed in this chapter is hinted to at Pl. *Cra.* 386b-c, and better expounded in Pl. *Alc.* 2 138d-139c, 140d-e, and S.E. *M.* XI.197-209. In the last one, in particular, we read that ‘there is no work peculiar to the wise man, whereby he shall differ from the not wise’,<sup>404</sup> which allows Sextus to conclude that wisdom is not an art of life. This is all the more interesting if we think that in his following chapter, Sextus tackles the question of whether such an art of life would be teachable, if it ever existed (S.E. *M.* XI.216-257). This perfectly aligns with the next topic of our text too, as *Dissoi Logoi* 6 discusses the teachability of that wisdom which is here under scrutiny, and pairs this concept with excellence. This correspondence holds also from a lexical point of view, as the two authors use highly similar terms. In fact, Sextus identifies this art of life (ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη), which should be characteristic of the wise (φρόνιμος, but few times also σοφός) and virtuous (σπουδαῖος) man, with excellence (ἀρετή) and wisdom (φρόνησις). Our author, in turn, uses both σοφός and σωφρονῶν (very close to

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<sup>404</sup> Translation from Bury (1968), 483.

φρόνιμος) in this chapter, as well as ἀρετή and σοφία (instead of φρόνησις) in the following one.

**τοὶ μαινόμενοι...ἀμαθεῖς]** The two couples of opposites, sane/insane and wise/ignorant are kept distinct from here to § 5.8. There they intersect and we are told about the wise behaving insanely (τοὶ σοφοὶ μαίνονται) and the insane being wise (τοὶ μαινόμενοι σοφοί). Finally, in § 5.9 they merge and σοφοί features as a perfect synonym of the σωφρονοῦντες of some line before, so as to avoid a repetition. Furthermore, the author never conceives an argument which applies to either couple, but not the other. Hence, no numerical diversity is meant by these two distinctions, rather they just depict two forms of one more general contrast with which the author is really concerned in this chapter, namely that between an intelligent life, led with rationality and advised by knowledge, and one straying from the guide of the intellect, insofar as proceeding irrationally and in ignorance. From now on I will hence appeal to this latter more fundamental distinction, for economy of words. Finally, the possibility of this simplification constitutes a further point of contact with Plato's aforementioned passages, as both the *Cratylus* and the *Alcibiades II* present just one opposition, between σωφροσύνη and ἀφροσύνη; and, to an even higher degree, with Sextus' above text, where φρόνιμος and σοφός are used interchangeably.

## § 5.2

**καὶ πρᾶτον...καττωυτό]** The IT which has just been stated is now clarified, and the underlying assumption which made such a seemingly counterintuitive thesis possible can thus emerge. This consists in lowering the requirements of saying and doing the same things (ταῦτὰ [...] λέγοντι καὶ πράσσοντι (§ 5.1)) to the more easily achievable level of giving the same name to things (ὀνομάζοντι ταῦτά) and performing the same actions (ποιέοντι ταῦτά). Giving the same names somehow recalls the obscure argument of § 4.2, which drew the identity of the true and the false speeches from that

of their words. More precisely, it fits the scenario of words belonging to one same vocabulary, which was entailed by the weakest reading of the identity between the words of the true and the false speeches there. As for the performance of the same actions, now the author is bound to look merely at the basic biological ones (κάθηνται καὶ ἔσθοντι καὶ πίνοντι καὶ κατὰκείνται) which unsurprisingly both those living according to the intellect and those straying from it carry out, insofar as all humans do.

καὶ πρῶτον...ὀνομάζοντι ταῦτά] The passage can be compared with *Cra.* 392c2-5, where, however, Plato has Socrates and Hermogenes agree that the wise give names more correctly than the unwise.

### § 5.3

καὶ μὲν...πάντα] IT is now defended through an argument which for the first time in the work goes from the general to the specific, and not the other way around. In fact, it subsumes IT under the more general statement that every thing is identical to the other (οὕτω...πάντα), as no attribute can differentiate it, because that thing possesses also the attribute opposite to that one (καὶ μὲν...κουφότερον). But if there is no way to distinguish a thing from the other, then – the author implies – neither will there be one by which to differentiate between the words and the actions belonging to a life guided by the intellect and those of a life straying from it.

The necessity of knowing the distinctive features of an object in order to know it is said to have been stressed by Speusippus, at Arist. *APo.* 97a6-22 (=Fr. 5 Isnardi Parente), whereas the thesis of the indiscernibility of all things is attributed to Pyrrho according to D.L. IX.61,<sup>405</sup> and according to Aristocles in Eus. *PE* 14.18.3.<sup>406</sup>

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<sup>405</sup> 'Each thing is no more this than this': translation from Long/Sedley (1987), 13.

<sup>406</sup> 'Things are equally indifferent, unmeasurable and inarbitrable': translation from *ibid.*, 15.

#### § 5.4

**τὸ...βαρύτερον]** A first example of the identity of all things, claimed in § 5.3, is given here, with particular reference to the opposites of lightness and heaviness possessed by the same object. This time the argument goes back to moving from the specific to the general, namely from a comparison between the weight of some coins (τὸ...ταλάντων) to the conclusion that every thing is lighter (κουφότερον) and heavier (βαρύτερον).

The initial observation, τὸ δύο...ταλάντων, exemplifies the intuitive fact that a scalar property such as weight, is possessed by an object to a higher degree than by a second one, but also to a lower degree than by a third, the only two exceptions being the extremes of the sequence, if one admits them. However, in moving to the conclusive τωὐτόν...καὶ βαρύτερον the author removes the terms of comparison, which makes it seem that the comparative forms of the two opposites can be predicated absolutely as well, and that an object is lighter and heavier at the same time, under the same respect, *i.e.* as compared to another implicit and same object, against the Aristotelian Principle of Non-Contradiction (Arist. *Met.* Γ 1005b19–20). The illegitimacy of this new procedure is clear and no wonder from Plato it emerges that ‘more and less’ puzzles like this were dear to sophists like Protagoras (Pl. *Tht.* 154b-c). Both the necessary gradualness of some physical properties and the conclusion of an object having opposite properties against the Principle of Non-Contradiction, although these properties not being in a comparative modality in this case, can be found in Anaxagoras’ fragment DK 59B3.

**τάλαντον]** Robinson misprints it as τάλαυτον.<sup>407</sup>

#### § 5.5

**καὶ ζῶει...οὐκ ἐντί]** The first speech ends with this paragraph, where the author raises the stakes of his defence of IT, showing how that thesis actually instantiates an even more general principle than that of the sameness of all things, stated in § 5.3. For a life guided

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<sup>407</sup> Robinson (1979), 126.

by the intellect is the same as one straying from it not just because each thing is identical to the other; but especially because no thing is identical to itself, each one being and not being (ταὐτὰ ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστι and καὶ ἐντὶ τὰ πράγματα καὶ οὐκ ἐντί). Now, this latter position, no more of mere indiscernibility, but of ontological indeterminateness is one which Aristotle ascribes to Heraclitus (*Metaph.* Γ 1005b24-25),<sup>408</sup> and which he means to counter through his law of contradiction (b19-20).<sup>409</sup> It also features among the statements which Pyrrho admits ‘concerning each individual thing’, namely ‘that it no more is than is not, or it both is and is not, or it neither is nor is not’<sup>410</sup> (Aristocles in Eus. *PE* 14.18.4). The latter sentence is particularly interesting for us as, firstly, it comes in conclusion to the aforementioned 14.18.3. Secondly, the ‘cognitive incompetence’ it describes ‘is not attributed [...] to a weakness in our faculties as such, but to “how things are by nature”’<sup>411</sup> (14.18.2), which Pyrrho deems as something which ‘whoever wants to be happy must consider’ (ibid.), and the importance of which with regard to a man’s conduct will be praised also in *Dissoi Logoi* 8.1-2.

It is worth noting that a lot of the dialectical efficacy of this argument hinges on different values of the verb εἰμί, which, unlike the modern reader, an ancient Greek speaker could perceive. For in ταὐτὰ ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστι — which comes straight after καὶ ζῶει...οὐ ζῶει, and is therefore likely to maintain something of its coordinate clause — one finds the existential value of εἰμί, namely that expressing ‘being *alive* in contrast to being *dead*’,<sup>412</sup> and it would hence seem fitting to translate it in the sense of ‘live’. On the other hand, the generic plural neuter ταὐτά advises against this move, because it would narrow the range of the subject to living beings only. I therefore preferred keeping the basic form ‘be’, although I believe that in virtue of the above vital nuance, the passage

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<sup>408</sup> ‘For it is impossible for anyone to suppose that the same thing is and is not, as some imagine that Heraclitus says’: translation from Tredennick (1933), 163. See also fragment DK22 B49a.

<sup>409</sup> ‘It is impossible for the same attribute at once to belong and not to belong to the same thing and in the same relation’ (translation from ibid., 161).

<sup>410</sup> Translation from Long/Sedley (1987), 15.

<sup>411</sup> Long/Sedley (1987), 16.

<sup>412</sup> Kahn (2003), 233.

from ‘the same man both lives and does not live’ to ‘the same things are and are not’ sounded more smooth to the ancient Greek ears than to ours.

## 5.6

τοὶ...λέγοντι] DT is here formulated in open contrast with what the first speech has argued so far. Its dialectical, and slightly polemical, tone is particularly clear from a phrase such as τοὶ τῆνα λέγοντες [...] οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγοντι, and is then confirmed by the zeal with which the second speech starting here tackles the single points made by the first speech. Such accuracy does not have a parallel in chapters 1-4, but, rather, in the give-and-take between the two speeches of chapter 6.

<καὶ τὼς σωφρονοῦντας>] Robinson sticks to the codices and does not accept this supplement by Schanz,<sup>413</sup> with the result being that the sequence of human groups which the author here recalls would oddly be composed of three terms only (‘the demented and the wise and the ignorant’),<sup>414</sup> leaving out the opposite of τὼς μαινομένως. As has been said above, in §§ 5.8-9 the author will attempt to reduce the two couples of opposites into one; yet, only here he mentions three classes of individuals. Furthermore, as Schanz himself notices, immediately in the next paragraph, μανία will be openly contrasted with σωφροσύνη in the same way as σοφίη with ἀμαθία.<sup>415</sup> Finally, as Classen points out, the transmission of this passage has been very uncertain, as suggested by a note in the margins of B,<sup>416</sup> which proposes the reading τεμνομένως, which according to Diels and Kranz is a corruption of τε μαινομένως, a possible variant of τὼς μαινομένως.<sup>417</sup> Things thus standing, it is hence opportune to intervene in the

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<sup>413</sup> Schanz (1884), 381.

<sup>414</sup> Robinson (1979), 127.

<sup>415</sup> Schanz (1884), 381.

<sup>416</sup> Classen (2004), 104.

<sup>417</sup> Diels/Kranz (1922), 341.



text with Schanz's supplement, with no need, as usual, of its Doric accentuation σωφρονούντας, proposed by Blass.<sup>418</sup>

## § 5.7

αἰ...“ναί”] This is the start of an argument for DT which covers §§ 5.7-9 and which targets the statement of IT itself, in § 5.1, and its explanation, in § 5.2. As he has done on previous occasions, the author imagines a direct interrogation of the upholders of IT (cf. §§ 1.12-13, 2.21, 3.13, 4.6), but this time he does not need any *reductio ad absurdum* to make them contradict themselves. In fact, they deliberately retract their former position by answering ‘yes’ (φαντί: “ναί”) to the question ‘whether insanity differs from sanity, and wisdom from ignorance’, which is tantamount to asking ‘whether the actions and words of the insane differs from those of the sane, and those of the wise from those of the ignorant’, as §§ 5.8-9 make clear.<sup>419</sup>

## § 5.8

εὔ...συνταράσσονται] The IT supporters are said to acknowledge a difference in the actions of the opposing groups, and by so doing they overturn part of what was said in §§ 5.1-2 (see ταῦτά [...] πράσσοντι and ποιέοντι ταῦτά).

οὐκων, καὶ ταῦτά πράσσοντι] Robinson added αἰ after καί and translated this as ‘so even if they do the same things’.<sup>420</sup> However, the initial concessive clause he thus proposes seems to mistrust the results of the just-mentioned examination of the opposing groups’ actions (εὔ...ὁμολογησοῦντι), and effectively prove DT (εὔ...ὁμολογησοῦντι). If, instead, we keep the sole καί of the codices, ταῦτά πράσσοντι more suitably becomes the first of a series of possibilities (καὶ

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<sup>418</sup> Blass in Weber (1897), 46.

<sup>419</sup> On this equivalence, already discussed, see *supra*, 169.

<sup>420</sup> Robinson (1979), 128.

ταὐτὰ...συνταράσσονται) which must be excluded precisely on the basis of that previous examination (οὐκων).

### § 5.9

**καὶ...δεῖ**] The author deals with the second element on which IT insisted, namely what the people living according to the intellect, and those straying from it, say. In this case, the IT upholders are imagined not to withdraw their position as easily as before. On the contrary, they offer an answer which appeals to the identity of the two groups' words, through the same relativistic pattern as the arguments of the first speeches of chapters 1-4 ('the same act,  $x$ , is done at the proper time,  $a$ , by the wise, and at the wrong one,  $\neg a$ , by the insane'). Their answer also exploits a criterion of 'proper time' which is reminiscent of the notion of *καιρός*, already seen in §§ 2.19 and 3.12. In this regard, it is interesting to compare the current passage with [Pl.] *Just.* 375a2-6, where in a similar vocabulary, things are said to be just if they are done at the due and right time (ἐν μὲν τῷ δέοντι καὶ τῷ καιρῷ) and unjust when the time is not appropriate (ἐν δὲ τῷ μὴ δέοντι). What is more, at 375b4-5 the author then explains that only he who possesses knowledge can act in the former way, whereas the ignorant man is bound to the latter, which is the point of the author's final observation ἀλλὰ τοῖ...δεῖ.<sup>421</sup>

### § 5.10

**καὶ τοῦτο...ἤμεν**] Now the author strikes back at the first speech's arguments, following the same order in which they appeared. He shifts from distinguishing a life lived according to the intellect from one straying from it (§§ 5.6-9), to tackling the broader issue of what makes a thing in general differ from the other (§§ 5.10-14). This counters the parallel, but opposed in meaning, transition from §§ 5.1-2 (about the identity of the opposite groups' words and actions) to 5.3-5 (about the impossibility to distinguish a

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<sup>421</sup> On a comparison between the two passages and on a hypothesis of the relationships between the two works see Gomperz (1912), 153-154, 166-167.

thing from the other). Furthermore, the linguistic focus on words and clauses which we now see in §§ 5.10-12 already characterized § 5.2.

Here, the author argues that the specific addition of the relativizing temporal clauses ἃ δει and ἃ μὴ δει changes the nature of what the two groups say, because, generally speaking, any addition alters the subject which undergoes it, as clarified later in § 5.14. Consequently, the author abandons the rhetorical strategy used in the second speeches of chapters 1-4, just as we saw him doing with the usual strategy of the first speeches. For so far in the work, the second speeches, firstly, used to drop the relativizing conditions under which the first ones had predicated opposite attributes of the same object; then they performed *reductio ad absurdum* on the absolute versions of ITs, so obtained. Here, instead, the author points the finger at those conditions, presenting them not merely as circumstantial, but as integral parts of the objects to which they are referred. In other words, if in § 5.9 the IT upholders argued that the sane and the insane say the same things, and that what changes is just the time when they do so, here the DT supporters no longer reply by accusing them of equating the two classes without restriction. Rather, they stress the importance of the relativizing clauses of that identity so much as to fit in them in the definition of the objects over discussion, by retorting that the time in which a thing is said contributes to its identity.

### § 5.11

ἐγὼ...ξουθός] Here starts a series of four paragraphs, §§ 5.11-14, through which the author justifies the statement in § 5.10, that the addition of the clauses ‘when there is need’ and ‘when there is no need’ changes what the sane and the insane say (for the logic of this justification, see the commentary on § 5.13). §§ 5.11-14 stand out for their points of contact with Plato’s *Cratylus*, which, yet, scholars have just partially pinpointed, focussing only on those scattered passages of the dialogue which feature morphological changes similar to those grouped in this section. An example of this, with reference to the current paragraph where change of intonation (ἀρμονίας

διαλλαγείσας) is introduced, is Pl. *Cra.* 399a7-b5, where ‘change of accents’ (τὰς ὀξύτητας μεταβάλλειν) appears. However, the proximity between the two texts actually proves more systematic and philosophically meaningful, as soon as one focuses on 431e9-432b1, which commentators have generally neglected,<sup>422</sup> but which runs thus:

Cratylus: That is true. But you see, Socrates, when by the science of grammar we assign these letters—alpha, beta, and the rest—to names, if we take away or add or transpose any letter, it is not true that the name is written, but written incorrectly; it is not written at all, but immediately becomes a different word, if any such thing happens to it.

Socrates: Perhaps we are not considering the matter in the right way.

Cratylus: Why not?

Socrates: It may be that what you say would be true of those things which must necessarily consist of a certain number or cease to exist at all, as ten, for instance, or any number you like, if you add or subtract anything is immediately another number.<sup>423</sup>

The first thing to notice in this exchange is the similarity with §§ 5.11-14, as far as the trains of thought of the two texts are concerned. For, firstly, Cratylus reflects on how morphological changes turn a word into a different one, similarly to §§ 5.11-12; then, Socrates assimilates this observation to an example of addition and subtraction from ten, which is reminiscent of § 5.14.

Some differences emerge in the details, though. In the first place, Cratylus says that in presence of these morphological changes, a word becomes a different one (τὸ ὄνομα [...] εὐθὺς ἕτερόν ἐστιν, ἐάν τι τούτων πάθῃ), whereas precisely in the current paragraph of our text, the author says that it is things themselves which undergo an alteration in those cases (ἀλλοιοῦσθαι [...] τὰ πράγματα). However, the two passages can be reconciled under the assumption that here our author may have understood some premises which Plato puts in Cratylus’ mouth elsewhere in the dialogue. In order

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<sup>422</sup> An exception is Horky (2013), 162, n. 153.

<sup>423</sup> Translation from Fowler (1926), 163.

to see which these are, let us look at Cratylus' initial views about the relation between language and world, before they start to capitulate under the blows of Socrates' dialectic at 432d. Cratylus originally claimed that a name is correct insofar as it reveals the nature of the thing it means (428e), and that all names have been correctly given (429b). Then, at 430a-b, Cratylus agrees with Socrates that the process through which names reveal the nature of things is an imitative one, but unlike Socrates, he believes that such imitation does not allow imperfections and on occasion of the slightest departure from its standard form, a word is not simply miswritten and yet still recognizable as the same one; it becomes a wholly different one (432a, quoted above). But the new and different word so generated must also indicate a wholly different thing, if each word reveals the nature of a thing, as just recalled. As a result, according to Cratylus, the most minimal change in a word reflects one in the nature of the object denoted by it. That perfectly tallies both with Heraclitus' fluxism and with what our author too here says on the topic, the two sharing the same ontological views about pronouncing the same word with different accent (cf. this paragraph and DK22 B48 and 51).

As a second difference between the two texts, removal (ἀφέλωμεν), addition (προσθῶμεν), and transposition (μεταθῶμεν) of letters, which Plato mentions, are just three out of the five morphological changes named over §§ 5.11-14, namely the aforementioned change of intonation, pronunciation with long or short vowel (τὰ δὲ μακρῶς καὶ βραχυτέρως ῥηθέντα, § 5.12), transposition of letters (γράμματα διαλλάξαντα, § 5.12), addition and removal of some element (τις ἢ ποτιτιθεῖ τι ἢ ἀφαιρεῖ, § 5.13). On the other hand, albeit not here, all of these five mutations sparsely appear in the *Cratylus* too, and the proximity between the two texts is hence less compromised than it may appear.

Desbordes interestingly points out how these five morphological changes actually boil down to four linguistic phenomena known to ancient Greek and Roman grammarians, namely addition (πρόσθεσις, or *adiectio*), subtraction (ἀφαίρεσις, or *detractio*), mutation (ἀλλοίωσις, or *inmutatio*), and metathesis (μετάθεσις, or

*transmutatio*); <sup>424</sup> on this reading, changes in intonation and in vowel length are, of course, both cases of mutation. Basing himself on the testimony of Var. *L.* 7.2, Barwick locates the origin of this quadripartite scheme among Stoics, with Chrysippos as its probable first promoter, and, again, the *Cratylus* as their source for it.<sup>425</sup> The both linguistic and ontological nature of these four phenomena, then, made Desbordes also connect them to the three Aristotelian categories of quantity (in case of addition and subtraction), quality (mutation), and place (metathesis). It is not my business here to assess Desbordes' hypothesis that the Aristotelian physics has a debt to the *Cratylus* 'modèle des manipulations qui sont possibles sur l'écriture'.<sup>426</sup> A passage such as Arist. *Ph.* I 7.190b6-11, which she does not quote, seems to articulate this notion, but the one I prefer to dwell on for the sake of my analysis is, rather, Ph. *De aeternitate mundi* 113, which she too mentions, and in which the author attacks the Peripatetic account of destruction as follows:

Some of those who consider that the world is everlasting carry their ingenuity still farther and employ an argument of the following kind to establish their view. We find, they say, four principal ways in which destruction occurs, addition, subtraction, transposition, transmutation. Thus two is destroyed and becomes three by the addition of one and similarly four by subtraction of one becomes three.<sup>427</sup>

Just as in the above *Cratylus* passage and in our §§ 5.11-14, here the different kinds of mutation are compared with cases of numeric addition and subtraction. On the other hand, whereas here and in our text such an example is reported simply as belonging to some thinkers (i.e., Peripatetics and the IT upholders), in Plato it has a contrastive function, as Socrates uses it to show how, contrarily to what Cratylus seemed to suggest,

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<sup>424</sup> Desbordes (1987), 41, Desbordes (1983), 23.

<sup>425</sup> Barwick (1957), 78. See also D.L. VII.44.

<sup>426</sup> Desbordes (1983), 28.

<sup>427</sup> Translation from Colson (1941), 263-265.

names are not affected by alterations in the same highly sensitive way as numbers are. As a result, interpreters like Taylor and Solana Dueso are wrong when reading the second speech of our chapter as providing a Socratic or essentialist answer to the Heraclitean tenet that ‘things are and are not’ of § 5.5. For over §§ 5.10-14 too our author adopts ideas about language which in the *Cratylus* are associated to the Heraclitean *Cratylus* and are opposed by Socrates.

In conclusion, unless we agree to add these paragraphs to the list of those *Dissoi Logoi* passages which may have inspired Plato, and in this case an even longer tradition after him, Robinson’s belief that *Dissoi Logoi* 5 antedates the *Cratylus* must be overturned, and, one must acknowledge our author’s original use of that source in this section.<sup>428</sup>

Expertise in correctness of names and morphology has been associated with sophists too, with a particular preference for Hippias (cf. Pl. *Cra.* 391b, *Hp.Ma.* 285d, *Hp.Mi.* 368d).<sup>429</sup> With specific reference to the eristic deployment of change of accent in the words pronounced, I would also point out Arist. *SE* 166b1-9. Sextus Empiricus’ *Against the Grammarians*, namely M. I.41-320, is, then, a relevant criticism of the effective value of the art of letters (ἡ γραμματική), which is concerned, among other things, with morphological notions similar to those exemplified here.

**οὐ πράγματος]** If one takes ἐγώ...διαλλαγείσας at its face value, and translates it in a way such as that of most translators, for example like Robinson’s ‘I myself do not think that things are altered by the addition of such qualifications’,<sup>430</sup> a contradiction arises with what comes both immediately before and two paragraphs later.<sup>431</sup> For in § 5.10 the author maintains that by adding words, a thing is no longer the same (μηκέτι τὸ αὐτὸ

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<sup>428</sup> Cf. Robinson (1979), 207.

<sup>429</sup> See also *ibid.*, 205-206.

<sup>430</sup> *Ibid.*, 129.

<sup>431</sup> This kind of translation is also in North (1671), 69, Fabricius (1724), 630, Von Orelli (1821), 227, Mullach (1875), 550, Untersteiner (1954), 177, Dumont (1969), 243, Sprague (1972), 289, Poirier (1988), 1175, Solana Dueso (1996), 193, Waterfield (2000), 295, Dorion (2009), 142.

ἤμεν), and in § 5.13 that addition, as well as subtraction, of words makes things different to a higher extent than any other change in a word can do (τοσοῦτον...ἀφαιρεῖ). I, rather, agree with the fewer translators who spot the omission of a μόνον after οὐ in this passage, a phenomenon attested also at Th. 4.92, E. *Hipp.* 359 and *Ph.* 1480 (LSJ, s.v. μόνος B II 2).<sup>432</sup> For if one understands it, the οὐ μόνον...ἀλλὰ... correlation thus resulting smooths the problematic denial of addition of words (πράγματος τοσοῦτω ποτιτεθέντος) being a sufficient cause for things to become different (ἀλλοιοῦσθαι τὰ πράγματα). On this reconstruction, that morphological change, in fact, will become one of the many possible ways, starting from change in intonation (ἁρμονίας διαλλαγείσας), through which things change their nature. Such a reading, one can finally notice, also paves the way for the emergence of the *a fortiori* logic of the whole argument, revealed in § 5.13. To conclude, Dillon and Gergel propose ‘I do not think that the situation is altered so much by the addition of an element, as by an alteration, as it were, of tone’,<sup>433</sup> which, as is clear, does not require the expression of μόνον. However, this solution cannot stand up for reasons both of grammar, as in a comparative sentence with τοσοῦτος the conjunction employed should be ὥς and not the coordinating ἀλλά, and of content, as it means that alteration changes a thing more than how addition can do, which is the exact opposite of what is then argued in § 5.13.

γλαυκός] Rather than Robinson’s unqualified ‘green’, I preferred the linguistic coinage ‘glaucous’, although scarcely used nowadays, as its definition of ‘dull or pale green colour passing into greyish blue’ (OED, s.v. ‘glaucous’, a) is closer to the bluish green or grey indicated by the original Greek adjective (LSJ, s.v. γλαυκός).

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<sup>432</sup> Teichmüller (1884), 217, Timpanaro Cardini (1954), 223, Maso/Franco (2000), 195, Becker/Scholz (2004), 77, Bonazzi (2008), 445, Reale (2008), 1857.

<sup>433</sup> Dillon/Gergel (2003), 329, and similarly Graham (2010), 893.



“Γλαῦκος”...“ξουθός”] With the couples of objects exemplifying these morphological alterations the author confronts names of person (Γλαῦκος, Ξάνθος, Ξοῦθος) and colours (γλαυκός, ξανθός, ξουθός), but the import of this association is inscrutable.

## § 5.12

ταῦτα...“νόος”] Variation in the length of a vowel (τὰ δέ...“σακός”) and the swap of the place of letters within the same word (ἄτερα δέ...“νόος”) are the morphological changes presented here. As far as variation in vowel length is concerned, the author seems not to have picked the most perspicuous examples, since in both the chosen couples, namely Τύρος (ῡ)/τυρός (ῠ) and σάκος (ᾱ)/σακός (ᾱ), the accent also shifts from the first onto the last syllable; a phonetic phenomenon already discussed in § 5.11. A reflection on the variety of vowels is also in Pl. *Cra.* 424c, and S.E. M. I.111-116,121-130, whereas for metathesis of letters cf. Pl. *Cra.* 394b and the already seen 432a.

“καρτὸς” καὶ “κρατός”] κάρτος καὶ κράτος is the reading of the codices, which yet have the inconvenience of being two dialectal versions of the same word, the first form being Doric, Ionic and Epic, the latter Attic only (*LSJ*, s.vv. κάρτος, and κράτος, I 1). As they both mean either ‘strength’ or ‘power’, they do not seem to constitute a fitting example of things becoming different by a change in the words denoting them, and any translation such as Blass’ ‘robur et regnum’ cannot be but arbitrary.<sup>434</sup> Since Diels’ edition of 1903, all editors, Robinson included, have been printing Wilamowitz’s conjecture κάρτος καὶ κρατός, which, yet, features another inconvenient accent slide like the one seen in Τύρος/τυρός and σάκος/σακός.<sup>435</sup> The solution I propose here averts this problem, by making both the original paroxytone words oxytone.

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<sup>434</sup> Blass in Weber (1897), 47.

<sup>435</sup> Wilamowitz in Diels (1903), 585, Robinson (1979), 128.

“ὄνος” καὶ “νόος”] This inversion of the first two letters of the word ὄνος is the morphological change with the most drastic ontological consequences among those the authors mention and both Aristophanes (*Nu.* 1273) and Plato (*Lg.* 701d) played on it.

### § 5.13

ἐπεὶ...ἐστίν] This paragraph finally clarifies the point the author seems to have been driving at since § 5.11, namely to show that subtraction and addition, contrarily to what IT supporters are reported to say in § 5.10, actually change words, and, consequently, the things denoted by them, more substantially than modifications such as those of §§ 5.11-12.

One may wonder why a change in the length of a vowel, for example, should compromise the nature of a word less than the addition or the subtraction of a letter. I believe that the interpretive paradigm to adopt in order to answer this question is again the one of language as imitation appearing in the *Cratylus*, and which now seems particularly useful for its featuring the idea of artistic imitation (cf. Pl. *Cra.* 423d-e). In fact, for the likeness of an artistic reproduction the presence of all and only the distinctive characteristics of an object is more important than how the latter are rendered, provided, of course, that their rendering is not so poor as to compromise their recognisability. In the same way, a word, or a sentence, becomes less recognizable when some letters, or words, are added or subtracted, rather than when the latter components are just in different shapes or places. How the identity of a sentence is interwoven with the presence or the absence of its parts is discussed, with higher subtleness, in S.E. *M.* I.131-141 too.

That this *a fortiori* argument moves from the little changes concerning accent, vowel length and collocation to the bigger ones of addition and subtraction further proves that the second speech of this chapter does not express a Socratic position. For both in Pl. *Cra.* 394b and 432e Socrates ranks all these changes as equally innocuous for the nature of a word, and, hence, of the thing denoted by it.

## § 5.14

αἱ τις...καττωὺτό] Just as §§ 5.10-13 take up the reflection on words of § 5.2, the use of numbers in the current example recalls the idea of measurement which characterized the following §§ 5.3-4.

Commentators have usually stressed the sophistic nature of this argument, grouping it among the puzzles about addition and subtraction which sophists fancied, according to Pl. *Phd.* 101c and, especially, Arist. *SE* 178a30-35, where we read:

Has a man lost what he had and afterwards has not? For he who has lost one die only will no longer have ten dice. Is not what really happens that he has lost something which he had before but no longer has, but it does not follow that he has lost the whole amount or number which he no longer has? In the question, therefore, he is dealing with that which he has, in the conclusion with the total number; for the number was ten.<sup>436</sup>

Aristotle classifies this argument among those ‘that turn on the identical expression of things which are not identical’<sup>437</sup> (178a5-7). As Aristotle’s final explanation in this passage suggests, the clause ‘he [...] will no longer have ten dice’ takes on the phrase ‘to have something’ in a different way from that of ‘what he had and afterwards has not’ of the previous question, although one may be led to take it thus. Actually, this clause is no more than a synthetic form of the more proper ‘the dice which he will have will no longer be ten’, the stress of the negation being put on the number and not on the existence of the dice.

Robinson sees this same logic in our argument, which he in fact sums up as ‘I no longer have all ten, so apparently I have lost all ten’.<sup>438</sup> Furthermore, he equates the two passages to the *Cratylus* one analysed above. But here some problems arise, as this triangulation is anything but certain. First of all, precisely since our argument is close to

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<sup>436</sup> Translation from Forster (1955), 111-113.

<sup>437</sup> Translation from *ibid.*, 109.

<sup>438</sup> Robinson (1979), 207.

one found in *Cratylus*, as I too argued earlier, it is also far from the sophistic fallacy told by Aristotle. For in that Platonic passage, Socrates was surely not sophistic in showing that Cratylus' ideas on the nature of words led to a true disappearance of a word, such as that of two numbers involved in a calculation, when a new one, the result, replaces them. Aristotle's fallacy, instead, turned on physical objects such as dice, whose disappearance after subtraction is just apparent, and which are hence optimal for making a sophism about them. Bearing this distinction between Robinson's advocated parallels in mind, if we go back to our text, we immediately notice that differently from *Sophistical Refutations*, but similarly to the *Cratylus*, the numerals used here (δέκα and ἕν) are no further qualified, which has made all translators, including Robinson, read them as numbers rather than enumerated objects.<sup>439</sup> As I just said about the *Cratylus*, by making such a choice, one also takes the argument seriously, not as a sophistic trick, and that perfectly tallies with the end of § 5.13 (καὶ τοῦτο δείξω οἷόν ἐστιν) which announces a serious explanation about how subtraction and addition affect objects.

If, in conclusion, the *Cratylus* is confirmed as our author's benchmark at this height of the text, and in this paragraph in particular, it is also worth recalling how the first instance of a reasoning such as the current one is the so-called Growing Argument of Epicharmus of Kos, at DK23 B2. Although it describes a subtraction of physical tokens such as pebbles, its concern is unambiguously on the change of numbers, like the *Cratylus*, for which, in fact, Horky suggested it worked as a source.<sup>440</sup> Finally, alternative formulations of our argument are attested in a few places of Sextus Empiricus, namely *P.* II.215, III.109, *M.* IV.25, X.323, and his interest for subjects such as, more generally, the relation between whole and parts (*P.* II.215-218), subtraction and addition (*P.* III.85-96, *M.* IV.23-34, IX.303-330), becoming and perishing (*P.* III.109-114) is high. All this

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<sup>439</sup> For although in the commentary Robinson argued that the author is playing on the ambiguity of these two possible referents (Robinson (1979), 207), he too translated the passage as 'if a man were to take away one from ten, there would no longer be ten or even one' (ibid., 131).

<sup>440</sup> Horky (2013), 125-166. On how the argument of this paragraph echoes Epicharmus' one, see also Menn (2010), 43-50.

made Robinson think of this paragraph as one of the most responsible for this work's collocation at the end of Sextus' codices.<sup>441</sup>

## § 5.15

**τό...ἔστι]** This final paragraph is one of the most controversial and there have hardly been two similar translations of it. I myself will propose a new one, which strays from Robinson's, partially as regards the Greek text chosen too. The first two sure points from which I move are the initial mention of 'the same man' (τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον), who reappears for the first time after § 5.5, and the correspondence which we have just verified both between §§ 5.2 and 5.10-13, and between §§ 5.3-4 and 5.14. Taking them together, it is therefore likely that here the author completes his counter to the first speech by coming to contrast the idea that 'the same man both lives and does not live' (ζῶει [...] καὶ οὐ ζῶει) of § 5.5. One may suspect the passage from that original formulation to 'is and is not' (τὸ...ἦμεν), but one must not overlook the possible contribution of the same vital value of εἰμί to it, as I earlier pointed out in the case of καὶ ταῦτα ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστι of § 5.5 too.<sup>442</sup>

Moving on, then, the author asks for clarification about the relative or absolute value which the opponents gave to their statement. Thus I interpret "τὶ ἢ τὰ πάντα ἔστιν;", in a way just seemingly identical to Robinson's 'does he exist in some particular respect or in every respect?'.<sup>443</sup> For the latter is actually an incomplete request for clarification, as the previous clause involved not only the same man's being, but also his not being (καὶ ἦμεν καὶ μὴ ἦμεν). Rather than the sole previous ὁ αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος, I follow Freeman and Dillon and Gergel<sup>444</sup> in assuming that the subject of ἔστιν is the

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<sup>441</sup> Robinson (1979), 208.

<sup>442</sup> See *supra*, 172-173.

<sup>443</sup> Robinson (1979), 131.

<sup>444</sup> 'As for the argument that the same man both is and is not: the question to ask is, does this relate to the part or the whole?' (Freeman (1946), 421), 'Do we mean in some respect or in all respects?' (Dillon/Gergel (2003), 429).

whole articulate infinitive clause τὸ...μὴ ἦμεν. On this interpretation, I hence read ἔστιν as exploiting the veridical use of εἰμί, namely as ‘be true’.<sup>445</sup>

The fact that τὸ ἢ τὰ πάντα applies to both ἦμεν and μὴ ἦμεν is also immediately confirmed in what follows, where, rather than on the same man’s being, the author prefers to focus on the idea that that man is not, and in an absolute way (οὐκῶν...ταῦτα). He, in fact, explains that this cannot be the case, because ‘every thing, in some way, is’ (πάντα...ἔστι). In the latter concluding remark, I see an epitome of the whole second speech, which, by showing how new entities can originate from the slightest change in pre-existent ones, has set the stage for a multiplication of the objects which are, as is said here.

To sum up, this concluding paragraph elucidates the opposition between the non-discriminatory ontology of the first speech, where all things were said to be and not to be (καὶ ἐντὶ τὰ πράγματα καὶ οὐκ ἐντί, § 5.5) and hence identical the one to the other and not distinguishable from it, and a new opposed scenario where all things are, no matter how significantly distinguished (πάντα ὧν πη ἔστι, § 5.15). As touched on before in connection with the *Cratylus* too, it is noteworthy that both these ontologies can be drawn on Heraclitus, both being aspects of his same fluxism. For precisely because an object does not have a definite identity and can be said to be and not to be, it also undergoes innumerable changes which produce as many wholly new natures out of it.

**τὰ πάντα...ἔστι]** In Robinson’s text the end reads ταῦτα πάντα ὧν πη ἔστι, with the period placed between εἰπὼν and ταῦτα, more similarly to the manuscripts which read εἰπόντες. ταῦτα πάντα (εἰπόντες was rightly emended in εἰπὼν by Mullach for the sake of concordance with the singular τις).<sup>446</sup> The translation which then springs from this text is ‘all these things exist in some way’, which is a bit obscure, as the author has just been talking exclusively about the specific case of a man who is and is not. I,

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<sup>445</sup> Kahn (2003), 355-362, 368-370.

<sup>446</sup> Robinson (1979), 130, Mullach (1875), 550.

therefore, agree with Diels on moving the period one word forward, but without turning ταῦτα into ταὐτά, as he did.<sup>447</sup> For ταῦτα perfectly takes up the initial proposition τὸ δὲ...μὴ ἤμεν which, when connected with τὰ πάντα through the circumstantial participle εἰπών, constitutes a conditional clause bearing a fitting answer to the question ‘τὶ ἢ τὰ πάντα ἔστιν;’ Finally, precisely in order to exploit the predicative construction τὰ πάντα εἰπών ταῦτα (‘if he means that in all respects’), I removed the double quotations of direct speech which Robinson introduced between τὰ πάντα and which make sense only with the punctuation he gave to his text.<sup>448</sup>

**πη]** Many translators treated this particle as a synonym of τι and hence as hinting at a specific nature as opposed to the general one of τὰ πάντα, as we can see from the question “τὶ ἢ τὰ πάντα ἔστιν;” This choice has been defended especially on the grounds of the Aristotelian distinction between being either something (τι) or in some way (παρὰ τό πη), and being absolutely (ἀπλῶς), appearing in Arist. *SE* 166b37-167a20.<sup>449</sup> However, one may wonder why if the author really wanted to repeat the same idea as before, he did not similarly use τι in the last sentence, as he had done immediately before with τὰ πάντα. Furthermore, unlike in Aristotle, here πη is not accompanied by any preposition and in this simple form it does not usually mean anything more than ‘in some way’ (see LSJ, s.v. πη, I).

I do not, therefore, agree with Kranz that the final sentence which features this expression makes the Socratic point that everything is connected with a specific quality.<sup>450</sup> That, again, would have been more likely in case of a second occurrence of τι, and we must also remember the anti-Socratic, and, instead, Cratylean, spirit which the second speech has had so far; an abrupt inversion of its would be hardly excusable

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<sup>447</sup> Diels (1903), 585.

<sup>448</sup> Robinson (1979), 130, the whole sentence being translated as ‘thus, if anyone denies that the man in question exists, he is making the mistake of asserting “in every respect”’ (ibid., 131).

<sup>449</sup> Robinson (1979), 209, Fait (2007), 118.

<sup>450</sup> Kranz (1937), 231.

at its very end. Finally, Socrates believes that the human delimitation of the essences is the task of the art of dialectic, and that it therefore requires a knowledge and precision which do not seem to fit this *πη* (see, for example, Pl. *Phdr.* 277b-c).

## Chapter 6

### § 6.1

**οὐτ' ἀληθής, οὐτε καινός]** This expression seems to suggest a 'strong proclivity on the author's part', as Robinson put it, but the antilogic nature of the chapter which will fully emerge at the end of it, must refrain one from quick conclusions on the author's preference for either side of the dispute.<sup>451</sup> Robinson is, instead, right when spotting a similiarity with 'Gorgian rhetorical mannerism'<sup>452</sup> of DK82 B11a, where 'both the terms καινός and ἀληθής are used and in a remarkably similar fashion to here: εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀνοήτους, καινὸς ὁ λόγος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀληθής'.<sup>453</sup> That the unteachability thesis was not new is proved by sources prior to the sophists' educational revolution in the 5<sup>th</sup> century BCE (cf. Thgn. 434-439, P. O. 2.86, 9.28, P. 8.44, N. 3.38-42),<sup>454</sup> and probably even by a sophist like Gorgias, who at Pl. *Men.* 95c is said to laugh at people who promise to teach excellence, claiming to instruct only in the skill of speaking.

**σοφία]** In agreement with Classen,<sup>455</sup> I selected the reading σοφία, prevalent in the manuscripts, instead the Ionic σοφίη of the P3, followed by Robinson.<sup>456</sup>

**σοφία...μαθητόν]** Both here and in § 6.7 the author prefers the pairing σοφία καὶ ἀρετά to its single components. This is also confirmed by the collective reference to

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<sup>451</sup> Robinson (1979), 210. On the author's actual commitment to the speeches he displayed chapters 1-5, see *infra*, 281-282.

<sup>452</sup> Robinson (1979), 92, n. 85.

<sup>453</sup> Ibid.

<sup>454</sup> See Jaeger (1989), 364-418.

<sup>455</sup> Classen (2004), 109.

<sup>456</sup> Robinson (1979), 130.



them through the singular neuter διδακτὸν εἴη οὔτε μαθητόν<sup>457</sup> in place of the possible plural feminine,<sup>458</sup> which has motivated my use of the pronoun ‘something’ in the translation, as a medium between the nouns and the adjectives. The morphological connection between σοφία and ἀρετά hints at their conceptual kinship, which it is crucial to convey in the translation. σοφία and ἀρετά, in fact, were what sophists particularly boasted to teach to their pupils, as will also emerge in §§ 6.5-6.<sup>459</sup> The most famous of them was Protagoras, as described in the eponymous Platonic dialogue, which now is particularly useful to the translation of these two terms.

At *Prt.* 318e-319a, Protagoras’ teaching (μάθημα) is defined as ‘the political technique’ (ἡ πολιτικὴ τέχνη); then, moving to 319e, we see Socrates contrasting the possibility that such a technique could provide that kind of excellence (ἀρετή) in public life that Protagoras promised to the young Hippocrates (at 322b,e, 323b,e ἀρετή too is qualified as πολιτική). I suggest that the translation of ἀρετά that best fits the arguments which our text too proposes is precisely that in terms of excellence, meant as one’s value in a sociopolitical context, measurable according to its public acknowledgement (cf. § 6.6 and ἐλλόγιμος γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει, 316c).<sup>460</sup> On the other hand, translating σοφία according to the Protagorean definition of his μάθημα entails some difficulties. In fact, if we looked for something close to τέχνη and translated it as ‘knowledge’, ‘expertise’ or ‘skill’ (*LSJ*, s.v. σοφία 1), this would be inadequate for some examples proposed later in the chapter, as I will show, and we would fail to account for part of the meaning of σοφιστής too.

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<sup>457</sup> See also §§ 6.3, 6.13 for other two occurrences of διδακτὸν.

<sup>458</sup> Likewise, in the openings of two other works of the Platonic corpus which are close in contents to ours, namely at *Pl. Men.* 70a1-4 and [*Pl.*] *Virt.* 376a, the same neuter adjectives are referred to ἀρετή and one must also assume that σοφία is just implicit and not absent, given the belief in a tight connection between σοφία and ἀρετά that these dialogues share with our chapter.

<sup>459</sup> Yet, such a claim was far from being commonly accepted and people from different backgrounds strongly opposed it, in a way that again perfectly fits the contrasting nature of our text (*Pl. Prt.* 316c-d, *Men.* 91c-92d, *R.* VI 492a-d).

<sup>460</sup> As Kerferd put it, ἀρετή indicated ‘those qualities in a man which made for success in Greek society and which could confidently be expected to secure the admiration of a man’s fellow-citizens, followed in many cases by substantial material rewards’ (Kerferd (1981), 131).

The term originally denoted ‘tout homme qui excelle dans un art, devin, chanteur, poète, orateur, sage [...]’;<sup>461</sup> only from the mid-5<sup>th</sup> century it ‘désigne un professeur d’éloquence, et se trouve pris en mauvaise part, par ex., chez Ar. et Pl. “sophiste, charlatan”, etc.’<sup>462</sup> However, that the former connotation still echoed in the latter is proved in some places, especially in Plato’s *Protagoras* again. Firstly, at Pl. *Prt.* 316d-317b, Protagoras declares that he practises the ancient sophistic art (ἡ σοφιστικὴ τέχνη [...] παλαιά), just as in the ancient times did poets like Homer, Hesiods and Simonides, legendary and magical figures like Orphaeus and Musaeus, gymnasts like Iccus of Tarentum and Herodicus of Selymbria, musicians like Agathocles and Pythoclide of Ceos, who all aimed at educating men (παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους). The only difference was that they hid and masked their art under the name of specialised arts. As Kerferd suggested, here Protagoras deems his ancient precursors σοφισταί ‘not in virtue of techniques or special skills, but in virtue of the content of their thinking and teaching, their wisdom or Sophia’.<sup>463</sup> In the same way, some pages before, at 311e-312b, Hippocrates’ difficulty in defining the kind of σοφία peculiar to the sophist proves that the outlines of this concept were more blurred than those of any other technique. Soon after, at 312c, his attempt at defining σοφιστής as ‘the man who knows wise things’ through an incorrect etymology shows that he still bears in mind the earlier meaning of the term.<sup>464</sup> Finally, at 318e-319a, the political art is described as ‘sound judgement’ (εὐβουλία) in private and public matters, confirming that Protagoras’ pupils would

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<sup>461</sup> DELG, s.v. σοφιστής. Likewise, the etymological definition of σοφία presents the term as true ‘aussi du poète, du savant, de la sagesse pratique, de la sagesse en general’ (DELG, s.v. σοφία). Similarly, Kerferd made a thorough classification of ‘the earlier uses of σοφιστής according to the type of person to whom it is applied’ (Kerferd (1950), 8). This list is grounded on numerous sources starting from Pi. I. V 28, and shows how the word firstly indicated ‘poets, including Homer and Hesiod [...] musicians and rhapsodes [...] diviners and seers [...] the seven wise men [...] similar early wise men [...] presocratic philosophers [...] contrivers, often with suggestions on mysterious powers’ (Kerferd (1950), 8).

<sup>462</sup> DELG, s.v. σοφιστής.

<sup>463</sup> Kerferd (1976), 28.

<sup>464</sup> See also Kerferd (1950), 9.

have acquired not just some knowledge — as Waterfield translated<sup>465</sup> — but also a form of wisdom, although in practical matters, by learning his technique.

In conclusion, in the σοφία professed by Protagoras and sketched in chapter 6, there is still a trace of the wisdom of ‘those who in one way or another function as the Sages, the exponents of knowledges in early communities’;<sup>466</sup> and that hence justifies the almost unanimous translation of this word as ‘wisdom’.

But even though that is the meaning our author gives to σοφία throughout chapter 6, he presents two different views on how this concept stands with that of technique (τέχνη). In fact, the first thesis claims that wisdom has nothing to do with techniques, whereas the second position will describe wisdom as one of them. This is testified by the logic of the examples involving techniques, that are put forward in support of both positions; in the first case, their aim is contrastive (§ 6.3), whereas in the second it is assimilative (§§ 6.7, 8, 10). Precisely as a consequence of this first disagreement between the two positions, it will then follow that the first one declares it impossible to teach and learn wisdom, as Socrates and Anytus maintain in the *Protagoras* and the *Meno*, whereas the second position defends such a possibility in virtue of the technical *status* of the subject, as done by Protagoras in the *Protagoras* too.

## § 6.2

ὥς...ἔχειν] This first proof has been wrongly compared by many scholars to Gorgias’ demonstration of the incommunicability of what we comprehend in the Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, at DK82 B3,83-86. In particular, Untersteiner regarded the loss of knowledge<sup>467</sup> which here the author envisages for the teacher as the simple appearance of a new wisdom in the learner, different from the teachers’ one, which does not vanish.<sup>468</sup>

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<sup>465</sup> Waterfield (2000), 296.

<sup>466</sup> Kerferd (1950), 8.

<sup>467</sup> Untersteiner read σοφία as ‘sapienza’ in the translation, but as ‘conoscenza’ in the commentary note. (Untersteiner (1954), 179-180).

<sup>468</sup> See *ibid.* Solana Dueso supported this comparison (Solana Dueso (1996), 162).

Dupréel, instead, first recognised that in this case we are before a sophism based on the truism that we cannot hand something to someone and still retain it. Then, he explored the possibility of a Gorgianic source of the passage, but this time in the spirit of the demonstration of the unknowability and inconceivability of being at DK82 B3,77-82. By a general consideration concerning something happening to all the existing things, the author would have implicitly stressed the fact that since we do not lose our wisdom when we transmit it to another person, 'le connaître est tout autre chose que l'être et [...] la virtue, en particulier, n'est pas une chose, mais un simple rapport occasionel'.<sup>469</sup>

I agree with Robinson<sup>470</sup> that both interpretations miss the sense of the text. As for Untersteiner's comparison, it misinterprets the idea conveyed by the author, which is clearly about the loss of wisdom on one's part in favour of the acquisition of it by another. A more similar image is given, instead, at Pl. *Smp.* 175d, where the transmission of wisdom (σοφία) from a wiser to a less wise man is depicted as water flowing through wool from a fuller to an emptier cup. Dupréel's mistake, instead, consists in extending Gorgias' negation of the possibility of knowledge to our text, where just the teachability of wisdom is in question. The only similarity I can see between Gorgias' and our author's arguments is that they are expressed through conditional sentences.<sup>471</sup>

Finally, the possibility that the teachers of wisdom and excellence turn out not to be expert themselves seems to be reminiscent of Pl. *Men.* 96a-b, where Socrates says that excellence is the only subject in which its alleged masters are actually inexpert.

### § 6.3

ἄλλα... ἀποδεδεγμένοι ἦν] That the absence of proven teachers represents a proof of the unteachability of wisdom and excellence is an idea which, too, appears in Plato's

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<sup>469</sup> Dupréel (1948), 94.

<sup>470</sup> Robinson (1979), 212.

<sup>471</sup> Provided we assume the beginnings of Gorgias' argumentations *κἂν ἤ τι, τοῦτο ἀγνωστόν τε καὶ ἀνεπινόητόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπῳ* and *εἰ καταλαμβανόιτο δέ, ἀνέξοιστον ἑτέρῳ* as representative of the entire arguments at DK82 B3,77-82, 83-87.

*Protagoras* and *Meno*. At *Prt.* 319b-d, Socrates reflects on the fact that when Athenians need advice on arts (τέχναι)<sup>472</sup> like architecture or shipbuilding, they turn to their architects and shipbuilders,<sup>473</sup> whereas when they have to decide about the administration of the city, everyone, no matter what his job is, feels that he is able to contribute with his own opinion. His conclusion is that Athenians do not consider this matter a teachable one. As for *Men.* 89d-e, the likeness to our paragraph is even stronger. Firstly, Meno agrees with Socrates that if something is teachable, then there must exist teachers (διδάσκαλοι) and learners of it. Then, in a sort of *modus tollendo tollens*, they infer that if there are no teachers of a certain subject, then that subject is not teachable. And this is the case of political excellence, whose teachers Socrates says he is not able to find.<sup>474</sup>

ὥς τᾷς μωσικᾷς] We have already seen that τέχνη is the term used for teachable disciplines for which there are proven teachers. The same noun is implicit after μουσική, a discipline with which now the author contrasts wisdom and excellence. Since music is here mentioned for its being a technique, the argument works only if the other term of the contrast, σοφία καὶ ἀρετή, was not seen as being technically taught as well. This is a textual grounding to prefer a translation of σοφία as ‘wisdom’ instead of ‘expertise’ or ‘skill’, as discussed above.

#### § 6.4

τρίτα...φίλως] From the usage of a present supposition implying that the condition is not fulfilled, the author seems again to suggest that reality declares one of the consequences of the teachability thesis — namely that wise men have taught wisdom

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<sup>472</sup> Pl. *Prt.* 319c.

<sup>473</sup> A similar exemplification is given also at Pl. *Men.* 90b-e and [Pl.] *Virt.* 376b-c.

<sup>474</sup> The same concept is repeated at Pl. *Men.* 96a-d and seems to emerge from the conclusion of Thucydides’ example at [Pl.] *Virt.* 378c, too.

and excellence to their acquaintances — impossible and, hence, that the thesis itself must be false.

Such an impossibility is exemplarily shown by Plato too, through some major figures in the history of Athenian democracy. At *Pl. Prt.* 319e-320b, Socrates attacks the teachability of the political art with the specific case of Pericles: ‘about the subject about which he himself is wise, neither he personally taught it [to his children], nor did he entrust it to someone else’s care’. In fact, he let his children search for the political excellence by themselves, like sacred animals at pasture.

Then, at *Pl. Men.* 93a-94e Socrates draws on this same theme in his discussion with Anytus, calling his attention to the fact that although many were and are the men who are good at politics (ἀγαθοὶ τὰ πολιτικά), none of them has ever been a good teacher of his own excellence (διδάσκαλοι ἀγαθοὶ [...] τῆς αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς). On this occasion, Socrates quotes some examples too, starting with Themistocles who taught his child Cleophantus how to be a good rider and to perform numerous exercises on the horse, these activities being again described as ‘what pertained to good teachers’ (ὅσα διδασκάλων ἀγαθῶν εἶχετο). Unfortunately, he did not manage to make of him ‘a man excellent and wise in the matters in which his father was so’. The same could be said of Lysimachus and his son Aristides, of Pericles with Paralus and Xanthippus, and of Thucydides and his sons Melesias and Stephanus (cf. also [*Pl.*] *Virt.* 377a-378c, *Pl. La.* 179a-d, 180b, *Alc. I* 118c-119a).

## § 6.5

**τετάρτα...ὠφέληθεν]** Finally the sophists appear on the scene, confirming my initial supposition that it is within their doctrines and teaching that one must look for the wisdom and the excellence here debated. Moreover, for the first time the *reductio ad absurdum* makes room for a new mode of argumentation, consisting in the falsification by counterexample of what is taken as a common belief, namely that sophists are the masters of wisdom and excellence. From a logical point of view, we can appreciate how

the author attacks the implication  $(\forall x) (Sx \rightarrow Ix)$  (with men as domain of ' $x$ ', ' $Sx$ ' meaning ' $x$  goes to the sophists', and ' $Ix$ ' meaning ' $x$  improves'), by producing a case which contradicts this rule,  $(\exists x) (Sx \wedge \neg Ix)$ , which is a form equivalent to  $\neg (\forall x) (Sx \rightarrow Ix)$ . In conclusion, the fact that sometimes even sophists fail seems here to be used as a new proof for the non-existence of acknowledged teachers of wisdom and excellence. Its function to conclude that these cannot be taught at all has already been argued for.

Mistrust in the results of the sophistic teaching is reported, with much more emphasis, also at Pl. *Men.* 91c, where Anytus mounts a strong accusation against sophists, saying that 'these are a clear ruin and calamity for those who associate with them'.

## § 6.6

πέμπτα...γεγένηνται] Here again, we are before a real life case, meant to contrast the connection between frequenting the sophists and the acquisition of wisdom and excellence. This time, however, the target of the argument is slightly different: in fact, it excludes the necessity, for one who 'became important' (ἄξιοι λόγῳ γεγένηνται) of having gone to the sophists:  $(\exists x) (Ix \wedge \neg Sx)$  is equivalent to  $\neg (\forall x) (Ix \rightarrow Sx)$ . On a first level, the claim of this argument seems to be that sophists' formal teaching of wisdom and excellence is not a necessary condition for one to learn those. However, given the reference — implicit in § 6.5, explicit in § 6.7 — to sophists as the acknowledged teachers of these subjects, and recalling the wider scope of the teachability thesis, a further point is that the teaching of wisdom and excellence as such is not necessary for these to be learnt. For the first time, teachability and learnability are hence separated.

Once again, Plato too, in the *Laches*, shows the case of people who improved without the aid of any teacher in general. Firstly, at 185e Laches reminds Socrates that in some arts (τέχναι) there are persons who have even surpassed the masters, without taking lessons from them. In his reply, at 186c, Socrates agrees and quotes his own

experience as a self-taught man in the discipline of education, because of the unaffordable costs of taking lessons from the sophists, the only ones who promise to make someone good and excellent (καλός τε καὶ ἀγαθός). These attributes go together with the one used in our paragraph, ἄξιοι λόγῳ, according to the ideology of ἀρετή of that time. A more fitting example of how excellence could not be disjointed from social recognition is the one, already mentioned, of *Prt.* 316c. Finally, at Isoc. *Oratio Contra Sophistas* 14, some people are said, in very similar words, to have become impressive in speaking and dealing with public affairs even though they have never frequented a sophist. The same argument pattern occurs, in a medical context, at Hp. *de Arte* 5: ‘there are sick people who recover health without going to the physician’.

## § 6.7

ἐγὼ...ἀρετάν;] Here starts the second speech of the chapter which replies to the ‘teachability thesis’<sup>475</sup> which has been discussed so far with what it seems more proper to define as unteachability position, than ‘thesis’. For it consists only in a severe statement against the first thesis, followed by a cluster of counterarguments against its five proofs, and as Becker and Scholz remarked, only in the final sentence the author hinted at the existence of a second thesis (λόγος, § 6.13).<sup>476</sup>

Commenting on this paragraph, Robinson put forward the hypothesis that ‘the author would perhaps be willing to accept a “qualified” version of the thesis of 6.1-6’.<sup>477</sup> He argued this on the basis of the final sentence of the chapter and due to the fact that as the first thesis has been defended through arguments which presented it in an absolute sense, the author might now be rejecting only this unqualified reading of it. For the moment, I will respond only to the second point, leaving the first for my commentary on § 6.13. There is no doubt that the five arguments seen so far interpret

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<sup>475</sup> Robinson (1979), 213.

<sup>476</sup> Becker/Scholz (2004), 100.

<sup>477</sup> Robinson (1979), 213.



the unteachability thesis in an absolute sense. But at this stage of the text, it is just the thesis (τόνδε τὸν λόγον) that the author now calls ‘silly’, saying nothing about its proofs (ταὶ ἀποδείξεις), criticized later in § 6.13. Furthermore, Robinson added that ‘in similar fashion, he [*scil.* ‘the author’] never actively attacks the ‘qualified version’ of the identity-thesis in chapters 1-4 [...] and probably 5 also’.<sup>478</sup> But that is just a part of the story. In fact, whereas in chapter 6 and, *pace* Robinson, chapter 5 the terms of the first theses present predications with absolute value, in chapters 1-4 the first theses do have a qualified nature, according to their initial statement, which roughly states that the same object has two opposite properties under different conditions.<sup>479</sup> It follows that not attacking the qualified version of the first theses, and, rather, targeting the absolute one, represents a rhetorical means in the first four chapters, but an act of intellectual honesty in the following two.

γινώσκω...κιθαρίζεν] Analysing the author’s new rhetorical strategy, we see how he now wants to demolish the previous proofs, one by one, ‘by the production of counter-cases’.<sup>480</sup> The first, directed towards the argument in § 6.2, involves the professional categories of grammar teachers and kithara-players, who are shown not to lose their specific knowledge after having taught it, as claimed in the *reductio ad absurdum* of the first thesis. A strikingly similar reflection is put forward by Socrates at Pl. *Alc. I* 118c-d, where the teachers of letters, citharists and gymnasts, are cited as example of how someone who has wisdom in a certain field is also able to transmit it to other people (cf. also *Prt.* 312b, 325d-326c).

This reply also enables the same twofold interpretation as the rival argument did. From a general point of view, the two disciplines mentioned by the author prove that teaching does not have such paradoxical consequences. At the same time, the counter-

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<sup>478</sup> Ibid.

<sup>479</sup> See also *infra*, 279.

<sup>480</sup> Robinson (1979), 213.

argument replies to the implicit allusion to the particular teaching of wisdom and excellence made by the first speech, proposing two disciplines considered to be teachable. Once again, the notion of τέχνη as something teachable turns out to be central and just as in § 6.3 the argument relied on the idea, peculiar to the first speech, that wisdom and excellence are not arts, the current argument is grounded on the opposite assumption.

καὶ αὐτῶν <ἐκαστος>] This solution is one of two conjectures by Orelli.<sup>481</sup> καὶ αὐτός, Robinson's reading of the codices,<sup>482</sup> would, in fact, abruptly introduce a new unspecified male individual in the discourse.

πρὸς...ἀρετάν;] With regard to this second reply, addressed against § 6.3 and split between this and the following paragraph, Pl. *Euthd.* 278d, 283a and *Men.* 91a-e too present wisdom and excellence as the objects of teaching which make sophists famous and rich. So, even though Robinson was right when he considered this example 'hardly an answer to 6.3',<sup>483</sup> because it fails to justify 'the acceptability of certain sophists' claims',<sup>484</sup> we must remember that, according to many people, they were indeed the teachers of wisdom and excellence, and, so, the response has some rhetorical strength.<sup>485</sup> From this point of view, unlike in § 6.5, here ἀποδεδεγμένοι may have conveyed to the ancient Greek reader not just the idea of epistemic validity ('proven'), but also that of the sophists' reputation ('acknowledged').<sup>486</sup>

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<sup>481</sup> Von Orelli (1821), 652.

<sup>482</sup> Robinson (1979), 132.

<sup>483</sup> Ibid., 214.

<sup>484</sup> Ibid.

<sup>485</sup> Interestingly, Roochnik observed: 'what matters is that the author, in shoring up the positive side of the argument, simply points to what he takes to be an observable fact: there are teachers of virtue out there. A contemporary parallel might well be to members of the clergy. They exist. Some claim to teach virtue. Some perhaps, only a very few, are even "acknowledged" to do so' (Roochnik (1997), 7).

<sup>486</sup> Robinson's choice of 'acknowledged' in both cases also goes paradoxically against his stance that this argument does not reply to § 6.3 (Robinson (1979), 214).

σοφίαν] The choice of most codices' reading instead of Robinson's<sup>487</sup> σοφίην follows what I earlier said about σοφία of § 6.1.

## § 6.8

ἢ] It is not necessary to delete the introductory ἢ, as done by Wilamowitz<sup>488</sup> and agreed on, among the others, by Robinson.<sup>489</sup> Here this disjunctive conjunction just introduces a new case undergoing the same logic of the previous one about sophists, so the translation to 'or' is fitting, as firstly shown by North, who translated 'aut'.<sup>490</sup>

ἢ...ἦεν;] Again with the aim of contrasting the idea that there cannot be teachers of excellence, now the author gives the counter-example of philosophers such as those of Anaxagoras and Pythagoras' schools, which confirms the necessity of a translation of σοφία as 'wisdom' rather than 'knowledge' or 'expertise'.

Robinson thought that 'such references suggest that the author is using the term σοφιστής in an extremely broad sense',<sup>491</sup> comprehending both sophists and philosophers, whereas Kranz<sup>492</sup> and Untersteiner<sup>493</sup> took this new example just as that of other possible individuals concerned with the problem of wisdom and excellence. There is some truth in both positions, because, on the one hand, the author presents this case as a new one, including it in a separate question, distinct from that about the sophists, this term meaning the new class of professional teachers. On the other hand, he is likely to have exploited the earlier and broader sense of the word, according to which Anaxagoras and Pythagoras too were considered σοφισταί, as reported respectively at Isoc. *Antidosis* 235 and Hdt. 4.95.

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<sup>487</sup> Ibid., 132.

<sup>488</sup> Diels (1903), 586; Diels (1907), 646.

<sup>489</sup> Robinson (1979), 132.

<sup>490</sup> North (1671), 71.

<sup>491</sup> Robinson (1979), 214.

<sup>492</sup> Kranz (1937), 228.

<sup>493</sup> Untersteiner (1954), 180.

τὸ...ποιεῖν] This short paragraph ends with the story of Polyclitus, reminiscent of *Prt.* 328c, as we saw earlier on. In reply to the argument in § 6.4, that considers it impossible for wise people to teach their acquaintances, the author parallels wisdom to sculpture, and, once again, such a comparison is possible only on the basis of the technical nature which he assumes the two subjects have.

It also confirms that in our text ἀρετή does not have a moral value, as I initially underlined. In fact, once Roochnik, who thought so, came to this point, he found the counter-argument ‘puzzling’,<sup>494</sup> ‘a non sequitur’,<sup>495</sup> and he thought that if ‘the negative [*scil.* ‘the first’] thesis depends upon the disanalogy between *techne* and virtue [...] then Polyclitus teaching his son an art is irrelevant’.<sup>496</sup> But in saying this, he fell into two misunderstandings. The slighter was to assume that the author is compelled to accept the opposition between τέχνη and ἀρετή, characteristic of § 6.3, in the second position too, despite the fact that in § 6.7 he has already proved to radically change his mind about from it. The more important one was the belief in a disconnect not only between art and excellence, but implicitly also between wisdom and excellence, whereas the two concepts have been presented as interconnected since § 6.1. Only by taking Polyclitus’ wisdom in his field as the object of his teaching to his son the passage appears not only a coherent reply, but also a fitting one to the first thesis’ proof. In fact, Polyclitus is known to be not only a sculptor, but a good one, and, so, in teaching his wisdom he cannot but also teach his excellence.

## § 6.9

καὶ...διδάξαι] By Polyclitus’ example, the author has replied to the proof of § 6.4 and now he seems to use the same case to get to a different and more general conclusion: that not only is it possible to teach wisdom and excellence to people familiar to us, but

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<sup>494</sup> Roochnik (1997), 8.

<sup>495</sup> Ibid.

<sup>496</sup> Ibid.

that it is possible to teach in general. This is what in § 6.2 the first thesis excluded and, so, for the first and only time, the second position exploits the consequences of an example addressed to a certain proof, to attack another one too.

δ' εἷς τις ἐδίδαξε] This is Wilamowitz's conjecture in place of δ' ἔστι διδάξαι in the codices<sup>497</sup> and it leads to a particular present supposition implying nothing as to the fulfilment of the condition. If the reading of the codices were correct, in fact, there would be the tautology "if it is possible to teach, there is a proof that teaching is possible". Robinson followed it and tried to solve the difficulty by assuming that an αὐτῷ was left out<sup>498</sup> and, so, translating the conditional sentence as 'if he is able to teach it, there is your proof that it is possible to do so'.<sup>499</sup> But here the author recalls Polyclitus' case not just as that in which the possibility of teaching is shown (ἔστι διδάξαι), but as the one of a single man (εἷς τις) who actually taught (ἐδίδαξε). It is with this individual empirical evidence that the observation of the first sentence about a generic man (τις) who does not teach (μὴ διδάξη) can be best paired and contrasted, in order to conclude that it is possible to teach. Dupréel was, thus, right in saying that this exploitation of the case of a single individual to draw a broader conclusion on 'la possibilité'<sup>500</sup> of communicating wisdom testifies 'une belle concision de logicien'<sup>501</sup> on the author's part: a single negative case (the fact that a single man does not teach) is not sufficient either to affirm a thesis (*i.e.* to say that teaching is possible) or to discard it (to say that teaching is not possible).

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<sup>497</sup> Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1889), 8, n. 1.

<sup>498</sup> Robinson (1979), 214.

<sup>499</sup> Ibid., 133.

<sup>500</sup> Dupréel (1948), 212.

<sup>501</sup> Ibid.

## § 6.10

**τέταρτον...μαθόντες]** The first sentence reintroduces the proof of § 6.5, emphasising it a little, if we consider that it talks about ‘the people’ (τοί) and not just about ‘some’ (τινες), and that the sophists mentioned are now described also as wise (σοφοί). The second sentence, then, presents the real counter-argument, it too relying on the technical nature of wisdom. It, in fact, uses the case of letters to show how a possible failure in learning a discipline is not sufficient to prove its unteachability; the learner’s skill may not be up to the contents taught.

**τοί...παρὰ σοφῶν σοφιστῶν]** I followed Weber’s preference for the transmitted reading τοί and not the broadly accepted τοι, first adopted in Stephanus’ edition.<sup>502</sup> The main reason for this is that in some dialects, including the Doric, the enclitic form stands just for the dative singular of the personal pronoun σύ<sup>503</sup> and not for the indefinite pronoun τινες, as it was taken in their translations by North, Untersteiner and Sprague.<sup>504</sup> Robinson too chose τοι,<sup>505</sup> but, unlike the former translators, he read it as ‘those in question’, leaving the following παρὰ σοφῶν σοφιστῶν without any other suitable element to depend on and working out a sophisticated construction to solve the problem.<sup>506</sup> Moreover, this value of demonstrative pronoun ironically coincides with one of the three possible for the codices reading τοί.<sup>507</sup> The other two are that of a relative pronoun,<sup>508</sup> and that of a determinative article,<sup>509</sup> which is the one I have preferred, since

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<sup>502</sup> Stephanus (1570), 480, Weber (1897), 48.

<sup>503</sup> Buck (1973), 98.

<sup>504</sup> North (1671), 71 Untersteiner (1954), 181, Sprague (1972), 290. For this point see also Robinson (1979), 215.

<sup>505</sup> Ibid., 132.

<sup>506</sup> ‘The fourth point <is valid only> if those in question do not become wise after associating with skilled sophists’ (ibid., 133). τοι is endorsed also by Classen, but without any justification (Classen (2004), 111).

<sup>507</sup> Buck (1973), 100.

<sup>508</sup> Ibid., 101.

<sup>509</sup> Ibid., 100.

it manages to incorporate *παρὰ σοφῶν σοφιστῶν* into the restrictive adjective clause ‘the people coming from wise sophists’.

### § 6.11

*ἔστι δέ τις καὶ φύσις.*] In contrast to Robinson,<sup>510</sup> who followed Diels,<sup>511</sup> I have kept the codices’ period after *φύσις*, which logically separates this proposition from its following explanation.

This sentence seems both to support the reply to § 6.5, already started in § 6.10, and to address § 6.6, since both proofs entailed the fundamental importance of natural skills in any activity; the former by showing how a lack of skills can prevent the learning, the latter how natural talent sometimes makes the formal instruction unnecessary.

*αἰ δέ*] Once again, I have stuck to the codices and kept *αἰ δέ*, instead of Diels’ *ἄ δὲ*,<sup>512</sup> adopted by Robinson.<sup>513</sup> Therefore, I have taken *δέ* according to its possible function of copulative particle in explanatory clause<sup>514</sup> and translated it with ‘in fact’, as Mullach did first.<sup>515</sup>

*αἰ... γενόμενος*] The passage is reminiscent of Pl. *Prt.* 327b-c, in which Protagoras outlines the contribution of talent in any field in general, to prove its contribution in excellence in particular, without denying the necessity of teaching as well, which perfectly agrees with the author’s view. It is also worth highlighting a closeness in the

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<sup>510</sup> Robinson (1979), 132.

<sup>511</sup> Diels (1903), 586.

<sup>512</sup> Diels (1903), 586.

<sup>513</sup> Robinson (1979), 132. On the outcomes of this choice see also *infra*, 206, n. 523.

<sup>514</sup> *LSJ*, s.v. *δέ*, II 2 a. See also Deniston (2002), 169-171.

<sup>515</sup> ‘*Enim*’ (Mullach (1875), 551).

use of the adjectives ἀφύης ('without natural talent'), used by Plato and opposite to our εὐφύης, and ἱκανός ('competent'), present in both texts.<sup>516</sup>

**ῥαδίως...μητρος]** The path to wisdom followed by talented persons consists in taking their cue from their parents' conduct, in the same way as they learn from them how to speak their mother tongue without being taught. So, again, the author is saying something reminiscent of Pl. *Prt.* 320a, where the wise Pericles is said to have let his sons 'graze alone like sacred animals, with the hope that they meet excellence by themselves'. Rightly, Solana Dueso drew attention to τὸ αὐτόματον, a phrase that Socrates uses in this sentence and also at Pl. *Prt.* 323c, *Men.* 92e, *Alc. I* 118c (cf. also Hp. *de Arte* 6), to describe the same learning without teaching that our author too imagines.<sup>517</sup> Dupréel, then, saw this autodidactic process as a direct learning of the things themselves without them passing through words, 'tandis que les professeurs enseignent inséparablement les choses et les mots'.<sup>518</sup>

Rightly Robinson underlines how 'the 'reply' embodied in 6.11 turns out to be more of an explanation of the point made at 6.6 than a denial of it'.<sup>519</sup> For here the author specifies what enables someone to learn wisdom and excellence without receiving sophistic education — which was the point of § 6.6 — namely his being one of few (τις) naturally endowed (εὐφύης) individuals.

**συνάραξα]** This is Schanz's correction of the codices' συναράξαι,<sup>520</sup> kept by Robinson.<sup>521</sup> Once again, this change from the infinitive aorist to the third singular

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<sup>516</sup> See also Kranz (1937), 228 and Solana Dueso (1996), 161. Solana Dueso recalled how in Hp. *de Arte* 11 the human nature is said to influence medical activity.

<sup>517</sup> Ibid., 161-162.

<sup>518</sup> Dupréel (1948), 212.

<sup>519</sup> Robinson (1979), 216-217.

<sup>520</sup> Schanz (1884), 384.

<sup>521</sup> Robinson (1979), 132.



person of the indicative aorist<sup>522</sup> turns out to be fundamental, since it provides the long string of words εὐφυής...μαθὼν with a verb with a definite mood and, so, the entire conditional sentence with an apodosis, otherwise absent.<sup>523</sup> In terms of content, this usage of the verb συναρπάζω ('to grasp'), which does not occur elsewhere in the chapter, in place of the usual μανθάνω ('to learn'), can be considered the author's way of expressing the kind of autonomous and spontaneous learning that we have seen to be suggested by Plato's phrase τὸ αὐτόματον.

## § 6.12

αὶ δέ... ἴσαμες] The paragraph is devoted to a new interesting thought experiment, this time about language learning. Gera observed how it showcases some typical traits of this kind of epistemological device. Firstly, the author addresses this experiment to a precise audience, that is 'a hypothetical doubter' (αὶ...γίνεσθαι), through a clause, γνῶτω ἐκ τῶνδε, that is reminiscent of the one used by Hyppocrates in his account of an experiment on freezing water at Hp. *Aër.* 8, γνοίης δ' ἅν ὧδε, due to its invitation to the reader 'to try things for himself'.<sup>524</sup> Then, as regards its first part (αἶ τις

<sup>522</sup> Devoid of the augment, as usual in Doric with the 'Augment der Praeterita von Verben, deren Stamm mit α anfängt' (Weber (1898), 73).

<sup>523</sup> Those who did not adopt this correction tended to commit grammar infractions, like North who translated συναρπάξει with 'arripuerat' (North (1671), 72), or Fabricius and Orelli, who had it governed by the former εὐφυής and, so, were compelled to turn the participle γενόμενος into the indicative perfect 'natus fuit' (Fabricius (1724), 631; Von Orelli (1821), 229). Finally, Mullach wrongly found in γενόμενος and the infinitive συναρπάξει the same construction as the Latin 'natus' + ad + either gerund or gerundive, and he translated 'natusque ad plurima prope sine litterarum studiis facile arripienda' (Mullach (1875), 551). In this solution, it also remains unclear whether the verb governing what follows εὐφυής is still ἐγένετο or, in a repetition of Fabricius and Orelli's grammar mistakes, γενόμενος, by taking 'natus' as 'natus fuit'. The only grammatically acceptable alternatives are those following Diels' option for ἄ instead of αὶ of the codices (Diels (1903), 586) and among which is Robinson's (see *supra*, 204). For they do not require a second verb with definite mood after ἐγένετο, and συναρπάξει can be taken as governed by ἰκανός. I have preferred keeping αὶ, as done only by Poirier who, though — keeping also συναρπάξει and its correlate syntactical problems — was compelled to unfaithfully translate: 'si quelqu'un, sans avoir étudié auprès des sophistes, finit par se montrer capable, c'est qu'il est naturellement doué, qu'il saisit facilement beaucoup de choses après avoir un peu appris de ceux qui nous apprennent à parler' (Poirier (1988), 1176).

<sup>524</sup> Gera (2000), 34.

εὐθύς...περσίζοι κα), our mental experiment exhibits the classical pattern of ‘an initial thesis’ (linguistic nativism), ‘a hypothetical situation’ (having a Greek baby raised in Persia), ‘a control for the experiment’ (his being deaf to Greek) and, finally, ‘the test’ of the initial hypothesis whose result contradicts it (his speaking Persian).<sup>525</sup> The second part (καὶ αἱ τις τὴν ὀθεν τῇδε κομίζοι, ἑλλανίζοι κα) is seen by Gera as ‘an additional control: a second experiment precisely parallel and complementary to the first’.<sup>526</sup> Furthermore, it gets support from the former and either of them ‘acts as a check for the other’, confirming a negative result for the initial nativist thesis.<sup>527</sup> Two other noteworthy features are its ‘randomness and repeatability’, provided by the choice of a generic τις as performer of it, and its syntactical construction, ‘a less vivid future condition, with εἰ and the optative in the protasis, and the optative and κα (the Doric ἄν) in the apodosis’.<sup>528</sup>

Gera believed that the author was influenced by other authors of that time: we have already cited Hyppocrates’ experiment, but one could also add Plato, at *R.* II 359b-362c in particular, where Glaucon proposes a personal thought experiment involving the famous Gyges’ ring, and Xenophon, at *Mem.* II.1.1-7 where Socrates presents ‘an armchair experiment’<sup>529</sup> concerning just education. The fundamental parallel with our passage must be drawn, however, from *Hdt.* 2.2. Here the Egyptian king Psammetichus is said to have segregated two infants in a hut for two years, just to hear what kind of language they would speak after this time of isolation; this turned out to be the Phrygian and that led the Egyptians to think that the Phrygians were the oldest people of all, under the supposition that language is innate. According to Gera, such a nativist attitude could not certainly meet our author’s approval, and his experiment ‘seems to be a reaction’<sup>530</sup> to it. Her final judgement on the value of the two narrations was that

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<sup>525</sup> *Ibid.*, 23.

<sup>526</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>527</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>528</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>529</sup> *Ibid.*, 31.

<sup>530</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.

‘our author’s thought experiment is the more satisfying of the two trials’,<sup>531</sup> even though it is purely mental, whereas the other is presented as something which actually occurred. In the first place, its results are more likely and, secondly, it looks ‘more elegant and more humane, precisely because it does not have to be executed in reality’.<sup>532</sup>

Dumont underlined that the author here sees wisdom as an ‘enseignement mutuel et que chacun l’apprend de chacun, comme il apprend sa langue maternelle’<sup>533</sup> and that is what Desbordes and Gera too thought. The former argued from this passage that the author denies both that language comes from the things around us and that it is ethnically determined at our birth. In a way that confirms what was said in the previous paragraph, then, the author would maintain that language is learnt ‘par imitation de l’entourage’<sup>534</sup> and, therefore, it consists in ‘une propriété diffuse de toute une communauté [...] indépendant des choses, mais indépendant aussi de la personne qui l’émet et qui n’en est qu’un support temporaire’.<sup>535</sup> For her part, Gera pointed out that it is precisely in the conclusion that ‘language [...] is imparted by the surrounding community as a whole’ that the author’s example has not simply a destructive purpose, but ‘leads to constructive results as well’.<sup>536</sup>

In my opinion, this last digression has the function of clarifying the nature of that particular kind of learning to which I referred as τὸ αὐτόματον or ‘grasping’, commenting on § 6.11. It does so by analysing how we learn language, a skill the teaching of which was said to pertain to those from whom we grasp wisdom and excellence too and, so, something which itself is usually learnt in this alternative way. Now those persons are seen in the peoples of Persia and Greece, conversation with whom enables the two children to grasp the knowledge of a foreign language without taking any formal lesson.

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<sup>531</sup> Ibid.

<sup>532</sup> Ibid., 26-27.

<sup>533</sup> Dupréel (1921), 38.

<sup>534</sup> Desbordes (1987), 36.

<sup>535</sup> Ibid.

<sup>536</sup> Gera (2000), 24.

καὶ (II)] Placed at the beginning of the sentence, this καί serves to introduce the second part of the experiment as a logical complement of the first and so, is not to be deleted as done, unintentionally according to Classen, by Diels and Kranz<sup>537</sup> whom Robinson then followed in this respect.<sup>538</sup>

καὶ τὼς διδασκάλως οὐκ ἴσμες] I take this final statement about our ignorance as to who our language teachers are as a logical consequence of the fact that they do not exist, according to a definition of διδάσκαλος as the professional in a certain art who gives lessons of it, that the author has assumed so far (cf. §§ 6.3, 7). This entails that he does not consider the persons from whom we sometimes grasp our knowledge (§ 6.11) as teachers either.<sup>539</sup> At Pl. *Prt.* 327e-328a, Protagoras says very similar things, namely that a master of the Greek language cannot be found, nor he who has taught the craftsmen's children to practice their fathers' arts at the same level. This last example supports also the mention of parents as typical individuals from whom we learn by grasping, in § 6.11.

### § 6.13

οὕτω...μέσον] It is not easy to identify the three parts of the author's speech to which he alludes here. Rohde took the reference to a τέλος as indicating a possible original end of the entire work at this point; a conclusion through a chapter dealing with the teachability of wisdom and excellence would have been a logical one for a sophistic teacher as the author was.<sup>540</sup> Another option could be, instead, that the λόγος is the whole chapter and, as Becker and Scholz said, 'demnach wäre unter ἀρχή die

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<sup>537</sup> Diels/Kranz (1952), 414. Actually, Classen had this change date back to Kranz (1937), but no trace of this is there, which may also explain why he does not provide the page number of this reference (Classen (2004), 113).

<sup>538</sup> Robinson (1979), 134.

<sup>539</sup> Similarly, Solana Dueso quoted this proposition to exemplify what he calls 'el modelo social' of education (Solana Dueso (1996), 163).

<sup>540</sup> Rohde (1884), 25, and *ibid.*, n. 3. In this way, also Maso/Franco (2000), 289.

Exposition einer These, μέσα [scl. our μέσον] die Darstellung der Argumente für diese These und τέλος die Konklusion, hier die Widerlegung der These, zu verstehen'.<sup>541</sup> From this perspective, within the didactical context of the work which Becker and Scholz maintained, chapter 6 is meant to offer a 'Modell für eine Argumentation'.<sup>542</sup>

I think, rather, that here the author wants to draw the reader's attention to the complete and regular shape of the second speech he has just been making. The ἀρχή can be seen in the counterarguments addressed to the first thesis (§§ 6.7-11), the μεσόν in the excursus on the origin of language (§ 6.12), and the τέλος in this paragraph itself (§ 6.13), which sums up what has just been said. A proof of this interpretation is given by the following and last sentence which starts with a καί that indicates a logical continuity with what precedes, and which presents a verb, λέγω, having the epexegetic function of explicating the content of the λόγος just mentioned. This is a declaration of the insufficiency of the proofs presented in the first speech (οὐκ ἀποχρῶντί μοι τῆναι τὰ ἀποδείξεις) which finally substantiates the initial criticism of that as 'silly' (§ 6.7).

μέσον] The last word of the sentence proposed by most codices, μέσῃν, needs to be revised, because it is not elsewhere attested as 'the intermediate part', as the editors who have kept it have translated it, and as it needs to mean for the sake of the reasoning. The same applies to μέσων, that Robinson selected from P3.<sup>543</sup> Mullach's μέσον,<sup>544</sup> backed also by Weber,<sup>545</sup> fits best in this sense, *pace* Classen's preference for the plural μέσα conjectured by Diels.<sup>546</sup>

καὶ οὐ...ἀποδείξεις] The two denials contained in this sentence have been widely analysed by scholars to clarify our author's ultimate position on the theme of the

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<sup>541</sup> Becker/Scholz (2004), 101.

<sup>542</sup> Ibid.

<sup>543</sup> Robinson (1979), 134.

<sup>544</sup> Mullach (1875), 551, 552.

<sup>545</sup> Weber (1897), 49.

<sup>546</sup> Diels (1903), 586.

chapter. For he steps back from the teachability position and remarks his dialectical victory over the arguments of the unteachability thesis at once.

Firstly, Kranz considered the passage as even ‘Sokrates würdig’,<sup>547</sup> thinking of the opinion on the teachability of excellence that Plato has him express in *Protagoras*. He did not quote a particular passage of the dialogue, but the most likely must be Pl. *Prt.* 320b, where Socrates says that from the examples until then considered he cannot infer the teachability of political excellence. I, again, recognise a similarity between our chapter and this dialogue, but I would not go so far as to talk of a ‘sokratische Haltung’,<sup>548</sup> as Kranz did, also in reference to a similarly aporetic end of chapter 1.<sup>549</sup> For a glance at the work is sufficient to realize the number of passages clearly anti-Socratic and, especially in chapters 1-4, relativistic.<sup>550</sup>

Alternatively, Robinson believes that οὐ λέγω ὡς διδασκτὸν ἐστίν is a *caveat* against the conclusion that the author completely refuses the unteachability thesis, as he, in fact, has contrasted only the absolute version of it which emerges from the five arguments of §§ 6.1-6.<sup>551</sup> This reinforces Robinson’s above idea that the author implicitly sides with a qualified version of the first thesis, just as he did in chapters 1-5. While I have already discussed the weaknesses of this parallel, now it is worth wondering what such a qualified version of the unteachability thesis could be like. The most likely hypothesis would be that of a statement which is softer than the original σοφία καὶ ἀρετὰ οὔτε διδασκτὸν εἶη οὔτε μαθητόν (§ 6.1), allowing the possibility of divergent cases. This is in fact the way in which the author conceived the identity-theses of the first four

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<sup>547</sup> Kranz (1937), 230.

<sup>548</sup> Ibid.

<sup>549</sup> Ibid.

<sup>550</sup> See also Levi (1940), 302, n. 51, Robinson (1979), 217.

<sup>551</sup> ‘The author, in rejecting the λόγος of 6.1-6, is in fact rejecting only the argument currently used to bolster it’. (Robinson (1979), 217). Similarly, Barnes considered this passage as the first clear statement of the ‘distinction between rejecting an argument for a conclusion and rejecting the conclusion itself’, an acquisition ‘crucial’ for the development of ‘the art of criticism’ (Barnes (1979), 51). Theodor Gomperz had already written something similar: ‘er unterscheidet [...] mit einer im Altertum nahezu unerhörten Strenge zwischen der objektiven Unwahrheit einer Behauptung und der Unzulänglichkeit der bisher zu ihren Gunsten vorgebrachten Argumente’ (Gomperz, T. (1912), 281).

chapters, which, as Robinson himself deems,<sup>552</sup> have a qualified nature. Such a version would therefore be something like ‘wisdom and excellence are not something teachable or learnable, except in some cases’. But that would not represent the unteachability view anymore, since, as in § 6.9 the author’s himself says, a single case of someone who managed to teach is sufficient proof to conclude that teaching is possible. Therefore, one must observe that the concept of possibility conveyed by the verbal adjectives διδακτόν and μαθητόν requires the unteachability thesis have the maximum of strength, since a single counter-case can falsify it and, conversely, prove the truth of the teachability-thesis.

In conclusion, firstly, Robinson’s distinction between qualified and absolute versions of the author’s theses has once more proved not to help, but to impede, the understanding of this chapter. Secondly, the best a reader can make of this ending seems to register the author’s withdrawal from both the sides of the question, in the same way as at the end of chapters 1-5 they could simply take note of the support which the author has given to both the opposite theses. In neither case the author’s own position can be concluded.

## Chapter 7

### § 7.1

τινες τῶν δαμαγορούντων] With reference to the key-case of the 5<sup>th</sup>-4<sup>th</sup>-century Athenian democracy, Hansen divided Athenian citizens into four groups, according to their political involvement, the most part of which was attested precisely by their habit of speaking at the assembly (δημηγορεῖν).<sup>553</sup> The first group was made of passive citizens not involved in the public life of the city. The second consisted in those who attended the assembly just to listen and vote, without addressing it. The third were ῥήτορες in legal sense, namely a good number of citizens who occasionally spoke, ‘but

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<sup>552</sup> Robinson (1979), 213.

<sup>553</sup> Hansen (1983).

they avoided any regular or “professional” involvement in politics; they were emphatic in stating that they were ἰδιῶται and they did not like to be grouped with those ῥήτορες who took the platform incessantly’.<sup>554</sup> Finally, the fourth group represented ῥήτορες in a political sense, namely few citizens ‘who regularly addressed the ἐκκλησία, proposed laws and decrees, and frequented the courts as prosecutors or συνήγοροι’.<sup>555</sup> δημηγορεῖν was common to both the third and the fourth group,<sup>556</sup> and since there is no clue as to what kind of rhetors the δαμαγορῶντες of our text are, whether politically or just legally characterised, it seems safer not to translate this expression with nouns (‘rhetors’ or ‘public speakers’), as done by Robinson and almost all the previous translators, because such solutions lean towards the idea of habitual and publicly acknowledged orators, thus excluding the third group. I have, rather, opted for rendering the substantivated present participle with the more inclusive formulation ‘those who address the assembly’.<sup>557</sup>

ὥς...γίνεσθαι] The city in which the author gave, or maybe just imagined giving, this speech did not appoint public officers by lot yet, if supporters of this practice were taking the floor to invoke its introduction. Unfortunately, one cannot conclude much from that. For this procedure, which was certainly a characteristic trait of classical Athens (see f.e. Hdt. 3.80.6, E. *Supp.* 403-410, Pl. *R.* VIII 557a, X. *Mem.* I.2.9, [X.] *Ath.* I.2-3, Arist. *Rh.* I 8.4, II 20.4, Isoc. *Areopagiticus* 22-23) and has been regarded as ‘the very essence of the democracy’,<sup>558</sup> is nonetheless attested also in oligarchies (such as those of the Four Hundred (Th. 8.70), of the Five Thousand (Arist. *Ath.* 30), of Heraea (Arist. *Pol.* V 1303a13-16.) and of Thebes (Plu. *De gen. Socr.* 597a) and in cities both within the

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<sup>554</sup> Ibid., 45.

<sup>555</sup> Ibid., 46.

<sup>556</sup> An example of the verb used with reference to the orators of the third group is at Lys. *For Mantitheus* 20; with reference to the fourth group ones see D. *On the false Embassy* 251-52.

<sup>557</sup> In this way, similarly to Solana Dueso’s ‘los que hablan en el ágora’ (Solana Dueso (1996), 195) and Bonazzi’s ‘quanti parlano nell’assemblea popolare’ (Bonazzi (2008), 449).

<sup>558</sup> Headlam-Morley (1891), 17, n. 1.



Athenian sphere (Sinope, Thasos, Styra, or Naxos in Sicily)<sup>559</sup> and within that of Sparta (Heraea in Arcadia, Syracuse, Kamarina in Sicily, Tarentum, Pontecagnano and Reggio in Magna Graecia).<sup>560</sup>

## § 7.2

εἰ] In agreement with Classen,<sup>561</sup> I have chosen this reading, given in most codices, in place of αἰ. The only exception to this reading is in P3, selected by Robinson.

εἰ...προστάσεις] Trieber recognized in this passage<sup>562</sup> a strong similarity to αἶ τις [αὐτὸν] ἔροιτο τὸν ταῦτα λέγοντα...τὸ ἄρα...τί δέ...τί δέ...<sup>563</sup> in §§ 1.12-13, which also supports the thesis of the text having a single author. The parallel is suggestive, because just as in chapter 1 the conditional clause formed with the protasis οὐδὲ κ' αὐτὸν ἔχεν ἀποκρίνασθαι<sup>564</sup> a conditional sentence expressing a less vividly imagined case in the future, here an elliptical apodosis<sup>565</sup> of the same kind seems to implicitly join εἰ γάρ τις αὐτὸν ἐρωτῶη in the same grammatical construction. The examples subsequently shown aim to highlight the indisputable absurdities to which the rival's thesis would lead, if ever put into practice, which too occurs in chapter 1.

“τί... τοῦτο;] From this point to the end of § 7.4 the author gives his reasons to condemn the use of lot through some examples invoking the superiority of expertise and ability to chance on which lot is founded. A similar praising of competence occurred in the previous chapter, and in particular in §§ 6.3, 7, 8, 10, where the experts were presented

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<sup>559</sup> See Kroll (1972), 270-277, Cordano (1988), Masson (1992), Alfieri Tonini (2001), 115-117, Cordano (2001) 84-86.

<sup>560</sup> See Cordano (1992), 39-40, Lazzarini (1995), Cordano (2001), 84, 86-89.

<sup>561</sup> Classen (2004), 114.

<sup>562</sup> Trieber (1892), 224.

<sup>563</sup> He read αἶ τις αὐτὸν ἔροιτο τὸν ταῦτα λέγοντα...τὸ ἄρα...τί δὲ...τί δὲ... (ibid.).

<sup>564</sup> Which is, in turn, dependent on the previous οἶμαι.

<sup>565</sup> Goodwin (1912), 179.

as the primary source from which knowledge could be obtained in a certain discipline. From a political point of view, then, we have testimonies of how such arguments belonged to aristocrats, or at least, to critics of democracy (Hdt. 3.81, Isoc. *Areopagiticus* 22) such as, in particular, Socrates (X. *Mem.* I.2.9, Arist. *Rh.* II 20.4.1393b4-9).<sup>566</sup> But this is not sufficient either to render the author a supporter of aristocratic ideology, thus overlooking the two last paragraphs pervaded by democratic spirit, or to think, with Rossetti, that these Socratic arguments are presented as ‘fragili’<sup>567</sup> and unworthy of being investigated, since their point will be advanced again in § 7.6.

Rightly, Robinson<sup>568</sup> introduced inverted commas at the beginning of this passage and at the end of § 7.3 to delimitate the portion of text where the questions asked through ἐρωτώη are expressed, as Diels had already done for the exchange in direct speech in §§ 1.12-14. These direct questions asked of the interlocutor shows him the awkward consequences of a choice by lot in other fields, through *reductio ad absurdum*. The first question is directly addressed to the interlocutor by the second singular person προστάσσεις and reveals how lot might end up swapping the tasks of who will cook a dish (ὀψοποιᾷ) and of who will drive the cart (ζευγηλατῇ).

**ὀψοποιᾷ]** Most codices have ὀψοποιᾷ and Robinson<sup>569</sup> corrected this with De Varis’<sup>570</sup> conjecture ὀψοποιῇ, third singular person of the active present subjunctive. I, with Classen,<sup>571</sup> have preferred the equivalent ὀψοποιᾶ, first seen in Stephanus, for its being closer to the codices’ reading. That a verb ending in –εω can follow the pattern of those ending in –αω is a phenomenon registered in Doric.<sup>572</sup>

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<sup>566</sup> As Ober observed, in not accepting ‘that ordinary citizens were capable of making important decisions’ Socrates criticised one ‘of the underlying assumptions of the democratic culture of Athens’ (Ober (2011), 142).

<sup>567</sup> Rossetti (1980), 42.

<sup>568</sup> Robinson (1979), 134, 136.

<sup>569</sup> Ibid., 134.

<sup>570</sup> Robinson (1972), 195.

<sup>571</sup> Classen (2004), 115.

<sup>572</sup> Buck (1973), 125-126.

**κατὰ τοῦτο]** All the codices have this reading, the meaning of which is perfectly fitting and does not require any correction, such as Robinson's κατὰ τωὐτό, firstly conjectured by Koen.<sup>573</sup>

### § 7.3

**καί...ἐπίσταται;"]** The Socratic spirit of the passage reminds us of Pl. *Cra.* 388c-e where carpenters, blacksmiths and other craftsmen are defined as being such for nothing else than their specific technical knowledge.

### § 7.4

**τωὐτόν...πραξοῦντι]** The same strategy seen in § 7.2 and consisting in a *reductio ad absurdum* of the exchange of some tasks is repeated here with the case of musicians (αὐλητάς and κιθαρωδός) and warriors (τοξότας, ὀπλίτας and ἵππεύς). Playing the kithara (κιθαρίζειν) appeared in § 6.7, while singing to the kithara (κιθαρωδία) in § 1.7. Here we have a mixed solution, with κιθαρίζειν applied to κιθαρωδός, and not to κιθαριστής (appeared in § 6.7 as well), and, more importantly, a swap between two musical performances and performers regarded in opposite way by ancient Greek culture. For, as Wilson wrote, in Athens the status of kithara, and stringed instruments in general, was 'much more elevated',<sup>574</sup> as confirmed by 'the foundational role that "learning one's strings from an early age" played in the formation of the élite citizen'.<sup>575</sup> Conversely, among auletes we observe 'an overwhelming predominance of foreigners, females, slaves'.<sup>576</sup> Likewise, in dramas auloi were played by the choir of Dionysus, whereas stringed instruments like lyre or chitara were associated with heroic characters.<sup>577</sup> As for musical contests, like those here mentioned, if we think of the

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<sup>573</sup> Koen in Schaefer (1811), 234, n. 26.

<sup>574</sup> Wilson (2002), 42.

<sup>575</sup> Ibid.

<sup>576</sup> Wilson (1999), 74.

<sup>577</sup> Wilson (2002), 42.

Panathenaic competitions between the 5<sup>th</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> century BCE, there ‘it was the citharodes who got the largest prizes’.<sup>578</sup> For the auletes, instead, ‘the prizes were fewer, and almost certainly lower in value and there was only one all-inclusive age-category’.<sup>579</sup> Considering such variation in esteem for each of these instruments and players, the swap of tasks here imagined appears even more drastic than what emerges from a merely musical assessment.

**αὐλητὰς κιθαρίζειει**] Whereas Robinson translated ‘a flute-player will [...] be playing the harp’,<sup>580</sup> here I have abided by the aforementioned rule of transliterating ancient Greek music terms.<sup>581</sup> Likewise, Mullach proposed *citharoedus*, *citharam pulsare*, *tibicen* and *tibia canere*;<sup>582</sup> as the Roman *tibia* ‘seems to represent essentially the same instrumental resource’ as αὐλός.<sup>583</sup>

**κιθαρίζειει**] The imperative κιθαριζέτω of the manuscripts does not match with the following indicative futures coordinated with it, so many scholars felt the need to emend it in the same way. Diels’ conjecture, κιθαρίζειει,<sup>584</sup> has the advantage of reproducing the author’s use of the sigmatic future for the two other active verbs in the third singular person in this paragraph, αὐλήσει and τοξεύσει. Wilamowitz’s Doric future κιθαριξειῖ,<sup>585</sup> by contrast, is analogous only to the passive third singular person ἵππασεῖται and to the active third plural person πραξοῦντι. The Attic future of Robinson’s κιθαριεῖται<sup>586</sup> has no parallel here and a usage of the middle diathesis of κιθαρίζω is also nowhere else attested.

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<sup>578</sup> West (1992), 368.

<sup>579</sup> Wilson (1999), 78.

<sup>580</sup> Robinson (1979), 137.

<sup>581</sup> See *supra*, 97, n. 206.

<sup>582</sup> Mullach (1875), 551.

<sup>583</sup> Wilson (2002), 42.

<sup>584</sup> Diels (1903), 586.

<sup>585</sup> Diels (1907), 647.

<sup>586</sup> Robinson (1979), 136.

πολέμῳ] Robinson wrongly printed πολεμῶ.<sup>587</sup>

## § 7.5

λέγοντι...νομίζω δαμοτικόν] With this paragraph the author presents his position on the non-democratic nature of lot. In doing that, he also seems to offer some clues regarding his personal political views. He starts by condemning the lot for being the least (ἥκιστα) democratic, in opposition to the above-mentioned speakers who considered it democratic at the highest level (κάρτα). A question immediately arises: why, if the author did not support democracy, did he not use his rivals' statement that lot is extremely democratic (δαμοτικὸν κάρτα) as proof of its negativity, rather than arguing for its non-democratic nature? In my opinion, the most convincing answer is that he was indeed a democrat, although of a particular kind, better described in the next paragraph.<sup>588</sup>

Rossetti considered this first statement as proof that the author was not Dorian, but just an Attic addressing a 'Doric-speaking audience'<sup>589</sup> in Doric. He thought, in fact, that there cannot be any other strong reason to justify the exposition of such democratic concerns in front of an audience of Dorians, people politically akin to Sparta and, so, used to perceiving democracy as a danger. But this overlooks the fact that the political situation in the Doric-speaking world was not the same everywhere, which democratic cities like Tarentum demonstrate.<sup>590</sup> On the contrary, I believe that assuming the

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<sup>587</sup> Ibid.

<sup>588</sup> From the reading of this chapter commentators have come to four different interpretations of the author's political views. Some did not find it difficult to deem him a democrat (see, f.e., Untersteiner (1954), 184; Dillon/Gergel (2003); 410, Graham (2010), 903); others, with whom I agree, preferred thinking of a moderate democrat (Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf (1889), 626; Mazzarino (1966); 294, Robinson (1979), 53); a group suggested he was actually an aristocrat (Rostagni (1922), 175-176; Solana Dueso (1996), 169-171; Bordes (1987), 150, n. 7); a last one chose not to take position on the matter (Nestle (1966), 446; Hoffmann (1997), 348-349; Becker/Scholz (2004), 101).

<sup>589</sup> Rossetti drew this phrase from Robinson, who first proposed an analogous interpretation. (Rossetti (1980), 46-47; Robinson (1979), 51).

<sup>590</sup> Tarentum was founded by Spartans and western Doric dialect was spoken there. It lived according to Sparta's aristocratic regime until 473 BCE, when it 'adopted a quasi-democratic political system' (Robinson (1979), 53). See Arist. *Pol.* V 1303a, VI 1320b9-16.

historical reality of this speech, only an equally democratic sentiment in the audience may have enabled the author to feel comfortable in publicly stressing the political centrality of the people which we see here and in the following paragraph.

ἐντί...δᾶμον] To prove that lot is not democratic at all, the author argues in a very peculiar way that has a parallel only in Isoc. *Areopagiticus* 23. In fact, he shows his concern that those who hate the people (μισόδαμοι ἄνθρωποι), called ‘the partisans of oligarchy’ (οἱ ὀλιγαρχίας ἐπιθυμοῦντες) by Isocrates, could be picked by lot and use their power against the people (τὸν δᾶμον). From this Solana Dueso concluded that the author shared the same aristocratic views as Isocrates, since any attack on lot could not be but an attack on democracy.<sup>591</sup> As a reply to this position, false in itself for relying on the fallacy that every criticism of democracy is necessarily anti-democratic,<sup>592</sup> two elements are to be shown: firstly, and once more, lot was not necessarily a democratic electoral instrument nor the only one that ancient democracies knew; secondly, the proximity to Isocrates’ political ideas confirms our author’s adhesion to democracy rather than to aristocracy. In fact, at *Panathenaicus* 131 Isocrates openly professes his preference for what he calls ‘the democracy under the rule of the best’ (δημοκρατία ἀριστοκρατία δὲ χρωμένη),<sup>593</sup> which he sees in the democracy in its original form, as opposed to that ruling at random (ἡ εἰκὴ πολιτευομένη) that he witnessed in his times. As Bordes stressed, the choice for the term ‘democracy’ is not casual, because soon afterwards, at 132, Isocrates himself points out the categorical distinction between oligarchy (ὀλιγαρχία), democracy (δημοκρατία), and monarchy (μοναρχία).<sup>594</sup> In the next paragraph we will see how our author thematises a similar idea.

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<sup>591</sup> Solana Dueso (1996), 169-171.

<sup>592</sup> Cf. Harris (2005), referred to the exemplary case of the Athenian democracy.

<sup>593</sup> In fact, here ἀριστοκρατία ‘is not a regime, but an attitude’ and ‘this would seem to say that aristocrats could consistently be democrats’ (Bloom (1955), 43). Similarly, Bordes took this democracy as that which ‘fait appel aux meilleurs’ (Bordes (1982), 256).

<sup>594</sup> ‘C’est bien une démocratie qui prône Isocrate, et non un quelconque régime intermédiaire entre l’oligarchie et la démocratie’ (Bordes (1982), 257). See also Isoc. *Areopagiticus* 57 and 70, where Isocrates

Some scholars<sup>595</sup> played down the author's worry observing that, if we make reference to the Athenian democracy as a paradigm, there, after the sortition, a scrutiny of the elected, called δοκιμασία, was held to make it sure that the person was compatible with the democratic system which he was about to enter. Such a method would have, therefore, prevented the recruitment of the enemies of the people, warding off all of the author's concerns. Rossetti, in particular, said that since he could not be unaware of the institute of δοκιμασία, his argument proves to be as 'pretestuoso' as those of Socrates,<sup>596</sup> but that he was, nonetheless, a democrat.

However, that δοκιμασία could really prevent the city from appointing anti-democratic people is not so obvious. In fact, according to the description given at Arist. *Ath.* 55.3-4, the interview was meant to inquire into aspects of the elected persons's life, such as who his relatives were, whether he used to observe the cults of the city, or whether he performed his civic duties, like the payment of taxes or the military service, leaving aside any question regarding his political views.<sup>597</sup> Surely, if in the past the man had committed offences against the people or even taken a public office under an oligarchic regime like, for example, that of Thirty, as hypothesised at Lys. *On the Scrutiny of Evandros* 10, the emergence of such facts was sufficient to have him excluded from the democratic offices. But at least from Aristotle's account on Athens, as Headlam-Morley observed, 'no one was excluded because of his opinions, only because he had committed certain actions',<sup>598</sup> and so our author's fears were not so ungrounded.

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highlights his distance from the oligarchical ideas. However, Bordes, relying on the general observation that 'le tirage au sort n'est jamais critiqué en Grèce par les véritables partisans de la démocratie', suspected that behind this professed idea both Isocrates and our author shared an actual aristocratic attitude. (Bordes (1987), 150, n. 7 and, similarly, Brock (1991), 169; *contra* Vlastos (1973), 186-188). Bearzot, instead, argued for Isocrates' adhesion to the kind of democratism that had distinguished Theramenes' moderates (Bearzot (1980), 116, 131).

<sup>595</sup> Rossetti (1980), 43-46, Bordes (1987), 150, n. 7, Solana Dueso (1996), 170.

<sup>596</sup> Rossetti (1980), 46.

<sup>597</sup> This is reminiscent of the description of the δοκιμασία of magistrates which is given at Din. *Against Aristogeiton* II.17, which Feyel summed up thus: 'dire comment on se comporte en privé; dire si l'on agit bien envers ses parents; dire si l'on a participé aux campagnes militaires menées au nom de la cité; dire si l'on a des tombeaux ancestraux; dire si l'on s'acquitte de ses impôts' (Feyel (2009), 205).

<sup>598</sup> Headlam-Morley (1891), 101.

Moreover, at *Ath.* 55.2 Aristotle tells us that all the magistrates, no matter whether elected by lot or election, undergo this exam, and this could probably be the reason why our author did not consider it in his treatment of sortition. He could easily have taken it for granted and, nonetheless, deemed lot a more effective way than election for oligarchs to obtain power, such a procedure excluding the popular choice. Finally, Feyel commented that differently from Athens, the rest of the Greeks tended not to practice the δοκιμασία of the magistrates, with the exception of some big cities like Rhodes, Ephesus and Susa.<sup>599</sup> The vast majority, in fact, was made up of cities of a small size for which δοκιμασία must have been felt superfluous, because ‘les citoyens devaient donc bien s’y connaître’.<sup>600</sup> Obviously, for this to work, election and not lot must have been the system of selection employed, otherwise the advantage of this familiarity would have been neutralized. But if this is true, the many testimonies of the political use of lot outside Athens seen before compel us to again take the author’s concern for the oligarchic dangers entailed by the sortition of the magistrates seriously.

ὧν αἱ κατὰ τύχην ὁ κύαμος] Regarding the author as a Pythagorean, Rostagni interpreted his condemnation of the bean through the lens of a 4<sup>th</sup>-century BCE tradition (Lucianus *Vit.Auct.* 6, Iamb. *VP* 260, and D.L. VIII.34) which explains the famous Pythagorean precept of the abstinence from eating beans as a refusal of democracy, that in the drawing of the bean was so well symbolised. From this Rostagni argued for the author’s aristocratic ideology.<sup>601</sup> However, that does not explain, again, why he did not attack the lot for this very reason, instead of for precisely the opposite one, namely that it is not democratic.

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<sup>599</sup> Feyel (2009), 351-374.

<sup>600</sup> *Ibid.*, 376.

<sup>601</sup> Rostagni (1922), 175-176. This reading did not convince Minar, who observed that ‘the real reason for the taboo on beans was doubtless shrouded in the mists of legend, and the mystical meanings attached to it in Pythagorean teaching were supposedly secret’ (Minar (1979), 64).



κύαμος, ἀπολοῦντι] Robinson was the only one to delete the comma carried by the manuscripts,<sup>602</sup> but this has the function of marking a correct pause between the protasis, αἶ...κύαμος, and the apodosis, ἀπολοῦντι τὸν δᾶμον, of a conditional sentence of the future.

## § 7.6

χρή...<καττωτό>] The author's solution, described as the people's choice by means of a personal observation (τὸν δᾶμον αὐτὸν ὁρῶντα αἰρεῖσθαι), consists in election by ballot which in the Athenian democracy was held to appoint officers requiring particular abilities, like the στρατεγός mentioned here. It is no surprise, then, that this reason is part of the improvement that the author thinks this electoral procedure could bring. For by ballot it is possible to choose persons suitable for the offices (τῶς ἐπιτηδείως) and favourable (τῶς εὖνως) to the people, solving in this way both the problem of incompetency and the risk of oligarchy for which lot was blamed before.

Such a solution is as akin to our modern idea of democratic elections as it is different from that effective in ancient Athens and, therefore, one could even deem the author an aristocrat, in the same way as has been done with Isocrates. However, the view that people can elect the best is something that an opponent of democracy would undoubtedly reject. From this point of view, we can also appreciate the distance between our author and Socrates. The latter attacks the advice of the many, on which the voting system is based, at Pl. *Alc. I* 110e, while at Pl. *R.* VI 493e-494a he says that in no way can the majority be philosophical. At Pl. *Cri.* 44c-d, then, Socrates interestingly equates their irrational conduct with that of chance, and this is proof of his belief that lot and election are two very similar practices. For him, what the many do in politics is just repeating the powerful people's opinion (Pl. *Prt.* 317a) and because of their large number, it is even impossible to discuss with them (Pl. *Grg.* 474a-b). Finally, they bring

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<sup>602</sup> Robinson (1979), 136.

into their assembly the banausic way of thinking to which their practical jobs have accustomed them (X. *Mem.* III.7.6). Also, at Pl. *Plt.* 292d-293a Plato has the Visitor say that the art of kingship does not belong to the many. Then, at *ivi*, 303a-b, the same character criticises the government of the many for its weakness, due to its distributing offices in small portions among a large number of people. By contrast, our author's trust in the people's political judgement is reminiscent of Protagoras', who at Pl. *Prt.* 322d-323c gives two demonstrations that all the people share political excellence, which is perfectly consistent with the historically close links between democracy and the sophistic movement.<sup>603</sup>

Furthermore, the Athenian model already had the most important offices elected through popular vote and, rather ironically, what in effect our author here suggests is just to extend this practice to the minor ones. This peculiar democratic attitude of his could also be due to the fact that he, as a Dorian, did not have Athenian politics as his benchmark and this would have a parallel in Aristotle's detached attitude at *Pol.* IV 1300a8-b12. There, in fact, during his theoretical classification of all the possible constitutional forms according to their electoral systems, he defines any constitution where all citizens can be appointed by all by vote as democratic.<sup>604</sup> On the other hand, one could point out how the election by ballot privileged those who could afford the cost of a good education by which to gain skills and fame, such as the one sophists provided.<sup>605</sup> But it is also reasonable to suppose that our author's angle on this matter was chiefly the utilitarian one of him who was able to sell precisely this kind of education.

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<sup>603</sup> See Guthrie (1971), 19-20, 179. Similarly thinks Athenagoras at Th. 6.39, who defines the many as those able to take the best decisions for the life of a democracy.

<sup>604</sup> Arist. *Pol.* IV 1300a32-33. Nor can Aristotle either be considered an aristocrat, given his views about the preferability of the advice of the many over that of the few, at III 1281a42-1282a.

<sup>605</sup> It is the same Protagoras who admits that those are the students who can receive a political education (Pl. *Prt.* 326c). Bearzot saw Isocrates' ἰσότης founded on merit as implying this same social disparity (Bearzot (1980), 126 et *passim*).

**στραταγὲν [...] νομοφυλακέν]** Leading the army was the task of the στρατηγός, the general well attested in Athens, differently from the guardian of the laws, known as νομοφύλαξ whose presence in the Athenian democracy became stable not earlier than the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BCE.<sup>606</sup> A reason for this could be that this was an aristocratic office, as hinted by the crucial role of the νομοφύλακες in Pl. *Lg.* 754d-755b and as seen in Arist. *Pol.* VII 1323a8. On the other hand, as Franco Sartori suggested, both offices had a particular importance in Tarentum,<sup>607</sup> where, to be more precise, the task of preserving the laws (νομοφυλακέν) was performed by the ῥητροφύλαξ,<sup>608</sup> and where the στρατεγός is thought to have appeared with the new democratic constitution.<sup>609</sup> The latter seems to be endowed with a particular power, being allowed to disregard the decision taken by the assembly (Plu. *Quaes. Gr.* XLII 301c). The current passage, therefore, makes of this ‘democrazia *sui generis*’<sup>610</sup> a good candidate for the place which the author had in mind when composing this speech, as Mazzarino suggested,<sup>611</sup> although no certainty can be reached about this point.

**καὶ τᾶλλα <καττωὺτό>]** All manuscripts present a short lacuna after καὶ τᾶλλα, except L, V1, Z. Robinson too had the chapter end here, but not in accordance with these codices, which he considered of small or no value;<sup>612</sup> we will see him placing a little insertion at the beginning of the following chapter. However, whereas no other instance of καὶ τᾶλλα ending a sentence appears in the work, there are many examples if it followed by adverbial locutions like the καττωὺτό here conjectured by Schanz.<sup>613</sup> I have

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<sup>606</sup> Untersteiner (1954), 185. Gaetano De Sanctis, in particular, thought that the office was established by Ephialtes, abolished either by Pericles or during the restored democracy of 403 BCE and, then, re-established either by Phocion or Demades (De Sanctis (1913), 3-4).

<sup>607</sup> Sartori (1953), 86-88.

<sup>608</sup> Ibid., 88.

<sup>609</sup> Ibid., 86.

<sup>610</sup> Sartori (1953), 87.

<sup>611</sup> Mazzarino (1966), 293.

<sup>612</sup> Robinson (1979), 22.

<sup>613</sup> The same closing phrase appears in §§ 3.16 and 5.2, but others similar are καὶ τᾶλλα κατὰ τωὺτόν (§ 2.24), καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως (§ 2.25), καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα (§ 5.2), καὶ τᾶλλα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον (§ 5.5), καὶ

therefore opted for this insertion, preferring it to Blass' ἐπιστατέν.<sup>614</sup> This verb seems, in fact, to bring to an unclear 'and that they [*scil.* 'the people'] attend/follow all the others offices', in accordance with the usual meaning of ἐπιστατεῖν with the accusative. If, instead, Blass intended 'and that they exercise all the other offices', then the genitive would have been expected.<sup>615</sup>

## Chapter 8

### § 8.1

τῷ...αὐτᾶς τέχνῃς] The way the author introduces this art could draw on a phraseology already in use to show the multiple benefits for those who embarked on the study of the art of speaking. For in Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen*, at DK82 B11.2, the skills 'both of speaking the needful rightly and of refuting the unrightfully spoken'<sup>616</sup> are said to be proper of the 'same man', through a possessive genitive (τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ ἀνδρός) recalling our τῷ δ' αὐτῷ ἀνδρός. At Pl. *Euthd.* 274e, then, Socrates asks the sophist brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus whether it is the function of the same art (τῆς αὐτῆς τέχνης ἔργον) to persuade both that excellence can be taught and that they are the ones from whom it can be best learnt. At *Phdr.* 261e, then, Plato speaks of 'one single art of all kinds of speaking' (περὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα μία τις τέχνη) through which a man makes things resemble one another and through which he exposes anyone who does the same. Finally, at *Sph.* 233d (cf. also 234b), the Visitor presents the self-proclaimed omniscience of the sophist as that of a person who promises to do anything by the means of a sole art (ποιεῖν καὶ δοῶν μία τέχνη συνάπαντα ἐπίστασθαι πράγματα).

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τᾶλλα καττοῦτο (§ 5.14, but I reported it as corrected by Mullach in καὶ τᾶλλα καττωτό) and καὶ τᾶλλα κατὰ τοῦτο (§ 7.2).

<sup>614</sup> Blass (1881), 740.

<sup>615</sup> LSJ, s.v. ἐπιστατέω: 'c. gen., to be in charge of, have the care of [...] rarely c. acc., attend, follow'.

<sup>616</sup> Sprague (1972), 50.

τῶ...ἀνδρὸς] We will soon know the six skills that this man can possess through the mastery of one particular art. In light of them and the following ones described in the remainder of the chapter, interpreters have come to different hypotheses as to this man's identity. Taylor thought of the Socratic 'διαλεκτικός',<sup>617</sup> who would also be 'the true philosopher' and therefore 'the true statesman and ῥήτωρ'.<sup>618</sup> Then, Solana Dueso observed how this man fits 'el ideal del sabio en aquel tiempo', versed in the knowledge both of nature and of discourse,<sup>619</sup> whereas Becker and Scholz preferred to speak, more generically, of a democratic citizen, without clarifying whether an aspiring sophistic teacher or a political speaker, or both.<sup>620</sup>

I support this last open option, because the chapter will precisely pinpoint the common source of all those abilities, rather than considering each one in itself. Surely, one can think of this man as focussing more on one than another, in accordance with his professional aims. So, for example, a political speaker may have been primarily interested in how to instruct the city as to the best policy to adopt, whereas a reflection on the nature of things may have suited better whoever took part in private conversations (cf. *Pl. Sph.* 232c). As for Taylor's appeal to the Socratic paradigm, it is true that our man is depicted as a διαλεκτικός, a φιλόσοφος and a ῥήτωρ at the same time. But if in a part of the chapter the Socratic assumption of the priority of knowledge seems to hold, things dramatically change with the Euthydemean arguments of §§ 8.3-5, 7.

τᾶς...αὐτᾶς τέχνας] This particular art is introduced in a rather indirect way, by listing the six main skills it provides, which, along with the following eight, correspond to those taught on the courses of those 5<sup>th</sup>-4<sup>th</sup>-century private teachers whom historians of ancient philosophy label 'sophists'. No sophist is said to have delivered all these teachings together, but many of these can be found in the outline of the philosophical

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<sup>617</sup> Taylor (1911), 127.

<sup>618</sup> Ibid.

<sup>619</sup> Solana Dueso (1996), 172-173.

<sup>620</sup> Becker/Scholz (2004), 104-105.

rhetoric sketched by Socrates throughout Plato's *Phaedrus*, and in Alcidamas' *Against the Sophists* too.

Also, since the abilities usually associated with sophists varied according to each one's inclinations,<sup>621</sup> those which are here presented can be regarded as forming the particular repertoire of skills the author offered to his customers, by teaching them 'only one art' (ἡ αὐτὴ τέχνη). If so, this chapter could represent a sort of menu of the skills the sophist author taught to his pupils: firstly, just six of them are brought in, then, by reviewing them one by one and in the reverse order, the author either clarifies their content or shows how they imply eight new ones. This way, the manifold potential of the art initially announced would be not only demonstrated, but also enhanced, since in the end the total number of the acquirable skills reaches fourteen.

**κατά...διαλέγεσθαι]** Brachilogia is a rhetorical feature we find attributed to sophists, philosophers and rhetors. As for the first category, a source is Plato's *Gorgias*, where Gorgias says he is perfectly happy with Socrates' request that he answer κατὰ βραχύ (449b), as one of the sources of his own pride is just to speak ἐν βραχυτέροις (449c=DK82 A20).<sup>622</sup> Then, the excessive brevity of Socrates' dialectics, and so of a philosophical method, is also censored by Hippias at Pl. *Prt.* 338a (=DK86 C1). Finally, the rhetor Alcidamas praises the speaker's capacity to shorten long parts of a speech, as well as to lengthen the short (Alcid. *Soph.* 23).<sup>623</sup>

However, here the verb used, διαλέγομαι, indicates a more precise form of speaking, namely conversation, which implies the interaction of two speakers. Therefore, at this stage, the sophistic and the philosophical statement seem more likely

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<sup>621</sup> See Schiappa (1991), 5-8).

<sup>622</sup> Similarly, see also Pl. *Phdr.* 267a-b and DK85 A12. Other sophists said to possess this skill are Protagoras (DK80 A7), Thrasymachus (DK85 A12), Critias (DK88 A1), without forgetting Euthydemus and Dionisodorus of Plato's *Euthydemus*, whose eristic consisted in a fast and close questioning of their interlocutor.

<sup>623</sup> Also, according to Pl. *Phdr.* 267b, it was common belief that Prodicus and Hippias could make speeches of the correct length, and at 272a Socrates' good rhetor is said to opportunely use short speaking.

to be referred to than the rhetorical one;<sup>624</sup> for rhetors' art does not concern discussion, but display and their eloquence entails an audience and not an interlocutor, which also typically leads to the opposite of brevity.<sup>625</sup>

**τάν...ἐπίστασθαι]** The author does not give any information to qualify this ἀλάθεια τῶν πραγμάτων ('truth of things'), and Robinson<sup>626</sup> and Scholz<sup>627</sup> generically attributed the phrase to the sophists' jargon. However, an inquiry into their texts and testimonies rejects that proposal, highlighting only one occurrence of it, in Antipho Soph. *On the Murder of Herodes* 3. Scholz is, instead, right in saying that a similar pursuit for 'grundsätzliche "Wahrheiten"'<sup>628</sup> was, in any case, a hot issue in the author's contemporaneous Greek culture, where an authentic 'Rationalitätskult'<sup>629</sup> took place. The phrase is, in fact, traceable also in rhetoric, with Isoc. *To Nicocles* 46 and *To Philip* 4, and, as one would expect, in philosophy, in Pl. *Sph.* 234c, where the concept is contrasted with the void images produced by the sophistic art of speaking (similarly, Pl. *Phdr.* 259e, 277b where τὸ ἀληθές is used).

**καὶ δικάσασθαι...ἤμεν]** The translation of δαμαγορεῖν with 'to address the assembly' repeats in § 7.1, stressing the political value of the verb, similarly to North and others,<sup>630</sup> but differently from translators like Robinson, inclined to more neutral solutions such

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<sup>624</sup> Not by chance, when the verb denotes rhetors' practice, it loses this meaning in favour of the more generic one of 'to say', as if it were a simple λέγω (Cf. Isoc. *Against Euthynus* 5 and *LSJ*, s.v. διαλέγομαι).

<sup>625</sup> Emblematic of that are Pl. *Phdr.* 235a, where Socrates points out Lysias' prolixity and Pl. *Prt.* 328e-329b, where Protagoras is compared with political rhetors for the same feature. Schiappa and Timmerman, instead, quoted the current passage among those attesting an early form of dialectics, before Plato's theorization of it (Schiappa/Timmerman (2010), 23-24).

<sup>626</sup> Robinson (1979), 236.

<sup>627</sup> Becker/Scholz (2004), 35.

<sup>628</sup> Ibid.

<sup>629</sup> Ibid.

<sup>630</sup> 'Concionari' (North (1671), 74; Meibom (1688), 729; Fabricius (1724), 633); 'advise the people (das Volk beraten)' (Teichmüller (1884), 222); 'arrangare il popolo' (Timpanaro Cardini (1954), 226); 'fare discorsi politici' (Untersteiner (1954), 187); 'hablar anta la asamblea' (Solana Dueso (1996), 197); 'to speak in public assemblies' (Graham (2010), 897).

as ‘to speak in public’.<sup>631</sup> Although both these translations are possible for the verb,<sup>632</sup> that its political vein must here be stressed seems suggested by the description of this ability given in § 8.6 (καὶ...κωλύειν) and by its conceptual kinship with the other infinitive δικάσασθαι. For the two, which are also syntactically joined through two καί and depend on the same οἶον, are usually employed to represent the essential factors of the citizen’s success in public life, namely pleading one’s case at the lawcourt and addressing people at the assembly. Although Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* is the first work to technically analyse this proximity (1354b, 1358b, 1377b, 1399b), it was the 5<sup>th</sup>-century sophists who first spread their joint teaching.<sup>633</sup> For example, according to Gorgias’ recipe for ruling others in a city, at Pl. *Grg.* 452d-e, a man needs to know how to ‘persuade by speeches judges in a law court, councillors in a council meeting, and assemblymen in an assembly or in any other political gathering that might take place’.<sup>634</sup>

**λόγων...ἐπίστασθαι]** Similarly to Robinson,<sup>635</sup> Schiappa translated λόγων τέχνην as ‘argument-skills’,<sup>636</sup> but he did not distinguish the phrase from λόγων τέχνη,<sup>637</sup> which he also took as a teaching of discourse broader than rhetoric and implying philosophy too, in a period, between the late 5<sup>th</sup> and early 4<sup>th</sup> century, when rhetoric was not yet an independent and recognised discipline.<sup>638</sup> But three controversies shall follow. First, as Pendrick convincingly showed, there is not enough evidence to support the idea of a

<sup>631</sup> Robinson (1979), 137. Others are ‘concionem’ (Von Orelli (1821), 231); ‘verba ad populum facere’ (Mullach (1875), 552); ‘parler en public’ (Dupréel (1948), 192; Dumont (1969), 245); ‘to make public speeches’ (Sprague (1972), 291); ‘s’adresser au peuple’ (Poirier (1988), 1177); ‘parlare in pubblico’ (Maso/Franco (2000), 201; Bonazzi (2008), 451); ‘to deliver public speeches’ (Waterfield (2000), 297); ‘making public speeches’ (Dillon/Gergel (2003), 332); ‘vor dem Volk zu sprechen’ (Becker/Scholz (2004), 87); ‘tenere discorsi pubblici’ (Reale (2008), 1861); ‘parler devant le peuple’ (Dorion (2009), 145).

<sup>632</sup> See *LSJ* s.v. δημηγορέω: ‘practise speaking in the assembly’, ‘make popular speeches’.

<sup>633</sup> Cf. Wilcox (1942), 135-136.

<sup>634</sup> Zeyl in Cooper (1997), 798. Similarly, see also Pl. *Grg.* 454b, 485d, 486a; *Phdr.* 261a-b (where the couple δίκαι-δημηγορία is considered), 261d-e (δικαστήρια and δημηγορία); DK87 A2 (λόγοι φονικοί and λόγοι δημηγορικοί); Alcidi. *Soph.* 9 (δημηγοροῦντες and δικάζομενοι).

<sup>635</sup> Robinson (1979), 137.

<sup>636</sup> Schiappa (1992), 4-5, or ‘the skills involved in argument’ (Schiappa (1990), 459-460).

<sup>637</sup> Schiappa (1992), 4-5.

<sup>638</sup> Ibid.



λόγων τέχνη earlier and broader than ῥητορική.<sup>639</sup> Secondly, since ‘argument-skills’ only ‘underscores the sophist’s dialectical ability in argument’,<sup>640</sup> Schiappa’s translation does not fit his own idea of an art embedded with philosophy. In third place, the use of the plural τέχναι as ‘skills’ is attested to just in poetry (*LSJ*, s.v. τέχνη, I 1). A safer possibility is, instead, to take λόγων τέχναι as meaning ‘techniques of speeches’, in order to convey the idea of a plurality of rhetorical rules not necessarily making up a unitarian theoretical entity, otherwise expressed through the singular τέχνη (‘art’), which is also reflected in Adams’ ‘tricks of speech’ for the same phrase in Aeschin. *Against Timarchus* 117.<sup>641</sup>

περὶ...διδάσκειν] The Presocratic interest in how everything in the world (as here said, τὰ πάντα), undergoes material mutations (ὥς ἐγένετο), but also, and primarily, exists and has a specific identity (ὥς ἔχει) was shared by the sophists too. We know, for example, that Gorgias wrote a book on nature (DK82 A10), and Antiphon’s reflections on nature and essence have been handed down to us (DK87 B15). At Pl. *Prt.* 337d (=DK86 C1), then, during his harangue to the quarelling Socrates and Protagoras, Hippias recalls the prestige of the sophists there gathered, for their knowing ἡ φύσις τῶν πραγμάτων, whereas at 340b (=DK84 A14) we have Socrates playing the part of a sophist and challenging Prodicus to answer whether being (τὸ εἶναι) and becoming (τὸ γενέσθαι) are the same things or different. But even more interesting is *Sph.* 232c where sophists are described as being used to successfully disputing about the origin and the nature of things in general (γενέσεώς τε καὶ οὐσίας περὶ κατὰ πάντων).<sup>642</sup> Therefore, Heidel’s interpretation, according to which here φύσις τῶν ἀπάντων is equivalent to τὰ

<sup>639</sup> Pendrick (1998), 20. On the contrary, other late-5<sup>th</sup> and early-4<sup>th</sup> century places where this ‘art of speeches’ already indicated ‘rhetoric’ are Pl. *Phdr.* 266c, 266d, 267d (referred to Prodicus), X. *Mem.* I.2.31 (referred to Critias).

<sup>640</sup> Robinson (1979), 227.

<sup>641</sup> Adams (1919). The phrase appears with the same sense also in Alcidi. *Soph.* 15.

<sup>642</sup> Less surprisingly, at Pl. *Phdr.* 270e, Socrates says that those who want to deliver speeches with art must highlight the essential nature (ἡ οὐσία τῆς φύσεως) of the thing they speak about.

φυόμενα insofar as meaning the outward constitution of all the existing things, runs the risk of obscuring the philosophical component of the phrase, in favour of a modern notion of physics.<sup>643</sup>

**διδάσκειν]** For the first time a skill does not consist in a kind of knowledge or ability but in teaching something which is supposed to be known. This could be seen as a reason to connect this ability with the second one, as the knowledge of the truth of things, and hence of their nature, is in fact the prerequisite for teaching it.

## § 8.2

**καί...πράσσειν]** The paragraph starts off by highlighting a further and seventh skill implied by the sixth one. Taking up Hippias' mention of ἡ φύσις τῶν πραγμάτων in *Pl. Prt.* 337d, both here and there the knowledge of the nature of all things can properly direct the conduct of a man (ὀρθῶς καὶ πράσσειν), preventing him from bad behaviours worthy of laymen (ὥσπερ οἱ φαυλότατοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων) who are not knowledgeable about it.<sup>644</sup> This way, φύσις τῶν ἀπάντων proves again to be something more than a mere naturalistic principle, but a guiding one for man's life. Dupréel's reading of the passage as hinting at 'l'application du savoir à la politique'<sup>645</sup> overly restricted the value of πράσσειν and anticipated, without any apparent reason, the political theme which appears in § 8.6.

Taken in itself, the seventh ability falls within the major sophistic task of making the client successful in his life, which meant to wisely deal with one's private and public business, as said in *Pl. Prt.* 318e-319a. Some sophists' knowledge is reported to have been so wide that their practical abilities went far beyond the ones needed for social

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<sup>643</sup> Heidel (1910), 111, n. 125.

<sup>644</sup> 'La physis dell'universo, oggetto della scienza della natura, deve insegnare i criteri direttivi della condotta umana' Levi (1942), 446.

<sup>645</sup> Dupréel (1948), 194.

success, like in the case of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus' ability in fighting, in Pl. *Euthd.* 271d-272a, 294b, or Hippias' self-production of clothes, in *Hp.Mi.* 368b-c.

τῶν ἀπάντων [...] περὶ πάντων] Robinson pointed out some 'basic and interesting ambiguities [...] in a number of key words',<sup>646</sup> which would give to this chapter 'a dialectical tension that it does not at first sight possess'.<sup>647</sup> A similar crafty use of words would coincide with the one made by the sophist brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus in Plato's *Euthydemus*, who, however, do not seem to have 'any honest propaedeutical purpose in mind'.<sup>648</sup> Our author — Robinson maintains, but apparently without justifying it — is 'both clever and serious', instead. As a result, the author must have aimed at exercising and improving 'the philosophical muscles' of his advanced hearers through his 'amazing phantasmagoria of *non-sequiturs*'.<sup>649</sup>

As a matter of fact, just one of the ambiguities Robinson pointed out may, but not necessarily, occur (ὁρθῶς in § 8.6), and only as a result of his textual assumptions. Furthermore, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus use these ambiguities to argue for any possible side of a matter so as to trap and dominate their interlocutor (cf. Pl. *Euthd.* 275e-276d). Our author would have no reason to prove a further and opposite position to that he openly declares, instead, and particularly in this chapter where no mention of alternative views on the matters at issue is made. At the same time, although Robinson does not see it, an Euthydemean style can indeed be recognised in the eristic means by which the author pushes his demonstrations in §§ 8.3-5, 7.

In any case, the first example of the weakness of Robinson's interpretation is given in these two occurrences of ἅπας and πᾶς, in which he detected 'the fallacy of Division', namely the one according to which 'collective and distributive propositions are not such

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<sup>646</sup> Robinson (1977), 134-135.

<sup>647</sup> Ibid., 135.

<sup>648</sup> Ibid.

<sup>649</sup> Ibid.

that the former necessarily entail the latter'.<sup>650</sup> Actually, as a quick translational test can easily show, the rationale of the argument, namely the passage from knowledge to action, is not affected at all by the sense in which ἅπαντα and πάντα can be assumed, whether they are both taken distributively, or both collectively, or one distributively and the other collectively.

**δυνασέται]** The use of the indicative future has the function of stating things for sure and, so, of guaranteeing, here and in the following paragraphs, that by possessing a certain ability (here 'the knowledge of the nature of all things') a man cannot help having another ability too (here 'to act correctly in relation to all of them'), in an assertive tone which could hint at a promotional intent of this chapter.

### § 8.3

**ἔτι...λέγειν]** A thesis is here formulated, that the possession of the techniques of speeches is sufficient to get the new eighth ability of speaking correctly about everything. The path to get to this conclusion will be rather long, covering the two next paragraphs, and intricate, especially considering the banality of the stakes: the notion of techniques of speeches itself implies the idea of speaking correctly in the largest possible number of situations.

**περί...λέγειν]** An ability which represented reason to boast for sophists and rhetors, according to a few testimonies. At Pl. *Grg.* 457a, Gorgias recalls speaking about any matter (πρὸς ἅπαντας [...] καὶ περὶ παντὸς λέγειν) while describing what a rhetor does, and the same skill is attested for the historical Gorgias' at DK80 A26, A1a, and A26. Alcidamas highly regards it, in combination with improvisation, at *Soph.* 3 and 31,

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<sup>650</sup> Ibid., 129.

whereas, as far as ὀρθῶς is concerned, Protagoras is recalled for his ‘correctness of diction’ (ὀρθοέπεια) at DK80 A26.<sup>651</sup>

**ὀρθῶς]** Robinson claimed that the word can be translated both as ‘nonfallaciously’ and ‘soundly’, and the author covertly aims to prove ‘that on every topic a man knowing the τέχνας τῶν λόγων will produce arguments that are both valid and sound (i.e. truth-delivering)’, although he can actually reach just the former goal.<sup>652</sup> But soon after, the first sentence of § 8.4 solves the doubt, by depicting ὀρθῶς λέγειν as conditional (δεῖ) on speaking about the known things (περὶ ὧν ἐπίσταται περὶ τούτων λέγειν), which enables not just a nonfallacious speaking, but a sound one. The fact that this concept cannot actually derive from the mere knowledge of the techniques of speeches and the fact that the entire argument §§ 8.3-5 is just a plain sophism, then, are different matters.

#### § 8.4

**δεῖ...ἐπίστασεται]** The first step of the demonstration consists in the two propositions presented here. Firstly, it is said that any correct speech implies the knowledge of its subject, and then, that the man we refer to has a universal knowledge. From these two claims it implicitly follows that he will just have to speak about the things he knows, in order to speak correctly about everything. However, whereas the first claim is supported by a prescriptive δεῖ which has the strength of the common sense,<sup>653</sup> the second one is not, and needs a justification which will be given in § 8.5.

**περὶ πάντων...ἐπίστασεται]** Appearing during the demonstration of the eighth skill, this ninth one plays a secondary role compared to it. Nonetheless, its sophistic value is important, if we think that the fame of many sophists was due precisely to the vastness

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<sup>651</sup> On sophists as experts of the correctness (ὀρθότης) of names see also Pl. *Cra.* 391a-b.

<sup>652</sup> Robinson (1977), 130.

<sup>653</sup> But also of Socrates’ consensus, in Pl. *Phdr.* 259e and 277b (see also *infra*, 273-276).

of their knowledge, described sometimes as wide, like in the cases of Protagoras (DK80 A4), Prodicus (DK84 A1a.2) or Hippias (DK86 A11, 12, 14), and other times as total, as said of Gorgias (DK82 A1a) and of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus in Pl. *Euthd.* 271c.

δέ] It is clear that the man's total knowledge cannot explain what precedes in any way, and that γάρ of the manuscripts must therefore be revised, but not deleted, as Diels did,<sup>654</sup> since a connective between the two parts is nonetheless needed. Robinson's proposal, γ' ἄρ',<sup>655</sup> has the merit of remaining very close to the original reading, but its meaning is too vague<sup>656</sup> to express the abrupt introduction of such a new decisive element for the sake of the argument as περι...ἐπιστασείται. Rohde's<sup>657</sup> δέ, instead, satisfies precisely this exigency.<sup>658</sup> Furthermore, the sense of doubt that Robinson conveyed by providing his γ' ἄρ' with the meaning of 'one must at any rate suppose'<sup>659</sup> is something odd both regarding the locution itself,<sup>660</sup> and the point of the current argument, in which the force of one of its fundamental premises<sup>661</sup> would be dangerously reduced, were this proposition presented just as a supposition.

## § 8.5

πάντων...ἐντί] The argument here formulated is as short as it is flawed. It consists of a first premise (πάντων...ἐπίσταται), about a man's knowledge of 'the techniques of all speeches' (πάντων τῶν λόγων αἱ τέχναι), a formulation slyly rephrased compared to

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<sup>654</sup> Diels (1903), 586.

<sup>655</sup> Robinson (1979), 138.

<sup>656</sup> It belongs to a series of combinations of ἄρα with other particles, which Denniston describes as mostly void of 'any very particular significance' (Denniston (2002), 43), as it is also shown by the various ways in which they are usually translated.

<sup>657</sup> Rohde (1884), 26, n. 4.

<sup>658</sup> As a connective, δέ can also be used to denote 'all that lies between' a connection and a contrast (see Denniston (2002), 162).

<sup>659</sup> Robinson (1979), 139. But the first scholar to propose a similar translation was North with 'suppono' (North (1671), 74).

<sup>660</sup> Of its components, γε is an emphatic particle and ἄρα an inferential one (see *LSJ* s.vv. γε and ἄρα).

<sup>661</sup> Proposition (II) in the scheme below (*infra*, 236).

the former 'techniques of speeches' (λόγων τέχναι, in § 8.1) in order to facilitate the combination with the second premise (τοιῶντι) that 'all speeches' are about all the things that there are (περὶ πάντων τῶν ὄντων). Finally, a principle is implicitly assumed, that he who possesses the techniques of speeches also knows the things these speeches are about. This last principle is clearly fallacious, leading from the knowledge of words to that of things without any apparent concern for how the two are connected, but is also essential for the author to implicitly conclude that he 'who knows the techniques of all speeches knows every thing that there is', which is equivalent to the thesis to be proven, namely 'he will know all things' (§ 8.4).

To sum up, being just a plain sophism, the argument of this paragraph fails to prove its conclusion, namely the ninth ability, and this, on its turn, prevents the demonstration of the eighth one too. For by reconstructing the entire reasoning of §§ 8.3-5 in a logically more perspicuous way, we will have the following:

1<sup>st</sup> assumption (1): 'He who desires to speak correctly must speak of the things he knows' (§ 8.4);

2<sup>nd</sup> assumption (2): The knowledge of the techniques of speeches implies the knowledge of the things these speeches are about (implicit);

3<sup>rd</sup> assumption (3): 'Techniques of speeches' means 'techniques of all speeches' (implicit);

4<sup>th</sup> assumption (4): 'All speeches are about all the existing things that there are' (§ 8.5);

1<sup>st</sup> inference (I): The speeches taken into account in the techniques of speeches are about all the existing things (for (3) and (4));

2<sup>nd</sup> inference (II): 'But he [*scil.* 'who knows the techniques of speeches'] will know all things' (§ 8.4; for (2) and (I));

Conclusion: 'He who has knowledge of the techniques of speeches will also know how to speak in the correct way about everything' (§ 8.3; for (1) and (II)).

One might wonder how the author's reliability in the eyes of his readers cannot be damaged by such a poorly grounded reasoning, especially if the chapter was meant to have a promotional goal, as I suppose. But on closer examination, he does not actually run this risk. First of all, this complex construction stems from the knowledge of the techniques of speeches, an ability which naturally encompasses the production of seemingly persuasive sophisms. Therefore, this whole construction must have sounded to the ears of the most careful readers as a meta-rhetorical device to show the potential of that very skill in action. Furthermore, as initially observed, since the simplicity of the thesis does not require the length of the argument used to prove it, behind the choice of such an impervious path there could have been also the precise intent of lengthening what is concise, in the spirit of Alcid. *Soph.* 23. The parallel is particularly fitting, as in that passage Alcidamas pairs this ability with the opposite one of shortening what is long, which resembles the first of the skills recalled by our author. If this is true, then this long excursus may improve the sophist's reputation. Finally, an analogous case can be stated for the use of verbal trickery, whose sophistic origin is not only well attested, especially in Plato's *Euthydemus* and Aristotle's *Sophistic Refutations*, but also underlies the appearance of the word 'sophism' to label it.

Albeit perfectly satisfactory from a sophistic point of view, the argument of §§ 8.3-5 completely fails from a philosophical one. The ninth epistemological ability of the knowledge of everything thus remains without a valid justification, similarly to what happens to Euthydemus and Dionysodorus' eristical defense of their alleged omniscience, at Pl. *Euthd.* 293c-295b.

**τοὶ...ἐντί]** The addition of τὰ ἐόντα<sup>662</sup> to what so far was more simply called τὰ πάντα endows this sentence<sup>663</sup> with an Euthydemean tone. In fact, that all speeches are about

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<sup>662</sup> Actually, it is due to Orelli's universally accepted insertion ἐόντων ἐντί>, to fill a short lacuna in the manuscripts (Von Orelli (1821), 653).

<sup>663</sup> Proposition (4) in the scheme above (*supra*, 236).



all the things *that there are* is what Euthydemus too claims at Pl. *Euthd.* 284a,<sup>664</sup> at the beginning of a sophism concluding that nobody speaks of things that there are not<sup>665</sup> and, hence, nobody lies (284c);<sup>666</sup> both here and there the neuter articulated present participle of εἰμί is also used.

Robinson thought that this sentence could be interpreted either ‘in terms of argument-*form*’, therefore claiming that ‘there is nothing [...] that falls outside of the purview of all argument-forms’, or ‘in terms of argument-*content*’, meaning that ‘the sum total of argument-content (actual and possible?) covers the sum total of what is (actually and potentially?) real/the case’.<sup>667</sup> Similarly to what happened in § 8.2, he also characterized the former paraphrase as exploiting the distributive sense of πάντες, whereas the latter, the collective one. However, this distinction is not meaningful, as one can legitimately move from the one to the other without their common fundamental idea varying in any way whatsoever. In fact, if everything can be communicated in an argument-form, in such a way that the number of the possible argument-forms is exhausted, then it is clear that the sum of the matters dealt with by all the possible arguments coincides with the sum of all the things; and the other way around. Moreover, Robinson expressed his preference for the reading based on the collective sense of πάντες, considering it necessary, ‘if the section is to succeed in its ostensible purpose of explaining the final claim of 8.4, in which πάντων appears to be used distributively’.<sup>668</sup> But, first, and again, it is obscure and pointless to tell which of the two uses πάντες has in § 8.4, and not by chance Robinson does not justify his views about the matter. Secondly, he omitted to explain why the collective πάντων of § 8.5 should be required by the distributive πάντες of § 8.4, whereas one would expect a demonstration to assume the words of its respective thesis in their original sense.

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<sup>664</sup> οὐκοῦν ὁ ἐκεῖνο λέγων τὸ ὄν, ἔφη, λέγει; ναί.

<sup>665</sup> οὐκ ἄρα τὰ γε μὴ ὄντ', ἔφη, λέγει οὐδείς.

<sup>666</sup> οὐδείς ψευδῇ λέγει.

<sup>667</sup> Robinson (1977), 131.

<sup>668</sup> Ibid.

## § 8.6

δεῖ δέ...λέγει] This proposition is followed by a lacuna between three and five lines long<sup>669</sup> which interrupts the train of thought. The translation here proposed differs from Robinson's, which took the clause περὶ ὅτων καὶ λέγει<sup>670</sup> to depend on λέγειν, and to consist in 'and the man who intends to speak correctly on whatever matter he speaks about must know'.<sup>671</sup> He also thought that ἐπίστασθαι is completed by 'an infinitive of some sort',<sup>672</sup> concealed in the lacuna, and coordinated with the following one, 'if the subsequent καὶ...διδάσκειν is to make sense'.<sup>673</sup> But this reconstruction is problematic in two respects. First, it is unlikely that ἐπίστασθαι can still be the verb to which διδάσκειν is referred, after such a long gap; and even so, neither politics nor any other specific ability among those possibly listed in the lacuna could match the idea of totality characterizing a man who aims at a correct speaking 'on *whatever* matter he speaks about'.<sup>674</sup> Also, in his reconstruction, this last clause (περὶ...λέγει) — and here comes the second difficulty — would be redundant, since the sole ὁρθῶς λέγειν would have conveyed the same concept, without incurring a repetition of the verb λέγω.<sup>675</sup>

By contrast, I have referred περὶ...λέγει to ἐπίστασθαι and read this first part of the paragraph as stating the same case of δεῖ...λέγειν, in § 8.4, namely the priority of knowledge to speaking, though in another fashion: from the necessity of speaking about the things one knows to that of knowing the things about which one speaks.<sup>676</sup> This

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<sup>669</sup> Weber (1897), 50. Robinson quantified it in '40-50 words' (Robinson (1979), 230).

<sup>670</sup> This λέγει is alternative to our λέγειν (see *infra*, 241).

<sup>671</sup> Robinson (1979), 139. For the problems of this translation see *infra*, 241, n. 683.

<sup>672</sup> Robinson (1979), 230.

<sup>673</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>674</sup> *Ibid.*, 139.

<sup>675</sup> Similar constructions are also in Becker/Scholz (2004), 87; Dorion (2009) 146; Graham (2010), 896.

<sup>676</sup> Similar constructions are also in North (1671), 74, Meibom (1688), 730; Fabricius (1724), 633-634, Von Orelli (1821), 231; Teichmüller (1884), 223; Dupréel (1948), 192; Timpanaro Cardini (1954), 226; Untersteiner (1954), 189; Dumont (1969), 245; Sprague (1972), 292, Poirier (1988), 1177 189; Solana Dueso (1996), 197; Maso/Franco (2000), 201 Dillon/Gergel (2003), 332; Bonazzi (2008), 451; Reale (2008), 1861. Waterfield's translation falls out of both this and Robinson's construction — 'and if someone is going to speak correctly he must, whatever his topic, know <...>' (Waterfield (2000), 298) — and he seems to pass over καὶ λέγειν of his reference Greek text (Diels/Kranz (1952), 415).

purely rhetorical change could hint at a continuation of the sophistic temper of the previous argument of §§ 8.3-5, and if so, one could suppose that the following lacuna conceals, in its first part,<sup>677</sup> reflections similar to περί...έντί of §§ 8.4-5, so that the entire justification of the thesis in § 8.3 would have been proposed again, but in a stylistically different way.

δεῖ] This verb sounded intentionally ambiguous to Robinson, who believes that whereas its ‘natural interpretation’ is ‘in term of duty’, the intended one leads to the translation ‘the μέλλων ὀρθῶς λέγειν *cannot help knowing*’.<sup>678</sup> However, although δεῖ may theoretically indicate both kinds of necessity, in this specific case, it is clear that the man’s mere intention of speaking correctly (ὁ μέλλων ὀρθῶς λέγειν) cannot be sufficient for him to possess another skill. Hence, only the former of Robinson’s readings proves to fit the text, and, once again, the author’s vocabulary does not seem ambiguous.

ὀρθῶς [...] ὀρθῶς] Here too,<sup>679</sup> Robinson believes that the author eristically plays on the double sense of this adverb, aiming at the highest stakes of contending that the skill of speaking in a nonfallacious way (first ὀρθῶς) is sufficient to be able to wisely (second ὀρθῶς) advise the city.<sup>680</sup> Although this is the most likely among the examples Robinson gave in support of his interpretation, it nonetheless depends on his reconstruction of the corrupted text of this passage. By contrast, following mine, this relation is not the case

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<sup>677</sup> As for its second part, see *infra*, 241-243. Apparently indifferent to the length of the lacuna, Diels filled it only with τὰ πράγματα (Diels (1903), 586), which is syntactically unnecessary to connect περί ὅτων either to ἐπίστασθαι or to λέγειν, and is due merely to Diel’s chosen construction (see above, nn. 680, 681). The choice has been kept in all the following editions (Diels (1907), 647; Diels (1912), 344; Diels (1922), 344; Diels/Kranz (1952), 415).

<sup>678</sup> Ibid.

<sup>679</sup> See *supra*, 232.

<sup>680</sup> Robinson (1977), 131.

and the latter ability is more straightforwardly associated to the one of addressing the assembly.

**κα λέγη]** Most codices have καὶ λέγοι, and so does Robinson,<sup>681</sup> whereas F1 and F2 present καὶ λέγει. The καί of both readings, placed inside a relative clause, would have a function of an adverb expressing emphatic assent, with the meaning of ‘even’, ‘also’ or ‘just’,<sup>682</sup> which cannot fit the sense of the passage, whether we construe it according to Robinson’s solution or to the one here chosen.<sup>683</sup> Moreover, Robinson himself recognises that the optative λέγοι after the pronoun ὅστις does not respect ‘the so-called Sequence of tenses’,<sup>684</sup> which would require ‘ἄν/κα+subjunctive’.<sup>685</sup> The indicative λέγει would be more legitimate, but still not common.<sup>686</sup> Therefore, it is safer to adopt Blass’ conjecture κα λέγη,<sup>687</sup> which also removes the unsuitable καί, and which has been followed by all the following editions of Diels’ and Diels/Kranz’s, as well as supported by Classen.<sup>688</sup> The only other grammatically acceptable conjecture left, Mullach’s δεῖ λέγεν, departs too much from the readings of the codices.<sup>689</sup>

**καὶ...κωλύειν]** No translator so far seems to have reflected on how unlikely it is that this second surviving portion of the paragraph can grammatically depend on the first

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<sup>681</sup> Robinson (1979), 138.

<sup>682</sup> See *LSJ*, s.v. καί, B.

<sup>683</sup> And it is not by chance that, in his translation, Robinson was then compelled to omit it (Robinson (1979), 139), otherwise he should have printed ‘and the man who intends to speak correctly on whatever matter he even/also/just speaks about must know’. This omission, joined by a silence in the respective commentary note too, is particularly eloquent, as, up to this point, he had always emphasised the idiosyncratic position of καί (appeared in §§ 6.11 and 8.2) both in the translation (*ibid.*, 133, 139) and in the commentary (*ibid.*, 215-216, 226).

<sup>684</sup> *Ibid.*, 230.

<sup>685</sup> *Ibid.* See also Goodwin (1898), 277 and *LSJ*, s.v. ὅστις.

<sup>686</sup> Goodwin (1898), 307.

<sup>687</sup> Blass in Weber (1897), 50.

<sup>688</sup> See Classen (2004), 118 and *supra*, 240, n. 677 for Diels’ and Diels/Kranz’s references.

<sup>689</sup> Translated as ‘praeterea recte dictum scire convenit, quibus argumentis immorari deceat’ (Mullach (1875), 552).

one after such a long lacuna.<sup>690</sup> Moreover, the subject of this lemma has now clearly turned to politics, which corresponds to the fourth of the six abilities initially listed and which, according to the reverse order of their treatment, is precisely the one we would expect after having dealt with the knowledge of the techniques of speeches. This has therefore prompted my tentative conjecture <τὸν δὲ δαμαγορεῖν ἐπιστάμενον δεῖ> for the last words of the lacuna which immediately precedes this lemma. This solution mirrors τὸν...δεῖ at the beginning of § 8.9, where the third ability, of pleading one's case, is analysed. In this way, I have aimed to keep the third and the fourth ability stylistically close, in the same way as it was in § 8.1, where their logical connection was emphasized by a common grammatical pattern.

It is worth noticing how no new skill is presented here, since advising the city as to the right policy to adopt sounds like an outline of what addressing the assembly (δημηγορεῖν) consisted in. This is, in fact, confirmed by a few other sources which share with our text a similar way to indicate political speech, through the nouns βουλή, δημηγορία or συμβουλή.<sup>691</sup> To begin with, at Pl. *Grg.* 502e the idea, presented as the one commonly accepted, that rhetors really have the best (τὸ βέλτιστον) in view when they address the assembly, is challenged by Socrates who suggests that they actually think of their own good (τὸ ἴδιον) rather than the common one (τὸ κοινόν).<sup>692</sup> Similarly, at Pl. *Phdr.* 260c-d he points out the possible risk of a rhetor who persuades the city to do

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<sup>690</sup> On Robinson's and Diels' treatments of the lacuna see *supra*, 240. Mullach did not even highlight it (Mullach (1875), 552), whereas Graham described it as just '4-5 litt.' long, which is also consistent with his option for Diels' insertion of just τὰ πράγματα to complete it (Graham (2010), 896). Stephanus, North, Meibom, Fabricius, Orelli and Weber correctly reported it, but who among them gave also a translation proved to believe in a dependence of what follows the lacuna on the initial δεῖ (Stephanus (1570), 481; North (1671), 74; Meibom (1688), 730; Fabricius (1724), 633-634; Von Orelli (1821), 230-231; Weber (1897), 50). Solana Dueso also thought that 'τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ/τὰ δὲ κακὰ exige en la laguna la presencia de τὸ ἀγαθόν/τὸ κακόν, cuyo conocimiento es la condición para que el orator aconseje correctamente a la ciudad' (Solana Dueso (1996), 197, n. 42). But, firstly, this hypothesis lacks a support in the chapter which never presents signs of this essentialism, rather in its philosophical part it moves from the knowledge of things to that of the concepts related to them (see *infra*, 248). Secondly, Solana Dueso seems to forget the ability of addressing the assembly, which would be cut out from the recapitulation of all the initial six, if the lacuna did not hide it.

<sup>691</sup> They will become terms of art with Aristotle's *Rhetoric*: see Schiappa/Timmerman (2010), 67-113.

<sup>692</sup> See also 455d.

something bad instead of good (πείθω κακὰ πράττειν ἀντ' ἀγαθῶν), whereas according to Isoc. *On the Peace* 5, rhetors should advise what is advantageous for the city collectively (τὰ μέλλοντα τῇ πόλει συνοίσειν) and not for a single person. The same terms and reflections will later appear within Aristotle's theorization of deliberative speech. At *Rh.* I.3.1358b, e.g., we first read that exhortation (προτροπή) and dissuasion (ἀποτροπή) are what those who speak in the assembly (οἱ δημηγοροῦντες) do; then, it is added that he 'who exhorts recommends a course of action as better, whereas he who dissuades advises against it as worse'<sup>693</sup> (ὁ μὲν γὰρ προτρέπων ὡς βέλτιον συμβουλεύει, ὁ δὲ ἀποτρέπων ὡς χείρονος ἀποτρέπει). Finally, the 'kind of good or bad things the deliberative orator advises'<sup>694</sup> (ποῖα ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ ὁ συμβουλεύων συμβουλεύει) is the concern of 1359a.

## § 8.7

εἰδώς...χρη] For the first time after §§ 8.4-5 the author argues again for the knowledge of everything, in a less sophisticated way, but still sophistic, endowing improvisation with an exaggerated capacity of filling the gaps in one's knowledge. As exaggeration itself was an early recognised rhetorical device (at Pl. *Phdr.* 272a is called δεινωσις), the author can have purposefully used it, to emphasize both it and improvisation before his readers.

This lemma is joined to what precedes through the pronoun ταῦτα, which, from a grammatical point of view, could refer either to the political ability just discussed or to all the nine seen so far. However, the latter hypothesis seems stylistically more likely, if we rely on the author's consistency with his use of the singular τοῦτο to denote only one skill in § 8.9 — namely τὸ δίκαιον ἐπίστασθαι. If so, then the digression of the current paragraph, along with its supporting example in § 8.8, could be due to a

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<sup>693</sup> Translation from Freese (1926), 35.

<sup>694</sup> Ibid., 39.

rhetorical exigence of variation, interrupting the usual flow of exposition with a reflection about the skills illustrated until then, before presenting the following ones.

The idea that one can know everything by knowing just something is also in Pl. *Euthd.* 294a, though through the sophism on the impossibility of knowing and not knowing at the same time, and without any hint at improvisation.

**τῆνα...χρή]** The need (τὰ δέοντα) of knowing something one ignores, when the situation requires it (αἰ χρή) did not worry those rhetors who could perform extempore speeches, whom Alcidamas at length praises in his *Against the Sophists*.<sup>695</sup> He too, in particular, recalls how this capacity can save speakers ‘in their hour of need’ (τῇ χρείᾳ, *Alcid. Soph.* 10), when their silence would otherwise bring shame on them.<sup>696</sup> In this respect, Gorgias is recalled to have never been ‘at a loss for words’<sup>697</sup> at DK82 A17 and his improvisation is reported at DK82 A1 and A1a; the same is said of Antiphon at DK87 A4. Finally, at *SE* 174b32 (=DK83 A6), Aristotle gives a piece of advice on how to efficiently guide one’s improvisation when out of words, suggesting that one focus on something different from what one is asked for, by ‘taking it in a different sense’;<sup>698</sup> for this was what Lycophron successfully did, when requested to praise the lyre.

Improvisation can therefore be counted as the tenth skill so far introduced. It differs from the others because it derives not from the knowledge of something else, but despite its ignorance. By relying on improvisation, the author chooses an easy and, again, deceitful way to justify omniscience, not actually aiming at the possession of an infinite knowledge, but just at the confidence of always being able to display a knowledge which is just apparently so.

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<sup>695</sup> αὐτοσχεδιαστικοὶ λόγοι is the word he uses for extempore speeches (see *Alcid. Soph.* 8).

<sup>696</sup> See also *ibid.*, 3, 8-10, 14-17, 20, 22-24, 26, 28-30, 33-34.

<sup>697</sup> Sprague’s translation of οὐχ ὑπολείπει αὐτὸν ὁ λόγος (Sprague (1972), 64).

<sup>698</sup> Sprague’s translation of ἐκεῖνο ἐκλαμβάνετε (Sprague (1972), 69).

## § 8.8

κᾶν...πράσσειν] Playing the aulos is here offered as an example of the extremely various kinds of activities one does not know but can improvise, according to what was seen in the former paragraph. It must therefore not be counted among the other skills implied in the one art that a man should learn, as also confirmed by the fact that among sophists only Critias is said to do it, at DK88 A15. Furthermore, in light of the previous comparison between § 8.7 and Pl. *Euthd.* 294a, it is worth noticing that in the latter too some usually non-sophistic skills are then immediately proposed to exemplify the omniscient man's polymathy.<sup>699</sup>

ἐπίσταται] This form, registred in all manuscripts, falls within those present subjunctives<sup>700</sup> formed by adding the endings 'directly to the long vowel of the stem'.<sup>701</sup> Therefore, there is no need to emend it, as Mullach first did with ἐπίστηται and then Robinson with ἐπιστᾶται, both of which, nonetheless, are grammatically sound alternatives.<sup>702</sup> Though recognising the possibility of reading it as a subjunctive, Weber preferred to take it as an indicative, and at the same time changed κᾶν in καὶ αἰ, thus turning the future supposition of vivid form into a simple present supposition implying nothing as to the fulfilment of the condition. He justified that with his disbelief in the author's preference of ᾶν – here contracted with καί in κᾶν – to κα, in light of the far

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<sup>699</sup> Shoemaking and astronomy along with the ironic one of knowing the number of the grains of sand (Pl. *Euthd.* 294b).

<sup>700</sup> See also Weber (1898), 73; Ahrens (1843), 313.

<sup>701</sup> Buck (1973), 120, where the case of ἐπισυνίσταται is referred. The phenomenon takes place in verbs whose present indicative has, instead, a stem with short vowel, and this is the case of ἐπίσταμαι too (ibid.). Our formation will therefore be ἐπιστᾶ-ται, where ᾶ does not become η, as usual in non-Attic dialects (ibid., 21).

<sup>702</sup> For, the present subjunctive of verbs like ἐπίσταμαι can be construed in further two ways, namely by adding the long vowel subjunctive sign η/ω either to the verbal stem ending with the long vowel or to the stem ending in consonant (Chantraine (1984), 261). According to the former formation, the third singular person used in our passage would thus be ἐπιστᾶ-ηται, then contracted in Robinson's ἐπιστᾶται (Robinson (1979), 138), whereas the latter formation would straightly lead to Mullach's ἐπίστ-ηται (Mullach (1875), 552). However, in most cases the contraction α+η > α occurs in Attic, whereas in Doric it results in η (Buck (1973), 37), therefore Robinson's description of his conjecture as a 'Doric subjunctive' (Robinson (1979), 233) is improper.



higher number of occurrences of the latter in the text, but, above all, of his disputable assumption about a consistent Doric dialect throughout the text, that we have already seen.

## § 8.9

**τὸν...ἄτερα]** The ability of pleading one's case reveals the eleventh one of knowing τὸ δίκαιον, also defined as that about which lawsuits are (περί...δίκαι). The term therefore denotes not the concept of justice, but rather the justice produced in lawcourts by suits and judgements, and for this reason I have translated it with 'what is just' in the sense of 'what is lawful'.<sup>703</sup> Not differently, at Pl. *Phdr.* 260a, Phaedrus recalls the common opinion that a rhetor needs to know not the things which are really just (τὰ τῷ ὄντι δίκαια), but those which seem just to the multitude who will judge (τὰ δόξαντ' ἂν πλήθει οἵπερ δικάσουσιν),<sup>704</sup> whereas at DK87 B44, Antiphon argues for the opposition between the administration of the law and real justice.

Finally comes an observation about the far larger corpus of information to which this knowledge can actually give access, and the sentence εἰδὼς...ἄτερα in fact recalls the statement of omniscience of § 8.7 (εἰδὼς...ἐπιστασεῖται). However, the absence of sophistic trickeries both in this paragraph and in the following, and related two, along with the lack of any supporting evidence, seems to exclude any hint at the idea of omniscience this time. Rather, here the author may well be saying that by knowing what is permitted by the law concerning a certain matter, one cannot but know also its

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<sup>703</sup> Contrariwise, Solana Dueso took the phrase as denoting the philosophical and essentialist concept of 'justice' in the same way — he argued — as in chapter 1 τὸ ἀγαθόν means 'goodness', in chapter 2 τὸ κακόν means 'beauty' and τὸ ἀλάθές of chapter 4 means 'truth' (Solana Dueso (1996), 175). According to him, in fact, as in § 1.11 the distinction between τὸ ἀγαθόν and τὸ κακόν is the necessary condition to tell the good things from the bad ones (ποῖον ἀγαθὸν καὶ ποῖον κακόν), so in this chapter the knowledge of τὸ δίκαιον, namely, of justice, would be the necessary condition to know τὰ δίκαια, namely just actions (ibid., 175-176). However, essentialism seems to go in the opposite epistemological direction of the philosophical message of this chapter, as already observed earlier, when commenting another similar analysis of his, about § 8.6 (see *supra*, 242, n. 690).

<sup>704</sup> See also Pl. *Phdr.* 261c-d and *Grg.* 455a.

contrary (τὸ ὑπεναντίον αὐτῷ), namely what is unlawful, and what is different from it (πάντα τὰ ἄτερα), namely he can spot aspects of a certain matter that are irrelevant to forensic justice and are, therefore, not ‘what lawsuits are about’. This would match with Pl. *Grg.* 454b, where lawcourts are said to be the place where persuasion is practiced about what is lawful and unlawful (δίκαιά τε καὶ ἄδικα), but, above all, with Arist. *Rh.* I 3.5. Here Aristotle starts by saying that ‘the end of the forensic speaker is the lawful or the unlawful; [...] all other considerations are included as accessory’.<sup>705</sup> That these ‘other considerations’ (τὰ ἄλλα) fit the description I have just suggested for our πάντα τὰ ἄτερα can be seen from Aristotle’s subsequent remark that ‘sometimes the speakers will not dispute’ about these other considerations, having in view just what is lawful and unlawful. This would be proven by the fact that ‘a man on trial does not always deny that an act has been committed or damage inflicted by him, but he will never admit that the act is unjust; for otherwise a trial would be unnecessary’.<sup>706</sup>

**πάντα τὰ ἄτερα]** At this point all the best manuscripts have a lacuna of about ten letters<sup>707</sup> preceding the string τερεία and following either τῶς νόμῳ, according to P4, P6, V2, or τὰ, according to the other codices. The marked distance between these two possible starts suggests caution towards Trieber’s preference for one of them, with his emendation τὰ <τούτων> ἄτερα.<sup>708</sup> The same can be said of Mullach’s τὰ ἐτεροῖα,<sup>709</sup> which is also too short, of Diels’ τὰ ἄτερα <πάντα>,<sup>710</sup> which also postpones it, and of Robinson’s tentative τὰ <ἄλλα αὐτῷ ἐ>τεροῖα,<sup>711</sup> which is also too strong.<sup>712</sup> I, therefore, agree with Classen that Wilamowitz’s πάντα τὰ ἄτερα<sup>713</sup> is the best solution

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<sup>705</sup> Translation from Freese (1926), 35.

<sup>706</sup> Ibid.

<sup>707</sup> Weber (1897), 51.

<sup>708</sup> Trieber in Diels (1907), 648.

<sup>709</sup> Mullach (1875), 552.

<sup>710</sup> Diels (1903), 587.

<sup>711</sup> Robinson (1979), 140.

<sup>712</sup> Of the same opinion is Classen (Classen (2004), 120).

<sup>713</sup> Von Wilamowitz in Diels (1907), 552; Classen (2004), 120.

among those proposed, also because it shares τὰ ἄτερα with the above recalled εἰδώς...τούτων of § 8.7.

### § 8.10

δεῖ...νόμῳς] Two new skills are here inferred from the eleventh one, according to the same rationale which allowed us to derive the eleventh skill from the second in the previous paragraph. For if pleading one's case implied the knowledge of the concept one appeals to when performing this rhetorical skill, namely what is lawful, this is now said to be acquirable only if one first knows the criterion on the basis of which it is defined, that is laws (δεῖ...πάντας). But in order to know laws one must first know the legal issues of which laws have been meant as a solution (αἰ...νόμῳς).

This movement from speaking to the knowledge of the theoretical framework according to which speaking takes place (§ 8.9), then to the constituents of this framework and finally to the empirical human situations on which these constituents are grounded (§ 8.10) is therefore the main expression of what I will later call the philosophical temper of the chapter,<sup>714</sup> and reflects Socrates' views at Pl. *Phdr.* 259e and 277b, where he says that a rhetor must know the truth about the things he aims to speak about. This idea already appeared in § 8.4, but within the sophistic context of an eristic demonstration.

τῶς...πάντας] That laws belonged to the subjects taught by sophists appears in Pl. *Grg.* 484d, whereas according to Pl. *Sph.* 232d sophists just taught how to discuss them. That they were of the greatest interest to sophists can also be inferred from the two opposing strong attitudes they had towards them. On the one hand, Antiphon highlights the unsolvable contrast between laws, which are bad, and nature, which is good (DK87 B44B), as argued for also by the character of Callicles at Pl. *Grg.* 482e-484c.

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<sup>714</sup> See *infra*, 272-273.

On the other hand, Anonymus Iamblichi praises the contribution of laws in guaranteeing justice and, therefore, social and political coexistence between people (DK89.3,6,7). And it is also handed down that Protagoras wrote the laws for Thurii (DK80 A1), whereas Critias was chosen to revise the old ones of Athens (DK88 B48).

### § 8.11

**τόν...νόμον]** The author aims to illustrate how the same search into things necessary for a good understanding of the laws of forensic justice in §§ 8.9-10 is also required in the case of the laws in any other field, for example music. Here too, in fact, one must first know the object, that is one must listen to a piece of music, in order to get its νόμος. Usually, in musical context, this word's meaning of 'law' is narrowed to that of 'law of music', namely 'melody'.<sup>715</sup> This seems to be the case here, considering the idea of an intimate relation between it and music (μωσική) expressed by the phrase ὁ ἐν μωσικῇ νόμος. However, since the efficacy of the example relies on the use of the same term which appeared in the previous paragraphs, the best translation seems to be the one offered by Dillon and Gergel, who by writing 'law' between single scare quotes, managed not to lose the word identity, and at the same time they signalled that a particular kind of law is meant here.<sup>716</sup>

**τις]** Neither τις of Y2 nor τίς of the other manuscripts and which is followed by Robinson respect the rule of accentuation of this pronoun which, since it is indefinite and not interrogative, should be enclitic.<sup>717</sup> Rightly, therefore, Fabricius read it as τις,<sup>718</sup> whereas Diels' conjecture <ὦν>τὸς,<sup>719</sup> crasis for ὁ αὐτός, swaps the idea of

<sup>715</sup> Cf. *LSJ*, s.v. νόμος, II, West (1992), 215-217, *OED*, s.v. 'melody', I.3.a.

<sup>716</sup> Dillon/Gergel (2003), 332.

<sup>717</sup> Vendryes (1904), 104.

<sup>718</sup> Fabricius (1724), 634.

<sup>719</sup> Diels (1903), 587.

indefiniteness of the original reading with an extraneous one of identity, in order to keep the incorrect accent mark.

ἐπίσταται,] The transmitted comma is useful in stressing how τις is proleptic to ὅσπερ, so Meibom's omission of it is not convenient,<sup>720</sup> whereas Robinson did not justify why he turned it into a question mark,<sup>721</sup> nor does a justification for that seem possible.

## § 8.12

ὅς...ἐπίσταται] Omniscience comes up again, this time as a natural consequence (εὐπετὴς ὁ λόγος) of the second ability, the knowledge of the truth of things. The lack of information about the latter prevents us from understanding this passage which appears, in any case, rather odd and probably meant, in the author's mind, as the conclusion of another eristic argumentation, like that of §§ 8.3-5, not given here though.

γα] The emphatic γα of most manuscripts is the most preferable reading, as it is logically fitting and there seems to be no lacuna around it. Therefore, there is no need to adopt Blass' insertion of δέ before it,<sup>722</sup> though that seems to address the odd absence here of this particle which occurs at the beginning of the treatments of all the other skills. Alternatively, γὰρ of L has no parallel in any of them and must therefore be discarded, although it would stress the logical kinship that the paragraph has with what precedes, and in light of which one must also exclude Wilamowitz's γα <μάν> (Doric for γε μὴν),<sup>723</sup> followed also by Robinson,<sup>724</sup> and which is mostly adversative.<sup>725</sup>

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<sup>720</sup> Meibom (1688), 730.

<sup>721</sup> Robinson (1979), 140. That this is not a mere typo is shown by the translation 'for who is it knows the rules (laws) of music?' (Robinson (1979), 141).

<sup>722</sup> Blass in Weber (1897), 51.

<sup>723</sup> Von Wilamowitz in Diels (1903), 587.

<sup>724</sup> Robinson (1979), 140.

<sup>725</sup> Denniston (2002), 348.

Finally, Meibom's κα must have been a typo,<sup>726</sup> considering the impossibility for this particle (=ἄν) to be construed with a present indicative<sup>727</sup> and that he translated the passage in the same way as North who had γα.<sup>728</sup>

### § 8.13

**ὁς...ἐπίστασθαι**] The symmetric recapitulation of the first six skills comes to its end here, where from the conversation by short questions and answers (κατὰ βραχὺ διαλέγεσθαι) is derived the fourteenth and last skill of answering any possible question (ἐρωτώμενον...πάντων), from which, in turn, another conclusion again concerning the man's omniscience is finally drawn (οὐκῶν...ἐπίστασθαι).

**ὁς...πάντων**] The rationale of this first step is clear provided we understand the first ability too as valid in any possible case, as here required by περὶ πάντων. But this assumption is not legitimate, as the sole κατὰ βραχὺ διαλέγεσθαι does not clarify whether this conversation consisting in short questions and answers is about any possible subject or just specific ones. According to the author, instead, the former case is granted, and the new skill turns out to be implicit in the first one: for it is clear that he who can converse in short questions and answers *about everything* is able to answer<sup>729</sup> any asked question too (ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνασθαι περὶ πάντων).

Finally, it is worth recalling the sophistic nature of this skill through the examples of Pl. *Grg.* 447c (=DK82 A20), where Gorgias is said to boast about his ability to answer any given question (πρὸς ἅπαντα ἀποκρινεῖσθαι),<sup>730</sup> and of *Hp.Mi.* 363c-d, where Hippias says he usually performs this ability at the temple of Olympia during the games.

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<sup>726</sup> Meibom (1688), 731.

<sup>727</sup> Goodwin (1898), 277.

<sup>728</sup> North (1671), 75.

<sup>729</sup> The Greek text just reads δεῖ [...] ἀποκρίνασθαι, but the prescriptive strength of δεῖ itself implies that an effective ἀποκρίνασθαι, namely the ability to do it, is meant here.

<sup>730</sup> Similarly to 458d and Pl. *Men.* 70c.

οὐκῶν...ἐπίστασθαι] With this second inference the sophistic tone of this paragraph reaches its peak, as nobody would be keen to derive the knowledge of a subject from the mere ability to reply to every question about it. For one could just memorize a series of basic notions about a subject and successfully stand a superficial interview about it, without for this very reason knowing it. Or, alternatively, one could satisfy a dull interlocutor by answering all their questions through stratagems like that described by Aristotle and mentioned before,<sup>731</sup> which makes the knowledge of the subject unnecessary.

For the fourth and last time in the chapter,<sup>732</sup> omniscience is therefore concluded by means of sophistic tricks, and, similarly to proposition (2) of the argument in §§ 8.3-5, the current fallacy consists in an invalid passage from speaking about everything to knowing it. This procedure seems to have been particularly dear to Gorgias, and our testimonies stress the connection between it and his boastful behaviour. At DK82 A1a it is said that ‘coming into the theatre of the Athenians he had the boldness to say “suggest a subject” [...] showing apparently that he knew everything’.<sup>733</sup> At Pl. *Men.* 70b (=DK82 A19), then, he is said to have taught how to ‘answer fearlessly and haughtily if someone asks something, as is right for those who know’,<sup>734</sup> which is clearly the opposite of what we usually expect from a teacher, who is supposed to teach a subject to his pupils, so that they can confidently answer as many questions as possible about it.

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<sup>731</sup> Improvisation is, in fact, a skill logically close to the current one, because in order to answer any possible question a successful man should also be prepared to speak about what he does not know, as omniscience is necessarily impossible for him.

<sup>732</sup> See 8.3-5, 7, 12.

<sup>733</sup> παρελθὼν γὰρ οὗτος ἐς τὸ Ἀθηναίων θέατρον ἐθάρορσεν εἰπεῖν ‘προβάλλετε’ [...] ἐνδεικνύμενος δῆπου πάντα μὲν εἰδέναι.

<sup>734</sup> ἀφόβως τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐάν τις τι ἔρηται, ὥσπερ εἰκὸς τοὺς εἰδότας. Translation from Sprague (1972), 31.

## Chapter 9

### § 9.1

μέγιστον...μνάμα] At first glance, it would seem surprising to define memory (μνάμα) as a invention (ἐξεύρημα), and not as a natural faculty of the human soul or mind, as maintained in the other ancient accounts of the phenomenon.<sup>735</sup> But when, in the following paragraphs, three rules are given to improve the reader's memory, the difficulty disappears as the chapter proves to actually concern not memory, but mnemonics. From this perspective, a similarity can be spotted in Auct. ad Herennium III.16, where two different, but connected, kinds of memory are said to belong to man — one natural and one artificial — with only the latter discussed.<sup>736</sup> There too mnemonics is described using a word equivalent to the English 'memory', the Latin *memoria*, but with the addition of the adjective *artificiosa*, as opposed to *naturalis memoria*, the natural human faculty.

As for the epithet of 'invention', the first source to present mnemonics in this way is *Marm.Par.* 55, dated 3<sup>rd</sup> century BCE, and which also identifies its inventor in Simonides of Ceos. We do not have proof that our author too has him in mind here, but

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<sup>735</sup> The first description of memory in these terms belongs to Aeschylus, who inaugurates the metaphor of memory as tablets of the mind (*Pr.* 788-789), then become more famous through the Platonic block of wax of *Tht.* 191c-e. Among the other manifold and varied Platonic references to memory, it is worth recalling first *Epin.* 976b5-c6, where memory is considered a natural gift (φύσις), which is confirmed in *R.* VI 487a3-4; secondly, *Phlb.* 38e-39c, where it is described as a painter of the soul. Finally, at *Phdr.* 275a the alphabet, an invention supposed to improve natural memory, is said to even damage it. At *Mem.* 449b22-26, Aristotle says, instead, that 'memory, then, is neither sensation nor conception, but a state of having one of these or an affection resulting from one of these, when some time elapses' (Bloch (2007), 27); and, again, the place where memory takes place is the human soul. The belief in a purely natural status of memory crosses the centuries and is frequently used to mark the difference between memory and mnemonics, with various rhetorical ends. For whereas in Cic. *de Orat.* II.356-357 and Quint. *Inst.* XI.2.1 memory's natural status is consistent with the art aiming at improving it, at Philostr. *VS* 523 we read: 'there is no such thing as an art of memory, nor could there be, for though memory gives us the arts, it cannot itself be taught, nor can it be acquired by any method or system, since it is a gift of nature or a part of the immortal soul' (translation in Wright (1921), 91-93).

<sup>736</sup> 'Sunt igitur duae memoriae: una naturalis, altera artificiosa. Naturalis est ea, quae nostris animis insita est et simul cum cogitatione nata; artificiosa est ea, quam confirmat inductio quaedam et ratio praeceptionis. Sed qua via in ceteris rebus ingenii bonitas imitatur saepe doctrinam, ars porro naturae commoda confirmat et auget, item fit in hac re [...] Nunc de artificiosa memoria loquemur' (Auct. ad Herennium III.16).



we cannot exclude the possibility, especially considering that he has already been shown to be sensitive to the simile between poetry and painting for which Simonides was famous,<sup>737</sup> and which ‘rests on the supremacy of the visual source’,<sup>738</sup> just as mnemonics does.<sup>739</sup> Since at Ael. *NA* VI.10, Hippias too is mentioned as one of the possible inventors of this art, and since he is the only sophist whom we know to be an expert in it, some interpreters have instead used this passage to support the attribution of the work to Hippias or to one of his entourage.<sup>740</sup> Wisely, however, Blum<sup>741</sup> suggested caution, stressing that our author’s system cannot reflect the same one that Hippias must have used to repeat a series of even fifty names after only one listening, according to Pl. *Hp.Ma.* 285e and DK86 A2. For, as far as the transmitted text goes, the mnemonist of chapter 9 lacks a means to check that he was repeating those names in the correct order, due to the absence of a spatial arrangement of the mental images.<sup>742</sup>

βίον, μνάμα, καὶ] Only Robinson<sup>743</sup> removed the commas before and after μνάμα which, instead, coherently highlight the syntactic, and semantic, centrality of this word within the sentence.

ἐς πάντα...σοφίαν] The attribute ἐς πάντα χρήσιμον, along with the previous μέγιστον δὲ καὶ κάλλιστον, reveals a trait common to the beginnings of the following

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<sup>737</sup> See *supra*, 136.

<sup>738</sup> Yates (1966), 28.

<sup>739</sup> Cicero thinks alike in the following passage: ‘vidit enim hoc prudenter sive Simonides sive alius quis invenit, ea maxime animis effingi nostri, quae essent a sensu tradita atque impressa; acerrimum autem ex omnibus nostris sensibus esse sensum videndi; quare facillime animo teneri posse, si ea, quae perciperentur auribus aut cogitatione, etiam oculorum commendatione animis traderentur [...] et unius verbi imagine totius sententiae information, pictoris cuiusdam summi ratione et modo formarum varietate locos distinguuntis’ (Cic. *de Orat.* II.357-358).

<sup>740</sup> See in particular Pohlenz (1913), 77, Dupréel (1948), 190-200, Nestle (1966), 437.

<sup>741</sup> Blum (1969), 49-51.

<sup>742</sup> Systems of place as fundamental component of mnemonics for their providing order to the images which they host appear at Cic. *de Orat.* II.351-354,358, Auct. ad Herennium III.16-19, Quint. *Inst.* XI.2.17-21 (and at 2.22 Quintilian recalls also Metrodorus of Scepsis for that), Longin. *Fr.* 201-202.

<sup>743</sup> Robinson (1979), 140.

ancient works on mnemonics too, namely the stress on the advantages of having a good memory, not only for oratory, but for life in general, or ἐς τὸν βίον, as just said.<sup>744</sup> However, here the main activity which is said to require a good memory is not oratory, but the pair φιλοσοφία τε καὶ σοφία, whose interpretation has been a point of controversy for scholars.

Pohlenz believed that the phrase proves the carelessness of the author's style, as the opposition one would have rather expected is 'bei Studium und Praxis'.<sup>745</sup> Robinson too found it problematic to give a literal translation and proposed the allegedly safer 'for both general education and practical wisdom',<sup>746</sup> which, however, seems to stray from the Greek concerning φιλοσοφία, as it nowhere else is attested as a general education.<sup>747</sup> If, on the one hand, no further element helps to interpret this phrase, on the other hand, the relation in which φιλοσοφία stands with σοφία can be inferred from what has been seen earlier in the work. At § 1.1, in fact, οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες were what the participants in disputes about good and bad were called, and these same individuals were also likely to be implicitly understood as the people discussing the philosophical opposites in chapters 2-4. As for σοφία, chapter 6 presented it as a 'wisdom' necessary for an excellence (ἀρετή) in the private and public affairs of the 5<sup>th</sup>-4<sup>th</sup> century Greek πόλις and whose teachers many recognised in the sophists. Finally, in chapter 8 σοφία was shown as a variegated system of teachings among which was also a philosophical

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<sup>744</sup> Cic. *de Orat.* II.355 ('qui sit autem oratori memoriae fructus, quanta utilitas, quanta vis, quid me attinet dicere?'); Auct. ad Herennium III.16 ('nunc ad thesaurum inventorum atque ad omnium partium rhetoricae custodem, memoriam, transeamus'); Plin. *Nat.* VII.37 ('memoria necessarium maxime vitae bonum cui precipua fuerit, haut facile dictum est, tam multis eius gloriam adeptis'); Quint. *Inst.* XI.2.1 ('et totus, de quo diximus adhuc, inanis est labor, nisi ceterae partes hoc velut spiritu continentur. Nam et omnis disciplina memoria constat, frustra docemur, si quidquid audimus praeterfluat; et exemplorum, legum, responsorum, dictorum denique factorumque velut quasdam copias, quibus abundare quasque in promptu semper habere debet orator, eadem illa vis praesentat. Neque immerito thesaurus hic eloquentiae dicitur').

<sup>745</sup> Pohlenz (1913), 74.

<sup>746</sup> Robinson (1979), 141.

<sup>747</sup> To this meaning παιδεία seems more appropriate : cf. *LSJ* s.v.v. φιλοσοφία and παιδεία. In a sense of the word typical of Isocrates and Alcidas, φιλοσοφία can, at best, mean 'the fitting of knowledge to the practical needs of the polis' (Walters (1993), 158).

inquiry into the nature and the truth of things; a certain kind of φιλοσοφία hence seemed allowed to be a part of the sophistic σοφία the author envisaged. Therefore, assuming that in this last chapter the author remains consistent with what he said in chapters 1, 6, and 8,<sup>748</sup> then we must conclude that in φιλοσοφία τε καὶ σοφία, where the two concepts are distinguished, φιλοσοφία indicates ‘philosophy’ in the narrow sense of the discipline, as opposed to the broad σοφία of the sophists.<sup>749</sup>

The praise of the importance of memory for philosophy does not have any parallel in the 5<sup>th</sup>-4<sup>th</sup> century literature, rather a denial in Socrates’ irony when he speaks of Hippias’ mnemonic art at Pl. *Hp.Mi.* 368d and *Hp.Ma.* 285e.<sup>750</sup> Things are diametrically opposed on the sophistic side, as we can read in these same Platonic passages, or at DK86 A2 and A5a, about Hippias’ mnemonics as well. Here, memory is said to play a fundamental educational role, and the same can be found in other passages previously recalled, among which is DK82 B14, where we read that both the teachers of eristic arguments and Gorgias would deliver some prepared speeches that their pupils should have learned by heart.

## § 9.2

ἔστι...ἔμαθες] The first mnemonic rule prescribes concentration (προσέχης τὸν νοῦν) on a given matter so as to make it easier to mentally embrace it in its entirety (αἰσθησέῃται σύνολον). The recommendation of concentration is common within the ancient production on mnemonics, as we read at Auct. ad Herennium III.24<sup>751</sup> and

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<sup>748</sup> *Contra* Burkert, who by simply extrapolating the phrase without any interest for the rest of the work, concluded that no relevant difference in meaning between the two words could be observed (Burkert (1960), 173, n. 4).

<sup>749</sup> On the chronological implications of this distinction, see *infra*, 276.

<sup>750</sup> *Contra* Kranz who recalled the current passage for its Socratic spirit (Kranz (1937), 230). At [Pl.] *Epin.* 976b-c, instead, the Athenian excludes that a man can be considered wise just for the possess of an efficient memory.

<sup>751</sup> ‘Non enim, sicut a ceteris studiis abducimur nonnumquam occupatione, item ab hac re nos potest causa deducere aliqua. Numquam est enim, quin aliquid memoriae tradere velimus et tum maxime, cum aliquo maiore negotio detinemur’.

Quint. *Inst.* XI.2.10.<sup>752</sup> Quintilian recognises also the difficulty of keeping ourselves focused on a speech we are trying to learn by heart, and recommends doing it aloud<sup>753</sup> and focussing particularly on the passages of the speech most difficult to remember<sup>754</sup> as props of concentration. Embracing a matter in its entirety, instead, has to do with the typically rhetorical necessity of a complete mental storage of a speech, both in its general structure and in detail.<sup>755</sup> At *de Orat.* II.355,<sup>756</sup> 357,<sup>757</sup> Cicero will identify it as one of the advantages that a good memory brings to oratory, the discipline within which mnemonics was conceived in antiquity.<sup>758</sup>

### § 9.3

δεύτερον...ἀκούσης] As second mnemonic precept, the author highlights the role of training (μελετᾶν), which will be largely recognised also later, at Cic. *de Orat.* II.357,<sup>759</sup>

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<sup>752</sup> 'Necdubium est quin plurimum in hac parte valeat mentis intentio et velut acies luminum a prospectu rerum, quas intuetur, non aversa'.

<sup>753</sup> 'Ediscere tacite (nam idquoque est quaesitum) erat optimum, si non subirent velut otiosum animum plerumquae aliae cogitationes; propter quas excitandus est voce, ut duplici motu iuветur memoria dicendi et audiendi' (Quint. *Inst.* 11.2.33). Yet, he immediately clarifies that 'sed haec vox sit modica et magis murmur' (ibid.).

<sup>754</sup> 'In experiendo teneasne, et maior intention est et nihil supervacui temporis perit, quo etiam quae tenemus repeti solent' (ibid., 11.2.35).

<sup>755</sup> Small (2005), 74.

<sup>756</sup> '[ 'Quid me attinet dicere' implied from the previous sentence] tenere quae didiceris in accipienda causa; quae ipse cogitaris? Omnis fixas esse in animo sententias? Omnem discriptum verborum apparatus? '.

<sup>757</sup> 'Verum tamen neque tam acri memoria fere quisquam est, ut non dispositis notatisque rebus ordinem verborum aut nominum aut sententiarum complectatur'.

<sup>758</sup> Yates (1966), 2, Small (2005), 74.

<sup>759</sup> 'Neque vero tam hebeti, ut nihil hac consuetudine et exercitatione adiuvetur'.

358,<sup>760</sup> Auct. ad Herennium 3.21,<sup>761</sup> 24,<sup>762</sup> and Quint. *Inst.* XI.2. 9,<sup>763</sup> 36,<sup>764</sup> 40,<sup>765</sup> 45,<sup>766</sup> and through a process which is illustrated in the rest of the paragraph.

μελετᾶν] Rightly, Robinson<sup>767</sup> followed North's<sup>768</sup> μελετᾶν in place of μελέταν of the codices, as otherwise δεῖ, which Robinson was correct in suggesting is the verb of the main clause,<sup>769</sup> would lack any infinitive to complete it. However, since the following αἵ κα of the codices also needs to be revised into ᾧ κα,<sup>770</sup> Weber was right to drop the comma which separates the new relative clause from the verb on which it depends.<sup>771</sup> Finally, although Mullach too removes the comma, his <διὰ τῷ> μελετᾶν is not convincing, since the insertion which it includes is not necessary and is due exclusively to a disagreeable conservation of δέ, in place of δεῖ in the sentence.<sup>772</sup>

ᾧ κα] By keeping αἵ κα of the codices, the apodosis ('it is necessary to exercise') can be joined with the protasis ('if you hear') only by assuming an understood object of

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<sup>760</sup> 'Quam facultatem et exercitation dabit, ex qua consuetudo gignitur'.

<sup>761</sup> 'Ut versu posito ipsi nobiscum primum transeamus bis aut ter eum versum'.

<sup>762</sup> 'Sed cum in omni disciplina infirma est artis praeceptio sine summa adsiduitate exercitationis, tum vero in nemonicis minimum valet doctrina, nisi industria, studio labore, diligentia conprobatur'.

<sup>763</sup> 'Quod et ipsum argumentum est subesse artem aliquam iuvarique ratione naturae, cum idem docti facere illud, indocti inexercitatieque non possimus'.

<sup>764</sup> 'Excepta, quae potentissima est, exercitatione'.

<sup>765</sup> 'Si quis tamen unam maximamque a me artem memoriae quaerat, exercitatio est et labor; multa ediscere, multa cogitare, et si fieri potest cotidie, potentissimum est. Nihilaeque vel augetur cura vel negligentia intercidit'.

<sup>766</sup> 'Atque in hanc consuetudinem memoria exercitatione redigenda'.

<sup>767</sup> Robinson (1979), 140.

<sup>768</sup> North (1671), 75.

<sup>769</sup> All manuscripts have δέ, but in this hypothesis, αἵ κα ἀκούσης should have been dependent on the former ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο and it should have governed μελέταν, or μελετᾶν, which is impossible.

<sup>770</sup> See the next commentary note.

<sup>771</sup> Weber (1897), 51. His change to the Doric μελετῆν however is, as usual, not necessary.

<sup>772</sup> Mullach's text, which some line before has also τοιοῦτο in place of τοῦτο, is therefore the following: ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο [...] δευτέρων δὲ διὰ τῷ μελετᾶν αἵ κα ἀκούσης (Mullach (1875), 552).

μελετᾶν and ἀκούσης, as done by most translators, Robinson included.<sup>773</sup> Rightly, therefore, Sprague<sup>774</sup> highlighted the importance of picking Blass'<sup>775</sup> conjecture ἄ κα.

**ἄ κα ἀκούσης]** This occurrence of ἀκούω has been translated almost unanimously<sup>776</sup> according to the main meaning of the verb, 'to hear', which, however, entails a problem: what one has simply heard is difficult to remember, especially if composed of many elements, like the words of a sentence. As a result, it can be laborious to go over it, as the author immediately adds (τῶ...παρεγένετο). Alternatively, if one first keeps a written record of the words to be memorised, then they can be read or repeated at any future point in time without the risk of being gradually forgotten. A second sense of the verb goes precisely in this direction. For, as is often the case in prose, when the objects of ἀκούω are words, speeches, or books — all these being expressed in the accusative<sup>777</sup> as ἄ here is — the verb can mean 'to read',<sup>778</sup> on the tacit assumption that someone hears the words of a text while they are being read to them, 'whether uttered by himself, by his slave or by anyone else'.<sup>779</sup> The first of these three possibilities seems to be the case here, as the paragraph then concludes by requiring that one frequently (πολλάκις)<sup>780</sup> listen (ἀκοῦσαι) and declaim (εἰπαί) the things they want to remember, as also advised

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<sup>773</sup> 'You must, whenever you hear anything, go over it carefully' (Robinson (1979), 141). Only one translation consistently omitted the object, in respect of the Greek, namely Fabricius' 'si mediteris, assidue audiendo' (Fabricius (1724), 635), whereas in Solana Dueso's 'ejecitarse si escuchas algo' (Solana Dueso (1996), 199) at least ἀκούσης is given an implicit τι.

<sup>774</sup> Sprague (1972), 293, n. 10.

<sup>775</sup> Blass in Weber (1897), 51. But Blass did not know that De Varis had already made the very similar conjecture 'ἄκε vel ἄκα' (Robinson (1972), 198).

<sup>776</sup> Contrastingly, Mullach and Dumont translated ἀκούσης as 'intelligas' (Mullach (1875), 552) and 'tes leçons' (Dumont (1969), 246), respectively. But the former implies an idea of understanding which misses the main theme of memory, whereas the latter unduly confines the author's precept to only the specific case of a lecture.

<sup>777</sup> Schenkeveld (1992), 131, 139.

<sup>778</sup> Schenkeveld listed a good number of these cases, including Pl. *Phdr.* 268c, 275a, 235b-c, 261b, *Alc. I* 112b, *Lg.* 629b, X. *Mem.* II.6.11 (Schenkeveld (1992), 141).

<sup>779</sup> *Ibid.*, 135. As Small observes, 'since there was virtually no silent reading in antiquity, ἀκούω came, by obvious extension, to mean "read"', and 'works were judged on how well a listener rather than a viewer understood them' (Small (2005), 165).

<sup>780</sup> Similarly to Auct. ad Herennium III.22 and Quint. *Inst.* XI.2.35, 40.

by Quint. *Inst.* XI.2.33. But the fact that we first recalled this same place from Quintilian in connection with concentration<sup>781</sup> shows a sense in which we can take the first two rules to be in connection: in order to memorize, the mind needs to focus on the chosen subject (first rule), and to do so a frequent, loud repetition helps, as it keeps the mind busy and alert through constant speaking and listening (second rule).

ταῦτά] The exigency that the memory of something be as accurate as possible is particularly felt in oratory, in order to avoid the unpleasant situation of not being able to recall a ready-made speech. For when one happens to lack even just one word, they will find it hard to figure out a substitute, as observed at Quint. *Inst.* XI.2.49.<sup>782</sup>

Interestingly, when literacy appeared, a change of psychical task occurred, ‘from [...] remembering to [...] writing and then, later, reading back the information’,<sup>783</sup> a transition which led to ‘a greater need for memory for words’<sup>784</sup> than in preliterate times. For as Plato pinpoints in *Phdr.* 274e-275d, the written text is an entity external to man and is, therefore, something over which he has no control. So, when he wishes to repeat it, he does not have words of his own to do it, and he is bound to pass through the exact ones of which the text consists. But the diffusion of written texts promoted the development of a memory *verbatim* in another sense as well: for, as Small put it, ‘one of literacy’s most notable effects is that it feeds upon itself. The more literate you are the more words you need to remember’.<sup>785</sup> In other words, since literacy stimulated the growth of the vocabulary, it has been maintained that by the 5<sup>th</sup> century BCE, the words used in the written communication were already too many to be handled ‘without some kind of improved retrieval system’.<sup>786</sup>

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<sup>781</sup> See *supra*, 257, n. 753.

<sup>782</sup> ‘Nam et invitus perdit quisque id quod elegerat verbum, nec facile reponit aliud, dum id, quod scripserat quaerit’.

<sup>783</sup> Norman (1993), 78, quoted in Small (2005), 4.

<sup>784</sup> Small (2005), 4.

<sup>785</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>786</sup> *Ibid.*, 74.

#### § 9.4

τρίτον...ἴππον] As Blum<sup>787</sup> pointed out, this third rule, especially in its statement ἄ...καταθέσθαι, is on the same wavelength as Longinus' remark that what is known (τὸ γνῶριμον) is the starting point for the memory of what is still to be known (τὸ γνωστόν, Longin. Fr. 201-202). Small recalled that this method for remembering unfamiliar words is also known as 'keyword mnemotechnics' among modern psychologists, whose tests showed that it helps memorize new words in the short term rather than the long term, for which a standard study of the word within its proper meaningful context gives better results.<sup>788</sup>

Our author then illustrates two different cases to which this rule applies: the former involves the so-called *memory of words* and is exemplified in the current and following paragraphs, whereas to the latter, concerning the *memory of things*, § 9.6 is devoted. The distinction between a first moment, where the general rule is given, and a second one, in which explanatory examples are offered, betrays the degree of development of the technique taught here which confutes the tradition of the mnemonics of ancient Greek authors as usually made of just long lists of ready-made mental images for the user to use slavishly, with no regard for what could have really stimulated their imagination and, hence, their memory (Auct. ad Herennium III.23).

ἄ κα] Similarly to what has been seen earlier, this solution by Blass proves again to be fitter than αἶ κα of the codices, which is followed by Robinson, but also than the new αἶ <ἄ> κα, which Schanz proposed.<sup>789</sup> This conjecture would be worth considering only if we did not accept Blass' emendation of ἔπειτα into ἐπὶ τὰ;<sup>790</sup> we would thus obtain the plausible τρίτον, αἶ ἄ κα ἀκούσης, ἔπειτα οἶδας καταθέσθαι. But, rightly, the editors

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<sup>787</sup> Blum (1969), 145.

<sup>788</sup> Small (2005), 101. He drew, in particular, on Wang/Thomas (1995) for this.

<sup>789</sup> Schanz (1884), 382.

<sup>790</sup> Blass in Weber (1897), 51. But, similarly to *supra*, 259, n. 775, De Varis had already conjectured the same (Robinson (1972), 198, Robinson (1996), 92).



have unanimously preferred ἐπὶ τὰ, because it enhances the relation between this first occurrence of κατατίθῃμι, enunciating the general statement of the third rule, and the following ones in the chapter, construed with ἐπί and the accusative and introducing sample cases of that rule.

**ἀκούσης]** In all of the examples of the third rule, the objects referred to as new or as known will be single elements, like names or things, and not compound ones, like sentences or collections of things. After all, creating associations between objects of the first group is simpler than doing it with those of the second, which the mind finds difficult to visualize in the first place (Auct. ad Herennium III.20-21).<sup>791</sup> In light of this fact, I have here varied the translation of the verb from what I did previously, opting, with most translators, for the primary meaning of ‘to hear’, because in order to memorize the objects the author proposes, a single listening is sufficient, and the aid of writing is not necessary.

**ἐπὶ...καταθέσθαι]** The principle underlying this statement is that of association,<sup>792</sup> a well known (Pl. *Phd.* 73c-74a, Arist. *Mem.* 452a8-16, Cic. *de Orat.* II.357, Quint. *Inst.* XI.2.30-31, Longin. *Rh.* I.2.201-202) and powerful principle of memory, and because of which here, once the connection between the new object and the one already known is established, whenever one tries to recollect (μεμνᾶσθαι) the former, the image of the latter comes up and guides them to their goal. Although Blum was right in judging the author as lacking ‘die Gestaltung von Bildern’,<sup>793</sup> since no indication is given concerning the aspect that the images should have,<sup>794</sup> the conscious use of both the principle of association and of different methods to visualise words and things proves that shaping

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<sup>791</sup> Blum (1969), 54.

<sup>792</sup> Blum (1969), 51, 58.

<sup>793</sup> Ibid., 50.

<sup>794</sup> But see also Yates’ right remark, *infra*, 265.

the mental images is nonetheless the heart of the author's peculiar mnemonic system, seemingly without mnemonic places.

δεῖ...ἵππον] Given in this second part of the paragraph is the first of two examples of how the rule of association can be applied to τὰ ὀνόματα, namely to names, as later explicated at the end of § 9.5. The contrast between τὰ ὀνόματα and τὰ πράγματα, which has characterised the treatise so far,<sup>795</sup> has a mnemonic version, here and in the last paragraph, devoted to the memory of things.<sup>796</sup> Thus, another historically known mnemonic feature comes up, namely the distinction between *memoria verborum* and *memoria rerum*.<sup>797</sup> The objects with which these two genres of memory operate are both expressed by words, but whereas *memoria verborum* aims to store these words with exactness, both as to which they are and in what order they are set (if more than one, like in a sentence), *memoria rerum* is just concerned with keeping their meaning.<sup>798</sup> This difference has led me to translate the names of *memoria verborum* between single quotation marks, so as to indicate that they are considered under their status as words, rather than for what they indicate, as happens to the things of *memoria rerum*, instead.

The genre of *memoria verborum* as illustrated here is, more precisely, etymological<sup>799</sup> and it specifically applies to those proper names, which, taken undividedly, like at

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<sup>795</sup> §§ 1.11, 2.1 (where τὸ σῶμα takes the place of τὸ πρᾶγμα), 3.13, 4.6.

<sup>796</sup> On this conceptual continuity, see also Kranz (1937), 226.

<sup>797</sup> Blum (1969), 51, n. 99, Desbordes (1987), 36. Other ancient sources are Cic. *de Orat.* II.359, Auct. ad Herennium. III.20.

<sup>798</sup> See also Blum (1969), 13). In light of the rhetorical context of ancient mnemonics, Yates recalled Cicero's distinction between *res* and *verba* in oratory (Cic. *Inv.* I.7.9), to conclude that "'things" are thus the subject matter of the speech; "words" are the language in which the subject matter is clothed' (Yates (1966), 9).

<sup>799</sup> 'Etymologisches Verfahren' or 'Sinnverfahren', according to Blum, who recognizes also a 'Stellvertretungsverfahren' and a 'Klangverfahren' (or 'Phonetisches Verfahren') as other possible classes of *memoria verborum* applied to names (Blum (1969), 19-21). Desbordes did not agree with this label, observing how the meanings of the words which are identified as components of the proper name do not contribute to reveal the overall meaning of the name (Desbordes (1987), 36). But they dictate how the mnemonic images of the name must be, hence the method could be considered etymological at least with regard to them.

Quint. *Inst.* XI.2.31,<sup>800</sup> or cut into parts, like in this case of Χρύσιππος, recall nouns<sup>801</sup> easier to visualise. An implicit assumption here is that one does not know, directly or indirectly, any person having the name to be remembered. Otherwise, firstly, the name would not be new to them, and, secondly, an association between the name and the mental image of this acquaintance would be more straightforward, and therefore more advisable,<sup>802</sup> than the one here prescribed. But if so, then it is legitimate to wonder who could be genuinely interested in learning the names of people they do not know anything about. As Blum noticed, the case of Hippias, who is said to be able to repeat a list of fifty names in the correct order after only one listening, reveals that such performances were practiced by sophists, either as a personal exercise of memory training,<sup>803</sup> or in a public demonstration of his own value. Yates also suggested the possibility that Plato's satire on the sophists' use of etymology could be partially due precisely to the mnemonic application of it, on the basis of his condemnation of the art of memory.<sup>804</sup>

## § 9.5

ἄλλο...ὄνυματων] Here we find the second and last example of etymological *memoria verborum*, in which a proper name (Πυριλάμπη) is easily remembered through the visualization of its components (τὸ πῦρ καὶ τὸ λάμπειν). The final remark on this procedure's restriction to names (τάδε μὲν περὶ τῶν ὀνυμάτων) presents a correlative μέν, and it anticipates the opposite τὰ δὲ πράγματα at the beginning of § 9.6.

<sup>800</sup> The names 'Aper', 'Ursus', 'Naso', 'Crispus', 'Cicero', 'Verrius', 'Aurelius' are proposed.

<sup>801</sup> Other kinds of words, like conjunctions, articles, and pronouns, cannot be reduced to images, as also observed at Cic. *de Orat.* II.359.

<sup>802</sup> It would be a case of 'Stellvertretungsverfahren' (Blum (1969) 19), as we read at Auct. ad Herennium III.18, Quint. *Inst.* XI.2.30.

<sup>803</sup> Cf. 'Nec nos hanc verborum memoriam inducimus, <ut versus meminisse possimus,> sed ut hac exercitatione illa rerum memoria, quae pertinet ad utilitatem, confirmetur' (Auct. ad Herennium III.24).

<sup>804</sup> Yates (1966), 37.

## § 9.6

τὰ...Ἐπειὸν] Discussed here is the application of the rule of association to the memory of things (τὰ δὲ πράγματα), or *memoria rerum*, and, in particular, its accomplishment through the use of symbolic images.<sup>805</sup> This precept too is attested in other ancient sources (Cic. *de Orat.* II.357, Auct. ad Herennium III.20), but only here are the examples concerned with the memorization of single things and not of complexes of them.<sup>806</sup>

These examples consist in three concepts which need to be connected to the images of concrete entities in order to be remembered. Ancient Greek gods and mythical characters are therefore brought in to accompany two psychological dispositions (ἀνδρεία and δειλία) and a profession (χαλκεία). Correctly, Yates believed that ‘here we may perhaps see in an archaically simple form those human figures representing “things” which finally developed into the *imagines agentes*’,<sup>807</sup> namely into human images ‘arousing emotional affects’<sup>808</sup> through their look ‘striking and unusual [...] beautiful or hideous, comic or obscene’<sup>809</sup> and ‘dramatically engaged in some activity’<sup>810</sup> (Cic. *de Orat.* II.357, Auct. ad Herennium III.21-22).

As Blum<sup>811</sup> recalled, Hephaestus, in particular, is the outcome of a metonymy representing what is done through the agent who does it, and is also mentioned at Auct. ad Herennium IV.43 and Quint. *Inst.* VIII.6.23, but just as a rhetorical figure. From this

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<sup>805</sup> According to Blum’s classification, *memoria rerum* applied to individual objects can be divided into ‘Abbilder’ and ‘Sinnbilder’; the latter, in turn, consists of ‘Teilbilder’ and ‘Symbolbilder’ which is the category to which these examples belong (Blum (1969), 13-17).

<sup>806</sup> Cf. ‘hoc modo, ut si accusator dixerit ab reo hominem veneno necatum, et hereditatis causa factum arguerit, et eius rei multos dixerit testes et conscios esse: si hoc primum, ut ad defendendum nobis expeditum <sit> meminisse volemus, in primo loco rei totius imaginem conformabimus: aegrotum in lecto cubantem faciemus ipsum illum, de quo agetur, si formam eius detinebimus; si eum non, at aliquem aegrotum <non> de minimo loco sumemus, ut cito in mentem venire possit. Et reum ad lectum eius adstituemus, dextera poculum, sinistra tabulas, medico testiculos arietinos tenentem: hoc modo et testium et hereditatis et veneno necati memoriam habere poterimus.’ (Auct. ad Herennium III.20). See also Blum (1969), 17-18.

<sup>807</sup> Yates (1966), 30.

<sup>808</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>809</sup> Ibid.

<sup>810</sup> Ibid.

<sup>811</sup> Blum (1969), 28, nn. 124-125.

perspective, the author of *Dissoi Logoi* can be shown to anticipate the medieval awareness of the mnemonic function of this and other rhetorical tropes.<sup>812</sup>

περὶ δειλίας...Ἐπειόν] Epeius is known not only as the builder of the wooden horse in the siege of Troy. His cowardice, reflected by his ineptitude in war, is largely attested by another tradition, less famous, as Robinson's puzzlement about this last example indirectly proves,<sup>813</sup> and whose first testimony dates back to Cratinus.<sup>814</sup>

Ἐπειόν\*\*\*] All manuscripts have a lacuna after the word Ἐπειόν, and with it the text of the chapter and of the entire treatise ends. Since we have no hint as to the extent of the loss, we can conjecture that it was large enough to contain at least one rule about mnemonic places which is fundamental to recalling the order in which images come, and is mentioned in all the other later testimonies of ancient mnemonics.<sup>815</sup> A more speculative theory, though still possible, is that the chapter would have then concluded by summing up the author's view on the matter, a usual feature of the other chapters, yet not shared by the eighth.

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<sup>812</sup> On this medieval discovery, see Blum (1969), 29.

<sup>813</sup> Robinson (1979), 240.

<sup>814</sup> Ἐπειοῦ δειλότερος (Cratin. CAF 460.1); see also Zachos (2013), 16. *Contra* Dillon and Gergel who described his cowardice as becoming proverbial only 'in later times' (Dillon/Gergel (2003), 411).

<sup>815</sup> See *supra*, 254, n. 742.

#### 4. The author's message

##### § 1. Two parts, one work: the structural duality and conceptual unity of *Dissoi Logoi*

Earlier on, I showed the reasons why I believe that the nine chapters of the work are more likely to be complete speeches than notes propaedeutic to write one, and as likely to have a didactic use as not.<sup>816</sup> Having read, translated, and scrutinized the text, we are now in a better position to widen our focus and assess whether the work is just a collection of random speeches, or whether it also possesses a specific meaning when considered as a whole.

Without a doubt, a first-time reader's initial impression of *Dissoi Logoi* is hardly one of unity. Although all dealing with motifs belonging to the sophistic culture, each of the nine chapters has an individual and separate theme, and not only do chapters 1-6 stand out for their antilogic form, as opposed to the demonstrative speeches of 7-9,<sup>817</sup> but structural differences within the former group are also clearly visible. Such heterogeneity is, hence, acknowledged by all scholars, who yet divide themselves on how to explain it.

As first, Trieber marked the hiatus in the work one chapter earlier than I do, and judged chapters 6-9 to be so distant in contents from 1-5, as even to pose doubts regarding their authenticity.<sup>818</sup> Farther along this line went Zeller, who suggested that the whole work is the product of multiple authors.<sup>819</sup> Gomperz maintained that *Dissoi Logoi* was originally meant as antilogic, but due to growing haste the author simplified its second part, by putting it down in the form of single speeches.<sup>820</sup> Robinson observed

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<sup>816</sup> See *supra*, 44-48.

<sup>817</sup> They can be seen as examples of ἐπίδειξις, but provided one assumes the Platonic use of this term, as 'public presentation of literature or speech' (sometimes sarcastically, with reference to his opponents' speeches; cf. Pl. *Hp.Mi.* 363a-d) (Timmerman (1996), 230), and not the Aristotelian technical one indicating the miscellaneous class of encomiastic, funeral and festival speeches (Ibid., 229).

<sup>818</sup> Trieber (1892), 224-225.

<sup>819</sup> Zeller (1920), 1333, n.1.

<sup>820</sup> Gomperz (1912), 186-187.

that antilogy is particularly appropriate for the first six chapters, as ‘in such matters articulate cases for and against particular propositions have been put forward by φιλοσοφοῦντες’,<sup>821</sup> and here the author is simply sketching out this debate without seriously taking part in it. By contrast, in chapters 7-9 the author’s views ‘start to emerge more and more clearly’,<sup>822</sup> and the monologic form then becomes more natural.<sup>823</sup> Rossetti supposed a promotional goal for the work, through which the author would have advertised a sophistic course of his to an audience, such as the Peloponnesian one, more easily captivated by wonder than by persuasion. As a result, the abrupt move from the initial antilogic chapters, whose philosophical themes are ideal to attract the listeners’ imagination, to the following political and rhetorical dissertations would likely have had precisely the possible intentional effect of bewilderment.<sup>824</sup> Finally, a special case is that of Kranz, who argued for some unifying train of thought to be carefully spotted under the apparent inconsistency of the work. He observed how the notion of wisdom (σοφία) firstly tackled in chapter 5, as opposed to ignorance (ἀμαθία), appears in chapter 6 too, where its teachability is at issue; it is, then, required from a good public officer, in chapter 7; it is accurately described for the various forms it usually takes when meant as the wisdom of a successful man, in chapter 8; finally, it is what needs the support of a well-trained memory, such as that illustrated in chapter 9.<sup>825</sup>

Interesting reflections, hence, emerge here, and yet I do not see them as the most salient ones, which I shall soon introduce. Trieber’s and Zeller’s similar ideas that different authors are responsible for different parts of the text do not agree, firstly, with what has been seen earlier about *Dissoi Logoi*’s stylistical unity;<sup>826</sup> secondly with the exhibition of the same rhetorical features throughout the work, such as the exchange

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<sup>821</sup> Robinson (1979), 79.

<sup>822</sup> Ibid., 81.

<sup>823</sup> Ibid., 79.

<sup>824</sup> Rossetti (1980), 28-29.

<sup>825</sup> Kranz (1937), 226-227.

<sup>826</sup> See *supra*, 23-24.

with an imaginary interlocutor (§§ 1.12-14, 2.21, 3.13, 4.4, 4.6, 5.7-10,15, 7.2-3), rhetorical question (§§ 2.28, 3.2,5,6,8, 5.13, 6.7,8, 8.2), and literary reference (§§ 2.19, 3.9,11-12, 6.8, 9.6). Robinson's identification of different operations in the two parts of the work, a descriptive one in chapters 1-6 and an argumentative one in chapters 7-9, sounds safer than both the excessive stress which Rossetti puts on the rhetorical value of the shift from antilogy to epideixis, and Gomperz's mere speculation about the work's origin as fully antilogic. Even the moderate version of the latter (which Robinson himself proposed) claiming that some expressions in the text give a 'dialectical tension'<sup>827</sup> to chapter 7 and 8, fails to convince, as I showed in the commentary. Although Robinson is therefore right in emphasising the disconnect between the structure and goal of *Dissoi Logoi*, I believe that the work finds its unity on a third level, which he did not mention, namely that of contents.

This comes hardly as a surprise, after what I stated at the beginning about the sophistic temper of the themes dealt with in *Dissoi Logoi*. Kranz too went down this line, but the notion of σοφία, which he saw as connecting all the speeches together, is certainly pivotal in chapters 5-6, but loses its priority in chapters 7-9, being accompanied by other relevant ones (sortition, man's education, and memory above all), without mentioning, as in fact he did not do, that it is even absent in chapters 1-4. I believe that where to look for the thematical unity of *Dissoi Logoi* is, rather, chapter 8, which has been comparatively neglected by commentators, but which bears special relevance on a few levels.

First and foremost, chapter 8 furnishes the strongest evidence of the sophistic nature of the text. For whereas the other chapters cover various subjects potentially interesting for either a philosopher (chapters 1-6), or a rhetor (chapters 7 and 9), chapter 8 outlines a comprehensive omniscience which keeps together abilities belonging to

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<sup>827</sup> Robinson (1977), 135.



both such figures and which easily reflect the kind of culture usually associated with sophists.

Secondly, and what more matters in the current discussion, among these abilities one finds those characterizing chapters 1-7. For the antilogies of chapters 1-6 can be considered under the heading of λόγων τέχναι (§ 8.1, 13). The one single art (ἡ αὐτὴ τέχνη) about which chapter 8 speaks is reminiscent of the wisdom and excellence (σοφία καὶ ἀρετὰ) the teachability of which is discussed in chapter 6; consider the reference to sophists as the acknowledged teachers of these subjects (§ 6.5, 7), and to their goal of making a man important (§ 6.6). Finally, advising the city to appoint their public magistrates by election rather than sortition, in chapter 7, is an instance of δαμαγορεῖν (§ 8.1, 6). This identification process leaves out chapter 9, although one may argue that memory, there discussed, is essential in retaining the many objects of knowledge mentioned in chapter 8, sometimes even magnified as ‘everything’ (πάντα/περὶ πάντων ἐπίστασθαι, in §§ 8.4, 7, 12, 13).

In light of this network of cross-references, a new unitary reading of *Dissoi Logoi* becomes possible, which lies in chapter 8. For the work can be regarded as the compilation of a programmatic sophistic manifesto (chapter 8) preceded by a demonstration of some of the skills showcased in that programme (chapters 1-7), and followed by an appendix on memory - perhaps on other subjects too, as the surviving work ends with a lacuna (chapter 9). On this hypothesis, chapters 1-8 could thus constitute a long unit of text with promotional function as it emerges particularly from chapter 8.<sup>828</sup> For there, in illustrating the plurality of expertises brought by the single art (ἡ αὐτὴ τέχνη) in question, the author implies that he is the kind of sophist who knows and masters the latter, as well as it stands to reason that the man who is repeatedly associated with this art (ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνὴρ) is the one who the reader will want to become, if the speech succeeds in persuading them. If so, then one could think of chapters 8 in

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<sup>828</sup> Rossetti too agreed that chapter 8 shows this function the most, but included chapter 9 in this unit (Rossetti (1980), 29-32).

the same way as Muir interpreted Alcidamas' *Against the Sophists*: 'a programme of what should be taught and arguments for its importance [...] designed to attract and persuade and to whet the appetite'.<sup>829</sup> For any 4<sup>th</sup>-century 'skilful, publicity-conscious rhetor' - as Alcidamas and, possibly, our sophist were - would advertise 'part of his wares, giving a kind of public prospectus for a course of instruction'.<sup>830</sup> To this end, he would certainly address 'an audience of prospecting students' in person, 'but for those who could not be there', he needed to resort to 'information technology – the written word'.<sup>831</sup>

The latter scenario seems the one which better suits Alcidamas' *Against the Sophists* and *Dissoi Logoi* 1-8, as they both stray from 'even the simplest conventional [...] structure'<sup>832</sup> of a formal speech designed for a public performance, consisting in an introduction, a middle part and a conclusion. They also lack an 'address to a real or imaginary audience', unless one is content with the quick and flimsy cases of 'Alcidamas' claim to be making an accusation – *kategoria* – in § 1'<sup>833</sup> and our author's mention of a circle of uninitiated people to whom he was talking, at § 4.4. The two texts are also almost of the same and short length (*Dissoi Logoi* 1-8 being slightly longer), which befits a possible promotional nature of the work, and, rather than speeches, both may be seen as treatises 'falling in no definite category'.<sup>834</sup> The only substantial difference between the two is that in chapters 1-7 our sophist also gives demonstrations of what he promises to his customer in chapter 8; by contrast, all that Alcidamas' client could find in *Against the Sophists* is promotion of the ability to make extempore speeches, albeit to a higher degree of detail than how the various *Dissoi Logoi* abilities are showcased in chapter 8.

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<sup>829</sup> Muir (2001), xiii.

<sup>830</sup> Ibid.

<sup>831</sup> Ibid.

<sup>832</sup> Ibid.

<sup>833</sup> Ibid.

<sup>834</sup> Ibid., xvii.

If this interpretation of chapters 1-8 is the case, how can we explain chapter 9? One can accept that the work starts *in medias res* with an essay of some sophistic skill, in chapters 1-7, and that then it informs the reader of how those are actually parts of a broader teaching making a man competent and successful in various fields. Less likely, instead, seems the hypothesis that in this same work, after such move from the particular to the general, the author wants to go back to a specific skill again, such as mnemonics of chapter 9. One may of course suppose that as chapter 8 concludes and contextualizes what precedes it, chapter 9 opens up a new section of the work, covering various chapters now lost in the lacuna with which the work now ends. However, it seems less speculative, and hence preferable, to me to think of chapters 1-8 and chapter 9 as separate writings gathered together because belonging to the same sophistic author, as similarity in language and style suggests, and maybe even forming a bigger corpus of texts with other pieces now lost in the lacuna.

## § 2. The author's sophistic ideology

Another surprisingly unnoticed aspect of chapter 8 is its contribution to reconstructing the author's personal views on the topics which, as earlier observed, make *Dissoi Logoi* a typically sophistic text. Once again, what emerges in this respect does not just tally with, but is also confirmed by, other passages of *Dissoi Logoi*, proving the author's consistency throughout.

To begin with, two opposite tempers, a philosophical and a dialectico-rhetorical one, coexist in the chapter. The former emerges from the necessity of an in-depth knowledge of the things we speak about in §§ 8.9-11 and echoes in the notions of ἀλάθεια τῶν πραγμάτων and φύσις τῶν ἀπάντων, in § 8.1, as well as in the discussion of the latter of these, in § 8.2. The requirement of such a knowledge is also aligned with the exigency of competence, observed in §§ 6.3,7 and, especially, in chapter 7. Furthermore, an ontological concern with the nature (φύσις) of things belonged to chapter 5 and § 6.8, a paragraph to which I will come back soon. The dialectico-rhetorical

thread, on the other hand, runs across the analyses of the λόγων τέχναι in §§ 8.3-6, of δαμαγορεῖν in § 8.6, and of the improvised knowledge provided by τὰ δέοντα in §§ 8.7-8; across the unargued derivation of omniscience from ἀλάθεια τῶν πραγμάτων in § 8.12, up to the treatment of κατὰ βραχὺ διαλέγεσθαι in § 8.13. The difference between the two groups of passages and between the strands they represent<sup>835</sup> can be grasped especially if one compares §§ 8.9-11 with §§ 8.3-5: in the first case, the knowledge of things is necessary to be able to describe them in words, in the second one, the knowledge of things is shown as deriving merely from the ability of composing speeches about them. In its turn, the distinction between a layer of things and one of words comes up in a few points of the work, with the stock phrase ὥσπερ καὶ τῶνυμα οὕτω καὶ τὸ πράγμα frequently being the rhetorical device used in the DTs to declare things not to be, ‘such as the facts are’; a formulation also hinting, by contrast, at the theory of truth as correspondence between world and word which has a pivotal part in the first speech of chapter 4.

Here a reflection on the date of the work becomes necessary again. For as far as our evidence goes, the idea of an omniscience bridging philosophy and art of speech is typical of 5<sup>th</sup>-century sophists, as Scholz observed.<sup>836</sup> For example, in Pl. *Sph.* 232a-233c the Visitor reveals it as a deception, and Socrates does the same throughout the *Euthydemus*. Its alleged philosophical component is what Plato distrusted the most, regarding it as a mere application of the art of contradiction to ‘private discussions about

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<sup>835</sup> Solana Dueso identified two similar groups, but he also argued that the chapter aims to prove that the rhetorical skills are subordinated to the philosophical ones, as would be shown simply by the fact that ἐπίστασθαι and εἰδέναι are the most used words (Solana Dueso (1996), 172-173, 176). But these verbs change their degree of truthfulness according to the context in which they are used: e.g., the same form ἐπιστάσθαι introduces a not reliable profession of omniscience in § 8.4, considering the justification for this claim then given in § 8.5, whereas in § 8.10 it is used in the sensible observation that the knowledge of legal issues precedes that of laws. By not discriminating between similar opposed uses, Solana Dueso inevitably fell in the mistake of reading the whole chapter as consistently making the same case as Socrates when praising the good rhetoric in Plato’s *Phaedrus*. In like manner, simply passing over the distinction of the two different classes of skills, Sichirollo too read the chapter as advocating the supremacy of philosophy over rhetoric (Sichirollo (1966), 43-48).

<sup>836</sup> Becker/Scholz (2004), 40.

being and coming-to-be'<sup>837</sup> (*Sph.* 232c). Upon reflection on *Sph.* 234b, one can conclude that, according to Plato, any declaration of knowing the truth of things of the kind our author takes (§ 8.1, 12) would be just the illusory product of a sophistic art, and not the solid grounding of a wise rhetoric, as it should be.

Conversely, separation between these two contrasting tempers of sophistic instruction occurred over the 4<sup>th</sup> century BCE, as one can see in Isocrates' *Against the Sophists* or *Antidosis*, and schools of philosophy and rhetoric were then opened for the first time in Athens.<sup>838</sup> Particularly indicative in this regard is *Antidosis*, where Isocrates claims that there is 'no place in training of practical statesmen for any but practical subjects',<sup>839</sup> and that young men should keep themselves far from any kind of philosophical speculations, which in fact he derogatorily qualifies as 'sophistic'. For similar 'barren subtleties' can just deviate the learner's mind from those superior studies 'which will enable us to govern wisely both our own households and the commonwealth'<sup>840</sup> (Isoc. *Antidosis* 285).

Furthermore, Morrison recalled how at 268, Isocrates' criticism is addressed especially to the study of the early philosophers of nature: he openly mentions Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Ion, Alcmaeon, Parmenides, Melissus and Gorgias, and again disparages them as 'ancient sophists'.<sup>841</sup> This passage sends the reader of *Dissoi Logoi* back to the controversial § 6.8, where Anaxagoreans and Pythagoreans too are presented as acknowledged teachers of wisdom and excellence. Regardless of whether or not here

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<sup>837</sup> Translation by Nicholas P. White in Cooper (1997), 235.

<sup>838</sup> Cicero illuminates this transition in classical Greek culture for us in *de Orat.* III.72-73: 'the older masters down to Socrates used to combine with their theory of rhetoric the whole of the study and the science of everything that concerns morals and conduct and ethics and politics; it was subsequently, as I have explained, that the two groups of students were separated from one another, by Socrates and then similarly by all the Socratic schools, and the philosophers looked down on eloquence and the orators on wisdom, and never touched anything from the side of the other study except what this group borrowed from that one, or that one from this; whereas they would have drawn from the common supply indifferently if they had been willing to remain in the partnership of early days' (translation from Rackham (1942), 59). See also Becker/Scholz (2004), 39.

<sup>839</sup> Morrison (1958), 217.

<sup>840</sup> Translation from Norlin (1929), 343.

<sup>841</sup> Morrison (1958), 217.

our author too applies the label of sophists to them, what matters is that he proves to be perfectly happy with what Isocrates instead explicitly condemns: some private teachers' idea that a successful education passes also through physical studies, such as those which in earlier times Pythagoras and Anaxagoras too included in their doctrines. Part of the Pythagorean παιδεία was, in fact, taken up by astronomy, and in Arist. *Metaph.* B 998b Pythagoreans are understood, along with Plato, as those who contemplate the nature of beings, treating the first principles of those as genera. In Pl. *Phdr.* 269e-270c, then, Anaxagoras is presented as the teacher who made Pericles 'the greatest rhetorician of all', precisely by providing him with that 'ethereal speculation about nature', which is a prerequisite of 'all the great arts'.<sup>842</sup> In the specific case of rhetoric, Plato observes, the relevant nature to know is that of the soul, which is why Anaxagoras' teaching on mind helped Pericles so much.

The temptation of reading the quick reference of our text to Anaxagoreans and Pythagoreans as a covert attack on Is. *Antidosis* 268 is as strong as it is risky. What one can more cautiously conclude from this comparison with Isocrates is that Scholz is right in associating the weight that philosophy has in our author's educational programme to the old 5<sup>th</sup>-century sophistic paradigm more than to the 4<sup>th</sup>-century educational system. However, this does not mean that at that time the ideal of universal knowledge combining the art of speaking and philosophy was completely 'überkommenen',<sup>843</sup> let alone leading us to prefer the earlier standard dating of between 403 and 395 BCE because it is earlier. For the polemical character of the aforementioned *Antidosis* passages indirectly testifies that early philosophical doctrines actually kept on playing a role in the programmes of some mid-4<sup>th</sup> century private teachers too. Further, the sole absence of this intellectual trait in the 4<sup>th</sup> century writings in our possession cannot rule out, *e silentio*, the possibility that a sophist, especially if from a peripheral Greek area, could still practice his profession in the traditional manner, offering, maybe still as a

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<sup>842</sup> Translation by Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff in Cooper (1997), 546.

<sup>843</sup> Becker/Scholz (2004), 40.

travelling teacher, an educational program as wide as possible, and useful also to win the day against a philosopher.

What I see as noteworthy about the author's claim of omniscience in chapter 8, is, rather, the fact that the two opposing trends I mentioned above can be identified with the philosophy (φιλοσοφία) and wisdom (σοφία) mentioned in § 9.1; incidentally, that also confirms my earlier views about this chapter's author being the same as the author of those before. These two terms, in turn, are striking for their sharp distinction, highlighted by the *καί* which join them together, and, at the same time, for their both better performing with the aid of a theoretical tool such as memory. They, in other words, are pictured as two separate proper disciplines, and that backs my later dating, as only in the 4<sup>th</sup> century, with Plato's dialogues, did φιλοσοφία rise to the status of discipline as opposed 'to the many varieties of *Sophia* or "wisdom" recognized by Plato's predecessors and contemporaries'.<sup>844</sup>

Similarly to what has just been said about the lack of 4<sup>th</sup>-century textual evidence of sophistic omniscience, the absence of ῥητορικὴ in § 8.1 cannot prove that this Platonic term 'had not yet entered into common usage'<sup>845</sup> when *Dissoi Logoi*'s author was writing, as Schiappa maintained, instead. As he himself acknowledged elsewhere, 'the word rhetoric is not found in the writings of Isocrates – even in the various texts in which Isocrates explicitly describes and defends his teachings'.<sup>846</sup> By the same logic which Schiappa applied to *Dissoi Logoi*, should one hence question Isocrates' dating and profession merely based on this silence? Once again, I suggest attention should, rather, be shifted to another aspect concerning the author's acquaintance with the art of speaking, namely the division in 'a beginning, a conclusion and a middle' (§ 6.13) at the end of the second speech of chapter 6. And, as above, it is Schiappa himself who accredited my suggested dating, when, in revising Kennedy's authoritative opinion that

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<sup>844</sup> Nightingale (1995), 14.

<sup>845</sup> Kennedy (1980), 19.

<sup>846</sup> Schiappa/Timmerman (2010), 47-48.

the 5<sup>th</sup>-century Syracusan rhetors Corax and Tisias first introduced the division of the parts of a speech,<sup>847</sup> he pointed out how ‘the codification of this distinction belongs to the fourth century BCE rather than the fifth’.<sup>848</sup>

In conclusion, the kind of sophist emerging from *Dissoi Logoi* is one who offers both a philosophical and a dialectico-rhetorical preparation, the two being unified under the umbrella of a single art, discussed in chapter 8, which promises to make man omniscient, with no regard for the opposition between the ways in which these two strands interpret the relationship between knowledge and speech. Although seen as on the same level, these philosophical and dialectico-rhetorical trends seem also to coincide with two distinct disciplines, namely philosophy and wisdom, mentioned in § 9.1 and so support my 4<sup>th</sup>-century dating of the work. To complete our picture, if it is true that Isocrates could have criticized the role of philosophy of nature in this educational system, on the other hand, he would have agreed with our author on the two following points. Firstly, just like Isocrates in *Against the Sophists* and *Antidosis*, *Dissoi Logoi*’s sophist too aims to make a pupil rhetorically skilled (chapter 8) and hence politically excellent (chapter 6). Secondly, he takes a characteristic stance against the sortition of public officers, but from a democratic standpoint (chapter 7), just as in Isocrates’ *Areopagiticus*. These two factors can be easily read together as claiming that only he who has received an adequate teaching of σοφία and ἀρετή can then be meritoriously and freely elected by citizens.<sup>849</sup>

### § 3. Within the first section

#### § 3.1 Chapters 1-6

As touched on earlier, chapters 1-6 stand out as the true ‘contrasting speeches’, namely as antilogies in which two opposing theses are firstly stated and then argued for,

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<sup>847</sup> Schiappa (1999), 4-6.

<sup>848</sup> Schiappa/Timmerman (2010), 170.

<sup>849</sup> On the thematic continuity between chapters 6 and 7, see also Kranz (1937), 226.



without the author seeming to genuinely uphold any of them, as opposed to the three single speeches making up chapters 7-9, in which the authorial standpoint emerges with clarity. From a sophistic perspective, this is also the section which is easier to associate with Protagoras, both because antilogy is a distinctive trait of the latter, and because his influence can be felt in chapter 6, *via* Plato's *Protagoras*.<sup>850</sup>

At the same time, the diversity of forms which antilogy takes in this section has led some scholars to wonder whether this structure is actually common to all chapters 1-6, or, instead, proper *δισσοὶ λόγοι* are only a subset of those. There surely is mileage in this. For on the one hand, Kranz was right in regarding all six of them as displaying the conflict of a thesis with an antithesis, and in arguing that the most immediate boundary to draw within them is the insubstantial one between the first five chapters, in which identity and difference theses are contrasted, and chapter 6, in which this contrast does not occur.<sup>851</sup> On the other hand, a more minute division within chapters 1-5 themselves proves to be not only possible, but also necessary to appreciate rhetorical and philosophical elements which *prima facie* the work does not seem to possess. The issue is therefore not a banal one, and an indication of that comes from Robinson, who in his edition initially claimed that the work's '(supposedly) "antilogical" quality is apparently confined to the first four chapters, with perhaps a truncated example in the fifth',<sup>852</sup> but shortly after he seems to have changed his mind,<sup>853</sup> and in his commentary

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<sup>850</sup> On these chapters, in particular, Solana Dueso grounds his reading of *Dissoi Logoi* as a controversy between Protagoras' relativism, represented by the ITs of chapters 1-5 and the teachability thesis of chapter 6, on one side, and Socrates' essentialism characterizing DTs and the unteachability thesis, on the other (Solana Dueso (1996), 177). Yet, that simplifies things excessively. For, firstly, some relativistic arguments in support of ITs are pronounced by Socrates himself within the Socratic literature (cf. the example of taking a sword away from a depressed friend, in § 3.4, and X. *Mem.* IV.2.17). Secondly, as for essentialism, the case of a number which disappears when another one is subtracted from it, is used to show that, in the same way, the identity of *any object* (καὶ τὰλλα καττωὺτό) is compromised by any minimal change, in § 5.14; by contrast, at Pl. *Cra.* 432a-b Socrates points out to Cratylus how things, in general, and words, in particular, do not behave in the way as that same arithmetic example shows.

<sup>851</sup> Kranz (1937), 226-227.

<sup>852</sup> Robinson (1979), 77.

<sup>853</sup> *Ibid.*, 79.

to chapter 6, he described it too as structured in 'λόγος (1-6) and counter-λόγος (9-13)'.<sup>854</sup>

Hence, I shall now carefully analyse this block of six antilogies, gradually withdrawing the outmost boundary of the section from chapter 6 to chapter 3, and bringing to light the different meanings which the text reveals each time this shift occurs.

### § 3.2 Chapters 1-5 and 6

From the point of view of structure, the antilogies of chapters 1-6 share a basic five-step pattern which goes essentially as follows: thesis enunciation, thesis arguments, antithesis enunciation, antithesis arguments, conclusion (except in chapter 4, the ending of which we do not possess and chapter 5 which seems to do without it). Yet, as soon as one goes into the contents thus displayed, Kranz's subdivision, which distinguishes the first five chapters, expounding an IT-versus-DT contrast, from the sixth one, which does not, gains interest. Something more can be added to that, though, namely the recurrent logical patterns which ITs and DTs follow in their opposition. This essentially comes down to an IT which states that:

The same  $x$  is  $a$  under  $c$ ,  $\neg a$  under  $d$

(with  $x$  standing for a subject of various nature (mainly state of affairs),  $c$  and  $d$  for different relativizing factors, and  $a$  for an attribute having  $\neg a$  as its mutually exclusive and exhaustive opposite),

and is argued for inductively with illustrative cases. DT rejoins to it by stating this:

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<sup>854</sup> Ibid., 210. Finally, he went so far as to recognise the antilogic structure even in chapter 7, provided one interprets the author's position as 'the counter-λόγος "offices in public and military life should be elective"' (ibid., 218-219). That seems to match Untersteiner's even more extreme claim that this and the two subsequent chapters of the work have a 'forma antilogica', despite the lack of a 'tesi contro tesi' structure (Untersteiner (1954), 183).

$x$  is either  $a$  or  $\neg a$ ,

which the author understands as equivalent, by semantic descent, to  $F(IT)$  ( $F(\dots)$  expresses the predicate ‘...is false’, as opposed to  $T(\dots)$  standing for ‘...is true’). The author arrives at the latter as a necessary consequence of the following *reductio ad absurdum*:

$T(IT) \rightarrow$  The same  $x$  is  $a$  and  $\neg a$ ,

obtained by dropping  $c$  and  $d$ , namely by deploying a fallacy connected to the absolute or the relative use of the same predicate.

Whereas this scheme repeats unvaried in the first four chapters, in the fifth it appears only in § 5.9, where an IT of this kind is stated, and partially in § 5.10, where a DT replies in a similar, but not identical, way, namely:

$T(IT) \rightarrow (a\text{-under-}c \leftrightarrow a\text{-under-}d)$ ,

where, rather than being dropped, the two relativizing factors  $c$  and  $d$  are now emphasized so much as to be embedded by  $a$  and to form two new distinct objects the identity of which IT is, again, accused to absurdly defend.

Granted, some arguments fall out of this logical schematisation (along with all the other ones in chapter 5, see, for example, the mental experiments of §§ 2.18, 26-28, or the poetical excursions of §§ 2.19 and 3.11-12) which nonetheless applies in most cases. Barnes even thought of another rationale for the IT of chapter 3, namely:

‘ $x$  is always  $a/\neg a$ ’ is always false.<sup>855</sup>

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<sup>855</sup> Barnes (1979), 217.

The underlying idea here is that, unlike in the previous ITs, neither the predicate ‘...is *a*’ or ‘...is  $\neg a$ ’ is elliptical of some relativizing clause represented as *c* and *d*. A fitting example of this could be the argument of §§ 3.3-4, where robbing friends and using force against the people dearest to us is presented as just, and contextualizing reasons are then given for it, but not a single word is added about a possible opposing judgement of such conduct as unjust. However, an explanation for this could be that the latter opinion is the one conventionally held about such actions in the vast majority of cases, and it is therefore left understood. If so, then the whole formulation can be seen as a simplification of the ITs scheme identified above rather than a true alternative to it, which, in fact, can be easily brought out in such arguments too, by simply expliciting the implicit second part of the opposition. Furthermore, in two circumstances, the usual pattern turns up in this chapter too, namely in § 3.2, where lying and deceiving are condemned when done to enemies, but accepted in certain cases in which they are done to those dear to us, and in §§ 3-7-8, where robbing a temple is said to be unjust in case of temples which belong to the cities, but just in case of those which are common property of Hellas, when national security is threatened.

If the logical contrast describing the clash between ITs and DTs is the one I have just illustrated, then it is immediately striking how these two positions are not contrasting, let alone contradictory, but compatible. For nothing prevents us from considering, for example, a certain custom beautiful under some condition, ugly under another one (IT), and, at the same time, to oppose one custom which we deem beautiful to another one which we deem ugly (DT).<sup>856</sup> From this angle, both ITs and DTs are sensible and the same applies to the particular DT of § 5.10 too, because considering an action, such as that of speaking, as essentially dependent on the time in which it takes place is a philosophical choice which one may legitimately make. If that is the case, then

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<sup>856</sup> Earlier in the commentary I also observed how a translation of the articulate form of the neuter adjectives in DTs in terms of concepts, such as Robinson’s, makes the two positions even less conflicting; and that, by a principle of linguistic charity towards λόγοι presented as δισσοί, strengthens the case for a translation such as mine.

some scholars' belief that the author must side only with either of the two positions proves unconvincing, also considering how for each thesis for which the author argues, he does not refrain from using phrases stating his own agreement with it, in a way which makes his actual views inscrutable.<sup>857</sup> Another questionable take on this issue is Diels', who even deemed the author so 'talentlose'<sup>858</sup> as not to realize the failure in the way ITs and DTs contrast. This does not do justice to the respectable standard of the author's reflection in chapters 7-9, though, or to what we have been seeing about the thought-out construction of the antilogic chapters. Furthermore, by the same token, criticism may well be advanced against Euthydemus and Dionysodorus too, although no one would be ready to question these characters' intellectual qualities.<sup>859</sup> For it is patent that the philosophical nonsense with which they flood Plato's *Euthydemus* should be taken simply for their eristic effect, namely for one of the results sought by a sophist such as the two brothers and, presumably, our author.

The consistency of chapters 1-5, however, does not boil down just to the same logic underpinning their different arguments, and the author seems to have worked on at least two other levels when producing this cluster of chapters. From a philosophical viewpoint, a Platonic passage, *R.* V.479a-480a, is of particular significance. There, Plato describes a kind of people who reject the existence of qualities in themselves, and yet do not refrain from predicating them of objects of the world. By doing so, they show themselves to have opinions about what they do not actually know, and hence to deserve the title of doxophilists, as opposed to philosophers. Going into such opinions,

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<sup>857</sup> That the author supports DTs has been argued, among the others, in Gomperz (1912), Levi (1940), Dupréel (1948), Untersteiner (1954). This view often hinges around flimsy factors such as DTs coming as second and its defense always occupying more space (which is even false!), as Robinson underscored (Robinson (1979), 73-74). He, instead, saw the author's preference going to ITs, judging them as 'frequently quite acceptable, and easily supportable by evidence', and their arguments as usually better than the others (Robinson (2003), 243). As for the phrases potentially indicating the author's commitment to some view, however, he too acknowledged that what can be made of those is unclear (Robinson (1979), 74).

<sup>858</sup> Diels (1907), 635.

<sup>859</sup> A defense of our author's intellectual qualities is, instead, in Rossetti (1980), 27-41.

Plato recalls those about things that look beautiful, just, and pious under some circumstances, but also ugly, unjust and impious, under others (479a-b); examples clearly reminiscent of the ITs of chapters 1-4.<sup>860</sup> Then, he broadens the range of such judgements showing how not only evaluative predicates, but also empirical ones can be included: things can appear both double and half, great and small, light and heavy (479b). By only relying on opinion, doxophilists are hence bound to equivocate the objects they opine, and they cannot be ‘certain that any of these things exists or does not, either as both or neither’<sup>861</sup> (479c). As a result, ‘the many notions of most people about beauty and the rest are rolling around somewhere between nonexistence and pure existence’<sup>862</sup> (479d). All of this latter extract of Plato mirrors with extreme accuracy §§ 5.3-5, which made me list this parallel among those testifying a second-class influence between *Dissoi Logoi* and ancient Greek authorities. What one can conclude from this comparison is that Plato’s doxophilists unequivocally coincide with the IT upholders of chapters 1-5, and in a way which brings to light a philosophical connection between the ITs of our work, which one would not at first sight suspect. For, granted, chapter 5 breaks with the previous ones by discussing the identity and the difference of opposites which are no longer qualities, but actions by different classes of people. On the other hand, we have just seen how it is also deeply integrated in chapters 1-4, by keeping a brief sketch of the ontological implications of those chapters’ ITs, as well as of its own. Finally, such coincidence can be reasonably explained with our author having been inspired by *R. V.* 479a-480a when composing the first speeches of chapters 1-5: as seen back in the *Introduction*, Plato’s *Republic* is one of the most likely sources of *Dissoi Logoi*.

Earlier, we observed that a philosophical and a dialectico-rhetorical temper characterize the author’s sophistic ideology. It thus would not come as a surprise if in a sample of text which has been proving particularly meaningful in the former respect,

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<sup>860</sup> The parallel with true/false is missing in Plato, but the point he makes is clear enough to embrace this couple, and hence to apply to the IT of chapter 4, as well, just as to any other possible couple of opposites.

<sup>861</sup> Translation from Emlyn-Jones/Preddey (2013), 565.

<sup>862</sup> *Ibid.*

we can now find something associated to the latter too. For chapters 1-5 also exemplify four different rhetorical strategies, which the author must have had in mind during their composition.

Firstly comes the one I label *relativization*, and which concerns the ITs of chapters 1-4. Here the author shows how an issue puts on opposite tones under different circumstances. One can better appreciate the rhetorical efficacy of this strategy if they move from the field of philosophical opposites to that of ordinary life. We can thus imagine, for example, defending our dog from the accusation of being aggressive, highlighting how it barks only at strangers such as the accuser, whereas among the family it is tame and plays with children.

The IT of chapter 5<sup>863</sup> shows *overgeneralization*, namely it makes different issues coincide by cutting out the aspects which differentiate them. This time we could think of another defence of our dog from the same accusation as before, by pointing out how it barks at everyone, passing under silence that it barks joyfully at known people yet threateningly to strangers.

Close to the latter strategy is the one employed by the DT of chapters 1-4, and which I call *absolutization*. It too dispenses with the relativizing clauses which cast opposite lights on an issue, but argues that only either of these lights is acceptable. For example, to the owner who distinguishes between his dog's behaviours with known and unknown people one can counter that the aggressiveness of the dog with strangers should make him seriously worry about leaving it in the company of his family members too.

Lastly, the DT of chapter 5 is based on *overspecification*, that is it exaggerates the importance of some details, ending up multiplying the actual number of matters at hand. A parallel would be to excuse our dog to a passer-by at whom it was snarling, by

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<sup>863</sup> I am here of course excluding § 5.9 which, as said above, leads back to the logical form of chapters 1-4 IT, and which too can be judged as a relativization from a rhetorical perspective.

clarifying that actually the dog was not about to attack him, as he could have thought, because usually when it does so it also lifts its tail.

### § 3.3 Chapters 1-4

We have just had further confirmation of a fact already known, namely that the author has familiarity with the art of speaking, regardless of the fact that he does not expressly name it. Something else in this sense can emerge if we now narrow down our focus to the first four chapters and, more precisely, to their second speeches, in defence of DT. What one sees here is the thought-out repetition of the same sequel of rhetorical steps, namely:

1. New enunciation of DT, after the one in the first paragraph of the chapter (§§ 1.11, 2.21, 3.13, 4.6);
2. Interrogation of the IT upholder and *reductio ad absurdum* of his position by putting him at odds with his own words and deeds (§§ 1.12-13, 2.21, 3.13, 4.6);
3. Absurd consequences that the IT would have in the upholder's judgement about some people (§§ 1.14-15, 2.22, 3.14, 4.6);
4. Review and refutation of some of the IT's arguments (§§ 1.16-17, 2.23-28, 3.15-16, 4.7-9)
5. Conclusion, except in chapter 4 where the final part of the text is missing, and with reference to the untruthfulness of art in chapters 2 and 3 (§§ 1.17, 2.28, 3.17).

It would be excessive to see in (2)-(4) those rhetorical commonplaces (τόποι), namely 'ready-made argument<s> usable in a variety of situations',<sup>864</sup> which according to Cic. *Brut.* XII.46-47 and Quint. *Inst.* III.1.1 Protagoras and Gorgias were the first to treat and which soon became a pivotal aspect of ancient rhetoric. On the other hand, the repetition of the same thread of general topics shows how the author was aware of the contribution of order to the creation and the retention of a speech, which is something already

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<sup>864</sup> Calboli Montefusco in *BNP*, s.v. 'Topics'.



discussed in connection with chapter 9, and which, incidentally, explains the historical affinity between rhetorical and mnemonic τόποι.<sup>865</sup>

#### § 4. A Pyrrhonian sophist?

The division of the antilogic chapters into smaller meaningful subsets has not actually concluded with the previous paragraph. A last group, chapters 1-3, are, in fact, what Barnes calls ‘the first 3 ethical sections’<sup>866</sup> of the treatise and, as anticipated in the *Introduction*, they have a special consideration in manuscripts and first editions of *Dissoi Logoi*. I also already mentioned how scholars observed the similarity of these chapters to Sextus’ *Ethicists*, and, as far as chapter 2 is concerned, S.E. *P.* I and, especially, III should be certainly added, as we will better see later.

That leads me to finally tackle the question, left suspended, about why our work has been attached at the end of Sextus Empiricus’ codices; a fact which, as I noted earlier, was not perfectly clear to the copyists themselves at some stage of the text’s transmission, judging from the comment ζητεῖται δὲ εἰ καὶ τὸ παρὸν σύγγραμμα Σέξτειόν ἐστιν in all manuscripts’ superscription. And, truthfully, at first sight, one may sympathize with them, given the author’s sophistic ideology seen in the previous paragraph. His clear-cut political stand in chapter 7; his profession of omniscience and his promotion both of rhetoric and of an inquiry into the nature of things, in chapter 8; finally, his faith in the potentiality of mnemonics, and his instruction of how it works: all that is inevitably at odds with Sextus’ suspension of judgement, with his tranquil avoidance of inquiring into the reality underlying man’s contrasting appearances, and with his suspicion of anyone claiming to have a knowledge to impart. In this connection, Fabricius stressed the anti-sceptical character of the text so much as to conjecture the

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<sup>865</sup> See Blum (1969), 53-54.

<sup>866</sup> Barnes (1979), 217.

Stoic Sextus of Chaeronea as its true author, and supposed that a mistake in copying his name caused the misplacement of *Dissoi Logoi* at the end of Sextus Empiricus.<sup>867</sup>

On the other hand, a few scholars spotted a sceptical vein in chapters 1-6, almost all of them without questioning the sophistic nature of the work either.<sup>868</sup> In particular, S.E. P. I.12 straightforwardly claims that ‘the main basic principle of the Sceptic system is that of opposing to every proposition an equal proposition; for we believe that as a consequence of this we end by ceasing to dogmatize’.<sup>869</sup> Whether one agrees with me about the author’s conceiving his contrasting speeches as equipollent, or not, as Robinson,<sup>870</sup> a compiler, especially if not very knowledgeable about philosophy, ‘could be forgiven for seeing an affinity between this view and the doctrine of equipollence that so characterises the writings of Sextus’ and for tying the two texts together, as Robinson himself acknowledged.<sup>871</sup> In this hypothesis, the association would have been made simply on the basis of their common practice of arguing on both sides of a given issue, and would hence have had a certain degree of fortuitousness. For by the same token, the same compiler may well have attached *Dissoi Logoi* to works from other later schools of thought, which shared the same technique, such as the Peripatos (Aristotle himself is reported to have introduced it, see Cic. *Orat.* XIV.46), the Academy (see *de Orat.* III.107-108, *Att.* II.3.3, *Acad.* II.7-8; Arcesilas and Carneades stood out in this, see *de Orat.* III.79-80, *Acad.* I.46, *Fin.* V.10-11), or the empirical school of medicine (Dionysius

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<sup>867</sup> Fabricius (1724), 617.

<sup>868</sup> Giacomo Leopardi first detected the pro and contra form of the starting chapters as typical of ‘esercitazioni scettiche’ (*Zibaldone di pensieri*, 21 June 1823); later he doubted the authenticity of the work, yet (*Ibid.*, 10 March 1829). The sceptical reading can be found also in Bergk (1883), 120, Schanz (1884), 372, Teichmüller (1884), 114-115, Weber (1897), 34, Dumont (1969), 232, Robinson (1996), 35-36, Burnyeat (1998), Bailey (2008), 261-263.

<sup>869</sup> Bury (1976), 9.

<sup>870</sup> See *supra*, 282, n. 857.

<sup>871</sup> Robinson (1996), 35. After all, Gregory of Nazianzus himself proves to have made this equation, when writing this: ‘ever since the Sextuses and the Pyrrhos and the practice of arguing to opposites have, like a vile and malignant disease, infected the churches, babbling has been regarded as culture and — as the Book of Acts says of the Athenians — we spend our whole time in speaking or listening to some novelty or other. (Oratio 21, caput 12, PG 35, col. 1095)’ (translation from Floridi (2002), 12). A contemporary example of such judgement comes from Dumont, who spoke of ‘deux thèses contraires, à la façon de Protagoras [...] ou des Sceptiques’ (Dumont (1969), 232).

of Aegae's Δικτυακά, see Phot. *Bibl.* 185,211), had he just found himself with their texts instead of those of Sextus.

However, other *Dissoi Logoi* features took on a considerable significance over the long arc of Pyrrhonism, whose Sextus Empiricus is famously our main source. The contrast in Greece among those who philosophize (των φιλοσοφοῦντων...τοὶ μὲν...τοὶ δέ...), with which the work starts off in § 1.1 and which involves the ITs and the DTs of chapters 1-4, recalls the notion of διαφωνία ('disagreement') to which the first Mode of Agrippa is devoted (S.E. *P.* I.178).<sup>872</sup> Both chapters 1 and 6 end with what Sextus calls ἐποχή ('suspension of judgement', *P.* I.5 *et passim*), the former underscoring the author's silence on the nature of the good thing, the latter refraining from concluding in favour of the teachability of wisdom and excellence, although all the arguments in support of their unteachability have been refuted. Finally, that it is essential for a man's success to know the nature of things (§ 8.1-2) and that indeterminateness is their nature (§ 5.5) were two of Pyrrho's tenets too. More broadly, the possibility that sophists 'provided the materials exploited most conspicuously but by no means exclusively by the later Sceptics'<sup>873</sup> has been illustrated by Striker. Exemplary of that is the case of the Anonymous author of MXG who, according to Jaap Mansfeld, was a Neo-Pyrrhonist already acquainted with Agrippa's thought and reasonably interested in Gorgias' *On What is Not*.<sup>874</sup>

Furthermore, looking back at the list of parallels between *Dissoi Logoi* and ancient authorities,<sup>875</sup> in five out of the eight cases involving Sextus Empiricus' works, no other author is included, and in two of these five, the influences are of second class (chapter 5 and S.E. *M.* XI.197-209; § 5.14 and S.E. *P.* II.215, III.109, *M.* IV.25, X.323).<sup>876</sup> Hence, albeit

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<sup>872</sup> Similarly, Gisela Striker examined MXG 979a14-21 and observed that 'by playing out one philosopher's arguments against those of another, Gorgias produced what the later Pyrrhonist skeptics would call a διαφωνία: a set of conflicting theses each backed by argument' (Striker (1996), 12).

<sup>873</sup> Striker (1996), 20. On the links between sophistic and scepticism see also Pullman (1994).

<sup>874</sup> Mansfeld (1988).

<sup>875</sup> See *supra*, 27-29.

<sup>876</sup> On the definition of the two classes, see *supra*, 27.

the possibility of a lost common source cannot be excluded, there is a good chance that an intellectual borrowing occurred between Sextus and our author, which comparison of their chronologies also shows to have gone from the latter to the former and not the other way around, like in all other cases of influence examined. If that is the case, then the fact that the text of *Dissoi Logoi* remained close to Sextus' corpus up to its manuscript transmission can be explained, more than with the questionable choice of a later compiler, with the fact that Sextus used, and hence accessed, our work. After all, he may have not been the first Pyrrhonist to be interested in this text, as I shall now show.

We already saw that D.L. IX.106 informs us of a writing *Περὶ διττῶν λόγων* composed by a sceptic called Zeuxis, and how this testimony counted as textual grounds for Weber to introduce 'Dissoi Logoi' as the new title of our work. It is now opportune to supplement that with the further information which Diogenes adds about Zeuxis, but which neither Weber nor Burnyeat, who more recently flagged up Zeuxis in connection with *Dissoi Logoi*, fully observed.<sup>877</sup> In the same Diogenes Laertius passage, in fact, Zeuxis is said also to be a friend of Aenesidemus and, just like him, to 'hold to phenomena alone'.<sup>878</sup> At IX.116, then, both Aenesidemus and Zeuxis appear within the legacy of Timon's pupils. More precisely we read that 'Aenesidemus of Cnossus, the compiler of eight books of Pyrrhonian discourses [...] was the instructor of Zeuxippus his fellow-citizen, he of Zeuxis of the angular foot'.<sup>879</sup> Hence, Zeuxis and Aenesidemus' above philosophical agreement is explained here with the indirect transmission of the latter's teachings to the former *via* Zeuxippus.

What this kind of teaching was like is another element of knowledge within our reach. As Bett put it, Aenesidemus was the starter 'of anything we could call a Pyrrhonian tradition' around three centuries after Pyrrho.<sup>880</sup> His brand of Pyrrhonism was yet different both from that of the origins and, especially, from the late one of Sextus

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<sup>877</sup> Cf. Weber (1897), 34, n. 1, Burnyeat (1998), 107.

<sup>878</sup> Hicks (1925), 517.

<sup>879</sup> *Ibid.*, 527.

<sup>880</sup> Bett (2000), 191.

Empiricus who, nonetheless, provides us with precious reconstructions of his thought. Our most conspicuous source for Aenesidemus is, however, Phot. *Bibl.* 169b18-170b35 which furnishes an account of how the Pyrrhonist behaves, which boils down to two fundamental points. Firstly, he ‘determines absolutely nothing, not even this very claim that nothing is determined’<sup>881</sup> (170a11-12). Secondly, though he is ‘free of all doctrine’<sup>882</sup> (169b41), Aenesidemus’ Pyrrhonist can nonetheless hold and express views on certain issues, unlike Sextus Empiricus’ one. An example of this is given at 170a1-3, where Pyrrhonists are said to maintain that things ‘are no more of this kind than of that, or that they are sometimes of this kind, sometimes not, or that for one person they are of this kind, for another person not of this kind, and for another person not even existent at all’.<sup>883</sup> In Bett’s words, ‘things are not *invariably F*’,<sup>884</sup> but ‘sometimes *F*, sometimes not-*F*, and *F* for one person, not-*F* for another, and non-existent for a third’.<sup>885</sup> The same stress on ‘the relativity of phenomena, or their variability with circumstances’<sup>886</sup> emerges also from Diogenes Laertius’ account of the ten Modes of suspension of judgement (D.L. IX.78-88) which, just as Sextus (P. I.346), he traced back to Aenesidemus.

With this in mind, it is not far-fetched to suppose that if an Aenesidemean Pyrrhonist such as Zeuxis had access to the book of *Dissoi Logoi*, he could find the ITs of chapters 1-4 to his liking, as they consist entirely in relativized assertions of that same kind.<sup>887</sup> It is also worth assessing the possibility, just briefly sketched by Burnyeat, that the διττοὶ λόγοι about which Zeuxis seems to have written from his work’s title, were those constituting the first six antilogic chapters of our work.<sup>888</sup> At first sight, this

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<sup>881</sup> Translation from Long/Sedley (1987), 469.

<sup>882</sup> Ibid.

<sup>883</sup> Ibid.

<sup>884</sup> Bett (2000), 195.

<sup>885</sup> Ibid., 194

<sup>886</sup> Ibid., 209

<sup>887</sup> Cf. *supra*, 279.

<sup>888</sup> Burnyeat (1998).

identification can sound fanciful, because the exercise of contrasting two opposing arguments on the same topic is attested both before *Dissoi Logoi*'s time, with Protagoras, and after it, with the aforementioned Hellenistic philosophers, as well as because one cannot rule out that the διττοὶ λόγοι about which Zeuxis wrote were his own. However, for what our available literary evidence is worth, the only other occurrence of the phrase δισσοὶ λόγοι beside *Dissoi Logoi*, is a cursory appearance in Fr. TGF 189 from Euripides' *Antiope*.<sup>889</sup> Furthermore, Aenesidemean relativism, based on opposite attributes predicated of the same subject under different conditions, which I have just sketched can be traced only in *Dissoi Logoi*'s antilogies and in those of Protagoras (Pl. *Prt.* 334a-c). Yet, one can observe how *Dissoi Logoi*, especially if we agree on the dating of it for which I have been arguing, is far closer in time to Pyrrho than Protagoras, and that could make it a more attractive reading for someone who was looking into the figure of Pyrrho. Finally, Aenesidemus came from Crete and by being able to speak Aegean Doric κοινή, one of the dialects which I previously associated to *Dissoi Logoi*, he could have a facilitated access to our work. If that was the case, it is also possible that he read it, deemed it an interesting testimony of ancient relativism for his own reflections on the subject,<sup>890</sup> and hence introduced it into his philosophical circle where Zeuxis could have known it.

At this point, we have reached two conclusions. The first is that Sextus Empiricus is likely to have drawn on *Dissoi Logoi*, which also explains the latter's manuscript collocation. The second, and more speculative, is that Zeuxis too may have accessed our work and made use of it. Granted, these two points are distinct both logically and as far as their degree of probability is concerned. Nonetheless, a hypothesis is worth exploring, which can coherently account for both of them, and also tell us more about those Sextus passages in which the debt to *Dissoi Logoi* is more visible, and on which I just touched when opening this section.

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<sup>889</sup> ἐκ παντὸς ἂν τις πράγματος δισσωὺν λόγων / ἀγῶνα θεῖτ' ἂν, εἰ λέγειν εἴη σοφός.

<sup>890</sup> See also Bury (1976), xxxvii.

To begin this exploration, we firstly need to recall two facts. In the first place, although Sextus is another source for Aenesidemus' thought, we lost the writings on which he based himself to reconstruct the latter. Secondly, it has been observed how the places of Sextus' work in which Aenesidemus' Pyrrhonism seems to emerge more decidedly are not as much those in which Aenesidemus is expressly referred to, as other implicit ones in which Sextus' scepticism takes turns so unexpected as to suggest that another kind of Pyrrhonism is in action.<sup>891</sup> In particular, Sextus' ethical writings 'have retained much more pervasive signs of Aenesidemean heritage than his writings on other subjects'.<sup>892</sup> A first example is the treatment of the tenth Mode of suspension of judgement, devoted to the variation in the laws and customs of peoples. Usually, in Sextus the Modes end by inviting the Pyrrhonist 'to suspend judgement as to the real nature of the objects' of which appearances are given.<sup>893</sup> This occurs with the tenth too (P. I.145-163), but with a characteristic additional 'emphasis on relativity'<sup>894</sup> which, in fact, enables the Pyrrhonist to opine at least about what belongs to an object 'in respect of this particular rule of conduct, or law, or habit, and so on with each of the rest' (I.163).<sup>895</sup>

On the same wavelength is P.III, whose second and ethical part is concerned, among the rest, with the question of whether something by nature good or bad exists. From a methodological point of view, Bett rightly points out as striking that here the author does not opt for contrasting arguments *pro* and *contra* 'the general proposition that there exist things that are by nature good or bad', in his usual oppositional fashion.<sup>896</sup> He, instead, displays 'a multitude of conflicting positions concerning what things are by nature good or bad',<sup>897</sup> and the immediate conclusion he draws from them

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<sup>891</sup> Cf. Bett (2000), 207-213, Bett (2010), 182-186.

<sup>892</sup> Ibid., 186.

<sup>893</sup> Bett (2000), 208.

<sup>894</sup> Ibid.

<sup>895</sup> Bury (1976), 93.

<sup>896</sup> Bett (2010), 182.

<sup>897</sup> Ibid.

is that there are no such things (cf. 179, 182, 190). That too strays from normal Sextus, in two respects. Firstly, it assumes a principle, which Bett called ‘invariability condition’,<sup>898</sup> and which at *M. VIII.8* Sextus himself admits comes from Aenesidemus, phrasing it as follows: ‘some of them [sc. ‘things’] appear to all men in common, others to one person separately, and of these such as appear to all in common are true, and the other sort false’.<sup>899</sup> As Bett recalls, ‘except in *Against the Ethicists*, the book that espouses an essentially Aenesidemean outlook, Sextus shows no sign of accepting the invariability condition; nor would one expect him to accept it – it would surely look to him like a dogmatic philosophical view’.<sup>900</sup> Secondly, the conclusion Sextus formulates is clearly a negatively dogmatic assertion, which, again, seems as far from him as expectable of Aenesidemus, who at *Phot. Bibl. 170b3-35* is described as denying the existence of signs, causes and ends, as well as the possibility for man to grasp concepts such as those of the world, gods, the nature of things, and of their causes.<sup>901</sup> Finally, suspicion surrounds the logical step which Sextus makes from this negative assertion to the conclusion of *P. III* on this issue, namely that ‘the Sceptic, seeing so great diversity of usages, suspends judgement as to the natural existence of anything good or bad’<sup>902</sup> (*III.235*). Refraining again from his usual oppositional method, Sextus does not come to this point by contrasting the negative view with its opposite ‘something is by nature good or bad’. On the contrary, at 182 he attempts to justify the move with a short line of reasoning, which, yet, lacks persuasiveness,<sup>903</sup> and seems designed just to tie together assertions reflecting two different kinds of Pyrrhonism.<sup>904</sup>

If in the case just examined suspension of judgement is grounded on shaky premises, in *Against the Ethicists* (*S.E. M. XI*), earlier touched on and sketched as the most

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<sup>898</sup> Bett (2000), 196 *et passim*.

<sup>899</sup> Bury (1967), 243.

<sup>900</sup> Bett (2000), 216.

<sup>901</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 197, 233.

<sup>902</sup> Bury (1976), 483.

<sup>903</sup> Bett (2010), 183-184.

<sup>904</sup> Cf. also *ibid.*, 183-185.



Aenesidemean of Sextus' books, it fails altogether. For here the sceptic's goal of ἀταραξία extraordinarily emerges straight from the acceptance of this 'definitive negative conclusion':<sup>905</sup> 'when reasoning has established that none of these things is good by nature or evil by nature, we shall have a release from perturbation and there will await us a peaceful life'<sup>906</sup> (M. XI.130; cf. also 118, 140).<sup>907</sup> The same book also features acceptance of relativized assertions (114, 118), commitment to the invariability condition (69-71), and another unambiguously negative answer at the end of the chapter inquiring whether an art of life exists or not (215).<sup>908</sup>

In summary, *P. I.*145-163, *P. III*, and *M. XI* reflect Aenesidemus' Pyrrhonism rather than that of their author. But what matters more to us is that, looking at the two lists of parallels between our work and ancient authorities again, a good five out of the eight portions of *Dissoi Logoi* paralleled with Sextus' texts (§ 2.5, §§ 2.9-17, chapter 5, § 5.14, chapter 6) corresponds to passages belonging to those three Sextus sections, three being the cases of first-class influence (§ 2.5, §§ 2.9-17, chapter 6), two being those of second-class influence (chapter 5, § 5.14). Also, the only three cases where relevant amounts of text from both works are paralleled involve precisely those three Sextus sections (§§ 2.9-17 and *P. III*.199-234; chapter 5 and *M. XI*.197-209; chapter 6 and *M. XI*.216-257). As a result, the passages in Sextus where Aenesidemus' thought stands out the most are also the closest ones to *Dissoi Logoi*.

Besides strengthening the case, already made, for the interest which an Aenesidemean Pyrrhonist like Zeuxis could have had in *Dissoi Logoi*, these outcomes may also suggest that Aenesidemean Pyrrhonism played a part in the relation between *Dissoi Logoi* and Sextus. More precisely, Sextus may have discovered *Dissoi Logoi* within that body of materials on Aenesidemus in which our work could have ended up, due to the said interest of Aenesidemean Pyrrhonists for it. Among the other writings of that

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<sup>905</sup> Bett (2000), 212.

<sup>906</sup> Bury (1968), 449.

<sup>907</sup> Cf. Bett (2000), 212, Bett (2010), 184.

<sup>908</sup> Cf. Bett (2000), 212-213, Bett (2010), 185-186.

same collection, all of which now lost, Sextus may have found Zeuxis' Περί διττῶν λόγων too. If this work did deal with *Dissoi Logoi*, on it Sextus could have drawn some of the ideas which make his *P.* I.145-163, *P.* III, and *M.* XI an expanded and Aenesidemean treatment of what some passages of our work originally said.

## 5. Conclusion

At the end of his entry ‘Dissoi Logoi’ for *The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Burnyeat warned that ‘sober readers will suspend judgement on every question about the work’.<sup>909</sup> I believe that with this thesis the range of this *caveat* has shrunk, and that concerning a few issues related to this work new reconstructions emerge which, although they do not meet the criterium of certainty which Burnyeat’s ‘sober reader’ might require, should, nonetheless, be welcomed by a scholar in ancient philosophy, as they are more grounded than those that the standard view on *Dissoi Logoi* has maintained so far.

In particular, the idea that the work is to be dated between the 5<sup>th</sup> and the 4<sup>th</sup> century BCE — to which its presence in Diels and Kranz’s collection of Presocratics earlier, and in Laks and Most’s edition of the early Greek philosophers now, is due — must be reconsidered. The numerous and strong similarities between *Dissoi Logoi* and the works of Plato and Isocrates suggest that our author was influenced by them. Combining the date of Isocrates’ *Aeropagiticus* with a reference to what the author calls ‘the most recent’ of the wars in Greek history, in § 1.8, I moved the date of composition to 355-338 BCE.

Fewer indications have surfaced about the geographical provenance of the text. But in this case too, the usual preference for Western regions of the Doric-speaking world, such as Sicily and Southern Italy, has turned out not to convince on linguistic grounds, as careful analysis of this dialect makes think of an Eastern form of Doric κοινή.

The sophistic nature of the author is confirmed, whereas both the idea of the text as a collection of lecture-notes and that of a didactic goal conflict with its style and with an internal unity which one may easily fail to see on first reading, but which starts to

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<sup>909</sup> Burnyeat (1998), 107.

emerge as soon as one focuses on chapter 8. Here the author showcases a series of sophistic abilities which his customers may have been interested to acquire, and samples of which may be recognised in the previous seven chapters. Chapters 1-8 hence look as a promotional essay followed by an incomplete treatise of mnemonics, chapter 9. These two writings are likely to belong to the same author, but can hardly have made part of the same work.

Finally, *Dissoi Logoi*'s collocation at the end of Sextus Empiricus' manuscripts is now strengthened by some new theoretical connections. The aforementioned comparison with parallel texts which has revealed our author's intellectual debts, here leads to the conclusion that *Dissoi Logoi* was read by Sextus, and likely by Zeuxis too: for the Aenesidemean kind of Pyrrhonism which seems to have belonged to this 1<sup>st</sup>-century BCE figure, to whom the only possible literary testimony of our work may also be associated, is the version of Pyrrhonism which suits *Dissoi Logoi*'s relativism the best.

To conclude, *Dissoi Logoi* seems to be the work of a 4<sup>th</sup>-century sophist imbued with a literary and philosophical culture of the past, and who held knowledge, including knowledge, in the highest esteem, considering it even as the essential basis of a true democracy.

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